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Abstract 
There is a growing consensus that the current energy system we rely on is fundamentally 
unsustainable and that it will have to be transformed if we are to continue to satisfy our 
energy needs in the future. At present we have a poor understanding of the role that the 
development and implementation of innovative business models, designed to satisfy our 
energy needs in a sustainable manner, could play in facilitating a transition to a sustainable 
energy system. To improve this understanding, this thesis develops an analytical framework 
that integrates co-evolutionary and business model theories, and applies this framework to 
analyse the case of the Energy Service Company (ESCo) business model and the wider UK 
energy system. 
The thesis begins by presenting the core characteristics of the ESCo business model and its key 
variants; its strengths and weaknesses; and the factors that have constrained and enabled the 
uptake of this sustainable business model. It then examines the coevolutionary relationship 
the ESCo model shares with the UK energy system to explain not only why the model has 
struggled to gain traction, compared to the incumbent Energy Utility company (EUCo) model, 
but also the role the ESCo model could play in a transition to a sustainable UK energy system. 
In light of the empirical investigation, the research finds that the development and adoption of 
the ESCo business model could play a valuable role in facilitating transitions to sustainable 
energy systems. However, it is likely to struggle to gain traction due to ESCos’ poor fitness with 
the prevailing selection environment, which can in part be attributed to the causal influence of 
the unsustainable, incumbent EUCo model. Conversely, worsening ecosystem crises, the 
introduction of supportive regulation and positive feedbacks associated with the adoption of 
this model by new and incumbent system actors could help the ESCo model to proliferate and 
thus, have an important influence on the transition to a sustainable energy system. 
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1 Framing the Energy Challenge: The Pressing Need for a 
Transition to a Sustainable Energy System 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis examines how the implementation of innovative business models, designed to 
satisfy our energy needs in a more environmentally and economically sustainable manner than 
incumbent business models, could help to facilitate transitions to sustainable energy system 
states. This line of enquiry has been adopted because even though such models already exist 
in niche applications, little research to date has explored the reasons why novel, sustainable 
energy business models have failed to proliferate. Furthermore, little is known about how the 
wide-scale uptake of novel sustainable energy business models might influence the wider 
energy system and crucially, how important their role could be in facilitating a transition to a 
sustainable energy system. 
Why ask these questions now?  The international and UK national energy system has in recent 
years begun to exhibit signs of being fundamentally unsustainable, as energy security has 
waned and energy prices have risen. Furthermore, the energy system constitutes a major 
emitter of greenhouse gases (GHGs) and consequently an important contributor to 
anthropogenic climate change, the effects of which could be devastating for the human race. 
As such there is a pressing need to identify a means of moving towards an alternative energy 
system that enables us to fulfil our basic human needs (e.g. hygiene, nutrition, warmth etc) in 
a more sustainable manner than offered by the incumbent system. To help illustrate what 
characteristics such a sustainable energy system might exhibit, we draw upon Nakicenovic and 
Grubler’s (2000) research to outline how such a system would operate as a means to: 
 provide the means and capabilities for present and future generations to satisfy their 
basic needs, as well as present them with the opportunity to make choices about their 
lives, beyond the fulfilment of these basic needs 
 provide present and future generations with the capacity to adapt to changing social, 
economic and environmental conditions 
 avoid catastrophic events and irreversible changes that threaten the life support 
functions of the earth 
In this introductory chapter we outline the scale of the ‘energy challenge’ facing the global 
community, focusing in particular on key sustainability issues relating to climate change, as 
well as energy insecurity and affordability. Subsequently, we focus in particular on (1) how this 
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challenge has affected the UK, (2) the ways in which the UK government has sought to address 
these issues through coordinating the activities of key energy stakeholders and (3) the 
effectiveness of this response in addressing this challenge. We then discuss the potential 
importance of sustainable energy business models in facilitating a transition towards a 
sustainable energy system, outlining how further research in this area would make a valuable 
contribution to the sustainability transitions literature and in doing so, helping to make the 
case for the project reported here.  
Subsequently, we introduce the Energy Service Company (ESCo) business model, which forms 
the unit of analysis for this research considering that it has come to be considered by a number 
of scholars as one that constitutes a significantly more environmentally and economically 
sustainable way of fulfilling our energy needs (Fawkes, 2007, Marino et al., 2011, Vine, 2005, 
Hansen, 2009) even though it has enjoyed only niche applications in the UK to date. In 
contrast, the incumbent Energy Utility Company (EUCo) model remains dominant despite 
major concerns having been raised in relation to its own sustainability credentials (Eyre, 2008, 
Steinberger et al., 2009, York and Kuschler, 2011). Drawing on these insights we identify the 
key research questions this thesis seeks to answer, with the view of ultimately improving our 
understanding of the role the ESCo model is likely to play in the transition to a sustainable UK 
energy system.  Finally, we outline the overall structure of the thesis. 
1.2 The Global Energy Dilemma 
Globally we are facing a triumvirate of energy related challenges that together pose not only a 
threat to the welfare of the human population but also to the health of our natural 
environment. These challenges include growing energy insecurity, the rising cost of energy 
services (and the associated increasing incidence of fuel poverty) and the effects of climate 
change and environmental degradation, which have recently been referred to as the ‘energy 
trilemma’ (WEC, 2011, E.On, 2012). We proceed to explore each of these and the threat they 
represent. 
1.2.1 Climate Change 
Climate change has steadily come to be recognised by the international community as a 
serious threat to the welfare of the humankind, as mounting evidence indicates that the 
release of anthropogenic GHGs into the atmosphere will lead to an increase in global average 
surface temperatures, the contraction of snow and ice cover, rising sea levels, a greater 
frequency of extreme weather events (e.g. flooding, droughts etc) and significant changes in 
precipitation levels for different areas (IPCC, 2007a). These climatic perturbations are likely to 
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undermine the integrity of the various ecosystems humans rely on to survive, which are for 
instance likely to lead to major disruptions to both food and water supply. 
Today we are extremely reliant on the combustion of fossil fuels to obtain the necessary 
energy to satisfy a broad range of our human needs. For instance, in 2010 approximately 87% 
of global primary energy consumption was sourced from coal, gas and oil (BP, 2012). The 
release of CO2 from the combustion of fossil fuels has been identified as the largest source of 
anthropogenic GHG emissions and thus a key driver of climate change. For example in 2004, 
56.6% of anthropogenic emissions were made-up of CO2 from fossil fuel use (IPCC, 
2007b)(Figure 1.1). As illustrated by Figure 1.2 (IEA, 2012b), the energy supply sector 
represents the largest emitting sector, contributing to 25.9% of global GHG emissions in 2004 
(IPCC, 2007b). The combustion of fossil fuels has also been linked to other adverse 
environmental effects, such as air pollution attributable to the release of gases such as sulphur 
dioxide and nitrogen oxide (Skea et al., 2011), which have also been associated with ecosystem 
degradation. 
 
Figure 1.1 Global anthropogenic GHG emissions in 2004 (IPCC, 2007b) 
Figure 1.2 Global GHG emissions by sector in 2004 (IPCC, 2007b) 
1.2.2 Energy Insecurity 
As outlined in Section 1.2.1, globally we are extremely reliant on fossil fuels to satisfy our 
energy needs, however reserves of these fuels are finite. Furthermore, levels of energy 
consumption have risen dramatically in recent decades and this trend is expected to continue. 
For instance, global primary energy consumption increased by a factor of 20 since the middle 
of the nineteenth century (Nakicenovic and Grubler, 2000) and if the current trend of energy 
consumption continues, by 2030 global energy consumption is expected to have increased by a 
further 39%, compared to 2010 levels (BP, 2012). Together these developments mean that we 
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are fast approaching a time at which we will be unable to satisfy global levels of energy 
demand by continuing to rely on fossil fuel derived energy. This has resulted in a drive towards 
identifying alternative methods to source fossil fuels in order to address this looming gap 
between supply and demand, such as hydraulic fracturing for shale gas and deep-sea oil 
extraction. However, many of these represent relatively immature forms of fossil fuel 
extraction, which have proven in recent years to be potentially hazardous, as illustrated by the 
shale-gas ‘fracking’ induced earthquakes in Blackpool (Green et al., 2012) and the Deep Water 
Horizon incident in the Gulf of Mexico (NOAA, 2012). Furthermore, even if we assume that 
these technologies will ultimately be successful, they still represent only a short-term solution 
because fossil fuels represent a finite resource. Consequently, if we remain reliant on fossil 
fuels, energy insecurity will grow once again in the future as the availability of these reserves 
once again diminishes.  
In addition to this, energy security is closely aligned with the stability of geopolitical 
relationships between net energy importer and exporter nations. Political instability within or 
between such nations is not normally conducive to energy security as these tend to lead to 
volatility in the energy markets and in some cases, significant disruptions in energy supply. For 
example, the Yom Kippur war and the Iranian revolution played an important role in the 
emergence of the global energy crises in the 1970s (BP, 2011, Thomas, 1996). Political 
instability and strained geopolitical relations between key energy importer and exporters 
continue to exist today, as illustrated by the recent Iraq war and sanctions imposed again Iran. 
It is expected that similar developments are likely to emerge in the future, considering that ‘as 
oil and gas become more expensive and scarce, boundary disputes in resource-rich areas rise 
in importance’ (Renner, 2006 p.58), thus placing further strain on the energy security of 
nations that are reliant on imports in the future. 
These examples serve to illustrate the scale of the energy security challenge we face, 
consequently underlining the need to utilise a wider range of energy sources and implement 
energy efficiency measures in order to reduce our reliance on these finite energy reserves.  
1.2.3 Affordability of Energy Services 
Alongside the growing scarcity of fossil fuels we have witnessed large increases in some energy 
prices in recent years. Figure 1.3 illustrates this global trend and how since the late-1990s 
energy prices have broadly increased. Heinberg (2011) explains that the era of cheap, easy 
energy is over and that this can in part be explained by the growing scarcity of fossil fuels, 
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encapsulated by the era of Peak Oil1. These price rises have had the effect of making some 
energy services sufficiently expensive that some consumers will find it difficult to afford to 
fulfil many of their basic human needs associated with access to energy (e.g. nutrition, 
warmth, hygiene). 
 
Figure 1.3  Total energy real end-use price index for industry and households (IEA, 2012b) 
To summarize, there is mounting evidence to indicate that the global energy system is 
exhibiting signs of being fundamentally unsustainable when we consider the mounting 
challenges of energy insecurity, rising energy prices and climate change. These developments 
have led to a call from both environmental groups (e.g. Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth) and 
numerous national governments (e.g. European Union, Australia, Japan etc) to move away 
from this system towards a fundamentally more sustainable one, which is considerably less 
reliant on the combustion of fossil fuels than the present energy system. Having outlined these 
challenges globally, we now turn to the UK to explore how it has been affected by these 
developments, as well as the ways in which key energy stakeholders have sought to address 
these challenges and the level of success the UK has had in doing so. 
1.3 The UK’s Energy Dilemma  
The UK has broadly been subject to the same triumvirate of issues outlined in the previous 
section, consequently having an important bearing UK energy policy (Figure 1.4):  
‘We face two long-term energy challenges [in the UK]: (1) tackling climate change by 
reducing carbon dioxide emissions…and (2) ensuring secure, clean and affordable 
energy as we become increasingly dependent on imported fuel’ (DTI, 2007 p.6) 
                                                          
1 Peak Oil ‘is a term that summarizes the concept that the production of crude oil —as well as 
that of most finite resources in a market economy  grows, reaches a maximum (peak),and then 
gradually declines to zero’ (Bardi, 2009 p.323) 
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These pressures have placed a significant pressure on the UK government to initiate a radical 
transformation of its energy system in order to address these issues: 
‘In Britain, as our own reserves in the North Sea decline, we have a choice: replace 
them with ever-increasing imports, be subject to price fluctuations and disturbances in 
the world market and stick with high carbon; or make the necessary transition to low 
carbon, [which is] right for climate change, energy security and jobs’ (HMG, 2009 p.v) 
 
Figure 1.4 Triumvirate of UK energy dilemmas and policy solutions (DECC, 2012e) 
In this section we outline how these issues have manifested themselves in the UK and briefly 
describe the approach the UK government has adopted to tackle these. We outline the 
progress the UK has so far made in addressing these challenges and crucially, that change is 
not currently happening at the rate required to ensure these long-term energy challenges are 
addressed in a timely manner. Consequently, in the subsequent section we identify one 
particular area of innovation that could help to accelerate the transition to a more sustainable 
energy system: the development and implementation of novel business models, designed to 
satisfy our energy needs in a sustainable manner. 
1.3.1 Carbon Intensity of Energy System 
1.3.1.1 Current Situation 
As has been the case globally, the UK’s energy supply sector represents the single largest 
contributor to the UK’s anthropogenic GHG emissions, accounting for approximately 40% of 
total emissions in 2011 (DECC, 2012b) (Figure 1.5). This can also be attributed to the UK’s 
dependence on fossil fuels to satisfy its energy needs, with gas and coal accounting for 
approximately 70% of the UK’s electricity generation in 2011 (DECC, 2012i) (Figure 1.6). 
Consequently the energy sector has become a focal point for government policy designed to 
drive decarbonisation. 
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Figure 1.5 Carbon dioxide emissions by source, 1990-2011 (DECC, 2012b)
2
 
 
Figure 1.6 Electricity Generation Mix for 2011 (DECC, 2012i) 
1.3.1.2 Progress Towards Decarbonisation 
In 2008 the UK introduced the Climate Change Act, which mandated the government to 
achieve a 34% reduction in UK Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions by 2020 and an 80% 
reduction by 2050, compared to 1990 levels (Crown, 2008 p.509). These reductions are 
enforced through a series of carbon budgets, set up to 15 years in advance, which are designed 
to help the UK meet its 2020 and 2050 GHG reduction targets (Figure 1.7).  
                                                          
2 Data for 2011 is provisional 
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Figure 1.7 Indicative annual percentage emissions reductions required to meet the legislated carbon 
budgets (CCC, 2012a) 
As part of the strategy to decarbonise the energy system and achieve these targets, the UK 
government has sought to improve the efficiency of the UK’s energy conversion, distribution, 
and transmission infrastructure, as well as encourage changes to user practices, which are 
both concomitant with reducing energy consumption (Section 5.4). Efficiency measures are 
especially important considering that fossil fuels are likely to remain an important part of the 
UK’s energy mix for the foreseeable future and so a reduction in energy consumption will 
equate to a reduction in fossil fuel consumption (HMG, 2010). One example of a government 
policy designed to promote energy efficiency are the ‘ambitious minimum performance 
requirements (in terms of carbon emissions) for new buildings were introduced in 2010 and 
will be gradually made stricter so that by 2016, all new-built dwellings will be zero-carbon’ 
(IEA, 2012a p.13). Obligations on energy suppliers to reduce the carbon emissions associated 
with their domestic energy supply represent another example (Section 5.4).  
The UK’s overall energy efficiency levels for households improved by 14.4% between 2000 and 
2009 (Odyssee, 2012). This increase can in part be attributed to major improvements in 
household energy efficiency level where between April 2008 and 2012 an extra 47% of homes 
were fitted with loft insulation and another 31% with cavity wall insulation  (DECC, 2012v)3 
(Figure 1.8). However, to date only 2% of homes with wall cavities had been fitted with solid 
wall insulation (DECC, 2012j). These statistics reveal that although progress has been made to 
improve the energy efficiency of the UK’s housing stock, millions of homes remain without 
these basic forms of efficiency measures.  
                                                          
3 It is estimated that 60% of homes had been installed with loft insulation and 59% of homes 
with cavity wall insulation by the start of 2012 (DECC, 2012j) 
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Figure 1.8 Homes in Great Britain with cavity wall insulation and loft insulation: April 2007 to April 2012 
(Thousands) (DECC, 2012v) 
The UK government has also sought to initiate a shift towards satisfying our energy needs via 
less carbon intensive fuels. Consequently, ‘the share of renewable energy in the United 
Kingdom’s total primary energy supply (TPES) has increased significantly in recent years, from 
1.5% in 2003 to 3.7% in 2010’ (IEA, 2012a p.103), largely due to a growth in renewable 
generation, which represented 9.4% of total electricity generation in 2011. Despite these 
gains, the UK is making slow progress towards meeting the EU Energy Directive target of 
meeting 15% of its energy needs (for electricity, heating and transport) from renewable energy 
sources by 2020. For instance, in 2010 the UK missed its interim renewable electricity 
generation target of 10%, achieving only 6.5% (Constable and Moroney, 2011). 
Provisional figures indicate that the UK has so far delivered a 24% reduction in its energy 
supply sector’s CO2 emissions by 2011, compared to 1990 levels (DECC, 2012a) (Figure 1.5). 
However, this achievement cannot be wholly attributed to the UK government’s low-carbon 
strategy, but to other developments such as the severe economic downturn in the UK, which 
reduced economic activity and thus the demand for energy (CAMECON, 2011, CCC, 2011). 
Additionally, this reduction can also be explained by the UK’s ‘dash for gas’ during the 1990s 
(Green Alliance, 2011), which arose predominantly due to the government’s privatization and 
liberalisation strategy (Parker, 1996) (Sections 5.2 & 5.3), and resulted in significant 
replacement of generation of electricity from coal with generation from gas. 
1.3.1.3 The Challenge Ahead 
Despite the reductions in GHG emissions described in the last section, both Cambridge 
Econometrics (2011) and the Committee on Climate Change (CCC) (2011) have in recent years 
expressed major concern that the current pace of decarbonisation will be insufficient to 
ensure the UK meets its 2020 and 2050 GHG emissions reduction targets, as illustrated in 
Figure 1.9..  
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Figure 1.9 CO2 emissions under pre-recession trend versus required reductions (1990 – 2050) (CCC, 
2011) 
In the CCC’s Progress Report to Parliament, they indicated that the UK has to date made 
valuable progress towards meeting both its first and second carbon budgets. However, they 
were clear that a step change in the UK’s approach was urgently needed if it was to remain on 
track to meet its future carbon budgets. In particular, they emphasised the need for the UK to 
initiate a move from its low-carbon transition policy development phase to its low-carbon 
transition delivery phase (CCC, 2012c).  
1.3.2 Energy Insecurity 
The UK government’s Energy and Climate Change Committee (2012) define a secure energy 
system as one ‘that is able to meet the needs of people and organisations for energy services 
such as heating, lighting, powering appliances and transportation, in a reliable and affordable 
way both now and in the future’ (p.1). In this sub-section we focus on reliability of supply and 
in the subsequent sub-section (Section 1.3.3) we focus on affordability of supply.  
1.3.2.1 Current Situation 
The UK used to be a net importer of energy during the 1970s. However, following the 
discovery of oil and gas in the North Sea and the subsequent development of the 
infrastructure necessary to capture and refine these fuels, it became a net exporter during 
most of the 1980s and 1990s, as well as the first half of the 2000s (DECC, 2011g) (Figure 1.10). 
This began to change when the North Sea oil and gas reserves began to dwindle and 
production consequently fell, meaning that it returned to being a net importer of energy in 
2004 and has remained so since (DECC, 2011g). 
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Figure 1.10 UK Energy Import Dependency 1970 to 2011 (DECC, 2012v) 
The UK’s energy demand has increasingly been met by imports, such as Norwegian and 
Continental gas via pipeline, as well as liquefied natural gas (LNG) via tanker (DECC and 
OFGEM, 2011). However, ‘import reliance, although neither new to the UK nor uncommon 
around the world, can bring additional risks of disruption to supply sources’ (DECC and 
OFGEM, 2011 p.29) because geopolitical disputes between countries, which may or may not 
involve the UK, can interrupt fuel supply through conflict, trade embargos etc. For example, 
the conflict between Russia and Ukraine in 2009 (ECCC, 2011 ) and the Libyan war in 2011 
(Allen, 2012), resulted in disruption of fossil fuel supplies.  
The UK’s energy security concerns are compounded by the prospect of 19 GW of its existing 
electricity generation capacity being discontinued by 2020 (DECC and OFGEM, 2011). This will 
largely be a result of many existing coal and oil fired power plants failing to meet modern 
environmental standards and a number of nuclear plants being decommissioned (DECC and 
OFGEM, 2011). Therefore, the UK will have to make swift arrangements to replace this 
generation capacity over the coming decade and also stimulate significant reductions in 
electricity demand to improve the security of its energy supply. 
1.3.2.2 Progress Towards Improving Energy Security 
The government’s strategy to address the UK’s energy insecurity has in recent years 
predominantly revolved around forming (1) international supply agreements, (2) renewing and 
diversifying the UK’s generation capacity portfolio, as well as (3) reducing energy demand via 
energy efficiency measures (ECCC, 2012, DECC, 2012h, Allen, 2012). Focusing on the first of 
these, the UK has moved to avoid potential disruptions of energy supply from other countries 
by forging bi-lateral and multi-lateral international agreements with key suppliers that the UK 
has traditionally shared healthy international relations with. For example, the UK has signed 
agreements with: Iceland for the supply of geothermal power (DECC, 2012u), France for 
nuclear electricity (DECC, 2012f) and Norway for gas (DECC, 2012q). 
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The government has also moved to improve the UK’s energy security by improving the energy 
efficiency of its generation, transmission, distribution and end-use infrastructure, as a means 
of helping to reduce the UK’s energy demand. The logic employed here is that ‘the most secure 
energy is the energy you do not use’ (ECCC, 2012 p.2), i.e. the UK’s energy needs will be easier 
to satisfy if it requires less energy, as this means that less energy has to be sourced either 
nationally or internationally (see Section 1.3.1.2. for examples of efficiency improvements).  
The government has also sought not only to renew but to diversify the UK’s energy supply 
portfolio as ‘the key to secure energy supplies is to have in place a diverse range of reliable 
sources of supply’ (ECCC, 2012 p.5). This strategy is designed to ensure that the UK does not 
become over-reliant on certain technology and fuel types, which may prove problematic in the 
future due to unforeseen circumstances (e.g. disruption to fuel supply, technological 
malfunctions, impact of external events etc). Furthermore, diversification will enable the UK to 
take full advantage of its abundant, indigenous renewable energy resources, such as wind, 
wave and tidal power (ECCC, 2012).  The UK has already signalled its intent to install 21.5GW of 
new electricity generation capacity by 2020, which will more than replace the 19GW due for 
decommissioning and include a mix of fossil fuel, nuclear and renewable generation (DECC and 
OFGEM, 2011). Approximately, 4.3 GW of gas generation and 3.6 GW of renewable generation 
capacity is currently being built with a further 13.2 GW granted planning permission, of which 
8.7 GW is gas-fired generation and 3.7GW is renewable (DECC and OFGEM, 2011). Plans are 
also in place to deliver approximately 16GW of nuclear capacity by 2025 (DECC, 2012p). 
1.3.2.3 The Challenge Ahead 
Despite the strides the UK has made towards improving its energy security, a secure supply of 
energy is by no means assured for the UK as it continues to be predominantly reliant on fossil 
fuels to fulfil its energy needs (Figure 1.6), which are typically sourced from other countries 
(Figure 1.10). Looking forward, the withdrawal of  E.On and RWE Npower’s from Horizon 
Nuclear Power, a private-sector led scheme designed to deliver an additional 6.6GW of new 
nuclear capacity to replace much of the capacity due for decommissioning, has cast doubts 
upon the prospects of the UK moving away from its dependence on fossil fuel (DECC, 2012g). 
However, the Horizon scheme has recently been purchased by Hitachi Ltd of Japan, 
consequently improving the prospects of new nuclear generation capacity being constructed in 
the UK over the next decade (Horizon Nuclear Power, 2012). 
With respect to reducing the UK’s demand for energy, some minor progress has been made 
towards reducing its total energy consumption in the last couple of years (DECC, 2012v) but 
concerns have been raised that the regulatory and market arrangements currently in place do 
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not present sufficient incentives for industry to deliver the necessary measures to improve 
levels of energy security (DECC and OFGEM, 2011), nor do they cultivate sufficient incentives 
for households and businesses to engage with such measures (Wicks, 2009).  
Considering the UK’s slow progress towards diversifying its energy supply portfolio and 
reducing its energy demand, it seems very likely the UK will continue to be reliant on imports 
of fossil fuels for many years to come. However, the UK sources much of its energy from 
countries that have a history of politically instability and/or with whom the UK has had a 
history of strained international relations with, such as Libya and Yemen for oil, Egypt for gas 
and Russia for coal (DECC, 2011b, DECC and OFGEM, 2011). It is likely that intra and 
international conflict will continue to be a feature of the global political landscape in the 
future, meaning that the UK will remain exposed to the risk of disruptions to supply for the 
foreseeable future. This emphasises the need to identify innovative ways of providing market 
actors with a lasting incentive to engage in measures that will help to diversify the UK’s 
portfolio of energy generation; harness indigenous sources of non-finite, renewable energy 
and deliver efficiency measures that will ensure demand is kept at a sustainable level, which 
can be realistically met by secure energy sources. 
1.3.3 Affordability of Energy 
1.3.3.1 Current Situation 
In recent years energy prices have risen dramatically in the UK. For instance, between 2001 
and 2011 real prices for domestic energy rose by 82% (Figure 1.11), whilst industrial electricity 
prices rose by approximately 77% and gas by 95% (DECC, 2012v). This has meant that the cost 
associated with satisfying a variety of basic human needs (e.g. warmth, lighting, 
communication etc) has increased, which has made it difficult for some consumers to afford to 
satisfy these needs despite previously being able to do so. Rising energy prices coupled with a 
fall in real wages due to the severe economic downturn in the UK (Fender, 2012), has meant 
that millions of households have been plunged into fuel poverty4 in recent years. For instance, 
between 2004 and 2010 there was an increase of  2.75 million households in fuel poverty5 
(DECC, 2011g). These households are often faced with the dilemma of having to choose 
                                                          
4 A household is fuel poor if ‘in order to maintain a satisfactory heating regime, they need to 
spend more than 10% of their income on all household domestic fuel use’ (DECC, 2011g p.17) 
5 In 2010, this figure stood at 4.75 million households (DECC, 2011g) 
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between which of their basic needs they will satisfy. This dilemma is often referred to as the 
‘heat or eat’6 phenomenon (see Beatty et al., 2011).  
 
Figure 1.11 Fuel price indices for the domestic sector in the UK: 1980 – 2011 (DECC, 2012v)
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1.3.3.2 Progress Towards Making Energy More Affordable 
The UK has made some recent progress towards alleviating fuel poverty, having reduced the 
number of households in fuel poverty by 750,000 between 2009 and 2010. DECC has partly 
attributed this fall in fuel poverty  to improvements in the energy efficiency of the UK’s 
housing stock such as the installation of loft and cavity wall insulation  (DECC, 2012m) (Section 
1.3.1.2). These measures have meant that many households are now able to satisfy their 
energy needs at a lower cost, as the efficiency gains have meant that they can purchase less 
energy but still enjoy the same quality and quantity of energy services (e.g. light, heat etc).  
The UK government has also sought to make energy more affordable by promoting 
competition in the UK energy markets via privatisation and liberalisation as a means of 
encouraging the cost-effective supply of energy (Allen, 2012, ECCC, 2012, Wicks, 2009) 
(Sections 5.2 & 5.3): 
‘In competitive markets companies have less power to influence market prices through 
their own individual actions, and therefore they are less able to pass through cost 
increases [to their customers]. They therefore have a constant incentive to reduce 
costs in order to increase the margin on their sales and/or extend their market share’ 
(Wicks, 2009 p.91)  
 
 
                                                          
6 This specifically refers to a fuel poor householder having to choose between maintaining a 
comfortable room temperature or enjoying a healthy diet 
7 Data for 2011 is provisional 
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1.3.3.3 The Challenge Ahead 
The cost of fossil fuels (i.e. oil, gas and coal) is projected to either increase or remain high until 
2030 (DECC, 2011a), partly due to an increased demand for energy from emerging economies 
(Allen, 2012) such as China, Brazil and India. Furthermore, energy bills are also expected to rise 
due to the cost associated with the UK government’s proposed energy policies to tackle the 
UK’s energy dilemma (DECC, 2010d). Projections for economic growth also remain bleak (IMF, 
2012), placing a downward pressure on real-term wages. Taking these factors into account it is 
expected that fuel poverty will rise over the coming years, with the central projection of a 
high-profile, fuel poverty focused research project envisaging that 8.1 million households will 
be considered fuel poor by 2016 (Hills, 2012a) (Figure 1.12), compared to 4.75 million in 2010 
(DECC, 2011g). 
 
Figure 1.12 Baseline projections of the number of households in fuel poverty under the Lower Income 
High Cost (LIHC) and fuel poverty indicators 1996 to 2016 (millions) (Hills, 2012a) 
Despite the scale of the challenge facing us, Hills (2012b) explains that there is a way forward 
to address these issues: 
‘This daunting problem is one with solutions. Our analysis shows that improving the 
housing of those at risk is the most cost-effective way of tackling the problem, cutting 
energy waste, with large long-term benefits to society as a whole. We need a renewed 
and ambitious strategy to do this’ (p.2) 
This underlines the need to identify innovative methods in the future that will encourage the 
uptake of demand management measures, such as the installation of more efficient boilers, 
insulation and double glazing, alongside the promotion of more frugal energy consumption 
behaviour via education schemes, which will help to reduce or at least, stabilize the cost of 
energy to consumers. 
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1.4 Accelerating the Transition to a Sustainable UK Energy System via 
the Implementation of Sustainable Energy Business Models 
The UK government has moved to address this triumvirate of energy challenges, i.e. carbon 
intensity, insecurity and affordability of the UK’s energy supply (Section 1.3), primarily by 
taking steps to increase the UK’s renewable energy generation capacity and energy efficiency 
levels (Ekins, 2010). Despite some valuable progress having been made towards a sustainable 
energy system in the UK, the transition has not yet gone far enough to have resolved these 
issues, as outlined in Section 1.3. The pace of this transition remains too slow and must be 
quickened if we are to ensure that the UK will meet its mandatory GHG emissions reductions 
targets to avert irreversible climate change (CCC, 2011), as well as to ensure that we ‘keep the 
lights on and avoid blackouts becoming a feature of daily life’ (Davey, 2012). The message is 
clear, if the UK is to achieve a transition to a more sustainable energy system within the 
timescale required, it must identify and implement a suite of innovative policy, market and 
technological solutions that will help to facilitate this transformation. 
To date much of the research exploring the factors driving system change and sustainability 
transitions has centred upon the role of technological innovation (Holtz et al., 2008, Edquist, 
2005). However in recent years, a growing number of scholars have emphasised the potential 
for non-technological innovation to play an important role, alongside technological innovation, 
in driving forward system change and thus sustainability transitions (Steward, 2008, Steward, 
2012, Witkamp et al., 2011, Bergman et al., 2010, Edquist, 2005): 
‘Traditionally, innovation studies have, to a large extent, focused upon technological 
process innovation and to some extent upon product innovations, but less on non-
technological and intangible ones, i.e. service product innovation and organizational 
process innovations…non-technological forms of innovation deserve more attention’ 
(Edquist, 2005 p.185) 
Steward (2008, 2012) explains that in order to successfully deliver sustainability transitions we 
should focus on the development and implementation of ‘system innovations’, which 
incorporate a multitude of complementary technological and non-technological innovations 
(e.g. institutional, social, cultural etc), and which involve a myriad of societal actors. He argues 
this mix of innovation is required if we are to fundamentally change the way people think 
about production and consumption, and most importantly reconfigure the ‘normal way of 
doing things’ (2008 p.5). Making reference to past system transitions such as the Industrial 
Revolution and the emergence of today’s IT centric society, Steward (2008, 2012) explains that 
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an important aspect of these system innovations will be the design and implementation of 
novel business models: 
‘In practice the most significant emission reducing innovations in the decade to 2020 
will draw on existing technologies. Therefore innovation that embraces novelty which 
is non-technological in nature, such as business models and services will be of primary 
importance.’ (Steward, 2012 p.337) 
Extending this logic we briefly introduce the concept of sustainable business models before 
explaining their relevance to a sustainability transition of the UK energy system. 
1.4.1 Business Models for Sustainable Development 
As we explore in detail in Section 2.4.1, a business model represents a story of what it is an 
organisation believes their customers want, how they want it, how it believes it should 
organize itself and interact with others to best meet those desires, and in turn, how it will 
generate revenue by being compensated for doing so (Johnson et al., 2008, Teece, 2010, 
Magretta, 2002, Johnson, 2010).  In essence, a ‘business model describes the rationale of how 
an organization creates, delivers and captures value’ (Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2010 p.14) by 
fulfilling the needs or desires of its customers. 
A sustainable business model can be defined as one where sustainable development plays an 
integral role in shaping the core objectives of the firm and consequently its decision making 
(Wicks, 1996, Stubbs and Cocklin, 2008). Such business models therefore incorporate a value 
proposition that reflects a balance between economic, ecological and social needs (Boons and 
Lüdeke-Freund, 2012) and organisations practicing such models therefore seek ‘to deliver 
economic, social and environmental benefits…through core business activities’ (Wilson et al., 
2009 p.1). A business operating a sustainable business model typically creates, delivers and 
captures value in a truly sustainable way by providing products and services that improve the 
quality of people’s lives but do so within environmental limits (Uren, 2010). We elaborate 
upon the concept of a sustainable business model in Section 2.5. 
A number of scholars have emphasised the need to incorporate the development and 
implementation of novel business models into strategies designed to promote sustainable 
development (Johnson and Suskewicz, 2009, Nidumolu et al., 2009, Wells, 2006), which has 
been echoed by high-profile institutions such as the European Commission and McKinsey & 
Company (Bonini and Gorner, 2011, COWI, 2008):  
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‘Greater spread and application of innovation in business models that reduce resource 
use has the potential to create multi-billion euro markets in the EU and overseas and 
bring very substantial environmental and economic benefits’ (COWI, 2008 p.3) 
‘Companies should integrate environmental, social, and governance issues into their 
business model—and act on them…Our research finds that a handful of companies are 
capturing significant value by systematically pursuing the opportunities sustainability 
offers’ (Bonini and Gorner, 2011 p.12)  
Considering the potential of novel business models to promote sustainable development, the 
development and implementation of novel business models for energy provision has been 
considered as a means of helping to address the challenges facing the UK and global energy 
system, as outlined in Sections 1.2 and 1.3. 
1.4.2 Sustainable Energy Business Models  
The design and implementation of novel sustainable energy business models has been 
considered by a number of leading scholars (Wüstenhagen and Boehnke, 2008, Szatow et al., 
2012, Saunders et al., 2012, Munns, 2008) and energy institutions (Valocchi et al., 2010, IEA, 
2010, COWI, 2008) who emphasise the range of economic, social and environmental benefits 
that the implementation of innovative, sustainable business models could provide, by 
reconciling the traditionally divergent objectives of sustainable development and the 
fulfilment of our energy needs. Specifically, the International Energy Agency has highlighted 
how the design of novel business models could represent a particularly important factor in 
promoting the uptake of sustainable energy technologies: 
‘A large proportion of breakthrough innovations come from new firms that challenge 
existing business models [and so the] growth of new firms may have an important part 
to play in low-carbon energy technology development…and the transition from 
demonstration to commercial deployment’ (IEA, 2010 p.7-8) 
This view is echoed by Wüstenhagen and Boehnke (2008) who emphasise that novel business 
models could help to commercialize innovative, low-carbon energy technologies by 
overcoming key barriers to adoption such as (1) the power of incumbent energy companies; 
(2) the capital intensity and long-lead times of new energy technologies and (3) the failure to 
internalize the cost of environmental degradation in market prices. More broadly they 
underline their importance in promoting sustainable energy production and consumption 
practices:  
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‘[We emphasise] the importance of new business models for enhancing sustainable 
production and consumption in the energy sector, particularly with regard to 
successful commercialisation of distributed energy systems’ (Wüstenhagen and 
Boehnke, 2008 p.77) 
We now discuss the extent to which the development and implementation of sustainable 
energy business models has been considered in the context of the UK energy system to date.  
1.4.3 Sustainable Energy Business Models in the UK 
At present the dominant business model for satisfying consumers’ energy needs in the UK is 
the Energy Utility (EUCo) model. A EUCo’s business model dictates that their revenue increases 
with the number of units of energy they sell to their customers, which is often referred to as a 
volume-sales driver (Eyre, 2008). Energy Utilities are therefore not incentivised to minimize 
their customers’ energy throughput via energy efficiency gains or behavioural change (Eyre, 
2008, Steinberger et al., 2009, York and Kuschler, 2011) because investment in such measures 
would reduce their revenue and thus not provide a return on investment (York and Kuschler, 
2011). This disincentive is reflected in the tariffs most Energy Utilities offer their customers, in 
which the latter are invited to pay a lower rate for any energy they consume beyond a 
predefined level of consumption (Hulme and Summers, 2009). Additionally, the Utilities also 
source the majority of their energy supply from fossil fuels, such as gas and coal (Friends of the 
Earth, 2011), meaning their energy supply has a high GHG emissions content. These examples 
help to illustrate how the EUCo model does not satisfy consumers’ energy needs in a 
sustainable manner. 
Considering the failure of this incumbent energy business model to reward the fulfilment of 
consumers’ energy needs in a sustainable manner, and the potential economic, social and 
environmental benefits associated with the application of novel, sustainable energy business 
models, scholars examining the transition to a sustainable UK energy system have also called 
for the need for further examination of this topic: 
‘Making fuller use of renewable energy means capitalising on the diversity of scales, 
technologies and business models for deployment, so socially beneficial solutions 
suited to local and regional circumstances can be found’ (Watson et al., 2010 p.12) 
‘Seeking out cost effective efficiency is vital because there could be major welfare 
losses associated with forcing down energy demand through the price mechanism…a 
careful look at the business models for delivering energy efficiency, particularly the 
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role of the utilities vis-à-vis local authorities and others, is needed’ (Ekins et al., 2010 
p.352) 
We now outline the need for further research on this topic and how this thesis will seek to 
address these requirements. 
1.4.4 The Need for Further Research 
Despite the range of environmental, economic and social benefits novel sustainable business 
models could potentially provide, they have to date only ‘been utilised to [a] limited extent, 
with a very unequal distribution, between different countries and industries’ (COWI, 2008 p.3). 
The reasons for this are not well understood and neither are the ways in which the 
proliferation of such models could promote sustainable development predominantly because 
‘despite its fundamental significance, the business model has been neglected in academic and 
practitioner-oriented literature on corporate sustainability and corporate sustainability 
management’ (Schaltegger et al., 2011 p.15-16). Consequently, ‘the design and management 
of sustainable business models [represents] an important but yet insufficiently researched 
area’ (Boons and Lüdeke-Freund p.9). Business models have largely been ignored within the 
socio-technical transitions literature, where scholars have traditionally focused on the 
interplay between niche technological innovations and socio-technical systems, as opposed to 
non-technological innovations, such as business models (Section 1.4). The potential role of 
business models has also been neglected by scholars engaged in sustainable energy (Johnson 
and Suskewicz, 2009), providing us with little insight into the role these models could play in 
facilitating transitions to sustainable energy systems. Consequently, we find that the business 
management, sustainability transitions and energy literature would all benefit from further 
research into the development and implementation of sustainable energy business models. 
We argue that in order to help address the deficiencies in the literature, it is important to 
begin by developing a more detailed understanding of the characteristics of specific 
sustainable energy business models. Amongst other insights, this will better equip us to 
understand the strengths and weaknesses of these models, from the perspective of both the 
firms operating these models, as well as their key partners and crucially, their customers. This 
insight is essential if we are to understand whether or not these models are likely to 
proliferate in the future. Additionally, a clearer understanding of these models’ characteristics 
will afford us the opportunity to then explore the extent to which these business models have 
co-evolved with the key dimensions of the wider energy system (e.g. institutions, technologies, 
user practices, ecosystems and business models). In turn this would provide us with valuable 
insight into not only the factors that enable and inhibit the uptake of sustainable energy 
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business models but crucially, the influence such models could have on transitions to more 
sustainable energy system states. In summary, we argue that there is a pressing need to 
explore (a) the core characteristics of novel, sustainable energy business models; (b) their 
strengths and weaknesses; (c) the factors responsible for enabling and inhibiting the uptake of 
such models and finally, (d) how their uptake could help to facilitate sustainability transitions. 
In order to help address these deficiencies in the literature, we examine one business model in 
particular; the Energy Service Company (ESCo) model. 
The EU Directive 2006/32/EC on Energy End-use Efficiency and Energy Services (EU, 2006) 
defines an ESCo as follows: 
‘A natural or legal [entity] that delivers energy services and/or other energy efficiency 
improvement measures in a user’s facility or premises, and accepts some degree of 
financial risk in so doing. The payment for the services delivered is based (either wholly 
or in part) on the achievement of energy efficiency improvements and on the meeting 
of the other agreed performance criteria’ (p.6) 
We select this model as our unit of analysis because it has been identified as a potentially 
financially viable means of fulfilling our energy needs in such a way that is sympathetic to the 
challenges of climate change, energy security and affordability (Fawkes, 2007, Marino et al., 
2011, Vine, 2005, Hansen, 2009, Fang et al.) as outlined in Sections 1.2 & 1.3. Unlike an Energy 
Utility, an ESCo’s revenue is not predicated upon the sale of units of energy (e.g. gas and 
electricity), but on the provision of energy services; i.e. the physical benefit, utility or good 
people derive from energy (EU, 2006). So ESCos provide useful energy streams (e.g. hot water, 
coolant etc) and/or final energy services (e.g. light, heat, motive power etc) to their customers 
via energy service contracts (Sorrell, 2007). They traditionally deliver these services by 
engaging in a range of sustainable energy supply and demand management measures that 
provide significant production cost savings (e.g. equipment and fuel costs) on their customer’s 
energy bill (Sorrell, 2007), enabling ESCos to fulfil their customers’ needs at a similar or lower 
cost compared to passively buying energy units via energy utilities. These measures entail an 
increase in levels of renewable energy generation and/or energy efficiency, leading to a 
significant reduction in the GHG emissions associated with fulfilling their energy needs (Marino 
et al., 2011).  
In the context of the UK, the ESCo model was first introduced in the mid-1960s (Fawkes, 2007, 
Iqbal, 2009). However, despite the ESCo model having received significant attention from both 
industry and academia as a means of promoting sustainable energy production and 
consumption practices (Bertoldi et al., 2006b, Fawkes, 2007, Marino et al., 2011, Smith, 2007a, 
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Sorrell, 2007) (Section 5), the ESCo model has so far failed to become a major component of 
UK energy system. However, the UK energy landscape and thus the selection environment of 
both ESCos and the Energy Utilities are beginning to change from one which has traditionally 
favoured the incumbent Energy Utility Company (EUCo) model. The current and emerging 
selection environment appears to be more conducive to ESCo operation than was once the 
case due to recent developments in the UK, such as the emergence of a low-carbon regulatory 
framework as outlined in Section 1.3. Taking this situation into consideration, it is possible that 
the ESCo model could proliferate in the future and thus play a more important role in the UK 
energy system over the coming years than at present.  
Some valuable research has already examined the core characteristics of the ESCo model (see 
Fawkes, 2007, Marino et al., 2011, Smith, 2007a, Sorrell, 2005, Sorrell, 2007), its strengths and 
weaknesses (Sorrell, 2007, Ellis, 2010) and the drivers and barriers to its adoption (Marino et 
al., 2011, COWI, 2008, Vine, 2005, Westling, 2003, Ellis, 2010) and with respect to the UK, the 
role it could potentially play in a transition to a sustainable energy system (Foxon, 2012, 
Sorrell, 2005). One of our major criticisms of the current literature is the lack of research that 
applies in-depth, rigorous empirical methodologies for examining ESCo activity (Fawkes, 2007, 
Smith, 2007a, Boait, 2009). Another is the lack of research focusing on ESCo activity specifically 
in the UK. Furthermore, much of the research that does meet these two criteria was 
conducted some years ago (Sorrell, 2005, Chesshire and Watson, 2000), meaning that despite 
its high-quality, it is somewhat out-of-date considering the pace with which the regulatory 
framework has changed in recent years. Through an in-depth and up-to-date empirical 
investigation of ESCo operation in the UK energy system, this thesis seeks to make a series of 
important contributions to the ESCo literature by examining following:   
 the core characteristics of the ESCo business model via a holistic analysis of the 
interdependent activities, components and the linkages between these that enable an 
ESCo to create, deliver and capture value for the provision of sustainable energy 
services. The thesis also outlines the different types of ESCo operating in the UK  
 the strengths and weaknesses of the ESCo model and its variants from the perspective 
of the organisation operating the business model and the customers it engages with 
 the enabling and inhibiting factors the ESCo model and its variants are subject to 
 the co-evolutionary relationship between the ESCo population and the wider energy 
system to help provide insight into (a) how the UK energy system has causally 
influenced the evolution of the ESCo population, particularly the uptake or selection of 
the ESCo model and (b) how the ESCo model has causally influenced the evolution of 
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the various dimensions that make-up the UK energy system and thus the impact it has 
had on the transformation of the UK energy system 
 how the co-evolutionary dynamic between the ESCo population and the UK energy 
system is likely to change in light of emerging development and crucially, the role the 
ESCo model is likely to play in a transition to a sustainable UK energy system  
An examination of the above would also make an important contribution to the following 
theoretical approaches, for the following reasons (we explore these discourses in Section 2): 
 Sustainable business model and Product Service System (PSS) literature – A detailed 
examination of a sustainable, service-based business model (i.e. the ESCo model) will 
provide insight into (1) the core characteristics; (2) the strengths and weaknesses; (3) 
the factors supporting and inhibiting its take up, as well as (4) the contribution this 
model could make to sustainable development. More broadly this insight could help to 
improve our understanding of the characteristics of other similar, service-based 
sustainable business model, the extent to which these are likely to proliferate and the 
scale of the contribution they could potentially make to sustainable development 
 Business model innovation literature – Beyond sustainability, an examination of the 
uptake and operation of an innovative business model in a heavily regulated, 
traditional sector such as the UK energy industry will provide insight into (1) the 
factors enabling and inhibiting business model innovation; (2) how business model 
innovation co-evolves with other forms of innovation (e.g. technological) and (3) how 
business model innovation can shape the business environment it is applied within 
 Co-evolutionary, socio-technical transitions and sustainability transitions literature – 
A clearer understanding of the co-evolutionary relationship between organisational 
populations operating novel business models and the various dimensions of socio-
technical systems will provide insight into the (1) factors (e.g. positive feedbacks, 
misalignment with regime etc) responsible for limiting the up-take of innovative, 
sustainable business models; (2) the environmental conditions that are necessary for 
them to proliferate and (3) how the uptake of such models could characterize socio-
technical system change 
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1.5 Research Questions 
The above ideas suggest that the development and wide-scale implementation of novel, 
sustainable business models, such as the ESCo model, could potentially play an important role 
in accelerating the transition to sustainable socio-technical system states because they possess 
the potential to ensure that consumers’ basic human needs are satisfied in a more sustainable 
manner than incumbent business models, such as the EUCo model, whilst ensuring that 
businesses and their partners are also rewarded financially. Therefore, taking the ESCo model 
as our unit of analysis, the overarching research question of this thesis is as follows: 
What role could the development and adoption of the Energy Service Company 
(ESCo) business model play in the transition to a sustainable UK energy system?  
This is an important, albeit broad question to answer and one that would therefore benefit 
from being divided into a number of sub-questions to help structure our enquiry and ensure 
this over-arching question is answered effectively, as follows: 
1. What are the core characteristics of the ESCo business model and key variants of this 
model?  
Here we seek to identify the system of interdependent activities and components that enable 
ESCos to create, deliver and capture value by satisfying their customers’ energy needs. To 
highlight how the ESCo model is characteristically distinct from traditional energy business 
models, we examine the core characteristics of the incumbent EUCo model, comparing these 
with the ESCo model. We also seek to identify the core characteristics of key variants of the 
ESCo model, which share some characteristics common to all ESCos but are also 
characteristically distinct in other respects. 
2. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the ESCo model and the key variants of this 
model? 
Having identified the core characteristics of the ESCo model we explore the strengths and 
weaknesses of this model primarily from the perspective of the ESCo (or organisation 
considering becoming ESCos) and its customers. The same line of enquiry is explored for each 
of the ESCo variants identified, to understand their particular strengths and weaknesses. 
3. How have the various key dimensions of the UK energy system causally influenced the 
evolution of the ESCo population? 
4. How has the ESCo population causally influenced the evolution of the various key 
dimensions of the UK energy system? 
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Questions 3 and 4 are designed to examine the co-evolutionary relationship the ESCo 
population shares with the various key dimensions of the UK energy system (i.e. technologies, 
institutions, user practices, ecosystem, business models etc). Question 3 is designed to help 
provide valuable insight into the way in which these dimensions have causally influenced the 
evolution of the ESCo population, i.e. the factors responsible for characteristic variations in the 
ESCo population (variation); the extent to which the ESCo model has been adopted (selection), 
and the manner in which the characteristics of the ESCo model have been ‘preserved, 
duplicated, or otherwise reproduced so that the selected activities are repeated on future 
occasions’ (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006 p.23) (retention). Conversely, question 4 examines how the 
ESCo population has causally influenced the evolution of these various dimensions of the UK 
energy system.  
5. How is the co-evolutionary relationship between the ESCo population and the UK 
energy system likely to change in the future? 
Question 5 looks to the future and examines both recent and emerging developments in the 
UK energy system to provide clarity in relation to how the co-evolutionary relationship 
between the ESCo population and the various dimensions of the UK energy system is likely to 
change over the coming years. Drawing on this insight, we seek to address the overarching 
research question relating to the role the ESCo model could potentially play in a transition to a 
sustainable UK energy system. 
1.6 Thesis Structure 
Chapter 2 constitutes a detailed and critical review of the various literatures that provide 
valuable insight into to our research questions. The chapter begins with a review of the socio-
technical transition literature and the associated evolutionary approaches to technological, 
industrial and economic system change, focusing in particular on the insight co-evolutionary 
approaches can provide into the nature of system change. The review highlights the lack of 
attention that has been paid by system change scholars to the role novel business models 
could potentially play in socio-technical transitions. Consequently, we turn to the business 
model and literature, focusing in particular on business model innovation, sustainable business 
models and Product Service Systems, to identify research that illuminates the role novel, 
sustainable business models could potentially play in sustainability transitions. Finally, we 
introduce the literature associated with our unit of analysis; the ESCo business model (as 
outlined in Section 1.5). The key purpose of this chapter is to identify the key gaps in these 
different literatures and how this research seeks to bridge these. 
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Chapter 3 presents our analytical framework, which integrates aspects of business model, 
socio-technical transitions and co-evolutionary theory outlined in the previous chapter. This 
develops an approach capable of providing insight into the co-evolutionary relationships 
between populations adopting novel, sustainable business model and the various dimensions 
of the wider socio-technical system. Here we also highlight the potential strengths and 
weaknesses of applying this framework. 
Chapter 4 introduces the methodology this research employs to apply empirically the 
analytical framework, which employs a combination of qualitative methods for data collection 
and analysis, as well as Straussian Grounded Theory as an approach for theoretical 
development. 
Chapter 5 explores the empirical context in which the research methodology will be applied by 
examining how the ESCo population has evolved historically, alongside key developments in 
the broader UK energy system. 
Chapter 6 introduces the findings from our empirical investigation. Based on Phase 1 of the 
research, the sector level investigation of the UK ESCo market, we outline the core 
characteristics of the ESCo business model and compare these with the incumbent EUCo 
model. Subsequently, we highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the ESCo model, as well as 
the external factors that have served to enable and inhibit ESCo operation in the UK. We then 
identify how emerging developments are likely to impact upon the ESCo market before we 
introduce the key variants of the ESCo model that currently exist in the UK ESCo population. 
Finally we describe Phase 2 of the research, which relates to the case-study investigation of 4 
characteristically distinct ESCos operating in the UK. This chapter addresses questions 1 & 2. 
Chapter 7 applies our analytical framework to the evidence generated by our empirical 
investigation, presented in Chapter 6, to examine how the various dimensions of the UK 
energy system (ecosystem, institutions, user practices, technology and incumbent EUCo 
population) have causally influenced the evolution of the ESCo population and conversely, how 
the ESCo population has causally influenced the evolution of these dimensions. This chapter 
addresses questions 3, 4 & 5. 
Chapter 8 draws on the insights generated from Chapter 6 & 7 to discuss how recent and 
emerging developments are likely to alter the co-evolutionary relationship between the ESCo 
population and the UK energy system. The purpose of this discussion is to highlight the role 
the ESCo model is likely to play in a transition to a sustainable UK energy system. Here we also 
present a number of policy recommendations designed to promote uptake of the ESCo model 
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Chapter 9 reflects on the research’s findings and situates these in the wider literature to 
illustrate the contributions this thesis has made to on-going debates in the wider literature. 
Chapter 10 is the concluding chapter, where we concisely address our research questions, 
reflect upon the strengths and weaknesses of the research strategy and the analytical 
framework this research has employed and in turn introduce a number of potential avenues 
for future research.
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2 Literature Review: Perspectives on Socio-Technical System 
Change and the Importance of Business Model Innovation  
2.1 Chapter Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a critical review of the various literatures relating to 
the key perspectives on socio-technical system change, focusing in particular on the insight 
these provide into the factors responsible for shaping system transitions and specifically how 
novel, sustainable business models are capable of shaping sustainability transitions. 
Subsequently, we review the literature relating to business models and business model 
innovation, as well as sustainable business models and Product-Service Systems, primarily in 
order to provide insight into how these concepts could improve our understanding of the 
factors responsible for driving or inhibiting sustainable system change, as outlined by the 
socio-technical transitions and co-evolutionary literatures. 
This chapter presents a critical review of these different literatures and in turn highlights how 
this research seeks to contribute towards the development of these approaches, particularly 
with respect to improving our understanding of the co-evolutionary relationship between 
novel business models and the various dimensions that make-up socio-technical systems. 
Consequently, this chapter acts as a necessary precursor to Section 3 where we introduce the 
analytical framework this research employs in order to address the research questions 
outlined in Section 1.5. 
2.1.1 Structure of Literature Review 
We begin by reviewing the socio-technical and evolutionary approaches to system change that 
explicitly deal with the processes responsible for triggering and shaping change within systems 
that have been developed by humans to fulfil societal functions, such as transport, 
communication, housing (Geels, 2004). Although related, we address the two bodies of 
literature separately as the socio-technical literature favours sociological explanations of 
system change, whilst the evolutionary economics literature emphasises the importance of 
evolutionary explanations (Foxon, 2011). Consequently in Section 2.2 we examine the socio-
technical transitions literature, where we begin with an introduction to the Science and 
Technology Studies (STS) and Social Shaping of Technology (SST) literature, which laid the 
foundations for the socio-technical transitions literature. We follow this by exploring the multi-
level perspective (MLP) on transitions, as well as its applications, strengths and weaknesses. 
Following this we introduce the evolutionary and coevolutionary perspectives on system 
change in Section 2.3. Here we begin by outlining the key differences between approaches 
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examining the evolution of biological system change versus other forms of system change. We 
also present some examples of how this approach has been applied before we turn to the 
coevolutionary literature and discuss how this has been applied to inform our understanding 
of socio-technical system change.  
In Section 2.4 we turn to the business model literature and begin by defining the concept of 
the business model, also identifying the various criticisms that the business model concept has 
attracted. Next, we introduce the concept of business model innovation, which refers to the 
development of novel business models for satisfying our needs and desires. We also consider 
not only the factors that inhibit and support this form of innovation but also those that shape 
it. In line with the review of the literature on socio-technical system change we then explore 
the research that has analysed how business models can shape their environment. Finally, we 
combine these insights to explain how business models share a co-evolutionary relationship 
with their environment.  
In Section 2.5 we narrow our focus to explore the sustainable business model and Product 
Service System (PSS) literature, to identify the types of sustainable models that have been 
developed to satisfy our human needs in a sustainable fashion. We discuss the impetus to align 
economic and environmental objectives within a single business model, as well as the barriers 
organizations may face in doing so. Subsequently, we identify opportunities for further 
research on the topic of sustainable business models and PSSs. 
Finally, in Section 2.6 we turn our attention to the Energy Service Company (ESCo) model, 
which constitutes the unit of analysis for this research. Here we introduce the concept of 
energy service contracting and its associated strengths and weaknesses.  
2.2 Socio-Technical Approaches to System Change 
In this sub-section we critically review the socio-technical transitions approach and discuss  the 
ways in which it has provided insight into how and why socio-technical systems undergo 
transitions from one system state to another. As this research considers how we might 
facilitate transitions to more economically and environmentally sustainable system states, we 
pay particular attention to how this approach has been applied to inform our understanding of 
the processes at play in transitions towards sustainable socio-technical system states.  
As Figure 2.1 serves to illustrate, there are a large number of different but complimentary 
literatures that make-up the sustainability transitions field. The figure depicts a field that is still 
undergoing an intense period of development, particularly in light of the pressing need to 
develop sustainable socio-technical systems, such as in the context of energy (Section 1). 
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Consequently, it is not possible to provide a particularly coherent picture of the entire field 
because the literature is still in its formative stages. We therefore focus only on the strands, 
which we consider most relevant to this research, most notably the Multi-Level Perspective 
(MLP), which constitutes the main focus for this review of the sustainability transitions 
literature. We begin however, by introducing the Science and Technology Studies (STS) and 
Social Shaping of Technology (SST) literature, which the MLP can be considered to have 
emerged from. 
 
Figure 2.1 A map of key contributions and core research strands in the field of sustainability transition 
studies (Markard et al., 2012) 
2.2.1 Social Shaping of Technology 
The socio-technical approach to system change can be traced back to the emergence of the 
STS field, which ‘starts from an assumption that science and technology are thoroughly social 
activities’ (Sismondo, 2010 p.11). This approach emphasises that the individuals responsible 
for developing technologies (i.e. scientists, engineers etc) are members of communities, which 
exhibit certain institutions (e.g. practices, rules, conventions). These play an important role in 
determining the behaviour of these individuals and therefore, the characteristics of the 
technologies they develop. This jars with the technological essentialist position, which reduces 
technologies to their functions and raw materials (Feenburg, 1999). Instead STS teaches us 
that ‘the actors in science and technology are…not mere logical operators, but instead have 
investment in skills, prestige, knowledge, and specific theories and practices’ (Sismondo, 2010 
p.11) and it is the purpose of STS to investigate ‘how scientific knowledge and technological 
artefacts are constructed’ (p.11). This approach therefore frames knowledge and artefacts as 
human products, which are indelibly marked by the circumstances under which they were 
32 
 
 
produced and therefore we should be sensitive to the social world if we are to accurately 
understand the factors responsible for characterising technological change and its effects 
(Sismondo, 2010) 
The Social Shaping of Technology (SST) approach (MacKenzie and Wajcman, 1985, Williams 
and Edge, 1996), emerged from Science and Technology studies, to focus on the social 
influence on technology as opposed to science. This development has come to be known as 
the ‘turn to technology’ (Woolgar, 1991). This body of literature also takes an anti-essentialist 
position, broadly rejecting the notion of the technological determinism, which is comprised of 
two key ideas, namely that technological development is autonomous and that societal 
development is determined by technology (Bijker, 1995). Mackay and Gillespie (1992) provide 
a comprehensive definition that helps to situate the anti-deterministic SST: 
‘Technological determinism is the notion that technological development is 
autonomous with respect to society: its shapes society, but is not reciprocally 
influenced. Rather, it exists outside society, but at the same time influences social 
change. In more extreme varieties of technological determinism, the technology is 
seen as the most significant determinant of the nature of a society’ (p.686) 
Rejecting the notion of technological determinism, the SST approach emphasises that both 
social and technical dimensions are intertwined (Bijker, 1995). Therefore, technology 
constitutes a social product, which is patterned by the conditions of its creation and use 
(Williams and Edge, 1996) and vice versa. Howcroft et al. (2004) explain that: 
‘SST both examines the content of technology and offers an exploration of the 
particular processes and context that frame the technological innovation. It achieves 
this with the provision of explanatory concepts that delve into a range of factors – 
organizational, political, social, economic and cultural – that pattern the design and 
use of technology’ (p.329)  
Specifically SST investigates the ways in which this range of factors shapes (1) the direction and 
rate of innovation; (2) the content of technological artefacts and practices; (3) and the social 
impact of technological change (Williams and Edge, 1996). It emphasises in particular how the 
social context in which technologies are developed not only shapes the characteristics of these 
technologies but also the impact they have on society (Williams and Edge, 1996). 
One particular sub-strand of this approach that emerged was the Social Construction of 
Technology (SCOT) discourse, which has sought to identify how actors’ choices between 
different technical options have helped to explain how certain technical designs have 
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triumphed over others (Williams and Edge, 1996, Pinch and Bijker, 1984). Pinch and Bijker 
(1987) take the case of the bicycle to help illustrate this phenomenon and explain that the 
form of the modern bicycle cannot be entirely explained by the triumphing of technically 
superior designs over inferior designs but also the different meanings that various users 
attached to each of the bicycle designs, termed interpretive flexibility. In this case, actors’ 
emphasis on a bicycle’s function shifted from speed to safety over the years, which in turn had 
an important bearing on its evolution. 
Hughes (1983, 1987) developed another sub-strand of the SST approach, which he termed 
Large Technical Systems (LTS). This approach investigates the ‘seamless webs’ of socio-
technical elements that make-up infrastructure systems. These webs are composed not only of 
physical artefacts (e.g. electric transmission lines) but also organisations (e.g. manufacturing 
firms, investment banks, research and development laboratories), as well as natural and 
scientific resources (e.g. books, articles, regulation, university teaching programmes etc) 
(Hughes, 1987). Furthermore, LTS seeks to identify the system builders that are responsible for 
weaving these socio-technical components into a seamless web and consequently, a 
functioning whole. 
Williams and Edge (1996) consider SST to represent a broad church, brought together by the 
critique of ‘the linear model of innovation, deterministic concepts of the dynamic of 
technological development, and of its societal outcomes’ (p.892), one which has been 
influential in emphasising the importance of the social in determining the nature of technical 
or technological change and vice versa. This discourse teaches us that these two dimensions 
are intertwined and that without considering these elements as an inter-dependent system, 
we run the risk of failing to understand the true nature of system change. In light of this 
Howcroft et al. (2004) explain that: 
‘There is no such thing as a social problem that does not have technological 
components; nor can there be a technological problem that does not have social 
components, and so any attempt to make such a division is bound to fail’ (p.330) 
Making reference to Fleck (1993), Geels (2005a) makes a similar point: 
‘Artefacts by themselves have no power, they do nothing. Only in association with 
human agency and social structures and organisations do artefacts fulfil functions. In 
real-life situations (e.g. organisations, houses, cities) we never encounter artefacts per 
se‘, but artefacts-in-context. For the analysis of functioning artefacts, it is the 
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combination of ‘the social’ and ‘the technical’ that is the appropriate unit of analysis’ 
(p.365)’ 
We argue that this approach provides a useful starting point for thinking about how business 
models shape and are shaped by their environment, considering that these not only represent 
constellations of socio-technical elements (e.g. technologies, values, routines, knowledge etc) 
but also operate within socio-technical contexts (e.g. systems of energy, transport, food etc). 
We now turn to the multi-level perspective (MLP) on socio-technical system change, which 
also emphasises the convoluted nature of both the social and technical to help explain not only 
why socio-technical system states can persist for a long-period of time but how they can also 
rapidly shift from one system state to another. 
2.2.2 Multi-Level Perspective on Socio-Technical Transitions 
The socio-technical approach to system change emerged in response to the need to develop 
an analytical perspective that was capable of taking into account not just market, scientific and 
economic factors but also social, cultural and institutional factors when explaining system 
change (Smith et al., 2010). Consequently, the multi-level perspective (MLP) on socio-technical 
system change was developed,  which in a similar vein to the SST literature, emphasised the 
inter-connectedness and mutual dependence of social and technical elements (Geels, 2002b, 
Geels, 2005c, Geels and Schot, 2007, Rip and Kemp, 1998). It applies this logic to help explain 
socio-technical system change.  
The key difference of the MLP compared to the SST approach is that the MLP focuses on the 
factors responsible for shaping socio-technical system-wide change, as opposed to that of an 
individual or group of technologies. The MLP pays particular attention to the processes 
operating at multiple levels, which are responsible for stabilization and destabilization of socio-
technical systems (Markard et al., 2012), the latter constituting an important pre-cursor to a 
systemic transition. In recent years this approach has been applied to help inform our 
understanding of how we might achieve transitions to more sustainable system states and is 
thus extremely relevant to the focus of this research. Another important difference to the SST 
approach is that the MLP seeks to combine insights from other bodies of theory, namely:  
‘concepts from evolutionary economics (trajectories, regimes, niches, speciation, path 
dependence, routines), science and technology studies (sense making, social networks, 
innovation as a social process shaped by broader societal contexts), structuration 
theory and neo-institutional theory (rules and institutions as ‘deep structures’ on 
which knowledgeable actors draw in their actions, duality of structure, i.e. structures 
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are both context and outcome of actions, ‘rules of the game’ that structure actions)’ 
(Geels, 2011 p.26) 
We begin by explaining the term socio-technical system before we introduce the multi-level 
perspective and the three levels it incorporates: landscape, regime and niche. Throughout this 
review, we assess the extent to which this literature has provided insight into how business 
models have co-evolved with the socio-technical systems within which they are operated. 
2.2.2.1 Socio-technical systems 
A socio-technical system can be understood as a seamless web of interlocking artefacts, 
institutions, organisations, natural resources, knowledge etc that combine to fulfil particular 
societal functions via production, distribution and consumption processes (Figure 2.2) (Geels, 
2004, Markard et al., 2012, Markard, 2011, Weber, 2003, Geels, 2005c). A socio-technical 
system is defined as: 
‘The linkages between elements necessary to fulfil societal functions (e.g. transport, 
communication, nutrition). As technology is a crucial element in modern societies to 
fulfil those functions, it makes sense to distinguish the production, distribution and use 
of technologies as sub-functions. To fulfil these sub-functions, the necessary elements 
can be characterised as resources. ST-systems thus consist of artefacts, knowledge, 
capital, labour, cultural meaning, etc’ (Geels, 2004 p.900) 
 
Figure 2.2 The basic elements and resources of socio-technical systems (Geels, 2004) 
Smith et al. (2010) take the case of the automobility socio-technical system to illustrate how 
the systems capable of fulfilling our mobility needs are comprised of both social and technical 
elements, such technology designs, road planning authorities, driving licence & motor 
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insurance institutions, the lobbying capacity of multi-national firms and the cultural 
significance of the automobile. 
2.2.2.2 The Multiple Levels of the Multi-level Perspective  
The MLP teaches us that socio-technical systems are embedded in socio-technical regimes, 
which represent the ‘semi-coherent set of rules that orient and coordinate the activities of the 
social groups that reproduce the various elements of socio-technical systems’ (Geels, 2011) 
and ultimately characterize the very nature of socio-technical systems. Consequently, 
transitions are understood to stem from the destabilisation of the socio-technical regime, in 
which the system is embedded. Destabilisation occurs through the inter-play of dynamics 
between three different socio-technical ‘levels’ of increasing stability (Geels, 2004, Markard et 
al., 2012): landscape, regime and niches (Geels, 2002a, Geels, 2005c, Geels, 2011, Schot and 
Geels, 2008, Rip and Kemp, 1998, Kemp et al., 1998). Each of these levels represent a 
heterogeneous configuration of elements, whereby the ‘higher’ levels are considered to be 
more stable than the ‘lower’ levels, particularly in terms of  the degree to which the elements 
that make-up these levels are aligned with one another (Geels, 2011) (Figure 2.3).  
 
Figure 2.3 Multi-level perspective on transitions (Geels and Schot, 2007) 
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Regime 
Prior to the conceptualisation of the socio-technical regime, the concept of a technological 
regime was introduced by Nelson and Winter (1977), which Genus and Coles (2008) explain 
refers to ‘the beliefs and prevailing successful designs which predispose innovators in firms 
towards development of certain apparently marketable or feasible options but away from 
other less attractive options’ (p.1437). Also making reference to Nelson & Winter’s work, 
Kemp (1994) explains that the ‘concept of a technological regime relates to technicians' beliefs 
about what is feasible or at least worth attempting’ (p.1025), highlighting the example of the 
DC3 aircraft in the 1930s, which ‘defined a particular technological regime: metal skin, low 
wing, piston powered planes’(p.1025). Similarly Dosi (1982) conceptualised the technological 
paradigm as an outlook, i.e. a set of procedures combined with a definition of the relevant 
problems and the knowledge required to deliver solutions to these problems. Dosi argues that 
within each technological paradigm, different definitions of progress are provided, relating to 
specific technological and economic trade-offs, which ultimately result in technological 
trajectories.  
These concepts of a technological regime or paradigm were developed further still to 
encompass a much greater emphasis on the intertwined nature of social and technical system 
components (Kemp et al., 1998, Rip and Kemp, 1998):  
‘A technological regime is the rule-set or grammar embedded in a complex of 
engineering practices, production process technologies, product characteristics, skills 
and procedures, ways of handling relevant artefacts and persons, ways of defining 
problems; all of them embedded in institutions and infrastructures’ (Rip and Kemp, 
1998 p.340) 
The concept of the socio-technical regime, as introduced by Geels (2002b), shares a great deal 
of similarity with the technological regime. Smith et al. (2010) explain that Geels extended a 
sociological sensibility to the concept of the regime, which meant that it now paid much 
greater attention to institutions, user relations, and social expectations. 
Drawing upon his earlier work, Geels defines the socio-technical regime as ‘the locus of 
established practices and associated rules that stabilize existing systems’ (Geels, 2011 p.26). In 
terms of content, it encompasses elements of the technological, user & market, socio-cultural, 
policy and science regimes but not their entirety. Consequently, it serves to ‘capture the meta-
coordination between different sub-regimes’ (Geels, 2011 p.27), emphasising not just the links 
within the regime but between regimes. 
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To help differentiate between the socio-technical system and regime we draw upon the 
comparison provided by Geels (2011): 
Socio-technical system – the tangible and measurable elements, such as artefacts, 
infrastructure, regulations and consumption patterns 
Socio- technical regime – the intangible and underlying deep structures, such as 
engineering beliefs, routines, heuristics, social expectations and visions 
Socio-technical systems are embedded within these regimes, which form the ‘deep structure’ 
that shapes the activities of the actors that reproduce the various aspects of ST systems (Geels, 
2011, Geels, 2004). It is this structure that encourages path dependent, incremental 
innovations, as opposed to disruptive radical innovations, thus lending stability to socio-
technical systems and supporting the emergence of prevailing means by which particular 
societal functions are realised (Geels, 2002b, Smith et al., 2010). However, the regime can 
become destabilized and reconfigured as a consequence of developments at both the 
landscape and niche levels. 
Landscape 
The landscape represents the socio-technical regime’s wider, exogenous context (Geels, 
2002a, Rip and Kemp, 1998) and normally changes very slowly. Examples include demographic 
trends, political ideologies or societal values (Geels, 2011, Smith et al., 2010). The term 
landscape is used to imply hardness and durability in order to emphasise the manner in which 
this abstract level is ‘beyond the direct influence of actors and cannot be changed at will’ 
(Geels, 2005c p.684). The landscape spans different societal functions and unfolds 
autonomously of specific socio-technical regimes (Smith et al., 2010). Quoting Geels and Schot 
(2007), Smith et al. (2010) explain that: 
‘Landscapes provide an influential backdrop with ramifications across a variety of 
regimes and niches: providing gradients and affordances for how to go about 
establishing socio-technical configurations that serve societal needs’ (p.441) 
Landscape developments can exert pressure on the existing regime, which can in some cases 
prompt the regime to become destabilised and consequently, create ‘windows of opportunity’ 
for novelties to gain traction (Geels and Schot, 2007) (Section 2.2.2.5). The landscape can also 
influence change at the niche level by externally influencing the perceptions of niche actors 
and the size of support networks that are responsible for characterizing niche innovations 
(Geels and Schot, 2007). It is also worth noting that the MLP teaches us that change in the 
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socio-technical regime can influence change at the landscape level (Geels and Schot, 
2007)(Figure 2.3). 
Niche 
The niche level is predominantly where radical innovations emerge, which are typically mis-
aligned with the socio-technical regime (Smith et al., 2010). It is these innovations that provide 
the seeds of systemic change (Geels, 2011). Niches represent sheltered spaces (e.g. R&D 
laboratories, subsidised demonstration projects, small market niches) within which these 
radical innovations can be protected from the hostile selection environment prevailing in the 
regime (Rip and Kemp, 1998). It is within these spaces that radical innovations mature via 
three important processes (Geels, 2011, Elzen et al., 1996, Geels and Schot, 2007, Kemp et al., 
1998): 
1) Articulation of expectations and visions, which help to provide legitimacy and direction 
to the niche 
2) Building of social networks to encourage stakeholder interaction and micro-market 
development, which is instrumental in growing the resource base of the niche)  
3) Learning and articulation mechanisms or processes to develop new rules and design 
heuristics (e.g. user preferences, business models, policy instruments etc)  
Through the progression of these three processes niches can gain sufficient momentum to 
challenge the dominance of key elements within the socio-technical regime, particularly during 
periods of regime destabilization (i.e. windows of opportunity). It is the culmination of these 
processes that can trigger a re-configuration of the socio-technical regimes and thus the 
transformation of socio-technical systems. 
2.2.2.3 Transition Pathways 
Geels (2011) explains that socio-technical transitions typically tend to follow a similar pattern 
to one another, where niche-innovations build up internal momentum in niches; landscape 
changes exert pressure on the regime; and the subsequent destabilisation of the regime 
creates windows of opportunity for niche innovations to enter mainstream markets and 
compete with the established regime, potentially leading to its reconfiguration (Geels and 
Schot, 2007, Geels, 2005c). However, it is considered that although often similar, transitions 
can characteristically differ from one another and thus follow different pathways. For instance, 
they can differ with respect  to the timing of multi-level interactions, as well as the nature of 
multi-level interactions, which may be competitive or symbiotic (Geels and Schot, 2007). 
Consequently, 5 key transition pathways have been identified and these are as follows (Geels, 
2002b, Geels and Schot, 2007, Geels, 2011): 
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 Reproduction – No external landscape pressure means the regime remains 
dynamically stable and continues to produce itself 
 Transformation – Landscape developments destabilize the regime but niche- 
innovations are immature. No breakthrough for niche innovations but experiences 
from these are translated and accommodated in the regime 
 Substitution – Landscape developments destabilize the regime when a niche-
innovation is mature. Window of opportunity emerges for the niche innovation to 
replace the regime 
 De-alignment/re-alignment – Landscape developments destabilize regime when 
multiple niche-innovations are mature. These all take advantage of this window of 
opportunity, creating uncertainty around which will become dominant until alignment 
eventually occurs around a single one  
 Re-configuration - Landscape developments destabilize the regime when a niche-
innovation is mature, which is symbiotic to the regime. This enables incumbent actors 
to adopt this as an add-on, which may subsequently trigger other adjustments and 
change the regime’s basic architecture 
2.2.2.4 Applications of the MLP 
The MLP has been applied to a number of historical, contemporary and forward looking 
empirical case studies, in order to provide insight into the processes responsible for driving 
systemic change. With respect to historical studies, the MLP has been applied to improve our 
understanding of a multitude of important historical transitions in socio-technical systems, in 
relation to shipping (Geels, 2002b), cargo handling (Van Driel and Schot, 2005), land transport 
(Geels, 2005b), hygiene (Geels, 2005a) etc. Contemporary studies of socio-technical system 
change include transitions of animal husbandry (Elzen et al., 2011), organic food (Seyfang and 
Smith, 2007) and housing (Seyfang and Smith, 2007) socio-technical systems. Of particular 
relevance to this research project are the numerous studies that have explored a wide range of 
contemporary energy system transformations (Geels and Raven, 2006, Raven, 2004, Raven and 
Verbong, 2009, Verbong and Geels, 2007).  
The MLP has also been applied to examine how we might facilitate transitions to socio-
technical system states in the future, which are in synthesis with current normative goals, such 
as realising sustainable development. This approach is known as Transition Management 
(Rotmans et al., 2001, Smith et al., 2005). Studies of this type have typically examined the 
conditions that would most likely enable us to shift towards more sustainable socio-technical 
system states in the future, representing a form of ‘problem-oriented thinking for sustainable 
transitions’ (Smith et al., 2010 p.439). Studies of this ilk have examined how transitions to 
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more sustainable transport systems (Köhler et al., 2009, Nykvist and Whitmarsh, 2008, van 
Bree et al., 2010) or cities (Hodson and Marvin, 2010) might take place. The MLP has also been 
applied to explore plausible transitions to more sustainable energy systems (Verbong and 
Geels, 2010, Hofman and Elzen, 2010, Foxon et al., 2010). 
2.2.2.5 Critique of the MLP 
Much of the allure of the MLP can be attributed to the way in which it rejects simple causality 
in socio-technical transitions. It seeks to identify the various non-linear processes, across 
multiple dimensions and levels that are responsible for triggering and characterizing socio-
technical system change (Geels, 2011). Smith et al. (2010) commend the MLP for seeking to 
package this complexity into a single, relatively straightforward framework, which is able to 
provide insight into system transformations. However, they warn that it could be over 
simplistic and fail to capture the complexity inherent in system change. 
A key strength of the MLP is that it presents a framework through which causal narratives of 
transitions can be told. These stories help to illustrate the sequence of events that are 
responsible for triggering and shaping socio-technical transitions: ‘reality occurs not as time-
bounded snapshots within which “causes” affect one another…but as stories, cascades of 
events’ (Abbott, 1991 p.227). The MLP therefore represents an effective means of illustrating 
how sequential and inter-related events are responsible for systemic change. 
The MLP also underlines how the timing of multi-level interactions has an influence on the 
type of system change that takes place: ‘If landscape pressure occurs at a time when niche-
innovations are not yet fully developed, the transition path will be different than when they 
are fully developed’ (Geels and Schot, 2007 p.405). This has given rise to the term ‘windows of 
opportunity’ that relate to a period of regime destabilization during which niche innovations 
have a much better chance of gaining wide-scale traction, compared to before or after this 
period. Consideration of this temporal dimension means the MLP lends itself well to 
explanations of lock-in and path dependency, emphasising the importance historical 
developments in shaping future system change. 
Despite the various strengths of this approach, it has also been subject to criticism, which has 
to some extent been subsequently addressed by exponents of this literature. The approach has 
in the past been criticised for being niche-bias, i.e. placing undue emphasis on the importance 
of bottom up dynamics in system change (Berkhout et al., 2004, Smith et al., 2005). This was 
addressed to a large extent by Geels and Schot (2007) with their typology of transition 
pathways that emphasises the critical role the regime and landscape levels also played in 
triggering and shaping system change. Geels (2011) explains that broader change models, such 
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as political revolutions, could potentially provide ‘fruitful terrain for future research on large-
scale transitions, which goes beyond an exclusive bottom-up bias’ (p.33), as illustrated by 
Dahle (2007). 
The MLP has also attracted criticism for being difficult to apply to empirical studies, mainly due 
to confusion around how abstract concepts such as niche, regime and landscape should be 
applied empirically (Berkhout et al., 2004, Genus and Coles, 2008). For instance, what may 
seem to represent the regime at one scale may only constitute a critical aspect of the structure 
of a wider regime. This can be partly attributed to the way in which the ‘role of places and 
spatial scales in these transition processes has not been an explicit issue of concern’ (Smith et 
al., 2010). It is for these reasons the MLP has struggled to not only be tractable to policy-
makers (Shove and Walker, 2007) but also empirical researcher seeking to identify specific 
causal factors that shape socio-technical transitions. The inaccessibility of the MLP to empirical 
researchers has been exacerbated by the lack of methodological coherence within this 
approach, as exhibited by the unsystematic approach taken to application of the MLP, which 
must be addressed if the approach is to go beyond illustration and exploration, and towards 
systematic research (Genus and Coles, 2008).  
The MLP has also attracted criticism for failing to accommodate the role critical actors play in 
shaping or managing transitions (Genus and Coles, 2008, Shove and Walker, 2007, Smith et al., 
2005, Smith et al., 2010). The approach has been accused of ‘undervaluing the role of agency 
and politics’ (Genus and Coles, 2008) in socio-technical transitions, i.e. the ‘playing out of 
power’ (Shove and Walker, 2007). In response, Geels (2011) explains that the MLP is ‘shot 
through’ with agency8 but would benefit from greater attention to the different types of 
agency that is responsible for shaping transitions. Particularly relevant to this study is Geels’ 
suggestion that the MLP could benefit from incorporating insight from the literature on 
business studies, strategic management and corporate alliance as a means of improving our 
understanding of how incumbent regime actors can retain their dominant position via 
different forms of agency and power or even collaborate with new entrants to develop niche-
innovations.  
Finally, the last key criticism of the MLP, which is particularly relevant to this research, is the 
lack of attention it has paid to the role of non-technological innovation in transitions. Holtz et 
al. (2008) explain that despite the attempts to incorporate the ‘social’ dimension into our 
                                                          
8 Agency in this context refers to the capacity of an individual or organisation to make their 
own free choices and consequently, act independently. It is often referred to as the 
counterpoint for structure, which constrains actors ability to make their own choices and act 
accordingly 
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explanations of system change, ‘the focus of “socio-technical regimes” remains centred on 
technological development’ where soft factors (e.g. institutions, culture, behavioural patterns 
etc) are only included ‘when necessary to explain technological change’ (p.625). In the socio-
technical transitions literature ‘it is commonplace for studies to take a technical artefact as an 
entry point’ (Witkamp et al., 2011 p.669), even though some radical innovations do not 
necessarily revolve around artefacts, such as business models (Witkamp et al., 2011). This 
means that transitions with important cultural and societal aspects or units of analysis may 
have been neglected (Geels, 2005a), where technology has not been the most important 
factor responsible for shaping socio-technical system change (Holtz et al., 2008). This 
research’s focuses on business model innovation seeks to address this criticism of 
sustainability transitions research to some extent by providing valuable insight into the role 
non-technological niche innovations play in socio-technical transitions, as well as the 
relationship between non-technological and technological niche innovations.  
In summary, the MLP represents a valuable heuristic device for understanding socio-technical 
system transitions as multi-level processes (Genus and Coles, 2008), where the timing and 
nature of interactions are critical to the trajectory of a transition. However, we argue that the 
MLP does not constitute an analytical framework that is designed to identify the causal 
mechanisms that might be responsible for supporting or inhibiting the proliferation of novel, 
sustainable business models, as well as the ways in which the adoption of these models could 
influence the evolution of the socio-technical system. Although the MLP may one day present 
a fruitful means of exploring these questions, its current lack of methodological rigour, as well 
as its neglect of different forms of agency and techno-centric focus means that whilst we seek 
to draw insight from this literature, we do not regard it as an appropriate framework for an 
investigation into the co-evolutionary relationship between innovative energy business models 
and their energy systems. Consequently, we turn to the complimentary (MacKenzie, 1992) but 
conceptually distinct ‘evolutionary’ approach to technological, industrial and economic system 
change, which places a much greater emphasis on variation, selection and retention processes, 
as opposed to sociological concepts of alignment between heterogeneous system components 
in order to explain socio-technical transitions (Foxon, 2011). 
 
 
 
44 
 
 
2.3 Evolutionary Approaches to Technological, Industrial and 
Economic Change 
The principles of biological evolution have been extended and applied to non-biological 
contexts to help explain the factors that have been responsible for socio-technical system 
change. This approach has been termed Universal Darwinism (Dawkins, 1983 ) or Generalised 
Darwinism9 (Hodgson and Knudsen, 2004a, Dennett, 1995) and the central thrust of this 
approach is that ‘the core Darwinian principles of variation, replication, and selection may 
apply not only to biological phenomena but also to other open and evolving systems, including 
human, cultural or social evolution’ (Hodgson, 2005 p.899). In this sense the evolution of 
biological systems constitutes a special case of evolution, as opposed to the sole case. 
However, evolutionary theory is only considered to provide insight into the mechanisms of 
non-biological system change if the system contains at least one population ‘of replicating 
entities that makes imperfect copies of themselves, and not all of these entities have the 
potential to survive’ (Hodgson, 2005 p.900). According to Generalised Darwinism (Dennet, 
1995, Hodgson and Knudsen, 2006, Aldrich and Ruef, 2006) a population is said to evolve: 
‘as long as many different entities (variation) are created, whether these entities are 
simple actions of individuals or entire organizations, as long as consistent selection 
pressures eliminate ill-adapted entities (selection), and as long as the entities have 
stability across time (retention), the surviving entities will be well-adapted to their 
environments’ (Murmann, 2012 p.2) 
Importantly however there are some key differences between applying evolutionary principles 
to help explain biological and non-biological phenomena (Buenstorf, 2006, Hodgson, 2002). 
We take care to highlight these in the following sub-section, with reference to the three core 
evolutionary processes: variation, selection and retention. 
2.3.1 Variation, Selection & Retention of Non-biological Populations 
2.3.1.1 Variation 
Non-biological variation is understood to be generated through innovation processes that arise 
in a population of heterogeneous actors, which are consequently responsible for the 
characteristic diversity in such populations (Suurs, 2009, van den Bergh et al., 2006). In the 
context of organisational change, Aldrich and Ruef (2006) explain that variation manifests itself 
as a ‘change from current routines and competencies [and/or a] change in organizational 
forms’ (p.17).  
                                                          
9 These two terms are inter-changeable and we make reference to Generalised Darwinism to 
refer to both 
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With reference to Campbell’s (1960) concept of blind variation, Simonton (1995) explains that 
in a similar way to evolution processes in the natural world, human actors can often lack a 
significant degree of foresight in the production of non-biological variations or innovations, 
consequently hindering their ability to purposively generate the most adaptive variations. 
Importantly, ‘in social systems the generation of variation is sometimes partly guided, while in 
biological systems it is accidental through mutations’ (Kallis and Norgaard, 2010 p.690). For 
instance, whilst genetic variations are the product of random re-combinations and mutations, 
non-biological variation can emerge in response to the needs of the organism (Mayr, 1991). 
Variations can be the result of conscious design, where novelties are designed to meet the 
needs of actors (Cordes, 2006). Consequently, non-biological variation is often anything but 
random because they have been designed with a purpose in mind: ‘a variant’s features are 
bound to be correlated with their intended purpose for its maker’ (Cordes, 2006 p.533). 
Therefore, in the context of non-biological  evolution, variation and selection are not 
necessarily independent of one another (Khalil, 1995, Ziman, 2000).  
Another important difference is that non-biological variety is introduced by populations that 
are not completely blind to the ultimate fate of the variation they generate (Cordes, 2006). 
With reference to innovation as a form of variation, actors possess some insight into the 
degree of fitness their innovations are likely to share with the existing or emerging selection 
environment. This insight is likely to shape the characteristics of the innovations actors 
generate as they seek to structure the design of these innovations in a bid to ensure they share 
a strong degree of fitness with the wider selection environment. 
2.3.1.2 Selection 
As in biological contexts, selection of non-biological variants is conducted through a selection 
environment, which relates to the multitude of forces that differentially select or selectively 
eliminate variations (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006). It is via selection, predominantly in the form of 
adoption, imitation and diffusion, that the internal variation of populations is reduced (Nelson 
and Winter, 1982). With respect to firms we are able to draw a distinction between internal 
and external selection environments, which are responsible for influencing their routines and 
competencies (Glynn, 2002, Aldrich and Ruef, 2006). Here the internal environment relates to 
forces internal to the organization, whilst the external relates to forces external to an 
organization (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006).  
Non-biological evolution differs to biological in the way that humans can evaluate the 
significance of variations ex ante, meaning they are able to opt against the selection of 
potentially ineffective or undesirable novelties: ‘the driving forces of socio-economic 
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evolutionary change involve human cognition, wants and creativity’ (Cordes, 2006 p.534). 
Conversely, biologically evaluation occurs ex post via natural selection, as is the nature of 
random mutations that occur during the process of genetic transmission (Witt, 2005). The key 
difference here is that humans often determine which types of non-biological variations 
(innovations) they adopt (Cordes, 2006). This concept is encapsulated by Campbell’s (1960) 
notion of selective retention, which refers to the selection of stable configurations and the 
elimination of unstable configurations by actors (Heylighen, 1992), where actors’ perceptions 
of the performance of past variations has an important influence on whether they select these. 
Socio-economic selection is also characterized by the concept of bounded rationality, 
pioneered by Herbert Simon (1955, 1959)  and later developed by Nelson and Winter (1982). It 
teaches us that actors are unable to attain perfect information to base their decision making 
upon, meaning they are not perfectly rationale entities but are instead limited in their ability 
to make rational decisions, resulting in sub-optimal development. Consequently, this notion 
contradicts that of perfect rationality, which forms one of the guiding principles of neo-
classical economics. In drawing upon Simon’s and Nelson & Winter’s work, Foxon (2011) 
explains that actors: 
‘act under conditions of uncertainty within a given institutional context. Rather than 
being profit-maximising, firms follow routines that ‘satisfice’ rather than optimise, i.e. 
that give rise to satisfactory levels of profit or performance and are only changed when 
outcomes are no longer satisfactory, due to internal or external changes’ (p.2260) 
Actors therefore do not make decisions entirely rationally but instead, they do so according to 
routines (e.g. R & D strategy). Drawing upon earlier work on this phenomenon (Dosi, 1982, 
Nelson and Winter, 1982, Simon, 1969), Suurs (2009) explains that these routines act as a form 
of search heuristic that limits the possibility space for taking action. These firm-level routines 
are only likely to change following a process of searching for superior techniques, commenced 
in order to satisfy an important criteria. As a consequence of their bounded rationality, firms 
will ‘usually look for incremental improvements in techniques or imitation of the practices of 
other firms’ and these search processes ‘will be terminated when firms satisfice by attaining a 
given aspiration level’ (Foxon, 2003 p.6). In summary, human actors’ selection of variations is 
not considered to be optimal. It is also worth noting that selection may also be linked with the 
struggle between populations of organisations for scarce resources (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006): 
‘In a world of limited resources, only some organizations can obtain the land, labour, capital, 
and other things they need to survive’ (p.26).  
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2.3.1.3 Retention 
‘Retention occurs when variations are preserved, duplicated, or otherwise reproduced so that 
the selected activities are repeated on future occasions or the selected structures appear again 
in future generations’ (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006 p.23). In this sense, habits, routines and 
institutions do not just persist but are replicated (Hodgson, 2002). However, their replication is 
often imperfect resulting in the emergence of new variations that are related but 
characteristically different to others (Hodgson, 2002). Retention can therefore be explained as 
follows: 
‘Retained variations are passed, with more or less additional variation, from surviving 
organizations to those that follow, and from old to new founders, employees, and 
managers. Replication occurs via people observing one another, through training and 
education, learning appropriate rules of behaviour, and interacting with machines and 
documents’ (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006 p.24) 
Hull (1989) explains that in order to explain retention one must identify an interactor and a 
replicator. Here the replicator is defined as ‘an entity that passes on its structure largely intact 
in successive replications’ and the interactor as ‘an entity that interacts as a cohesive whole 
with its environment in such a way that this interaction causes replication to be differential’ 
(p.96). In the context of biological sciences, the human organism would represent the 
interactor, whilst the human’s genes would represent the replicator. In the spirit of 
Generalised Darwinism, Dawkins (1976) applied the principles of evolution to explain 
transmission of units of cultural replication and selection, which he refers to as memes. He 
explained that cultural replicators, such as a tune or an idea, are passed on from generation to 
generation via human interactors. In the context of the evolution of organisational 
populations, the habits and routines of a firm constitute replicators, whilst the firm and other 
organisations constitute the interactors (Hodgson and Knudsen, 2004b). 
This sub-section has served to illustrate how the evolutionary processes of variation, selection 
and retention that shape non-biological populations are similar but differentiated from those 
applied to biological populations. We now briefly explore how an evolutionary approach has 
been adopted to help explain technological and industrial change. 
2.3.2 Evolutionary Approaches to Non-Biological System Change 
Born from Schumpeter’s (1934, 1942) early work on waves of creative destruction and later 
developed by Nelson and Winter (1982), the field of evolutionary economics emerged, which 
has sought to explain economic change through the application of evolutionary theory. 
Importantly, this field forms a critique of neoclassical economics, and drawing upon 
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Schumpeter’s work, it stresses that economies and markets are not in static equilibrium but 
are in fact in continuous turmoil, subject to the ‘perennial gale of creative destruction’ 
(Schumpeter, 1942 p.87), which means their structural conditions are in constant flux. 
Consequently, evolutionary economics teaches us that these represent thoroughly 
unpredictable environments, a point of view which jars with neoclassical economic thinking 
(Suurs, 2009).  
Building on this, van den Bergh et al. (2006) explains that evolutionary economics is 
characterised by six basic concepts: bounded rationality, diversity, innovation, selection, path 
dependency and lock-in, the latter we explore in greater detail later in this chapter. It is 
important to note that this approach, in a similar fashion to the socio-technical transitions 
literature evolutionary economics also emphasises the importance of both social and technical 
dimensions in shaping non-biological systems change. However, it separates socio-technical 
system components into discrete populations for analytic purposes, because evolutionary 
explanations are concerned with the processes responsible for characteristic changes in 
populations (Hodgson, 2005). 
Within this field, a group of scholars have focused in particular upon how evolutionary theory 
can be applied to provide insight into the nature of technological change. Drawing upon the 
pioneering work of both Dosi (1982) and Nelson and Winter (1982), Foxon (2011) explains that 
‘industrial innovation is constrained by shared assumptions and decision rules, so that change 
follows ‘technological trajectories’ within ‘technological paradigms’ (p.2260). This approach to 
system change teaches us not only that technology evolves within a particular social and 
economic context but also that the types of technologies that are developed and subsequently 
utilised also shape their environment. Consequently, technological evolution is considered to 
be dynamic, cumulative, systemic and uncertain (Grübler, 1998, Grubler and Gritsevskyi, 2002): 
Dynamic – Technological change is characterized by the continuous introduction of 
variations and continuous improvements/modifications of existing ones 
Cumulative – Technological innovations are representative of new forms of 
technological knowledge that cannot be created without prior knowledge, hence 
technological change is inherently cumulative  
Systemic – A change in a component of a large technological system will result in 
changes elsewhere in that system 
Uncertain - The form and applicability of new technological innovations and the 
diffusion of these cannot be known beforehand 
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2.3.2.1 Innovation Systems 
One approach that also applies evolutionary principles to socio-technical system change is the 
Innovation Systems discourse. In its broadest terms an innovation system is understood to 
incorporate the ‘determinants of innovation processes; all important economic, social, 
political, organisational, institutional, and other factors that influence the development, 
diffusion, and use of innovations’ (Edquist, 2004 p.182). In their review of the literature, Suurs 
(2009) explain that: 
‘The central idea behind the IS approach is that determinants of technological change 
are not (only) to be found in individual firms or in research institutes, but also in a 
broader societal structure in which firms, as well as knowledge institutes, are 
embedded’ (p.35)  
Edquist (1997) explains that this approach is not only limited to technological innovations but 
also non-technological forms of innovation and how the approach situates innovation and 
learning processes at the centre of its focus. Edquist continues to explain that the approach 
employs a holistic and interdisciplinary perspective to system change, in conjunction with a 
historical and evolutionary perspective, which renders the notion of optimality irrelevant. 
Finally, he emphasises the approach’s focus on interdependence, the non-linearity of 
innovation processes and the significant influence of institutions on innovation. The approach 
has been applied at various different scales, namely technology specific (Carlsson and 
Stankiewicz, 1991), sectoral (Malerba, 2002), regional (Cooke et al., 1997) and national 
(Freeman, 1988).  
Both the Innovation Systems approach and other similar approaches, including the MLP, have 
not only incorporated evolutionary but also co-evolutionary concepts to help explain socio-
technical system change. We now explore this body of theory in greater detail to outline how 
it can help to provide insight into the nature of socio-technical transitions. 
2.3.3 Co-evolution of Socio-Technical Dimensions 
As a strand of evolutionary theory, coevolution has been developed to provide insight into 
how and why two or more populations can causally influence each other’s evolution 
(Murmann, 2003, Norgaard, 1994), i.e. the fundamental evolutionary processes of variation, 
selection and retention these populations are subject to (Murmann, 2012). Importantly, co-
evolution only occurs between populations and these must be separable (Murmann, 2003). 
For instance, Thompson (1994) explains that coevolution takes place between some plants and 
insects, where the plant constitutes food for the insect, whilst the latter serves to spread the 
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plant’s pollen. However, more recently this approach has been applied to help explain how the 
causal inter-relationships between populations of producers, users, technologies, institutions 
etc and how these have shaped the trajectory of one another’s evolution (Kallis, 2007, Kallis 
and Norgaard, 2010, Nelson, 1994, Norgaard, 1994, Murmann, 2003, Murmann, 2012) 
In his earlier work Murmann (2003) explains that coevolution predominantly arises through 
two avenues: by altering the selection criteria or by changing the replicative capacity of 
individuals in the population without necessarily altering the selection criteria (Murmann, 
2003). However, in his more recent work Murmann (2012) includes changes to variation 
processes. He explains that in order to prove coevolution, one must be able to demonstrate 
that reciprocal (bidirectional) causal mechanisms between the two populations influence 
change in at least one of the three evolutionary processes (i.e. variation, selection and 
retention).  
2.3.3.1 Path dependency & lock-in 
Kallis (2007) emphasises that ‘coevolutionary change is path dependent’ (p.2) and so, in broad 
terms, ‘what happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes of a 
sequence of events occurring at a later point in time’ (Sewell, 1996 p.262-3). In other words 
history constitutes an important consideration when examining system change (Lovio, 2011). 
In this sense innovation can be considered ‘cumulative’, in the sense that current innovations 
draw upon some of the characteristics of those that preceded them (Nelson, 1994). 
Consequently, the evolution of systems can follow irreversible pathways, representing ‘an 
important distinction from neoclassical economic theory, which suggests that a system can 
return to an optimal configuration’ (van den Bergh et al., 2006 p.60).  
Adopting a coevolutionary approach has proven particularly useful for illuminating the ‘on-
going positive feedbacks between components of evolving systems’ (Norgaard, 1994 p.82) that 
have led to path-dependent increasing returns to adoption. Drawing on the work undertaken 
by Maruyama (1968), Murmann (2012) explains that reciprocal causal processes can create 
positive (deviation-amplifying) or negative (deviation-countering) feedback loops or 
mechanisms. Positive feedback loops are responsible for amplifying small initial differences 
between firms or technologies over time, which can help explain the proliferation of certain 
innovations over others. Hekkert et al. (2007) identified three typical forms of positive 
feedback in socio-technical systems (Figure 2.4). We focus here on two of these here, 
feedbacks A & B. The first relates to entrepreneurs lobbying for market formation, or in other 
words a more ‘even playing field’ for their organisation’s operations, thus helping to support 
their entrepreneurial activities. In turn this provides them with a greater capacity to lobby 
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other system actors in order to cultivate more favourable market conditions for their own 
business operations (feedback A). The latter feedback relates to when firms can lobby for 
greater resources to perform R&D, which can in turn lead to knowledge creation and thus, 
higher expectations that guide the search for entrepreneurial activities. Ultimately this can 
lead to greater lobbying power to help secure additional R & D resources, bringing us back to 
the start of ‘feedback B’. 
 
Figure 2.4 Three typical positive feedbacks in socio-technical systems (Hekkert et al., 2007) 
One particular group of positive feedbacks that have been associated with such developments 
are increasing returns to the adoption of a technology, which describe ‘the tendency for that 
which is ahead to get further ahead’ and which also explain why ‘that which loses advantage 
[loses] further advantage’ (Arthur, 1996 p.100). Arthur (1989, 1994) explored how increasing 
returns could help to explain the dominance of certain technologies over others, otherwise 
referred to as ‘lock-in’. He introduced 4 types of increasing returns, namely: 
Scale Economies - Unit costs decline with increasing output 
Learning Effects -The accumulation of specialised skills and knowledge through 
production and market experience results in the product becoming improved or 
cheaper 
Adaptive Expectations - Increasing adoption of a technology reduces the level of 
uncertainty surrounding its use, thus potentially reducing the market pull of 
alternative technologies 
Network Economies - When agents benefit from other agents adopting the same 
technologies  
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This phenomenon has been illustrated in a variety of ways, of which the QWERTY keyboard 
case study is probably one of the most well-known (David, 1985). The case highlights the 
dominance of the QWERTY keyboard layout design, which has become the international 
standard at a global-scale, despite competition from more efficient alternatives.  Another good 
example is the triumph of the VHS video format over BETAMAX (Arthur 1990). Increasing 
returns have also been used to explain the lock-in of energy technologies, such as the success 
of alternating current (AC) over direct current (DC) as a network standard (David and Bunn, 
1988) and the market dominance of the light water nuclear reactor (Cowan, 1990). Increasing 
returns have consequently helped to explain how technologies that gain an early lead from 
competitors can come to dominate the market. 
Path dependency has also been expanded to explain non-technological forms of lock-in, such 
as institutional lock-in (North, 1990). Pierson (2000) supports North’s argument and explains 
that (1) the central role of collective action, (2) the high density of institutions, (3) the 
possibilities for using political authority to enhance asymmetries of power; and (4) the intrinsic 
complexity and opacity of politics makes political institutions particularly prone to increasing 
returns. In particular, he underlines the importance of the incumbent political power being 
able to wield its power to enact changes that enhance their power. It is possible that 
technological and institutional increasing returns can be mutually reinforcing via 
coevolutionary processes (Foxon, 2011). 
2.3.3.2 Coevolutionary explanations of empirical system change 
Coevolutionary approaches are considered important to ‘illuminate processes of long-term 
industrial and economic change’ (Foxon, 2011 p.2261). One of the most frequently cited 
studies was led by Murmann (2003, 2012), who has investigated the extent to which 
coevolutionary interactions between technological development, institutional change and 
business strategies have been responsible for shaping the early development of the synthetic 
dye industry, as well as why certain firms and nations captured dominant shares in the market. 
He identified three causal mechanisms in particular, which were responsible for shaping the 
evolution of the industry: the exchange of personnel, commercial ties and lobbying (Murmann, 
2012). In both Figure 2.5 and Table 2.1 we illustrate how the causal mechanism of personnel 
exchange between the synthetic dye industry and academia has had an influence on the 
variation, selection and retention processes of both populations. 
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Figure 2.5 Exchange of Personnel as a Causal Mechanism of Evolutionary Change and Its Effect on the 
Evolution of Industries and Academic Disciplines (Murmann, 2012) 
 
Evolutionary 
Process 
Exchange of Personnel 
Synthetic Dye Industry Academia 
Variation Academically acquired knowledge allows 
individuals to come up with novel business 
ideas and increase the founding rate of firms 
Industry experience allows academic 
researchers to come up with novel scientific 
ideas, applications, and method 
Selection Firms that are able to hire the best talent 
from an academic discipline are likely to 
flourish from this access to scarce resources 
Academic researchers who are able to recruit 
talent with useful knowledge from industry 
will increase their access to scarce resources 
and be more productive 
Retention Firms that recruit personnel from a particular 
academic discipline will more readily retain 
knowledge related to the cognitive structure 
and methodologies of the disciplines 
Academic disciplines that recruit personnel 
from industrial firms will more readily retain 
knowledge that is relevant for practical 
application 
Table 2.1 Exchange of Personnel as a Causal Mechanism of Evolutionary Change and Its Effect on the 
Evolution of Industries and Academic Disciplines (Murmann, 2012 p.17) 
Coevolutionary studies of energy system change have also been conducted. For example, 
Stenzel and Frenzel (2008) have examined how incumbent energy companies coordinated the 
development of their technological capabilities and their political activities in order to shape 
their regulatory environment, which can have a significant impact upon the take-up of 
renewable energy technologies, such as wind power. Other work has examined the 
coevolutionary processes that shape innovation in the UK electricity distribution network 
industry, highlighting the importance of the interplay between institutional structures and 
technical infrastructure in shaping the energy industry (Bolton and Foxon, 2011). 
Turning to sustainable energy transitions, numerous scholars have examined how co-
evolutionary processes between technologies, institutions and organisations have resulted in 
positive feedbacks that have served to lock-in modern, carbon based energy systems, 
predicated on large-scale centralised electricity generation (Unruh, 2000, Unruh, 2002, Carillo-
Hermosilla, 2006, Marechal, 2007, Foxon, 2007, Unruh, 2006). Their work has also served to 
understand how lock-in processes have limited the adoption of alternative, low-carbon 
technologies and processes.  
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Unruh (2000), who applies co-evolutionary theory to explain the persistence of carbon-based 
socio-technical systems, explains that carbon lock-in can be explained by the coevolution of 
technological systems and governing institutions, coining the term Techno-Institutional 
Complex (TIC) to emphasise this notion. It is the expectations and preferences that these 
institutions represent that ‘co-evolve with, and become adapted to, the dominant 
technological system in an endogenous path-dependent manner’ (p.824). Technological 
systems and governing institutions thus become intimately inter-linked and feed off one 
another in a self-referential system, helping to explain the resilience of today’s carbon-based 
energy systems to change. He adds that lock-in is initiated by technological increasing returns 
but is ‘perpetuated by the emergence of dominant technological, organizational and 
institutional designs’ (p.826). Unruh turns to the US to illustrate how positive feedbacks 
between the technological, social, institutional and organisations dimensions have served to 
lock-in the current electricity system (Figure 2.6).  
 
Figure 2.6 An illustration of the techno-institutional complex that fosters lock-in in electric power 
networks 
2.3.3.3 Coevolutionary frameworks for system change 
A handful of scholars have developed analytical frameworks for non-biological coevolutionary 
change. These have been designed to provide insight into the types of bidirectional 
relationships that exist between populations in socio-technical systems and the way in which 
these causally influence one another’s evolution. Norgaard (1994) introduced a coevolutionary 
framework that made an analytical separation between five different dimensions that were 
considered to represent the core building blocks of socio-technical or socio-economic systems. 
These included values, organization, technologies, environment and knowledge. The decision 
to analytical separate these dimensions is in synthesis with the logic of Freeman and Louca 
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(2001) who explain that these different systems evolve under their own dynamic, however 
their evolution is also causally influenced through interaction with other systems.  
This framework was recently developed by Foxon (2011) who sought to combine insight from 
coevolutionary theory with that from the socio-technical transitions theory to develop a 
coevolutionary framework for analysing a transition to a sustainable low carbon economy. 
Through his review of the literature, he emphasises the importance of the coevolution 
between technologies, institutions and business strategies, which were not adequately 
accommodated for in Norgaard’s framework. Consequently, he altered the dimensions of the 
coevolutionary framework presented by Norgaard (1994) so that attention is focused upon the 
causal interactions between five heterogeneous key sub-systems that include ecosystems, 
institutions, user practices, business strategies and technologies (Figure 2.7). 
 
Figure 2.7 Foxon’s (2011) coevolutionary framework 
We now briefly define each of these dimensions according to Foxon: 
 Technologies – ‘systems of methods and designs for transforming matter, energy and 
information from one state to another in pursuit of a goal or goals’ (p.2262) 
 Ecosystems – ‘systems of natural flows and interactions that maintain and enhance 
living systems’ (p.2262) 
 Institutions – ‘ways of structuring human interactions’ (p.2262) 
 User Practices – ‘routinised, culturally embedded patterns of behaviour relating to 
fulfilling human needs and wants’ (p.2263) 
 Business Strategies – ‘the means and processes by which firms organise their 
activities so as to fulfil their socio-economic purposes’ (p.2262) 
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2.3.3.4 Critique of Coevolutionary Theory 
Section 2.3 has sought to identify how the application of evolutionary and coevolutionary 
theory presents a compelling, population focused approach to explaining the nature of socio-
technical system change and systemic transitions (Kemp and van den Bergh, 2006). We argue 
that the frameworks presented by Norgaard (1994) and Foxon (2011) present an attractive 
framework for tracing how the evolution of each of these five dimensions is causally linked to 
the evolution of the other dimensions and vice versa. 
It is however worth noting that this approach has drawn some criticism. For instance, 
Murmann (2003) warns that ‘not everything that looks like coevolution is really coevolution’ 
(p.23) because coevolution may be mimicked by other processes such as sequential 
adaptations from different causes or even simultaneous adaption of two populations to the 
same environment (Nitecki, 1983). Murmann (2003) therefore explains that ‘the only way to 
establish true coevolution as opposed to spurious coevolution is to gather evidence of cross-
flows among the alleged coevolving systems’ (p.23). However, Kallis (2007) warns that 
identifying two or more potentially co-evolving populations and the fitness criteria these are 
subject to, constitutes a particularly challenging process. 
Other concerns relate the notion that coevolution occurs at various different levels, between 
and within nested hierarchies of different types of system (e.g. social, biological, technical etc): 
‘Complexity explodes as coevolution within hierarchical systems (i.e. among interacting 
hierarchical levels) combines with coevolution between different biological and social 
hierarchical systems’(Kallis and Norgaard, 2010 p.696). This degree of complexity can make co-
evolutionary studies of socio-technical systems very challenging. Furthermore, the boundaries 
and geography of these interacting systems also represents an important consideration as 
these will ultimately influence the types of interactions that take place. Kallis and Norgaard 
(2010) explain that to date, space and isolation remain under-theorized in coevolutionary 
studies of socio-technical system change. They also warn that coevolutionary approaches tend 
to fail to fully account for the power relationships between human agents, which can naturally 
influence not only the type but the strength of the causal influences between populations.  
As in the socio-technical transitions literature, we argue there is also significant scope for 
additional research to examine the coevolutionary relationship between business models and 
the various different dimensions of socio-technical systems, to build upon the excellent work 
undertaken by Murmann (2003, 2012). Such a focus would provide valuable insight into the 
causal mechanisms responsible for inhibiting or enabling sustainable business models ability to 
gain traction and how such models would causally influence the evolution of the various 
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dimensions that make up the wider socio-technical system. Additional research into this co-
evolutionary relationship would also help to elucidate our understanding of whether positive 
feedbacks also subject business models to lock-in, in a similar way to technologies and 
institutions. This will in turn elucidate our understanding of the factors behind the persistence 
of unsustainable, incumbent business models and the marginalisation of novel, sustainable 
business models. 
Having identified the lack of attention paid to the role business models play in the evolution of 
socio-technical systems and consequently, the role they might play in system transitions, we 
now turn to the business and management literature to illustrate how business models both 
shape and are shaped by their wider environment. 
2.4 Business Models, Business Model Innovation and System Change 
2.4.1 The Business Model Concept 
Zott et al. (2011) explain that the concept of the business model emerged from the e-
Commerce, Strategy and Technology & Innovation Management literature. The concept was 
applied in e-Commerce to ‘describe new gestalts and Internet-based ways of ‘doing 
business’(p.17), as well as to provide taxonomies of businesses. Within the Strategy literature 
it has been applied to ‘explain new network- and activity system–based value creation 
mechanisms and sources of competitive advantage’ (p.17). Finally, within the Technology and 
Innovation Management literature it emerged to explain how technology is commercialized, as 
well as new networked modes of innovation. 
In their review of the literature, Zott et al. (2011) explain that some confusion continues to 
exist around what exactly constitutes a business model. To help address this they recently 
conducted a detailed review of the business model literature in order to identify a number of 
common themes relating to conceptualisation of business models. The first theme was that 
business models provide an explanation of how firms do business, i.e. how they create and 
capture value. Osterwalder & Pigneur (2010) explain that a ‘business model describes the 
rationale of how an organization creates, delivers and captures value’ (p.14) by fulfilling the 
needs or desires of its customers, because ‘at its most basic level, a company exists to deliver 
value in return for compensation’ (Johnson, 2010 p.6). A business model symbolizes what it is 
an organisation believes their customers want, how they want it, how it believes it should 
organize itself and interact with others to best meet those needs, and in turn, how it will 
generate revenue from doing so (Johnson et al., 2008, Teece, 2010). Business models 
therefore represent stories that illustrate how an enterprise entices consumers to pay for the 
value it creates, and how it converts these payments into profit (Teece, 2010, Magretta, 2002).  
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The second key emergent theme was that a business model represents a systemic 
representation of how firms create, deliver and capture value (Dubosson-Torbay et al., 2002, 
Timmers, 1998, Zott and Amit, 2010, Afuah and Tucci, 2000, Chesbrough, 2007, Osterwalder 
and Pigneur, 2010). The term activity system has been coined to refer to the system of 
interdependent activities, centred upon the focal firm, designed to create value for its 
customers, whilst appropriating a share of that value for itself and others (e.g. investors), 
usually in the form of profit (Afuah and Tucci, 2000, Zott and Amit, 2010, Porter, 1996). A 
system-level perspective illustrates the ‘components, linkages between [these] components, 
and dynamics’ (Afuah and Tucci, 2000 p.4) that constitute a business model and highlights the 
activities a firm performs, how it performs them and when it performs them (Afuah and Tucci, 
2003, Afuah and Tucci, 2000). Importantly, although the activity system is centred upon a focal 
firm (i.e. the company practicing the model), its boundaries transcend the firm to include other 
actors who sit outside the organisation (e.g. customers, partners, invertors etc) (Mason and 
Spring, 2011, Chesbrough, 2007, Zott and Amit, 2010, Zott et al., 2011).  
Although a number of valuable definitions of business models exist (as outlined above), these 
lack any great detail regarding the specific components that make up a business model: 
‘business models are frequently mentioned but rarely analysed: therefore, they are often 
poorly understood’ (Teece, 2010 p.192). Recently, research has begun to identify the various 
key components and interrelationships that make-up business models, to inform our 
understanding of not only what constitutes a business model but the basis on which different 
business models are characteristically distinct from one another (Mason and Spring, 2011, 
Shafer et al., 2005, Morris et al., 2006, Hedman and Kalling, 2003, Afuah and Tucci, 2003, Alt 
and Zimmermann, 2001, Stähler, 2002, Johnson et al., 2008, Voelpel et al., 2004). For instance, 
the concept of the activity system, as defined by Zott and Amit (2010), indicates that the core 
elements of a business model include components relating to activities of the business 
(content), how these activities are linked (structure) and who performs these activities 
(governance). Figure 2.8 provides an illustration of the activity system or business model for 
Southwest Airlines. 
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Figure 2.8 Southwest Airlines’ activity system (Porter, 1996) 
The most recent and comprehensive of these frameworks for business model characterization 
has been developed by Osterwalder & Pigneur (2010), which presents the 9 building blocks 
common to all business models (see Table 2.2). Figure 2.9 subsequently provides an example 
of how this framework has been used to populate Apple’s business model: 
Key Partners 
 
The network of 
suppliers and 
partners that 
make the business 
model work 
Key Activities 
 
The most 
important things a 
company must do 
to make its 
business model 
work 
 
Value Proposition 
 
The bundle of 
products and 
services that 
create value for a 
specific Customer 
Segment 
Customer 
Relationships 
 
Relationships a 
company 
establishes with its 
Customer 
Segments 
Customer 
Segments 
 
The different 
groups of people 
or organizations 
an enterprise aims 
to reach and serve 
Key Resources 
 
The most 
important assets 
required to make 
the business 
model work 
  
Channels 
 
How a company 
communicates 
with and reaches 
its Customer 
Segments 
Cost Structure 
 
All cost incurred to operate a business model 
Revenue Streams 
 
The money a company generates from each 
Customer Segment 
Table 2.2 The 9 Building Blocks of a Business Model (adapted from Osterwalder & Pigneur 2010) 
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Figure 2.9 Apple's Business Model (Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2010) 
Many business and management scholars are quick to point out that a business model is 
conceptually different from a business strategy (Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart, 2010, 
Osterwalder et al., 2005, Shafer et al., 2005). Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart (2010) have paid 
much attention to the difference between these two concepts and explain that a business 
strategy can be understood as the ‘choice of business model through which the firm will 
compete in the marketplace’ (p.196) and therefore a business model is the realization or 
manifestation of a firm’s business strategy. Shafer et al. (2005) lends support to this definition, 
claiming that a business strategy relates to the choices that businesses make and that a firm’s 
business model ultimately reflects these choices and their operating implications. Osterwalder 
et al. (2005) explain that a business strategy also takes into consideration how a firm is going 
to implement its business model.  
2.4.1.1 Criticisms of the Business Model Concept 
Despite the strength of the concept of the business model in helping to illustrate how firms 
create, deliver and capture value by fulfilling the needs or desires of their customers, it has 
also been the subject of criticism for some scholars. One of the major criticisms levelled at this 
conceptualisation of business activity is how theoretically underdeveloped the discourse is at 
present (Zott et al., 2011, Porter, 2001). Specifically, concerns have been raised about the 
extent to which the concept is differentiated from other ‘related concepts such as new 
organizational forms, ecosystems, activity systems, and value chains or value networks’ (Zott 
et al., 2011 p.1038):  
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‘It is unclear whether the concept can be meaningfully distinguished from other, 
already established concepts…As a result, the business model concept remains 
polysemic and ambiguous’ (Perkmann and Spicer, 2010 p.8-9) 
Even between those scholars who agree the business model represents a separate theoretical 
concept, there is still debate with regards to the meanings that should be associated with the 
concept (Morris et al., 2005), making the application of the business model concept in the 
context of empirical research particularly challenging (Porter, 2001).  
Perkmann and Spicer (2010) have expressed concern relating to the construct validity of the 
business model concept, which also raises questions about its application to empirical 
research. They explain that ‘it is unclear whether the concept refers to something that actually 
exists’ (p.9). However, we argue that almost all of the components of business models are 
empirically identifiable, particularly via qualitative research (Figure 2.9). 
Another criticism is that the concept provides only a snapshot of an organisation’s business 
logic at a specific moment in time (Mason and Spring, 2011, Osterwalder et al., 2005): 
‘an important limitation of the business model literature is that it only creates a 
description of the firm at a single point in time and in so doing, fails to take account of 
the influence of the business network on the business model and vice versa’ (Mason & 
Spring 2011 p.1033) 
This means that the approach does not readily accommodate analysis of how businesses 
change over time and the factors that are responsible for this. However, we argue that 
through carefully designed qualitative research, one can identify and compare the 
characteristics of an organisation’s current business model with those it applied in the past, 
and then investigate the internal and external factors that were responsible for these changes. 
We now examine the phenomenon known as business model innovation (BMI), which refers to 
the emergence and adoption of novel business models.  
2.4.2 Business Model Innovation 
Business model innovation (BMI) represents a new frontier in innovation research, one that 
goes beyond just product or service innovation (Koen et al., 2011). Markides (2006) explains 
that BMI is not merely the discovery of new products or services, although it may ‘redefine 
what an existing product or service is and how it is provided to the customer’ (Markides, 2006 
p.20). Nor is BMI simply the modification of an existing product or service, which may make an 
existing activity cheaper, faster or of a higher quality (Amit and Zott, 2012). Instead BMI relates 
to the development of a novel activity system for the creation and capture of value (Amit and 
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Zott, 2010), which can be achieved via a change to at least one of the following; the content, 
structure and governance of the activity system (Amit and Zott, 2012). Content refers to the 
selection of activities to be performed and can be innovated via the addition of novel activities. 
Structure refers to how the activities are linked together and in what sequence and innovation 
can occur here by linking activities in novel ways. Finally, governance relates to the parties that 
perform these activities. Innovation of this dimension involves a change in one or more of 
these parties: ‘Business model innovation can consist of adding new activities, linking activities 
in novel ways or changing which party performs an activity’ (Amit and Zott, 2012 p.41) 
It is important to note that the key word here is novel. In order for the transformation of a 
firm’s business model to count as a form of BMI, the new model must not only be novel to the 
firm but also to other firms and actors throughout the wider socio-technical system. In 
essence, the model must be original. We do not classify the adoption of an innovative model 
by a firm, which is already being operated by another firm as a form of BMI. Instead this 
constitutes a form of business model imitation (Teece, 2010) or replication, which we 
emphasise constitutes an essential process if a novel business model is to proliferate across 
multiple organisations10. However, imitation may be imperfect, either on purpose or by 
accident, which may lead to the emergence of an innovative business model (Section 2.3.1.3). 
In this sense business models are analogous with templates or recipes, which we explore in 
further detail in Section 2.4.4.1. 
So far BMI has received attention primarily from the business and management community 
(Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002, Johnson et al., 2008, Teece, 2010, Amit and Zott, 2010, 
Chesbrough, 2007, Chesbrough, 2010), focusing on how BMI represents an effective means of 
improving a firm’s competitive advantage. There are numerous examples of BMI from existing 
companies who have radically altered their business models, such as Xerox’s shift away from 
the sale of photocopiers towards the leasing of them (Chesbrough, 2010) and Apple’s move 
towards the sale of digitally recorded music, MP3 players and mobile phones, in addition to its 
traditional business of selling personal computers (Johnson, 2010). There are also multiple 
examples of start-up organisations, operating novel business models. For example, Wal-Mart’s 
model of putting large stores into relatively small towns which had traditionally been ignored 
by other retailers (Magretta, 2002) and Google’s business model which generated advertising 
revenue by allowing internet users to navigate the internet via their search engine 
(Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2010, Teece, 2010). 
                                                          
10 Not to be confused with business model replication as defined by (Winter and Szulanski, 
2001), which relates to the design of a business model that hinges upon the replication of 
numerous similar retail outlets, i.e. a chain, such as McDonalds or Starbucks 
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2.4.2.1 The Value of Innovative Business Models 
Having defined business model innovation and provided some illustrative examples, we now 
explore the factors that are responsible for determining whether or not a firm seeks to 
develop an innovative business model. We do so to provide insight into the reasons why 
incumbent firms, which may currently practice a distinctly unsustainable but financially 
successful business model (e.g. Energy Utilities), may choose to transform their model. Amit & 
Zott identify four key reasons why a firm would decide to develop an innovative business 
model: novelty, lock-in, complementarities and efficiency (Amit and Zott, 2012, Zott and Amit, 
2010, Amit and Zott, 2001): 
 Novelty - There can be substantial first-mover advantages for organisations who are 
the first to enter a market with a novel business method. For instance, the firm is able 
to develop brand awareness and reputation before other firms. It is also able to 
develop benefit from learning experiences and secure scarce resources, providing it 
with an advantage over organisations adopting the model after them (Amit and Zott, 
2001). The novelty associated with the development and implementation of innovative 
business models is generally considered to be more difficult to replicate than a product 
or process innovation, thus representing a form of sustainable competitive advantage 
for business model innovators (Amit and Zott, 2012, Teece, 2010, Zott and Amit, 2010) 
 Lock-in - Build in elements to retain business model stakeholders, e.g., customers, by 
introducing ‘business model activities that create switching costs or enhanced 
incentives for business model participants to stay and transact within the activity 
system’ (Amit and Zott, 2012 p.45). An oft cited example is that of the ‘razor-razor 
blade model’ pioneered by Gillette, which involved the pricing of razors inexpensively 
but marking-up the cost of the consumable blades (Teece, 2010)  
 Complementarities – Bundling activities together to generate more value. For 
example, some diamond businesses house their management, polishing and 
distribution activities under one roof, enabling them to tailor stones to the particular 
demands of each market segment (Zott and Amit, 2010) 
 Efficiency – Reorganisation of key activities to reduce transaction costs. For instance, 
Wal-Mart designed its business model to support its low-cost retail strategy, whereby 
it developed ‘highly sophisticated process, such as cross-docking, unrivalled in the 
industry’ (Amit and Zott, 2012 p.46), consequently helping it to gain competitive 
advantage 
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2.4.2.2 Barriers to Firms Adopting New Business Models 
Despite the potential value a business can accrue from engaging in business model innovation 
and replication, the adoption of a novel business model is not necessarily easy to achieve for a 
firm or organisation. Chesbrough (2010) highlights for instance the conflict between a firm’s 
existing business model and the novel model they are seeking to adopt. A firm usually needs to 
continue to operate their existing model effectively, whilst they develop their new model and 
undertake the transition towards this. This is no easy task and represents a serious 
organizational challenge as the move towards a new business model requires the firm to 
‘perform well in their current business (and business model), while at the same time 
undertaking the experiments necessary to nurture a new model’ (p.361). 
A firm may be disinclined to overhaul their business model because they might feel 
uncomfortable about ‘venturing into the unknown’, considering they are likely to be unfamiliar 
with the new processes and structures associated with the novel business model. For instance, 
many companies are prepared to adopt models that have been employed successfully by 
others but may not be prepared to run the risk of being the first to do so (Roudtable, 2006). 
Self-preservation is a related factor whereby many ‘managers are likely to resist experiments 
that might threaten their on-going [personal] value to the company’ (p.358), meaning that 
they are disinclined to transform their firm’s traditional business model if it continues to work 
for them because any radical change to that model could undermining their on-going success. 
Teece (2010) refers to this kind of reaction as the ‘cannibalization concern’, whereby an 
incumbent firm may be reluctant to transform its business model if it is likely to entail the 
cannibalization of its existing profits and/or disrupt important business relationships. 
Drawing on the concept of dominant logic developed by Prahalad & Bettis (1986, 1995) 
Chesbrough explains that the dominant logic of the firm can act as a barrier to business model 
innovation and replication because it is due to this phenomenon that the firm normally seeks 
to identify and absorb information that ‘fits with this logic and eschew that which conflicts 
with it’ (p.358). Consequently, this means that a firm can often ignore information, such as the 
novel use of technology, which can play a critical role in influencing its decision to either 
remain with its existing business model or initiate the move towards a different model. 
Typically the implementation of an innovative business model will involve the firm-level 
implementation of systems, processes and assets, which are fundamentally different from 
those it currently employs. Consequently, the firm may not possess the necessary resources, 
capabilities or partnerships to successfully make the transition to this new business model 
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(Teece, 2010). Another important internal barrier are the rules, norms and culture that have 
become established within the organisation during the operation of their traditional business 
model, which can often be at odds with the logic associated with the new business model 
(Johnson, 2010). Even if a firm possesses both the resources and the internal institutional 
support to implement a new business model, it may still fail to ‘understand in sufficient detail 
how a business model is implemented, or which of its elements in fact constitute the source of 
the customer acceptability’ (Teece, 2010 p.182). This phenomenon is often referred to as 
‘uncertain imitability’ (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982).  
2.4.3 Factors That Shape Business Models 
We have explored the factors responsible that both enable and inhibit firms to transform their 
existing business model. In this sub-section we review research that has examined how both 
internal and external factors firms are responsible for shaping the characteristics of the 
business models they develop and ultimately employ. 
2.4.3.1 Internal Factors 
Osterwalder (2004) indicates that the following organisational, strategic and technological 
characteristics of a business play an important role in shaping firms’ business model: 
 Organisation – The material form a business model assumes (e.g. organisational 
structure, processes) 
 Strategy - The company’s vision and core objectives  
 Technology – The various technologies crucial to the firm’s business model (e.g. 
hardware, software, information systems) 
Turning to the organisational literature, Nadler and Tushman (1980) explain that both formal 
and informal forces, internal to the organisation, are responsible for shaping the 
characteristics of the firm. Drawing on their work Senior and Fleming (2006) explain that the 
formal sub-system is comprised of the organisation’s strategy, goals, and the means of 
achieving these through operational activities. The informal subsystem relates to the more 
hidden elements of the organization’s culture and the politics within that organisation. It also 
relates to the direction the individuals that manage the company take and the relationship 
they share with their employees. In essence, factors internal to the organisation are important 
in shaping an organisation’s business model, as well as those external to the organisation. 
2.4.3.2 External Factors 
Osterwalder (2004) explains that a firm’s external environment plays a critical role in shaping 
an organisation’s business model, as it subjects them to constant change. These forces include 
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but are not restricted to environmental factors such as competition, legal, social, technological 
change and changes in customer demand: 
Technological Change: Firms are normally extremely reliant on technology to operate 
their business model and achieve their objectives. Technological innovations often 
present companies with the opportunity to create, deliver or capture value in 
innovative ways. For example, the advent of the internet constituted a critical factor  
that was for the emergence of new forms of business (Calia et al., 2007), such as 
search engine providers (e.g. Google) and social networking sites (e.g. Facebook). 
Conversely, innovative technologies can also undermine the dominance of incumbent 
business models by creating such opportunities for novel models to emerge. The case 
of the internet again serves to illustrate this, as it enabled on-line book retailers such 
as Amazon to become dominant, at the expense of high-street book retailers, such as 
Borders.  
Competitive Forces: Firms may adapt their business model in reaction to the strategy 
their competitors have taken in their market. This is particularly true with respect to 
new entrants threatening the dominance of incumbents, who may change their model 
to retain their market share (Christensen and Raynor, 2003, Christensen, 1997) 
Customer Demand: Changes in user practices, wealth and fashion can place pressure 
on a company to alter its business model. He cites the example of the move from land-
line to mobile telephony, in reaction to consumers desire to communicate outside 
whilst on the move 
Social Environment: The social acceptability of a firm’s actions may change over time. If 
society deems their actions to be unacceptable, potentially for moral reasons, then the 
company will be under pressure to alter its business model, which happened in 
relation to Nike’s clothing operations in Vietnam (Kahle et al., 2000) 
Legal Environment: Regulatory changes can mean a business is forced to transform its 
business model. For instance, making a business’s key activities illegal or alternatively, 
increasing their overheads or reducing their revenue, which could mean the business is 
no longer financially viable. Alternatively, regulatory changes could encourage a 
business to diversify its operations to take advantage of new regulatory incentives 
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Figure 2.10 Environmental factors that determine business model characteristics (Osterwalder, 2004) 
Teece (2010) also emphasises the extent to which a firm’s environment influences the 
characteristics of a firm’s business: 
‘Superior technology and products, excellent people, and good governance and 
leadership are unlikely to produce sustainable profitability if business model 
configuration is not properly adapted to the competitive environment’ (p.174)…‘Good 
business model design and implementation involves assessing such internal factors as 
well as external factors concerned with customers, suppliers, and the broader business 
environment’ (p.192) 
There are many parallels between the work that explores the environmental factors shaping 
business models and those factors responsible for shaping organizational change. In essence, 
the organizational change literature emphasises the extent to which the organization operates 
within an environmental context, which plays an important role in determining its 
characteristics: 
‘Every organization exists within the context of a larger environment that includes 
individuals, groups, other organizations, and even larger social forces-all of which have 
a potentially powerful impact on how the organization performs. Specifically, the 
environment includes markets (clients or customers), suppliers, governmental and 
regulatory bodies, labour unions, competitors, financial institutions, special interest 
groups, and so on’ (Nadler and Tushman, 1980 p.39) 
A number of approaches have been developed to aid analysis of the macro-environmental 
factors that shape managerial decision making and thus the characteristics of organisation. 
These have been referred to by a range of acronyms, namely STEP (Goodman, 1995) and PEST 
(Johnson and Scholes, 1999), which examine the socio-cultural, technological, economic and 
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political factors. A more comprehensive analysis is known as PESTEL, which emphasises how 
the following forces influence organizational characteristics (Gillespie, 2011, Senior and 
Fleming, 2006): 
 Political (e.g. government policy, political ideology) 
 Economic (e.g. interest rates, economic growth, inflation) 
 Social (e.g. demographic trends, lifestyle changes, gender equality) 
 Technological (e.g. technological advances) 
 Environmental (e.g. climate change, pollution) 
 Legal (e.g. minimum wage, discrimination legislation, environmental standards) 
2.4.4 How Business Models Shape their Environment  
In Section 2.4.3 we illustrated how both internal and external factors are responsible for 
shaping the characteristics of a firm’s business model and thus, those which are responsible 
for determining whether an organisation seeks to transform its business model or not. In this 
sub-section we briefly consider how the development and implementation of innovative 
business models can influence the characteristics of the wider socio-technical system, 
specifically established industries and incumbent firms. 
2.4.4.1 The disruptive influence of BMI on established markets and actors 
Making reference to the seminal work of Schumpeter (1934) on waves of creative destruction, 
Hall and Wagner (2011) explain that the introduction of radical innovations can potentially 
change the entire structure of a market as these can often render incumbents’ product, 
services and business models obsolete. This idea was captured by Christensen’s (1997) concept 
of disruptive innovation, which was subsequently developed by Christensen and Raynor 
(2003). In their review of the literature on this topic, Yu and Hang (2010) draw upon 
Christensen’s work to define a disruptive innovation as a form of innovation that provides a 
different value from past innovations and one that is initially inferior to these along the 
dimensions of performance that are most important to mainstream customers. However, 
‘despite its inferior performance on focal attributes valued by existing customers, the new 
product [eventually] displaces the mainstream product in the mainstream market’ (Yu and 
Hang, 2010) (p.437). This can be attributed to two main factors: ‘performance overshoot on 
the focal mainstream attributes of the existing product, and asymmetric incentives between 
existing healthy business and potential disruptive business’ (Yu and Hang, 2010) (p.437).  
Initially this conceptualisation was applied predominantly to technological innovations, to 
explain how new technologies came to surpass seemingly superior technologies in a market 
(Christensen, 1997). However, since then this form of innovation has been broadened to 
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include business models (Christensen and Raynor, 2003, Markides, 2006). This is because 
disruptive innovation can in effect paralyze leading, incumbent firms, who often fail to 
recognise the threat it poses to their market dominance (Christensen, 2006, Christensen and 
Raynor, 2003): ‘when incumbents are “overthrown”, it is generally by disruptive innovation’ 
(Schmidt and Druehl, 2008 p.347). However, disruptive innovation can have a major impact on 
an existing market and its incumbents without entirely displacing them (Schmidt and Druehl, 
2008). In some cases, incumbent firms have played the roles of smart disruptors, such as 
Sony’s success with the Walkman or HP’s success in inkjet printers (Yu and Hang, 2010). 
Business model innovation represents an important form of disruptive innovation (Markides, 
2006, Markides and Oyon, 2010). Markides and Oyon (2010) explain that when new business 
models enter the market, they emphasise different product and service attributes compared 
to the models of incumbent firms. Consequently, these firms become attractive to different 
customer segments than those who the value proposition of the incumbent firms resonates 
with. This leads to the formation of new markets around these new competitors. Furthermore, 
the needs and activities of these firms are characteristically different from those of the 
incumbents, making it difficult for the incumbent to wholly or partly adopt this model. This is 
not initially an issue because the incumbent is likely to regard a business model that is 
characteristically different from its own, and one which courts a different customer base, as 
unattractive. However, Markides and Oyon (2010) explain that the balance can soon shift 
towards the innovative business model and it can begin to have an important influence on the 
decision making of the incumbents: 
‘Over time, the new business models improve to such an extent that they are able to 
deliver performance that is sufficient in the old attributes established competitors 
emphasize and superior in the new attributes. At this point, even established 
customers begin to find the new way interesting and begin to switch. Inevitably, the 
growth of the disruptive innovation attracts the attention of established players. As 
more customers—both existing and new ones— embrace the new business model, the 
new business receives increasing attention from both the media and the established 
players. At a certain point, established players cannot afford to ignore this new way of 
doing business anymore, and they therefore begin to consider ways to respond to it’ 
(p.21) 
Charitou and Markides (2003) explain incumbent firms can react to disruptive innovation in a 
number of different ways. These include, (1) focusing on and investing in their traditional 
model, (2) ignoring the disruptive innovation, (3) developing a ‘second business model’ 
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designed to disrupt the disruptor, (4) adopting the disruptive innovation alongside their 
traditional model and (5) completely adopt the disruptive innovation. The third of these 
requires some further explanation. Here the incumbent may establish a ‘second business 
model’ that is organisational separate and characteristically distinct from both the incumbent’s 
traditional model, as well as that of the disrupter  (Christensen and Raynor, 2003, Markides 
and Oyon, 2010). The objective here is to develop a novel business model that disrupts the 
new entrant’s business model in a similar manner to how the new entrant initially disrupted 
the incumbent’s (Charitou and Markides, 2003). For instance, in response to Seiko and Timex’s 
low-cost watch business models, the Swiss watch industry developed Swatch, which did not 
conform to the disruptors’ value proposition of ‘price, features and functionality’. Instead 
Swatch’s model emphasised ‘style’, as a means of disrupting the disruptors (Charitou and 
Markides, 2003).  
As we outlined in Section 2.4.2.2, it is difficult for firms to operate two characteristically 
different and potentially conflicting business models. Firms that choose to do so and employ 
multiple business logics can find themselves ‘stuck in the middle’ between two distinct 
business models (Porter, 1980). This can have a negative impact upon their profitability 
because the firm has to invest time and money in operating both models, which can degrade 
the value of its existing activities (Porter, 1996). Therefore the incumbent is typically faced 
with the dilemma of which of the strategies to adopt, as outlined by Charitou and Markides 
(2003) in the previous paragraph. 
Sabatier et al. (2012) explain that in some cases the emergence of novel business models, 
alongside complimentary technological discontinuities, can lead to the transformation of an 
industry’s prevailing dominant logic, i.e. the general scheme of value creation and capture 
shared by its actors. Consequently, business model innovation has been identified as one 
means by which new markets or industries can potentially be created (Teece, 2010, Zott and 
Amit, 2002) or existing ones are reshaped (Johnson, 2010) as they are often considered ‘game-
changing to the industry or market’ (Johnson et al., 2008 p.58).  
Take for instance Apple’s ground-breaking introduction of both their iPod and iTunes software, 
where they sought to sell high-volumes of cheap music via iTunes in order to entice customers 
to purchase the high margin iPod hardware (Teece, 2010, Johnson et al., 2008). Not only did 
Apple’s business model innovation radically transform the focus of Apple’s operations and 
ultimately its fortunes but it also had a major disruptive influence on the wider music industry, 
for instance accelerating the transition from in-store to on-line music retail. This resulted in a 
dramatic change in the fortunes of the incumbent companies such as Virgin Megastore (a 
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distributor, which went into administration as the rebranded ‘Zavvi’ ) and EMI (a former FTSE 
100 record company currently in financial difficulty), who struggled to adjust to the radical 
change in the music industry’s dominant logic. 
The disruptive influence of a novel business model on an established industry can be amplified 
if it is replicated by other firms. We have already outlined the various barriers firms face in 
doing so (see Section 2.4.2.2) but as Teece (2010) explains ‘in practice, successful business 
models very often become, to some degree, ‘shared’ by multiple competitors’ (p.179), because 
successful businesses tend to inspire others to imitate their business model (Gambardella and 
McGahan, 2010). Consequently Doganova & Eyquem-Renault (2009) have likened business 
models to ‘templates’, whilst Baden-Fuller and Morgan (2010) refer to them as ‘recipes’. Both 
analogies imply that business models can be imitated by other organisations but that there is 
also scope for the organisation to make their own variations to the model. For instance, the 
budget airline business model, pioneered by firms such as Laker Airways and Southwest 
Airlines in the early 1970s (Teece, 2010), was later imitated by others such as EasyJet and 
Ryanair. The proliferation of this model had a particularly disruptive effect on the airline 
industry, making air travel available to customer segments who could not previously afford it. 
Consequently, incumbent airline operators, such as British Airways, reacted to this disruptive 
innovative by establishing their own budget airline venture called Go Fly (Chesbrough, 2007, 
Markides and Oyon, 2010)11.  
2.4.4.2 BMI and technological innovation 
We take a moment to consider the interplay between BMI and technological innovation, which 
currently represents a core focus for transition and innovation scholars. In section 2.4.3.2 we 
identified how technological innovation can be responsible for shaping business model 
innovation, however BMI can also influence technological innovation. Chesbrough & 
Rosenbloom (2002) explain that a business model constitutes a crucial link between 
technological development and economic value creation, helping to commercialise and thus 
promote the uptake of an innovative technology, consequently unlocking its potential. 
Chesbrough (2010) emphasises the importance of business models to technologies, explaining 
that ‘a mediocre technology pursued within a great business model may be more valuable 
than a great technology exploited via a mediocre business model’ (p.355), meaning that it is 
likely to enjoy higher levels of adoption. Johnson and Suskewicz (2009) illustrate this by using 
the case of Thomas Edison and his electric light bulb. They explain that the proliferation of this 
technological innovation can predominantly be attributed to Edison’s focus on developing a 
                                                          
11 See Strategy #4 for dealing with disruptive innovation as introduced by Charitou and 
Markides (2003) on page 68 
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coherent commercial system (or business model), i.e. a ‘technical platform [which] included 
generators, meters, transmission lines, and substations, and he mapped out both how they 
would interact technically and how they would combine in a profitable business’ (p.53) 
Returning once again to the example of Apple’s business model, the intertwining of Apple’s 
iPod and iTunes played an important role in the proliferation of the MP3 player. Johnson 
(2010) explains that the popularity of the Apple’s MP3 player, the iPod, cannot be explained by 
it being the first player to enter the market. Nor can it be explained by the iPod being 
significantly superior in terms of functionality or attractiveness compared to other MP3 
players, considering that other similarly attractive and functional players were available on the 
market at the same time such as Diamond’s Rio and Best Data’s Cabo 64. Neither can its 
success be explained by its low-price, as it was a relatively expensive product. Johnson explains 
that the uptake of this particular form of MP3 player was predominantly because:  
‘Apple did something far smarter than wrap a good technology in a snazzy design; it 
wrapped a good technology in a great business model. Apple’s genius lay in its 
realization that making it easy and convenient to download music to the iPod would 
fuel demand for its high-priced music player’ (p.14) 
The proliferation of the iPod can therefore largely be attributed to the technology being 
wrapped up in a great business model, which combined hardware, software, and service to 
provide game-changing convenience for the consumer. Subsequently, the proliferation of the 
iPod also had implications for the nature and popularity of future technological innovations. In 
terms of characteristics, the combination of the iPod and iTunes music store, which acted as a 
platform that connected music right holders directly with buyers, constituted the precursor to 
the development of the Appstore applications platform, as well as iPhone and iPad 
technologies (Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2010). Consequently, Apple’s initial business model 
innovation has had consequences for the design of smart phone and tablet computer 
technologies, which have sought to accommodate these software applications. Furthermore, 
the popularity of the iPhone and iPad can also to some extent be explained by the success of 
the iPod and iTunes, which helped to improve of Apple’s brand and increased the likelihood of 
its future products selling well.  
2.4.5 Business Model Positive Feedbacks 
As we have outlined in Sections 2.4.3 and 2.4.4 business models are shaped by their 
environment but also play an important role in shaping their environment because they 
characterize the behaviour of the individuals and organisations that engage with them. 
Consequently, a number of scholars recognise that business models share a co-evolutionary 
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relationship with the socio-technical system they are operated in, both iteratively influencing 
and being influenced by the development and implementation of business models (Doganova 
and Eyquem-Renault, 2009, Mason and Spring, 2011, Teece, 2010, Hagberg and Kjellberg, 
2010, Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart, 2010):  
‘Business models might be understood as bundles of interconnecting practices that 
evolve with the context within which they are practiced – but that in turn influence 
and shape the context’ (Mason and Spring, 2011 p.1040) 
Mason & Spring explain that business models are able to influence the characteristics of their 
environment because they represent bundles of practices and routines, which influence and 
shape both present and future collective and individual action, ‘in this way, the business model 
is understood as having [the] agency to shape action’ (p.1032). Doganova & Eyquem-Renault 
(2009) reinforce this point by explaining that business models represent active constructs or 
market devices that are capable of shaping the environment in which they are operate, by 
playing a performative role that frames the way businesses and markets behave, develop and 
grow.  
Developing upon this notion that business models share a co-evolutionary relationship with 
their environment, Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart (2010) emphasise that ‘business models 
often generate virtuous cycles, feedback loops that strengthen some components of the model 
at every iteration’ (p.199). They provide a handful of examples in relation to Ryanair’s low-cost 
airline business model (Figure 2.11). They elaborate on one of these in particular (see Virtuous 
Cycle 1): 
‘As Ryanair’s volume increases (because of its low fares), its bargaining power with its 
suppliers (airport authorities, Boeing, Airbus, etc.) grows, resulting in [low fixed costs 
and] improvements to Ryanair’s overall advantage’ (p.199) 
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Figure 2.11 Three examples of positive feedbacks in relation to Ryanair’s business model (Casadesus-
Masanell and Ricart, 2010) 
In summary, we find that some valuable research has been undertaken into not only what 
constitutes a business model but crucially how and why novel business models might emerge 
and even challenge the prevailing business model within an industry. We also find that 
research has provided us with some insight into the effect the emergence of alternative 
business models may have on the wider system, such as its impact on the uptake and design of 
technological innovations. However, we argue there is a need to analyse the coevolutionary 
relationship business models share with the various key dimensions of socio-technical systems 
and not just individual sub-systems (e.g. technology) if we are to fully appreciate the role novel 
business models play in socio-technical transitions. This is particularly true considering the lack 
of empirical research into the co-evolution of business models and their socio-technical 
environment. Additionally, much of the research into the business model innovation has 
focused on sectors that are not subject to much regulation, such as the entertainment and 
communications industries. We believe a detailed examination of more highly regulated 
industries (e.g. transport, energy, water etc), would help to improve our understanding of the 
factors enabling or inhibiting novel business models to gain traction in sectors where 
organisations’ behaviour is subject to greater constraints. 
In the following sub-section we return to the concept of sustainable business models, which 
we introduced in Section 1.4, to elaborate upon the characteristics such models exhibit. We 
review the Product Service System (PSS) literature in order to provide some examples of the 
types of sustainable business models that have been adopted. Following this we discuss why 
firms may choose to implement such models and the barriers they might face in attempting to 
do so, before we critique the strength of the relationship between environmental and 
economic performance. Finally, we identify opportunities for further research into the 
implementation of sustainable business models. In the following section we introduce the 
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Energy Service Company (ESCo) model, which represents a potentially sustainable form of 
energy business model and one that constitutes the unit of analysis for this research. 
2.5 Sustainable Business Models 
In Section 1.4 we outlined the concept of a sustainable business model as a logic dictating the 
activities of a business where sustainable development plays an integral role in shaping the 
firm’s decision making (Wicks, 1996, Stubbs and Cocklin, 2008, Wilson et al., 2009). A business 
adopting such a model creates, delivers and captures value by providing products and services 
to customers that serve to improve the quality of people’s lives but are also sensitive to 
environmental limits (Uren, 2010). Using a similar framework to Osterwalder and Pigneur 
(2010), Boons and Lüdeke-Freund (2012) introduce the following characteristics that make-up 
a sustainable business model: 
1. Value Proposition - ‘Provides measureable ecological and/or social value in concert 
with economic value’ (p.5) 
2. Supply Chain – ‘Involves suppliers who take responsibility towards their own as well as 
the focal company’s stakeholders. The focal company does not shift its own socio-
ecological burdens to its suppliers. This condition requires that a firm actively engages 
suppliers into sustainable supply chain management’ (p.5) 
3. Customer Interface – ‘The focal company does not shift its own socio-ecological 
burdens to its customers [but] also motivates customers to take responsibility for their 
consumption’ (p.5) 
4. Financial Model – ‘Reflects an appropriate distribution of economic costs and benefits 
among actors involved in the business model and accounts for the company’s 
ecological and social impacts (Maas and Boons, 2010)’ (p.5) 
As illustrated by the value proposition above, a successful sustainable business model must 
deliver not only both environmental and social value but also economic value. Therefore, it 
must be both environmentally and economically sustainable (Wilson et al., 2009, Stubbs and 
Cocklin, 2008). Teece (2010) explains that an economically sustainable business model is one 
that enables a firm to maintain competitive advantage over a long period of time. In summary,  
‘sustainable organizations must make a profit to exist but they don’t just exist to make a profit’ 
(Stubbs and Cocklin, 2008 p.121).  
2.5.1 Product-Service Systems 
The Product Service System (PSS) literature emerged in response to the perceived need to 
develop function-oriented business models that are capable of fulfilling societal functions in an 
economically and environmentally sustainable manner (Tukker and Tischner, 2006, Mont, 
76 
 
 
2002, Roy, 2000, Stahel, 2007, Tukker et al., 2008). Mont (2004) defines a PSS as ‘a system of 
products, services, networks of actors and supporting infrastructure that continuously strives 
to be competitive, satisfy customer needs and have a lower environmental impact than 
traditional business models’ (p.iii). Tukker and Tischner (2006) explain that the PSS concept 
revolves around two key pillars. The first is that it takes the final functionality or satisfaction 
the consumer desires as a starting point of business development. The second is that 
development of these systems should take a ‘greenfield’ mind-set, i.e. ignoring existing 
structures, routines, firms etc.  
The PSS concept has been adopted by scholars as a focus for supporting sustainable 
development by delivering significant efficiency gains and even decoupling economic growth 
from resource use (Tukker and Tischner, 2006). This is because firms employing PSS business 
models are not selling products to consumers, where it is wholly the customer’s responsibility 
to utilise these products to fulfil their needs, thus providing the firm with no incentive to 
ensure they are utilising these efficiently. Instead, with a PSS business model, the firm is either 
wholly or partly responsible for fulfilling its customer’s needs, thus incentivising them to 
undertake the various processes necessary to satisfy their needs as efficiently as possible in a 
bid to minimize their overheads and maximize their profit margin (Tukker, 2004, Tukker and 
Tischner, 2006). 
Three forms of PSS exist, which are as follows (Steinberger et al., 2009, Tukker and Tischner, 
2006)(see Figure 2.12 for an example): 
Product-oriented: Provider extends its traditional product-based offer with additional 
services such as maintenance, take-back and financing schemes. These are relatively 
easy to implement and require few changes to the firm’s business model, 
consequently providing limited environmental benefits 
Use-oriented: Provider sells the use/function of its products as opposed to the 
products themselves. These may take the form of renting or leasing strategies and may 
involve sharing or pooling on the customers’ side. These services entail some profound 
business model changes and can result in significant environmental improvements 
(e.g. Factor 2 decrease in material use) 
Result-oriented: Provider contractually guarantees the satisfaction of the customer’s 
needs, without any material consideration. Often based upon radical innovations, it 
requires drastic changes to the provider’s business model, as they assume all the 
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associated risks and liabilities. Such models can lead up to a Factor 10 environmental 
improvements 
Since its inception, the PSS field has explored a range of different PSS business models to fulfil 
a range of societal functions. For instance, a number of studies have explored novel 
automobile business models and their various sustainability credentials (Kley et al., 2011, 
Wells, 2006, Williams, 2007), such as finance schemes or extended warranties (product-
oriented); car sharing, pooling or rental schemes (use-oriented) and pay per mile schemes 
(result-oriented) (Williams, 2007) (Figure 2.12). Other examples have included chemical 
management service, resource management and remanufacturing companies (COWI, 2008).  
 
Figure 2.12 Mobility product service systems (Kley et al., 2011 adapted from Tukker 2004) 
2.5.2 The Impetus to Align Economic and Environmental Objectives 
Having defined what a sustainable business model is and introduced a number of examples in 
the form of PSSs, we now ask the question ‘why would a firm choose to transform its business 
model in order to integrate both economic and environmental objectives into a coherent and 
financially viable business?’ First and foremost we would argue that firms might be compelled 
to act in a sustainable manner to ensure there are sufficient resources (e.g. fuel, water, food) 
available in the future for them to continue to operate effectively. However, many firms do 
not typically think along such long-term time horizons and are often more interested in short-
term financial gains (Charter et al., 2008).  
Porter (1991) and Porter and Vanderlinde (1995) explain that strong environmental 
performance can in fact improve firms’ economic performance, which they term ‘win-win’ 
situations. This approach teaches us that a firm, through appropriate design of their business 
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model, is able to help conserve the natural environment whilst also enhancing its profits and 
competitiveness through the improvement of products/services, their production process or 
through enhancement of product/service quality. This work has come to be referred to as the 
‘pays-to-be-green’ literature (see Hart and Ahuja, 1996, Jaggi and Freedman, 1992, Wagner, 
2007, Telle, 2006), which examines the strength of the positive relationship between 
environmental and economic performance and thus, the extent to which integrating 
sustainability into a firm’s business model represents ‘the right thing to do as well as the smart 
thing to do’ (Stubbs and Cocklin, 2008 p.121). This view jar with the neo-classical economic 
paradigm, which teaches us ‘that any additional efforts to improve a firm’s environmental 
performance inevitably yield…lower profits’ (Telle, 2006 p.195). 
As part of their review of the literature on sustainable business models, Schaltegger et al. 
(2011) present a list of the various factors that are likely to encourage firms to develop a more 
sustainable business model, i.e. the business case for sustainability. These are as follows12:  
 Cost reduction  
 Improved sales and profit margin  
 Risk and risk reduction  
 Improved reputation and added brand value  
 Greater attractiveness as employer  
 Greater capability for innovation  
Drawing on the first of these, some scholars explain that by operating in accordance with the 
principles of sustainable development, firms can improve economic performance by 
identifying inefficiencies that translate into cost savings (von Weizsacker et al., 2009, Porter 
and Linde, 1995). For instance, Ambec and Lanoie (2008) explain that better environmental 
performance can result in a reduction in the costs associated with the firm’s risk management, 
materials, utilities, capital and labour. 
Moving beyond efficiencies, environmental performance can also improve a firm’s competitive 
advantage. According to the resource-based theory of the firm, ‘competitive advantage can be 
sustained only if the capabilities creating the competitive advantage are supported by 
resources that are not easily duplicated by competitors’ (Clarkson et al., 2011 p.126). Some 
studies have supported the notion that integrating sustainable development into a firm’s 
business model can be an effective means of creating valuable, novel and difficult-to-imitate 
resources that are essential for the company to gain long-term competitive advantage over 
                                                          
12 See Schaltegger et al. (2011) paper for references relating to each of these bullet points 
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their rivals (Hart, 1995, Sharma and Vredenburg, 1998, Hart and Sharma, 2004). For instance it 
can lead to the firm differentiating its products and/or services, which may result in better 
access to certain markets (Ambec and Lanoie, 2008).  
Competitive advantage can be improved via product and service innovation, which some 
scholars have explained can be increased if firms embrace the guiding principles of 
sustainability in their business model (Cohen and Winn, 2007). For instance, Luo and Du (2012) 
find that companies that have developed comprehensive Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
programmes have become more innovative. They argue that developing their CSR agenda did 
not represent a peripheral activity but a pivotal component of competitiveness and growth: 
‘In an era of open innovation and rapidly diversifying knowledge, companies can no 
longer rely solely on internal resources; they must find ways to bring external ideas 
into the firm. CSR can be a powerful catalyst for doing that’ (p.28) 
In essence, integrating the principles of sustainable development into one’s business model 
can in some cases also lead to a range of economic benefits too.  
2.5.3 Barriers to Sustainable Business Models 
Many of the barriers to developing and implementing innovative business models can also be 
applied to novel, sustainable models (see Section 2.4.2.2). We briefly identify some others that 
are considered more specific to sustainable models: 
 Risk adversity: ‘New [business] models carry new risks – to which people are often 
more risk averse than more familiar risks’ (COWI, 2008), i.e. a fear of the unknown.   
Charter et al. (2008) explain that firms may be concerned that a shift to a sustainable 
business model may damage the organisation’s brand or reputation, which has been 
built on their traditional model.  
 Short-termism: Charter et al. (2008) explain that most publicly owned corporations 
focus on short-term financial gain, typified by the quarterly results PLCs have to 
provide their shareholders with. This can serve to limit the organisation’s decision 
making and scope to adopt sustainability principles that may require a longer-term 
perspective to yield a return  
 Lack of awareness and understanding: A distinct lack of awareness and understanding 
of sustainable business models amongst both providers and consumers can serve to 
limit the demand from these parties to engage with such models. This lack of 
awareness and understanding can also manifest itself as a lack of trust from 
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consumers in the firm practicing the sustainable business model (Charter et al., 2008, 
Steinberger et al., 2009, COWI, 2008)  
 Profitability of Existing Business Model: Many firms are financially successful in their 
current form and in the current environment, therefore they may be unwilling to 
change as they have a vested interest in the maintaining the status quo’ (Charter et al., 
2008) 
 Lack of a Supportive Regulatory and Infrastructural Environment: A lack of supportive 
regulatory incentives and/or essential infrastructure can pose a significant barrier to 
the successful development and implementation of sustainable business models 
(Charter et al., 2008, COWI, 2008, Steinberger et al., 2009)  
Despite the various benefits that have been identified in aligning economic and environmental 
objectives, a number of academics have hastened to add that it may be premature or even 
incorrect to simply equate improved environmental performance with better economic 
performance. Drawing on existing literature (Schaltegger and Synnestvedt, 2002, Steger, 2004, 
Wagner, 2007), Schaltegger et al. (2011) explain that ‘it is an illusion to believe that any kind of 
automatic relationship exists between voluntary societal [and environmental] activities and 
business success’ (p.7), whilst Tukker and Tischner (2006) explain that ‘one simply has to 
accept that win-wins [do] not always exist’ (p.1555). As part of their literature review, Clarkson 
et al. (2011) support this argument and explain that to date studies on this topic have not 
established consistent evidence that a proactive environmental strategy enhances firm 
financial performance (Jaffe and Palmer, 1997, Margolis and Walsh, 2003).  
2.5.4 Scope for Additional Research 
We concur with Tukker and Tischner (2006) that ‘having and depicting sustainable PSS-dreams 
in themselves will not save the earth’, consequently we require a better ‘understanding [of] 
what it takes to realise such dreams’ (p.1555). This represents the focus of this research, 
where we explore one PSS model in particular (the ESCo model) and explore the reasons why it 
has enjoyed only niche-level applications to date, as well as the nature of developments that 
could enable it to proliferate. In addition to this, we believe that further research is necessary 
to understand the factors that might encourage unsustainable but profitable incumbent firms 
(e.g. Energy Utilities) to move towards novel, sustainable business models, as well as the 
barriers they are likely to face: 
‘Barring studies on sustainability-oriented service companies described in Halme et al. 
(2008), there have been few studies that have provided useful insights into how ‘stale’ 
business models (Hart and Milstein, 2003) can be transitioned towards more 
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sustainable models in firms providing goods and services to domestic and regional 
markets. In other words, how do firms change their business models to integrate 
stringent sustainability policies?’ (Hall and Wagner, 2011 p.185) 
Finally, we concur with Boons and Lüdeke-Freund (2012) that the literature would benefit from 
examining the extent to which sustainable business models can facilitate system innovations 
or socio-technical transitions. 
Consequently, we believe a more thorough investigation of the drivers and barriers to 
sustainable business model adoption is necessary, one which goes beyond a focus on 
environmental regulation (Porter, 1991) and improved financial performance (Schaltegger et 
al., 2011), to examine the societal, cultural and political factors that might encourage firms to 
satisfy their customers’ needs in a sustainable manner. Furthermore, we argue there is 
pressing need to understand how the implementation of such models could facilitate 
sustainability transition. As outlined in Section 1.5, we seek to address these needs by 
investigating the co-evolutionary relationship of the Energy Service Company (ESCo) business 
model with the various dimensions of the UK energy system. Consequently, as part of this 
literature review, we now turn to the energy service contracting literature to explore the 
characteristics, as well as the various strengths and weaknesses of the ESCo model, with a view 
to providing valuable context for our empirical investigation. 
2.6 Energy Service Contracting 
Energy services relate to the physical benefit, utility or good people derive from energy (EU, 
2006), such as comfort, illumination and mobility. Energy services can be provided to 
consumers via energy service contracts, which are managed by Energy Service Companies 
(ESCos). Sorrell (2005) defines energy service contracting as ‘the transfer of decision rights 
over key items of energy equipment under the terms and conditions of a long-term contract, 
including incentives to maintain and improve equipment performance over time’ (p.96). The 
energy service contracts they provide fall into two categories: energy supply contracting and 
energy performance contracting. 
2.6.1 Energy Supply Contracting 
As part of an energy supply contract (ESC), an ESCo provides useful energy streams to its 
customers, which Sorrell (2007) refers to as energy streams which have already been 
converted by primary conversion equipment (e.g. a boiler or CHP plant), such as hot water, 
coolant and electricity. Here the customer is usually charged per unit of useful energy (Sorrell, 
2007) or a fixed price for the supply of a pre-determined level of energy service (Marino et al., 
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2011)13. ESCos take control over the primary conversion equipment necessary to generate 
these useful energy services in an ESC. This control provides the ESCo with the opportunity to 
reduce its customer’s demand for delivered energy (i.e. imported fuel or electricity), 
predominantly by improving the technical and operational efficiency of its primary conversion 
equipment (Sorrell, 2007), which in turn helps to reduce the production costs14 associated with 
fulfilling its customer’s energy needs. However, even though ESCs may provide energy savings, 
the ESCo does not normally guarantee energy savings as part of an ESC because ‘it lacks 
control over both the efficiency of secondary conversion equipment and the demand for final 
energy services’ (Sorrell, 2005 p.17). 
2.6.2 Energy Performance Contracting 
Energy performance contracting (EPC) involves the provision of final energy services (e.g. 
lighting, heating, motive power), which represent energy streams that have been converted by 
secondary conversion equipment (e.g. radiators or fluorescent lighting) and can thus be 
enjoyed directly by customers, without the need for additional conversion processes (Sorrell, 
2007, Sorrell, 2005). Here the ESCo assumes control over the secondary conversion 
equipment, as well as the distribution (e.g. heat pipes) and associated control equipment (e.g. 
thermostats, light sensors)15, meaning it possesses a significant degree of control over the 
customer’s demand for final energy services, as well as useful and delivered energy (Sorrel 
2007). The scope of an EPC may also incorporate control of the primary conversion equipment, 
affording it even greater overall control over the quantity of energy required to satisfy its 
customer’s needs. This arrangement is sometimes referred to as Total Energy Management 
(Sorrell, 2007).  
The control an ESCo possesses as part of an EPC, over the conversion, control and distribution 
technologies required to satisfy its customer’s energy needs, enables it to provide certain 
guarantees relating to the standard (i.e. quality and quantity) of energy service it provides. For 
instance, the intensity and coverage of lighting, or room temperature and humidity (Sorrell, 
2007, EU, 2006). This high degree of control also affords the ESCo the opportunity to identify, 
deliver and maintain savings on the production and transaction16 costs associated with 
fulfilling their customer’s energy needs. Consequently, many ESCos guarantee a certain 
                                                          
13 This is often referred to as Contract Energy Management in the UK (Marino et al., 2011) 
14 Production costs refer to those incurred for the purchase of material inputs that create 
energy services. These include conversion, distribution and control equipment; as well as 
energy commodities (i.e. fuel & electricity) (Sorrell, 2007) 
15 Electronic controls monitor and control the flow of energy from conversion to consumption 
(e.g. thermostat) (Sorrell, 2007) 
16 Transaction costs refer to those associated with organising (or ‘governing’) the provision of 
those streams and/or services, e.g. negotiating and writing the contract (Sorrell, 2007) 
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standard of energy service (e.g. room temperature) at a particular cost, which is typically lower 
than their current or projected energy bill (Sorrell, 2007, Sorrell, 2005, Marino et al., 2011, 
Smith, 2007a).  
The different aspects of the energy supply chain that fall under the scope of Energy Supply and 
Performance contracting are introduced Figure 2.13. We compare these with the contracts 
traditionally provided by Energy Utilities, where they typically sell units of delivered energy 
such as gas and electricity17 to their customers. The key differences between Energy Supply 
and Performance contracting are summarised in Table 2.3.  
 
Figure 2.13 Differentiation between forms of Energy Utility and Energy Service contracting (adapted 
from Sorrell, 2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
17 Sorrel makes the differentiation between ‘imported electricity’ as a form of delivered energy 
and ‘electricity’ as a useful energy stream. We emphasise that both forms of electricity 
constitute a useful energy stream because they have undergone a primary conversion stage. 
His differentiation instead emphasises the difference between centralised (i.e. ‘imported 
electricity’) and decentralised (i.e. ‘electricity’) electricity generation 
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Variable Supply Contracting (ESC) Performance Contracting (EPC) 
Focus Useful energy streams  Final energy services 
Typical 
technologies 
Boilers, CHP, refrigerators etc HVAC, lighting, building fabric etc 
Contract scope Narrow Wide 
Potential for 
production cost 
savings 
Low to medium Medium to high 
Anticipated 
transaction costs 
Low to medium Medium to high 
Typical revenue 
streams 
 Unit price for delivered energy 
 Cost savings achieved on 
customer’s energy bill compared 
to pre-specified baseline  
 Capacity charge to cover fixed 
costs  
 Government financial incentives 
(e.g. Feed-in-Tariff) 
 Sale of energy back to the grid 
 Cost savings achieved on 
customer’s energy bill compared 
to pre-specified baseline 
 Capacity charge to cover fixed 
costs  
Table 2.3 Comparing energy supply and energy performance contracting (adapted from Helle, 1997, 
Sorrell, 2007, Sorrell, 2005) 
2.6.3 Allocation of Risk and Revenue 
As part of any energy service contract, the ESCo will assume some degree or the majority of 
the technical and financial risk associated with the provision of energy services to their 
customer (Bertoldi et al., 2006b, Painuly et al., 2003). In terms of technical risk, ESCos normally 
assume responsibility for the design, build, operation, and maintenance of the energy service 
projects, often guaranteeing the performance of these systems, such as a CHP plant for 
example (Fawkes, 2007). In terms of financial risk, ESCos will either cover the upfront capital 
costs of the energy service project with their own capital or borrow the necessary funds from a 
third-party, such as a bank (Bertoldi et al., 2006b, Fawkes, 2007, Smith, 2007a). In both 
instances financial risk is transferred away from the customer as they are not responsible for 
the investment. The customer may however choose to part-finance the project with their own 
capital or borrow the money from a third-party themselves to finance the project (Bertoldi et 
al., 2006b, Fawkes, 2007, Smith, 2007a). In either case the customer is safeguarded from the 
financial risk because the customer’s investment is normally backed up by the performance 
guarantee provided by the ESCo (Bertoldi et al., 2006b, CTI, 2003, Smith, 2007a). ESCos often 
draw on a combination of these funding streams in order to fund their projects.  
As part of an EPC, the customer may be offered either a guaranteed or shared savings 
contract. As part of the former, the customer is normally guaranteed a percentage reduction 
of the total cost of providing the relevant final energy services compared to a specified 
baseline level. Here, because ‘the ESCo takes over the entire performance risk, it is unlikely to 
be willing to further assume credit risk’ (Bertoldi et al., 2006b p.1821). Therefore, whilst the 
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ESCo assumes the technical/performance risk for delivering the energy savings, the client will 
normally have to assume some or all of the financial/credit risk.  
As part of a shared savings contract the cost savings are split between both the ESCo and the 
client according to a pre-arranged percentage (Bertoldi et al., 2006b). The way in which the 
savings are split between the two parties usually depends upon the cost and length of the 
project, as well as the degree of risk that each party has inherited. Here, the client takes over 
some performance risk, because instead of being guaranteed a certain percentage reduction 
on their energy bill, they are guaranteed a percentage of the value of the energy savings 
achieved (e.g. 50% of the energy cost savings). This therefore incentivises the client to adjust 
its own user practices to reduce their energy consumption. As the client assumes some degree 
of the performance risk, it will consequently try to avoid assuming any credit risk, ‘hence a 
shared savings contract is more likely to be linked with TPF or with a mixed scheme with 
financing coming from the client and the ESCo (CTI, 2003) whereby the ESCo repays the loan 
and takes over the credit risk’ (p.1822).  
The revenue streams differ between supply and performance contracts. As part of an ESC 
ESCos predominantly recoup the upfront capital costs of the project via the sale of useful 
energy, whilst as part of an EPC, the majority of their revenue stems from the energy savings 
they achieve on the customer’s energy bill (Marino et al., 2011) (Table 2.3). As these capital 
costs are normally high and the revenue streams relatively modest, it often takes a number of 
years to recoup the costs of the project and consequently begin to turn a profit. Therefore, 
ESCos normally engage in long-term contracts with their customers with supply contracts 
typically lasting between 20 to 30 years (Fawkes, 2007) and performance contracts between 5 
and 25 years (Sorrell, 2005, Smith, 2007a, Westling, 2003).  
2.6.4 Weaknesses of Energy Service Contracting 
We briefly outline some of the weaknesses of energy service contracting. In the results section, 
we return to this and present a range of empirically supported strengths and weaknesses of 
this form of energy service provision. 
Sorrell (2007) explains that the viability of energy service contracting is dependent upon a 
range of variable factors and warns that we should not automatically assume that it represents 
a financially viable means of fulfilling our energy needs. He identifies 6 factors that help to 
improve the viability of energy service contracting, without which energy service contracting is 
likely to be deemed unsuitable: 
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 A large technical potential for production cost savings for the energy services included 
within the contract  
 Small aggregate production costs for all energy services within the client organisation 
 The specificity of the assets required to provide the energy services included within 
the contract are low  
 A low level of task complexity, as measured by the difficulty in specifying and 
monitoring contractual terms and conditions  
 A competitive market for energy service contracts  
 An institutional framework that is conducive to contracting 
Sorrell (2007) also explains that contracting is normally only financially viable for medium to 
large-sized businesses, rather than smaller businesses, because they have larger production 
costs. This is because although contracting may provide a large percentage reduction in the 
production costs of smaller organisations, these absolute savings are likely to be outweighed 
by the associated transaction costs. Large organisations may also opt against it because ‘the 
percentage saving in production costs may be less since contracting may offer fewer 
advantages compared to in-house energy management’ (p.520). 
One of the major criticisms levelled at energy service contracting and in particular energy 
performance contracting, is that improvements in energy efficiency can lead to a phenomenon 
known as the rebound effect or Jevons Paradox (for review see Herring and Roy, 2007, 
Hertwich, 2005, Sorrell and Dimitropoulos, 2007). Sorrell (2009) provides an explanation of this 
phenomenon: 
‘The ‘rebound effect’ is an umbrella term for a variety of mechanisms that reduce the 
potential energy savings from improved energy efficiency. An example of a rebound 
effect would be the driver who replaces a car with a fuel-efficient model, only to take 
advantage of its cheaper running costs to drive further and more often’ (p.1456) (see 
Figure 2.14) 
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Figure 2.14 Illustration of rebound effect for consumers 
Sorrell (2009) explains that rebound effects are categorised by direct and indirect effects. In 
the context of energy consumption, the former relates to the phenomenon where efficiency 
gains, and the associated reduction in consumer’s energy bills, result in the individual using 
this spare capital to purchase and consume more energy. The latter relates to the situation 
illustrated in Figure 2.14, where the money saved on energy is spent on other goods and 
services that require energy to provide. They also explain that these effects can differ in terms 
of time frame (e.g. short, medium or long term) and also scale (e.g. individual, firm, sector, 
country).  
Some authors have argued (Brookes, 2000, Saunders, 1992) that this phenomenon can lead to 
back fire, which describes the situation where energy efficiency measures lead to long-term 
increases in energy demand. Recent empirical studies have revealed that in most cases the 
rebound effect is sufficiently small to provide some reduction in energy consumption and/or 
GHG emissions (Barker et al., 2007, Druckman et al., 2011), however in some cases there is 
evidence to suggest that back fire does occur (Druckman et al., 2011). Taking into account 
these results, Druckman et al. (2011) emphasise the importance of ‘moving to lower GHG 
intensity consumption patterns, and shifting incomes to ‘green’ investments [as] viable 
strategies for mitigating rebound’ (p.3579) and thus delivering reductions in energy 
consumption and GHG emissions.  
It is also worth noting that although authors in this field emphasise that the rebound effect  
can have a detrimental impact of the reduction of energy consumption, Sorrell and 
Dimitropoulos (2007) warn that the quantification of rebound effects is difficult due to a 
combination of limited data, endogenous variables, uncertain causal relationships, trans-
boundary effects and other factors.  
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2.7 Chapter Summary 
In summary, this review has identified that neither the socio-technical transitions nor the co-
evolutionary literatures have paid sufficient attention to the role novel, sustainable business 
models play in sustainability transitions, despite the capability of such models to align 
environmental, social and economic objectives, as emphasised by the sustainable business 
model, PSS and ‘pays-to-be-green’ literatures. Consequently, we argue there is a pressing need 
to better integrate the concepts of the business model and business model innovation into 
theories of system change. In particular, we must examine the causal mechanisms that have so 
far limited the adoption of sustainable business models and reinforced the dominance of 
incumbent business models because. Furthermore, it is important we investigate the manner 
in which the proliferation of novel, sustainable business models influence socio-technical 
system change, in order to develop a more detailed understanding of the role they might play 
in sustainability transitions.  
Taking these factors into account we introduce the analytical framework this research adopts 
in order to address our overarching research question: What role could the development and 
adoption of the Energy Service Company (ESCo) business model play in the transition to a 
sustainable UK energy system?
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3 Analytical Framework 
This chapter introduces the analytical framework this thesis employs, which integrates 
theoretical concepts drawn from the co-evolutionary and business model literatures, which 
were reviewed in the previous chapter (Section 2).  
An analytical framework represents a tentative theory of the phenomena being investigated, 
i.e. ‘a conception or model of what is out there that [we] plan to study, and of what is going on 
with these things and why’ (Maxwell 2005 p.33). The application of an analytical framework 
can help to structure the empirical investigation and assist the researcher in the process of 
making sense of the subsequent empirical data (Smyth, 2004). Consequently, the purpose of 
applying the integrated analytical framework outlined in this chapter is to help structure and 
guide the research’s empirical investigation, in order to effectively address the research 
questions. The application of this analytical framework consequently has an important bearing 
on the design of the methodology this research will employ. Therefore, this section acts as a 
bridge between the Literature Review (Section 2) and Methodology chapters (Section 4). 
In the Literature Review (Section 2) we highlighted the lack of attention both socio-technical 
transition and co-evolutionary scholars have paid to the interplay of innovative, sustainable 
business models and the different dimensions that make-up socio-technical systems. As a 
result we currently have a poor understanding of not only (1) the conditions under which 
novel, sustainable business models can gain wide-scale uptake but also (2) how the application 
of such business models might influence wider socio-technical system change and in particular, 
sustainability transitions. We seek to improve our understanding of the above by developing 
an analytical framework that integrates insights from both co-evolutionary and business model 
literatures. Subsequently, we apply this analytical framework to aid analysis of the data 
generated by this project’s empirical investigation into ESCo operation in the UK energy 
system. By applying this integrated analytical framework, we seek to elucidate our 
understanding of the following: 
 the core characteristics of the ESCo model, which represent a form of novel, 
sustainable business model 
 the causal mechanisms responsible for limiting the uptake of the ESCo model and the 
continued dominance of the EUCo model 
 the extent to which the ESCo model has so far causally influenced UK energy system 
change and is likely to do so in the future 
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Our analytical framework combines two conceptually distinct but complementary frameworks, 
namely Osterwalder and Pigneur’s (2010) 9 building blocks framework for business model 
characterisation (otherwise known as the ‘business model canvas’) (Section 2.4.1) and Foxon’s 
(2011) coevolutionary framework for analysing a transition to a sustainable low carbon 
economy (Section 2.3.3.3). The business model framework is selected to assist our efforts in 
constructing a detailed picture of the core characteristics of the ESCo business model and thus, 
the ESCo population. Having developed a detailed picture of ESCo business model and thus the 
ESCo population, we then apply the coevolutionary framework to examine how the evolution 
of this population has been causally influenced by the different dimensions of the wider UK 
energy system but also, the causal influence the ESCo population has had on the evolution of 
these energy system dimensions. Drawing upon our insight into the coevolutionary 
relationship the ESCo population share with the various dimensions of the UK energy system, 
in conjunction with empirical evidence of recent and emerging system developments, we then 
explore how this coevolutionary relationship is likely to change in the future. This will 
consequently provide us with a stronger understanding of the role the ESCo model is likely to 
play in a low-carbon transition of the UK energy system. 
In this chapter we first re-visit the two different analytical frameworks, which were introduced 
in the Literature Review. Here we provide a justification for their selection and highlight how 
we have integrated these. Additionally, we identify potential issues that might arise from 
employing these frameworks and explain how we intend to address these. Finally, we explain 
how the two frameworks have been synthesized, underlining the minor changes we have 
made to the original frameworks as part of the integration process. 
3.1 A Framework for Business Model Characterisation  
As we emphasised earlier in this section, before we explore the co-evolutionary relationship 
the ESCo population shares with the wider UK energy system, a necessary first step is to build 
a detailed picture of the characteristics exhibited by the ESCo model and thus the ESCo 
population. Consequently, we adopt Osterwalder & Pigneur’s (2010) 9 business model building 
blocks framework as it provides us with a structure around which we are able to populate the 
components of the ESCo model and consequently provide insight into the mechanics of an 
ESCo’s activity system. The framework teaches us that business models are made up of the 
following: key partners, key activities, key resources, customer value proposition, customer 
relationships, channels, customer segments, cost structure and revenue streams (Section 
2.4.1). 
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Osterwalder & Pigneur’s framework has been chosen over other frameworks for business 
model population primarily because it has been specifically designed to assist researchers’ and 
practitioners’ efforts to populate business models. This is evident in the way that they have 
packaged their framework within their ‘business model canvas’ (Appendix A - Section 12.1), 
which has been designed as a template upon which the various dimensions of a firm’s business 
models can be populated. The canvas incorporates a number of sub-questions that are 
designed to guide enquiry in order to accurately populate the business model under 
examination. For example, in relation to the business’ Value Proposition, it asks ‘which 
customer needs are we satisfying?’ and ‘what bundles of products and services are we offering 
to each Customer Segment?’ Additionally the canvas sub-categorises the kinds of business 
characteristics that relate to each building block. For instance, it categorises a business’s Key 
Resources into physical, intellectual, human and financial, whilst it lists various types of 
Revenue Streams, such as asset sales, licensing, usage fees, subscription fees etc. We argue 
that the sub-categorisation of each building block and the provision of questions designed to 
help identify components relating to these represents an effective approach to populate 
business models. In contrast, we argue the majority of the other frameworks that have been 
designed to aid conceptualisation of a business model (e.g. Hedman and Kalling, 2003, Mason 
and Spring, 2011, Shafer et al., 2005) provide relatively little practical support to those 
undertaking an empirical investigation of a firm’s or population’s business model.  
Another strength of the business model canvas is that it has emanated from a comprehensive 
review of the business model literature (Osterwalder et al., 2005) and thus constitutes a 
unifying framework  that seeks to integrate the various different components scholars have 
associated with a firm’s business model, in order to form a more coherent and comprehensive 
conceptualisation of the business model: 
‘To identify the most common building blocks among business models in the literature, 
we compared the models mentioned most often and studied their components. From 
this synthesis, nine building blocks emerge that cover all the business model 
components’ (Osterwalder et al., 2005 p.17) 
Consequently, accounts of business models constructed by this framework can be considered 
to be representative of the various perspectives on business models that exist in this 
theoretical discourse, helping to improve the integrity of the research’s findings. 
Turning to our empirical study it is important to consider whether there is novelty in 
populating the ESCo business model. To date various studies on energy service contracting 
have made reference to the business model ESCos employ, often referred to as the ‘ESCo 
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model’ or ‘ESCo business model’ (Hansen, 2009, Sorrell, 2005, Steinberger et al., 2009, 
Goldman et al., 2005). Although this work has been particularly valuable in identifying many of 
the core characteristics the ESCo model exhibits, these studies have not constituted a holistic 
and in-depth examination of the building blocks that make-up an ESCo’s business model. 
Consequently, we possess a poor understanding of both the content and mechanics of an 
ESCo’s business model. This has in turn led to some confusion around what actually constitutes 
an ESCo (Bertoldi et al., 2006a, Hansen, 2011, King and Shaw, 2010, Sorrell, 2005). By 
populating the ESCo model with this framework we provide a clear and detailed picture of how 
an ESCo operates, which will help to address this confusion.  
Applying this framework also enables us to populate the characteristically distinct Energy 
Utility Company (EUCo) model, which is similarly poorly understood considering the lack of 
research that has examined the business model employed by Energy Utilities, particularly in a 
specific UK context18. By populating both the ESCo and EUCo model we are afforded the 
opportunity to identify the key characteristic differences between these models. 
Understanding how they are differentiated will better enable us to understand why the EUCo 
model has so far thrived in the selection environment of the UK energy system, whilst the ESCo 
model has struggled to survive. In summary, applying this framework will enable us to 
populate the various components of ESCos’ and Energy Utilities’ business models, which will 
provide insight into not only how they operate as viable businesses but also how they operate 
differently from one another. 
3.1.1 Potential Challenges of Adopting Business Model Framework 
In the literature review we highlighted a number of criticisms that have been levelled at the 
application of the business model concept (Section 2.4.1.1). We briefly discuss these and 
identify the ways in which we intend to mitigate these challenges as part of the design of our 
integrated analytical framework. 
Some scholars have questioned whether the business model concept is sufficiently 
conceptually distinct from other business related units of analysis, making it polysemic and 
ambiguous (Perkmann and Spicer, 2010). Instead we concur with the results of Zott et al.’s 
(2011) review of the business model literature that the business model represents a new unit 
of analysis, which is conceptually distinct from others and worthy of further academic 
examination. They explain that this is because a business model incorporates the components 
and linkages that enable a firm to create, deliver and capture value. It is also distinct in the 
                                                          
18 The studies that have examined the EUCo business model have focused on the US energy 
system not the UK (see York and Kuschler, 2011, Valocchi et al., 2010, Small and Frantzis, 
2010). These companies are likely to be similar but may not be identical 
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sense that the boundaries of the business model extend beyond the firm to incorporate its key 
partners and customers.  
There are also concerns that the concept of the business model does not lend itself particularly 
well to empirical investigation (Perkmann and Spicer, 2010, Porter, 2001). However, we argue 
that the business model canvas presents us with a user-friendly means of constructing a 
detailed picture of both the characteristics and mechanics of a particular business model as 
the framework incorporates sub-questions and sub-categorisations relating to each building 
blocks (Appendix A – Section 12.1), meaning that a model can be populated relatively easily by 
collecting data from firms using methods such as documentary analysis and semi-structured 
interviews. 
Finally, with respect to case studies of individual firms, some academics have expressed 
concern that populating a business model provides only a snapshot of how a firm or a group of 
firms create, deliver and capture value at a particular moment in time (Mason and Spring, 
2011, Osterwalder et al., 2005). This is a valid criticism considering that firms’ business models 
are prone to change over time due to a combination of internal and external factors, as we 
highlighted in Section 2.4.3. However, we argue that by charting a firm’s history through 
careful empirical investigation, we are able to use this framework to develop a narrative of 
how the firm’s business model has evolved up to the present day. We can also examine why a 
firm’s business model has evolved in this manner by examining how the firm’s environment 
has changed during this same period and consequently, the causal mechanisms that have 
linked the evolution of the firm’s business model with its environment. This framework 
therefore provides us with the opportunity to develop a narrative of how and why a firm’s 
business model has evolved in the manner it has. 
3.2 A Framework for Analysing Business Model and Socio-Technical 
System Coevolution 
In applying the 9 building blocks framework we are able to build a clear and detailed picture of 
the ESCo model and consequently the various attributes that are common to all ESCos and 
thus the key characteristics of the ESCo population. However, this framework alone is 
insufficient to identify the causal mechanisms that have influenced the evolution of the ESCo 
population in the UK, namely the factors that have led to the emergence of variants of the 
ESCo model (variation), as well as those that have determined the extent to which these 
variants have been adopted (selection) and finally, those factors that have enabled these 
variants to persist and be replicated by other organisations (retention). The framework is also 
unable to provide insight into how the ESCo population has, to date, influenced the evolution 
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of the various dimensions of the UK energy system (e.g. technology, institutions, user practices 
etc) and consequently, how it might shape system change in the future. Therefore, we must 
identify an additional framework that compliments the 9 building blocks framework and is 
capable of examining the coevolutionary relationship the ESCo population shares with the 
wider energy system. 
In the literature review we introduced Norgaard’s (1988, 1994) framework for facilitating the 
examination of coevolutionary interactions within socio-technical systems. More recently 
Foxon (2011) has revised Norgaard’s framework to better equip it to analyse sustainability 
transitions, by incorporating some insights from the socio-technical transitions literature 
(Section 2.3.3.3). It is Foxon’s co-evolutionary framework that we adopt for this research and 
now we briefly outline the reasons why we have selected this over other frameworks. 
The key difference between Foxon’s and Norgaard’s frameworks is that Foxon puts greater 
emphasis on the importance of the coevolutionary interactions between technologies, 
institutions and business strategies, a dynamic that has received significant attention not only 
in evolutionary but also socio-technical analyses of system change. Crucially for this research, 
whose unit of analysis is the (ESCo) business model, Foxon’s framework acknowledges the 
importance of business activity in shaping socio-technical system change (i.e. the provision of 
valuable commodities or services to customers in return for revenue streams that outweigh 
the costs incurred).  Although we welcome Foxon’s addition of a business dimension to the 
framework, we do however question the framework’s incorporation of the business strategy 
concept as opposed to that of the business model. As outlined in Section 2.4.1 a business 
strategy represents ‘the plan of which business model to adopt’ (Casadesus-Masanell and 
Ricart, 2010 p.204). A business model therefore constitutes ‘a reflection of a firm’s realized 
[business] strategy’ (Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart, 2010 p.205), i.e. what the business does 
as opposed to what it intends to do. Consequently, we make reference to business models 
rather than strategies as these represent the locus of behaviours that are responsible for 
influencing other aspects of the system.  
The business model dimension can be considered representative not only of the way private 
sector organisations function but also public and third sectors (Neely and Delbridge, 2007, 
Kaplan, 2011). This is predominantly because these organisations also apply a logic that means 
they are able to provide valuable services in a financially sustainable manner (i.e. where 
expenditure does not outweigh funding or revenues) and thus, operate very much like any 
viable business would. In essence, all organisations operate business models and if an 
organization doesn't have a financially sustainable business model then it will soon cease to 
95 
 
 
exist (Kaplan, 2011). The key difference between models employed by private sector and 
public and third sector organisations is that public and third sector organisations’ key objective 
is not to generate profit but instead to deliver a range of cost-effective social, cultural and 
environmental benefits via the provision of products and services. 
A key strength of both Norgaard’s and Foxon’s frameworks is that they focus attention on the 
five heterogeneous key sub-systems that are considered to represent the most important 
dimensions that make up a socio-technical systems. As Foxon explains the main strength over 
the MLP here is that: 
‘this greater degree of analytical separation…focuses attention on the causal 
influences between systems, and hence may give greater insight into how decisions 
made by policy-makers or other actors could affect these influences, so as to promote 
evolution towards more sustainable, low-carbon systems’ (p.2262) 
In contrast the MLP stresses the inter-connectedness and mutual dependence of social and 
technical system components (Foxon, 2011). We argue that whilst the MLP does provide some 
distinction between the different dimensions that make-up the socio-technical regime, i.e. 
science, culture, technology, markets/user preferences, industry and policy (Geels and Schot, 
2007), the approach does not explicitly examine the co-evolutionary relationships that exist 
between these dimensions, instead these relationships are more implicit. Furthermore, unlike 
Foxon’s co-evolutionary framework, the MLP does not provide a break-down of what socio-
technical components can be assigned to each of these dimensions. Therefore, we select the 
co-evolutionary framework over the MLP because we consider it to exhibit three key strengths 
over the MLP for improving our understanding of how the UK ESCo population has been 
shaped by the key dimensions that make-up the UK energy system and vice versa. These 
include a (1) greater analytical separation of the key dimensions that make-up the socio-
technical system; (2) greater emphasis on the causal inter-play between these dimensions and 
(3) greater clarity of what components these different system dimensions are composed of. 
We make one further analytical separation in our framework, which is between novel and 
incumbent business models. This division is important because it enables us to explore how 
the evolution of non-incumbent firms practicing novel business models is causally influenced 
by incumbent firms practicing traditional models and vice versa, such as between the ESCo and 
Energy Utility populations. Furthermore, by separating these dimensions we are able to 
examine the coevolutionary relationship each model shares with the wider energy system. This 
separation will enable us to examine whether or not the dominance of the EUCo model and 
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the marginalisation of the ESCo model can be explained by co-evolutionary processes, such as 
positive feedback mechanisms. 
3.2.1 Potential Challenges of Adopting the Co-evolutionary Framework 
In Section 2.3.3.4 we identified a number of challenges associated with the empirical 
examination of coevolutionary change. In particular, we highlighted the difficulty associated 
with identifying the causal mechanisms that are responsible for coevolution. Murmann (2003) 
explains that the central focus of an investigation seeking to identify coevolution should be to 
locate ‘the bidirectional causality linking the two parties in the relationship’ (p. 23) and 
therefore, ‘the key challenge for such arguments is to establish that causal processes indeed 
do connect the two partners in a co-evolutionary relationship’ (p.23). Stenzel (2008) supports 
this argument and explains that one must seek to identify ‘a detailed mechanism that explains 
how the inter-connection in a coevolutionary relationship is causally linked’ (p.64). Murmann 
(2012) duly takes this approach and identifies three causal mechanisms that operated between 
the synthetic dye industry and academia during the mid to late 19th and early 20th centuries. 
These included exchange of personnel, commercial ties and lobbying, each of which were 
responsible for influencing at least one of the evolutionary processes (i.e. variation, selection 
and retention) that dictated how these two populations evolved. 
We take a similar approach for our empirical investigation and seek to identify causal 
mechanisms that link the evolution of the ESCo population with other key populations that 
make-up the socio-technical system (e.g. institutions, technologies, business models, user 
practices, ecosystems). A Straussian Grounded Theory qualitative research strategy is 
employed to collect sufficient evidence to identify and detail these mechanisms (Section 4).  
Kallis and Norgaard (2010) emphasise how important it is for scholars applying coevolutionary 
frameworks to be sensitive to the multiple levels at which coevolution occurs because 
biological and socio-technical systems exist within nested hierarchies of other systems: 
‘Evolution takes place at different levels of nested biological and social 
hierarchies...The conceptual challenge is how to frame the different levels of evolution 
in social systems and their internal and external interactions, especially with multi-
levelled biophysical systems’ (Kallis and Norgaard, 2010 p.696) 
They explain that future empirical research examining coevolutionary phenomena must be 
sensitive to ‘the different levels of (co) evolution, within and between hierarchies, their 
weights, and the nature of their interactions’ (Kallis and Norgaard, 2010 p.696) and make 
efforts to map these out. Consequently, with respect to our coevolutionary examination of 
ESCos, we take care to investigate causal mechanisms operating at multiple levels. For instance 
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this research is sensitive to the nature of regulation, which typically operates at different levels 
of government, ranging from local to regional to national to international.  
Kallis and Norgaard (2010) also warn that space and isolation are under-theorized in 
coevolutionary analyses. They explain that at present this discourse fails to adequately take 
into account the influence of the ‘friction of distance and the shelter of boundaries’ (Clark and 
Tsai, 2002 p.426) and thus the importance of geography on the evolution of non-biological 
populations. Geography could potentially play an important role in the evolution of business 
populations too. For instance, firms operating in an area with similar natural resources (e.g. 
gas, biomass, wind) may ultimately develop similar business models that are designed to 
create value from utilising these local resources. Furthermore, firms operating in close 
proximity to one another may form strong social networks or clusters that may alter the 
selection environment in that particular area, such as the various IT firms that located in Silicon 
Valley during the late 20th century. However, globalization is also seen as a phenomenon that 
has had a potentially moderating effect on the role of space and isolation in non-biological 
population evolution, as it has opened firms up to knowledge and material flows across the 
world. Considering these factors, as part of this research we pay attention to how firms’ local 
environment has influenced the evolution of its business model as well as the connections 
they may have developed nationally or internationally.  
Kallis and Norgaard (2010) highlight that a weakness of Norgaard’s framework, and by 
extension Foxon’s, is their lack of ability to accommodate for the inequalities of power and 
agency between actors. We move to address this weakness to some extent by making an 
analytical distinction between firms practicing novel, non-incumbent business model (e.g. 
ESCos) and those practicing a traditional, incumbent business model (e.g. EUCos) in our 
framework. The former are predominantly new entrants who wield less political power than 
the incumbent firms who have normally spent years cultivating a formidable power base. We 
argue this analytical distinction between incumbent and non-incumbent firms helps us to 
examine how inequality of power between these two populations and the subsequent playing 
out of this power (Shove and Walker, 2007) can influence not only these populations’ 
evolution but that of the wider socio-technical system.  
This separation will enable us to explore how incumbent firms may use their political power, 
via such means as political lobbying, to help cultivate a favourable selection environment that 
is supportive of their business operations. For instance, Murmann (2012) revealed that 
industrialists operating in the synthetic dye industries of Britain, Germany, France, Switzerland, 
and the United States, made efforts via lobbying to ensure that certain academic disciplines 
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obtained a significant share of public research money in order to support advances in organic 
chemistry that would help to develop a more supportive selection environment for their 
industry. Additionally, this process of an incumbent group of organisations utilising their 
political and economic strength may not only help to reinforce the incumbents’ dominance but 
also serve to undermine organisations operating novel business models, if it demands a very 
different selection environment to proliferate.  
3.3 Summary of Integrated Analytical Framework 
To illustrate how we have integrated the business model and co-evolutionary frameworks 
together, we provide a visual representation of our analytical framework (Figure 3.1). 
 
Figure 3.1 An integrated analytical framework illustrating the coevolutionary relationship between novel 
and incumbent business models and the various dimensions of the wider socio-technical system 
(adapted from Foxon, 2011, Norgaard, 1994) 
This is predominantly based upon on Foxon’s framework, although we have made four 
important changes, which we have both explained and justified throughout this chapter. We 
briefly summarise these changes and explain our reasons for making them: 
1. The business dimension has been centralised as this represents our unit of analysis and 
represents the central focus of this research 
2. In relation to the business dimension, business strategy has been replaced with 
business model because a business model constitutes the realization of a firm’s 
business strategy. Therefore, business models represent the locus of established 
routines and behaviours that characterize firms operating these models, which in turn 
influence other aspects of the system. The remaining 4 dimensions however remain 
the same, i.e. ecosystems, technology, institutions and user practices 
3. We ‘open-up’ the business model dimension by applying Osterwalder & Pigneur’s 
(2010) 9 business model building blocks framework in order to help us construct a 
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more accurate and detailed representation of certain business models that 
characterize different populations of firms. Understanding the characteristics of these 
firms and the populations they are part of is necessary if we are to appreciate how and 
why they are co-evolving with their wider environment 
4. The business model dimension is split into firms adopting novel and incumbent 
business models. This is because these business models and thus the firms that adopt 
them are characteristically distinct from one another. Furthermore, incumbent 
populations tend to wield more economic and political power than non-incumbent or  
niche populations of firms. This analytical separation affords us the opportunity to 
examine the coevolutionary relationship each population shares with the wider system 
and how these differ, as well as the coevolutionary relationship that exists between 
these two populations 
Although we make specific reference to the ESCo model, this framework could be applied to 
examine the coevolution between other populations of organisations also practicing novel 
business models (which may or may not be recognised as sustainable), with the dimensions of 
other socio-technical systems. Particularly systems that are currently dominated by an 
incumbent business model (see Section 10.3).  
In this chapter we have explained and justified our choice of analytical framework.  Its central 
role is to mobilise relevant theoretical constructs in order to aid our empirical investigation 
and consequently, assist our efforts in addressing the research questions. We now turn to our 
methodology, which is designed to mobilise this analytical framework via the application of 
complimentary methods of data collection and analysis, in a bid to provide the necessary 
evidence to address our research questions.
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4 Methodology 
The previous chapter introduced the integrated analytical framework this thesis applies, which 
integrates a combination of co-evolutionary and business model theoretical concepts. The 
framework constitutes a written and visual explanation of the key aspects this thesis examines, 
i.e. ‘the key factors, concepts or variables – and the presumed relationships among them’ 
(Stake, 1995 p.14). The framework represents the analytical tools this research applies in order 
to identify the core characteristics of the ESCo model and subsequently examine the 
coevolutionary relationship the ESCo population shares with the wider UK energy system. This 
chapter introduces the methodology this research employs in order to mobilise this analytical 
framework in a real world context, via a combination of qualitative methods for data collection 
and analysis.  
It is important to note that one of the key criticisms levelled at research that has examined 
socio-technical system change to date has been the lack of methodological rigour employed  
(Section 2.2.2.5). In light of this, we argue that by detailing and justifying the methodology we 
adopt in order to examine the factors shaping system change, this thesis makes an important 
contribution to this literature by providing a methodological basis for future empirical research 
of socio-technical transitions to potentially follow.  
In Section 4.1 we introduce the Straussian Grounded Theory approach to theoretical 
development, which forms the foundations of this methodology. Here we justify the selection 
of this approach with respect to answering our research questions. It is also in Section 4.1 that 
we outline our reasons for adopting an exclusively qualitative research strategy. Subsequently, 
in Section 4.2 we outline and justify the scope of the research, before we explain how and why 
this research is split into two key phases of data collection in Section 4.3. In Section 4.4 we pay 
attention to the data collection methods employed in both the sector-level (Phase 1) and ESCo 
case-study (Phase 2) phases of the empirical investigation. Finally, in Section 4.5 we introduce 
the methods this research adopts for qualitative data analysis. Throughout this chapter we 
identify potential weaknesses of this research’s methodology and the efforts we have made to 
address these. 
4.1 Research Strategy 
In this sub-section we introduce the research strategy this thesis adopts to examine the inter-
play between the UK ESCo population and the key dimensions of the UK energy system. Here 
we not only provide a detailed description of the methods this research applies but also a 
rationale for their selection in relation to addressing our research questions.  
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4.1.1 Straussian Grounded Theory Approach 
This thesis examines the co-evolutionary relationship between the ESCo model, which 
represents a novel, sustainable business model and the various dimensions that make-up the 
UK energy system. As we outlined in both Sections 2 and 3, this relationship is currently under-
researched. Consequently, we understand little of the inter-play between novel, sustainable 
business models and the wider socio-technical system, in order to appreciate the role they 
might play in sustainability transitions. Therefore, this research employs a form of Grounded 
Theory, known as Straussian Grounded Theory, which enables us to draw on insights from the 
existing co-evolutionary, socio-technical transitions and business model theory, whilst 
reserving an extremely important role for empirical observations in the development of new 
theory. We briefly explore the origins of this approach before we outline how it is used as part 
of our research strategy. 
Grounded theory was first introduced by Glaser and Strauss (1967) to describe an approach 
where theory is ‘grounded’ in data and observation, instead of being influenced by pre-
conceived theories, thus constituting a counterpoint to positivism (Pidgeon and Henwood, 
1997). Consequently, ‘systematic data collection and analysis should lead into theory’(Ezzy, 
2002 p.7). Glaser and Strauss eventually disagreed on how this approach should be developed. 
Glaser (1978, 1992) remained faithful to the classic conception of grounded theory as 
previously described, whilst Strauss, alongside Corbin (1990), adapted the approach.  
Both Glaserian and Straussian grounded theory approaches recognise that the researcher does 
not enter the field without their own ideas and pre-conceptions, which are likely to have been 
derived from past experience and existing literature. In this sense ‘presuppositionless data 
collection is impossible’ (Blaikie, 2000 p.104). However, these approaches fundamentally differ 
with respect to how researchers should utilise existing concepts before and during the 
researcher process. Locke (1996) explains that Strauss and Corbin (1990) ‘allow for the 
potential of prior theory, nontechnical literature, and personal as well as professional 
experiences to help researchers gain insight into the data’ (p.242). Ezzy (2002) explains that 
this Straussian strain of Grounded Theory ‘emphasise[s] the role of prexisting theory in 
sensitising the researcher to orienting questions that need to be examined during the 
research’ (p.12). In contrast Glaser (1978, 1992) objects to this approach, ‘advocating the 
position that the researcher should not bring any a priori knowledge to the research 
endeavour’ (p.242). Despite the obvious contrast between the two approaches, it remains a 
common misconception that all grounded theory approaches encourage the researcher to 
ignore existing theory until data is collected and analysed (Suddaby, 2006). As such Ezzy (2002) 
describes Straussian Grounded Theory as a sophisticated model for Grounded Theory, which 
103 
 
 
draws upon both inductive and deductive methods of theory generation, as illustrated in 
Figure 4.1 and the following quote: 
‘The task of the [Straussian] grounded theorist is to allow deductions from pre-existing 
theory to suggest specific research problems and foci, but the researcher must not 
allow this pre-existing theory to constrain what is noticed. [Therefore,] the grounded 
theorist uses deductively derived theory, but also examines questions and issues 
beyond what is suggested by deductively derived theory’ (p.12) 
 
Figure 4.1 The Straussian Grounded Theory Approach (Ezzy, 2002) 
As part of this research we adopt Strauss and Corbin’s grounded theory approach in an effort 
to provide insight into the role novel, sustainable business models might play in socio-technical 
transitions. For instance, we employ an analytical framework built upon existing theory and 
designed to assist our efforts in making sense of the data collected (Smyth, 2004). In turn, the 
insights generated by applying this framework to the empirical data are drawn upon to inform 
the development and redevelopment of theory relating to the co-evolutionary relationship 
between novel business models and their wider socio-technical system.  
A particular strength of a Straussian Grounded Theory research strategy is that it ensures the 
researcher first engages with the existing theory, affording them the opportunity to identify 
existing ‘gaps’ in the literature, i.e. topics that would benefit from additional research. This can 
help to ensure that the researcher is aware of the research that has preceded their own and 
thus the type of research that would constitute a novel contribution to science. However, 
Maxwell (2005) explains that drawing upon theory prior to empirical investigation may cause 
the researcher to overlook important ways of conceptualizing their study or key implications of 
your results because ‘a theory that brightly illuminates one area will leave other areas in 
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darkness; no theory can illuminate everything’ (p.43). Consequently, we make every effort to 
‘listen’ to the data and allow this to inform the development and redevelopment of theory 
(Ezzy, 2002). 
The Straussian grounded theory approach encourages the constant interaction of pre-existing 
theoretical and experiential insight with the generation of empirical evidence through data 
collection and analysis: ‘in Grounded Theory, the analysis begins as soon as the first bit of data 
is collected’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1990 p.6)(Figure 4.2). This process is otherwise known as the 
constant comparative technique, which entails the constant comparison of new data with 
existing data, categories, concepts and theory throughout the research process (Bryman, 2012) 
and is considered one of the most elucidating ways to knowledge (Flick, 2006): 
‘With grounded theory in particular, what appears to be ‘discovery’ or ‘emergence’ of 
theory is really the result of a constant interplay between data and the researcher’s 
developing conceptualisations, a ‘flip flop’ between ideas and research experience’ 
(Pidgeon and Henwood, 1997 p.255) 
 
Figure 4.2 Comparison between phases of data collection and analysis for constant comparative method 
(right) and non-constant comparative method (left) (Ezzy, 2002 adapted from, De Vaus, 2001) 
This iterative process of data collection, analysis and theoretical development continues until 
theoretical saturation is reached, which refers to the stage where additional data collection 
and analysis is unlikely to provide significant additional insight into emergent theory (Bryman, 
2012). Strauss and Corbin (1998) explain that this point is reached when: 
a) ‘no new or relevant data seem to be emerging regarding a category’ (p.212) 
b) ‘the category is well developed in terms of its properties and dimensions 
demonstrating variation’ (p.212) 
c) ‘the relationships among categories are well established and validated’ (p.212) 
Bryman (2012) raises concerns about using a Straussian grounded theory to generate theory, 
explaining that there is generally a relatively small scope for generalizations to be drawn from 
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the data, considering that grounded theory studies tend to have a relatively narrow focus. 
However, we argue that an in-depth analysis of social phenomena within specific contexts 
represents a critical stage in developing a comprehensive understanding of how these 
phenomena play out in various different contexts. 
4.1.2 Qualitative Research Strategy 
As outlined in the previous sub-section, this research employs a Straussian grounded theory 
approach, which means that although it draws upon insight from pre-existing theory it also 
seeks to uncover new insight via empirical investigation. Therefore, it is critical that methods 
for data collection and analysis are employed that can enable such insights to emerge from the 
data. Quantitative methods are deemed inappropriate for this research because they fix 
meaning rather than allowing meaning to emerge through the interplay between researcher 
and researched (Pidgeon and Henwood, 1997). This is because quantitative research typically 
seeks to operationalize and test existing theory, which requires hypotheses to be rigidly 
defined prior to empirical investigation (Pidgeon and Henwood, 1997). Considering that we 
currently have a poor understanding of the interplay between novel business models and 
socio-technical systems, it would be inappropriate to develop and test hypotheses without 
exploring their relationship first in order to provide the necessary insight to generate tentative 
theory (Weiss, 1994). Consequently, we turn to qualitative methods as a means of generating 
theory (Blaikie, 2010) relating to the interplay of novel, sustainable business models and socio-
technical systems. 
Qualitative methodologies are particularly well suited to providing detailed, holistic 
descriptions of events and their causes, as interpreted by those that experience them (Weiss, 
1994). This implies a broadly interpretivist epistemology, whereby the subjective meanings 
that human actors construct and associate with social phenomena are considered the 
acceptable form of knowledge (Saunders et al., 2009). Consequently, we adopt a set of 
appropriate qualitative data collection methods (e.g. semi-structured interviews) that enable 
us to uncover these subjective meanings, which can provide a rich, deep and textured 
understanding of the phenomena under investigation and their underlying causes (Bryman, 
2012, Pidgeon and Henwood, 1997). Building such a detailed picture of the ESCo business 
model as well as the interplay between the ESCo population and the wider UK energy system 
would be extremely difficult to achieve using quantitative methods alone. 
Developing such an in-depth understanding of social phenomena and the contexts in which 
they emerge using qualitative methods can help facilitate insight to emerge, via the interplay 
between the researcher and the researched (Bryman, 2012, Pidgeon and Henwood, 1997): 
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‘Conducting close, detailed qualitative analyses which are grounded in participants’ 
understandings and local contextual knowledges, and which seek to make explicit 
what is otherwise taken for granted, is an invaluable resource for the generation of 
new ideas’ (Pidgeon and Henwood, 1997 p.252) 
The unstructured nature of qualitative research and the ability for it to be employed in natural 
settings (Bryman, 2012) presents an effective means for gaining insight into the factors that 
shape real-life, social phenomena, such as the coevolution of the ESCo population and the UK 
energy system. 
4.1.3 Summary of Research Strategy 
In this sub-section a brief summary and visual representation of the research strategy is 
provided (Figure 4.3). 
 
Figure 4.3 Visual representation of key stages of research strategy 
Stage 1 - Phenomena worthy of additional research were identified through a detailed 
review of government, industry and academic literature 
Stage 2 - Research questions were structured with the aim of providing valuable 
insight into these phenomena through generating theory grounded in empirical data 
Stage 3 - Data collection was designed and undertaken with the aim of providing the 
necessary evidence to address these questions and generate theory (Section 4.4). 
Analysis was undertaken in accordance with the analytical framework introduced in 
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Section 3.3 and the methods in Section 4.5. Data collection and analysis were 
undertaken in parallel with one another in line with the constant comparative 
technique (Section 4.1.1). 
Stage 4 - In parallel with data collection and analysis, generalizations were sought from 
the findings of the empirical investigation, considering these constitute the building 
blocks for the development of new theory (Blaikie, 2000) 
Crossroads – After efforts were been made to develop theory from the research 
findings, it was necessary to make a decision about the next step to take 
Return to Stage 1 – At points during the stage of theoretical development 
(Stage 4), it became evident that we had to return to the literature (Stage 1) in 
an effort to identify theory that might help to facilitate an explanation of the 
phenomena that had been observed as part of the empirical investigation 
Return to Stage 2 – At other times, instead of seeking additional theoretical 
insight from the literature, it was considered necessary to refine the research 
questions. For example, the research questions were deemed unrealistic (e.g. 
too broad, too in-depth) and/or are unrepresentative of the subjects under 
investigation and thus required altering 
Return to Stage 3 – Towards the end of the empirical investigation it became 
apparent that that the existing literature was unlikely to provide significant 
additional theoretical insight into the phenomena under investigation. 
Furthermore, after multiple iterations, the research questions were 
considered appropriate. However, after analysis and theoretical development 
it was decided that additional empirical evidence was required to enable 
further generalizations to be drawn, thus presenting a need to engage in 
further data collection and analysis 
Progress to Stage 5 - Once theoretical saturation was reached (i.e. additional 
data collection and analysis was unlikely to provide additional insight into 
emergent theory) data collection and analysis ceased, marking a period of 
refining the theoretical insights generated by the investigation 
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4.2 Research Scope 
As outlined in the Introduction, this research is concerned with understanding the role 
sustainable, novel business models for energy provision are likely to play in sustainability 
transitions. We identified the ESCo model as a form of sustainable, novel business model that 
could potentially play an important role in facilitating transitions to sustainable energy 
systems. The decision was made to identify an energy system already undergoing a transition 
and one where ESCos were already present as this would be more amenable to an empirical 
investigation of the role ESCos might play in a socio-technical transition than a system that is 
not undergoing a transition and where there is no established ESCo market. The UK was 
selected as the focus for this research because here the energy system is already undergoing a 
transition to an alternative system-state and already incorporates a nascent ESCo market. The 
UK posed a particularly interesting case because the ESCo population is operating within an 
energy system that is currently dominated by vertically-integrated Energy Utility companies, 
which employ a very different business model to ESCos. This afforded the opportunity to 
explore how the interplay between two characteristically distinct populations of energy 
companies and their interaction with the wider energy system has given rise to causal 
mechanisms responsible for the locking-in of the EUCo model and marginalisation of the ESCo 
model.  
The scope of the empirical investigation was restricted to the UK, as opposed to a group of 
countries. Although this would have likely provided valuable insight into the role novel, 
sustainable business model play in sustainability transitions, the view was taken that 
investigating ESCo markets in multiple countries would require more time and financial 
resources than were available for the research. Limited resources also represented an 
important factor in deciding to select the UK over other countries, considering that the 
researcher was located in the UK, making research there much more amendable and thus less 
resource intensive. Additionally, the language barrier and accessibility to information also 
represented an important consideration.  
The scope of the research was also limited to residential and commercial energy service 
contracting. Again this was a decision made due to the limited resources of the research 
project. Industrial contracting was also omitted on grounds that the baseline of current 
industrial energy provision is relatively heterogeneous, making it difficult to draw 
generalizations from the research, unlike commercial and residential contracting. 
 
 
109 
 
 
4.3 Phased Empirical Investigation 
In line with the grounded theory approach outlined above the research was structured to 
allow for simultaneous data collection and conceptualisation. To allow for intense periods of 
comparison, the research was split into three different phases (Phase 1a, Phase 1b & Phase 2), 
after which the researcher was able to spend a period of time to make sense of the data and 
subsequently, to take stock of the progress that has been made in answering the research 
questions. The end of each phase presented a particularly good opportunity for the researcher 
to return to the literature to explore existing theory that could help explain observed 
phenomena and/or refine the research questions in light of the findings from the data 
collection and analysis (Stage 4 in Figure 4.3), prior to additional data collection and analysis. 
Another important reason for splitting the investigation into different phases was to allow for 
the opportunity to provide a copy of the results from each of the phases to interviewees and 
subsequently receive feedback from them on the results of that phase. This method is 
regarded as an important means of validating data in qualitative research, often referred to as 
respondent verification or member validation (Lincoln and Guba, 1985, Mays and Pope, 2000). 
Feedback from interviewees not only helped to validate the results but also informed the 
subsequent phase(s) of data collection and analysis. Finally, a key reason for splitting the 
research into phases was to allow for a shift in focus to take place between the sector-level 
examination of the ESCo population and the case studies of individual ESCos. The sector-level 
investigation (Phase 1) was undertaken first because it enabled us to identify a handful of 
ESCos that were suitable for case-study analysis, considering their potential to provide 
additional insight into the relationship between the ESCo population and the wider UK energy 
system, as part of Phase 2. 
Taking these factors into account the research was split into 3 phases: Phase 1a, 1b and 2. 
Both phases 1a and 1b constituted a sector-level investigation, whilst Phase 2 incorporated 4 
ESCo case studies. In total 43 in-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted with a 
broad range of ESCo experts, each typically lasting between 30 minutes and an hour long . 
Phase Date 
Nos. of 
Interviews  
Focus 
1 
1a 22/7/2010 – 17/1/2011 11 
Pilot sector-level study of UK ESCo 
market 
1b 8/7/2011 – 10/10/2011 20 Sector-level study of UK ESCo market 
2 13/7/2011 -  31/1/2012 12 
4 case-studies of archetypal UK ESCo 
variants 
Table 4.1 Summary of Research Phases 
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4.3.1 Phase 1 – Sector Level Study of ESCo Market 
Phase 1 constituted a sector level study of the UK ESCo market and was split into two different 
stages: Phase 1a and 1b. In total it consisted of 31 interviews with ESCo experts from a range 
of different backgrounds, the details of which are outlined in Section 4.4.1. The purpose of this 
sector-level approach was to develop a detailed picture of the UK ESCo market and in 
particular the commonalities and differences between the business models these 
organisations employ. Furthermore, the sector-level investigation was designed to provide 
insight into the structure and nature of the UK energy system. Combining a detailed 
understanding of (1) the characteristics and operations of the ESCo population and 
importantly, (2) the socio-technical energy system in which these organisations operate, we 
were able to begin developing theory that could help us to explain how novel, sustainable 
business models might causally influence the evolution of the various dimensions of the socio-
technical system and vice versa. 
Phase 1 constituted a cross-sectional study. Consequently, a single interview was conducted 
with each interviewee at a single point in time, as opposed to multiple interviews with the 
same interviewee at different points in time (Miles and Huberman, 1994). However, it shared 
some of the same characteristics a longitudinal study would. For instance, the study was 
conducted over 15 months, during which the ESCo population and the UK energy system were 
undergoing changes. Furthermore, it not only took account of the coevolution between ESCos 
and the UK energy system at present but also in the past, thus taking a retrospective approach 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
4.3.1.1 Phase 1a – Pilot  
Both Phases 1a and 1b shared the same focus (i.e. a sector-level investigation of the UK ESCo 
market), however the two differed in the respect that Phase 1a constituted a pilot study, 
which informed the design of Phase 1b. Its primary role was to ensure that the research 
strategy as a whole functioned effectively (Bryman, 2012), however the results were still 
considered valuable and were therefore used for theory building. As such Phase 1a presented 
an opportunity to refine the design of data collection, ‘with respect to both the content of the 
data [sought] and the procedures to be followed’ (Yin, 2009 p.92). For instance, the pilot study 
helped to refine the interview schedule by illuminating questions that worked and those that 
didn’t, as well as areas for additional investigation that may not have otherwise been 
identified, for which new questions need to be drafted (Bryman, 2012, Yin, 2009). In this way 
the pilot study highlighted aspects of the research design that were both suitable and 
unsuitable (Yin, 2009), giving the researcher the opportunity to alter its design as necessary 
(Bryman, 2012): 
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‘No design is ever so complete that it cannot be improved by a prior, small-scale 
exploratory study. Pilot studies are almost always worth the time and effort [if] any 
facet of your design needs clarification’ (Light et al., 1990 p.213) 
The pilot study was also integral in the development of the ESCo selection criteria (see Section 
4.3.2.3), which constituted a number of important, basic characteristics an organisation had to 
exhibit to be deemed an ESCo. These selection criteria had an important bearing on the guided 
the interviewee (Phase 1b) and case study (Phase 2) sampling strategies as explained in 
Section 4.3.2.3. The ESCo selection criteria was important considering that the term ESCo is 
often misused, having been applied to organisations that often do not fulfil the ESCo criteria 
(Bertoldi et al., 2006a, Hansen, 2011, King and Shaw, 2010, Sorrell, 2005, Ürge-Vorsatz et al., 
2007). Therefore, in order to build a detailed picture of the ESCo model, we had to be sure we 
were dealing with ESCos and not other forms of organisation that operate similar but 
characteristically different business models. 
Pilot studies are also instrumental in highlighting where the researcher might benefit from 
returning back to the literature, in an effort to identify existing theory that might help them 
‘make sense of what [they] see’ (Maxwell, 2005 p.43) (Figure 4.3). In the context of this study, 
Phase 1a was only loosely guided by theory relating to socio-technical transitions and thus 
represented a more Glaserian form of Grounded Theory approach. However, it was during and 
after this phase of data collection and analysis that the author identified the need to identify 
an analytical framework that would help to guide the remaining empirical investigation (i.e. 
Phases 1b and 2) and make sense of the phenomena that had been observed in order to 
effectively address the research questions (see Section 3 for details of framework).  
4.3.1.2 Phase 1b 
Phase 1b constituted an extension of the sectoral level study of the ESCo sector conducted in 
Phase 1a. It incorporated an additional 20 semi-structured interviews, meaning that Phase 1 
incorporated 31 interviews in total. As explained in the previous sub-section, the main 
difference between the Phase 1a & 1b was that in Phase 1b our analytical framework was 
employed. Therefore, Osterwalder & Pigneur’s (2010) business model building blocks 
framework was adopted to identify the core characteristics of the ESCo and EUCo business 
models, whilst Foxon’s (2011) co-evolutionary framework, was employed to provide insight 
into the manner in which the ESCo population had influenced the evolution of the UK energy 
system and vice versa. Although the theme of the interviews was not radically different to 
those in Phase 1a, the adoption of the analytical framework did have a bearing on the 
structure and content of the interviews. For instance, the adoption of the business model 
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framework helped to structure questions designed to populate the ESCo business model, such 
as ‘what are ESCos’ core Revenue Streams?’ or ‘who are normally an ESCo’s Key Partners?’. 
Naturally, the framework also had a bearing on our analysis as explained in Section 4.5.1. 
Another key difference was that the ESCo selection criteria (Section 4.4.1.1), which was both 
informed by the literature review and refined during Phase 1a, was applied as part of the 
interviewee sampling strategy for Phase 1b. 
4.3.2 Phase 2 – ESCo Case Studies 
Phase 2 incorporated 4 cross-sectional case studies of different types of ESCo variant and was 
designed to build upon the insight gained from Phase 1. The purpose of these case studies was 
to examine how these 4 different ESCos have coevolved with the various dimensions of the 
wider UK energy system and provide insight into the causal mechanisms that have shaped this 
phenomenon (Yin, 2003). Furthermore, by drawing upon the experience and intuition of 
individuals working as part of the organisations, we were also afforded insight into how the 
ESCo was likely to coevolve with the UK energy system in the future. We now examine the 
reasons why a case study approach was adopted in more detail and how these case studies 
were conducted.  
4.3.2.1 Why a Case Study Approach? 
Yin (2009) explains that a case study approach is suitable when ‘(a) ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions 
are being posed, (b) the investigator has little control over events , and (c) the focus is on a 
contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context’ (p.2). This research fulfils all these 
criteria considering (a) that research questions (RQs) 3, 4 and 5 are all ‘how’ questions (Section 
1.5), (b) the investigator has little/no control over events in the UK energy system and (c) the 
research examines the contemporary phenomenon of the interplay between novel, 
sustainable business models and socio-technical system by investigating the real-life context of 
the ESCo market and the UK energy system. Having identified the compatibility of the case 
study approach with this particular research project, we now outline the specific need to 
employ it. 
The sectoral level study of the UK ESCo market (Phase 1) identified the key characteristics of 
the ESCo business model,  however it also identified a number of key variants of this model 
being operated in the UK (Section 6.1.5). A case study approach was subsequently adopted to 
not only verify and add to the business model characteristics of the ESCo model identified in 
Phase 1 (RQ 1) but to also provide additional insight into the core characteristics of the 
business models there ESCo variants employed. In total, 4 case studies, each corresponding to 
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one of the 4 key variants identified in Phase 1 (Table 4.2), were conducted to provide 
extensive, in-depth, detailed accounts of the business models these ESCos employed.  
A case study approach was also employed to develop a more detailed understanding of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the ESCo model (RQ 2). By talking with numerous ESCo personnel 
and developing a detailed picture of their operations, we were able to gain insight into what 
they considered to be the strengths and weaknesses of the business model their organisation 
had adopted. Furthermore, in undertaking case studies of different variants we were able to 
better appreciate how strengths and weaknesses differed between these variants, depending 
on their characteristic differences. 
In Phase 1 interviewees often illustrated their responses with examples of individual ESCo’s 
experiences in the UK. However, these examples were often isolated in the sense that they 
were not situated within the wider context of the organisation’s narrative. This meant that 
only sections of the ESCo’s story were revealed making it difficult to identify and differentiate 
between cause and effect. Therefore, it was decided that in order to provide additional insight 
into the coevolutionary relationship ESCos share with the wider UK energy system, an 
extensive and in-depth examination of the narratives of a number of different ESCos was 
required (Yin, 2009). Therefore, the case studies provided retrospective insight into the nature 
of this coevolutionary relationship by developing a narrative of these organisations that began 
from the point at which they were established, up to the present day (RQs 3, 4) (De Vaus, 
2001). By conducting case studies, we were also able to improve our understanding of how 
different ESCo variants had enjoyed different experiences of operating in the UK, considering 
their characteristic differences. Importantly, the case studies also provided insight into the role 
these ESCo variants and ESCos more generally were likely to play in a transition to a 
sustainable UK energy system as interviewees were invited to talk about how and why they 
believed this co-evolutionary relationship was likely to change in the future (RQ 5).  
4.3.2.2 Considering Traditional Criticisms of Case Study Approach 
We now briefly consider some criticisms the case study approach has attracted and how we 
intend to address these in the design of this research. 
Reliability 
To ensure reliability, the researcher must document the research procedures followed so that 
an external auditor could in theory repeat these and generate the same results (Yin, 2009). As 
part of this research a standard set of procedures, similar to a case study protocol (Yin, 2009), 
were followed to ensure the procedures were replicable but also to ensure that a certain level 
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of consistency between case studies was maintained, in order to enable cross-case 
generalization to emerge. These procedures included the following: 
 An ESCo selection criteria, which had to be satisfied by each case study (see Section 
4.3.2.3) 
 A set of field procedures that were followed for each case study (e.g. ethical protocol, 
procedures for gaining access to organisations, data collection methods etc) 
 Standard procedures for interview (e.g. semi-structured interview guide) and 
documentary (e.g. search engine, access via interviewees etc) data collection 
 Standard procedures for interview (e.g. transcribing, coding etc) and documentary 
analysis 
 A standard format which each case study reports would follow (Section 6.2) 
These procedures are discussed in more detail in the following subsections. 
External Validity and Generalizability 
One of the major criticisms levelled at the case study approach is its external validity, i.e. the 
extent to which insights drawn from individual case studies has relevance beyond the case 
study research site (Bryman, 2012, Blaikie, 2010).  One way of improving the ‘generalizability’ 
of case study findings is to conduct multiple case studies, across different sites, as opposed to 
undertaking a single ESCo case study (Firestone and Herriott, 1984, Yin, 2009). Gomme et al. 
(2000) explain that the scope for generalization can also be improved if the group of case 
studies selected are representative of the degree of heterogeneity exhibited by the population 
the case studies are drawn from, in this way ‘generalizing is done by making judgements on 
the basis of knowledge of the characteristics of the case and the target population’ (Blaikie, 
2010 p.194). To understand the degree of the population’s heterogeneity a prior investigation 
of the population should be undertaken. Phase 1 constituted such a study and identified 4 key 
variants of the ESCo model, which each of the 4 ESCo case studies corresponded with. 
Another recommendation in relation to case study selection criteria is to select ‘typical’ case 
studies, i.e. seeking to ensure that the case studies selected can be shown to be similar to 
other cases in terms of their characteristics (Whyte, 1984). Yin (2003) does however warn that 
it can be extremely difficult to establish the comparability of multiple cases due to how unique 
each case normally is. However, on the basis of insights gained in Phase 1, we argue that the 4 
case studies selected in Phase 2 can be considered typical cases of the sub-species they 
represent within the ESCo population. 
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To improve the scope for generalisations Yin (2009) also recommends that the researcher 
employs multiple methods for data collection to allow for the convergence of evidence and 
consequently, the process of triangulation. Therefore, both interview and documentary 
analysis were employed (Section 4.4) to allow for triangulation and thus affording us a stronger 
position from which to generate cogent theory (Bryman, 2004).  
4.3.2.3 ESCo Selection Criteria and Selected Case Studies 
The first criterion for case study selection was that each of the case studies satisfied the ESCo 
selection criteria as outlined in Section 4.4.1.1 to ensure that the organisations selected 
constituted ESCos. Another important criterion was that each of the case studies corresponded 
to one of the key ESCo variants selected in Phase 119, i.e. Independent Energy Service Provider, 
Energy Utility Energy Service Provider, Local Authority ‘Arm’s Length’ ESCo and Community 
ESCo (Table 4.2).  
A decision had to be made to select one ESCo for case-study examination over other potential 
case-study candidates. This was normally a question of how accessible personnel were for 
interviews and the accessibility of primary literature for documentary analysis, which was 
gauged during Phase 1 when interviews were undertaken with representatives from a range of 
different ESCos. Another important selection criterion was that the ESCo had to have been 
operational for a number of years so that an extensive, rich and in-depth narrative could be 
developed. 
Company Type of ESCo Variant Dates Nos. of Interviews  
Thameswey Local Authority Arm’s Length 
ESCo 
10/1/2012 2 
MOZES Community Owned and Run 
ESCo 
(9/8/2011)  
2/2/2012 - 9/2/2012 
3 (4)* 
Honeywell Independent Energy Service 
Provider 
(23/7/2011)  
3/4/2012 - 2/5/2012 
3 (4)* 
Energy Utility 
X 
Energy Utility Energy Service 
Provider  
(22/9/2011)  
16/1/2012 - 1/2/1012 
4 (5)* 
Table 4.2 Case studies of ESCo variants conducted for Phase 2 
*This denotes that one interview conducted in Phase 1 was used as evidence for the case 
study. The dates of these are provided in brackets. Consequently, only 12 additional interviews 
were conducted in Phase 2, even though the case-study analysis incorporated 15 interviews 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 The different ESCo variants are examined in detail in Section 6.1.5 
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4.4 Data Collection 
We now explore the qualitative data collection methods employed in both Phases 1 and 2, and 
explain the rationale for selecting these. 
4.4.1 Phase 1 Data Collection 
Data collection during Phase 1 was centred around semi-structured interviews with experts on 
ESCo operation, specifically in the UK. 
4.4.1.1 Semi-Structured Interviews 
Phase 1 consisted of 31 interviews, where interviewees were invited to talk about (1) the core 
characteristics of the ESCo model and its different variants, (2) the strengths and weaknesses of 
the ESCo model, (3) how environmental factors have shaped the characteristics of the ESCo 
population, such as its size, heterogeneity etc, (4) how ESCos have influenced UK energy system 
change and (5) how they believed emerging developments could alter the co-evolutionary 
relationship between the UK energy system and the ESCo population. Interviewees were 
encouraged to illustrate their responses with specific examples of ESCo activity, as well as 
examples of broader developments in the sector, in a bid to provide additional richness to the 
empirical data. 
Interviews were selected as the preferred method of data collection because they provide 
‘access to the observations of others’ (Weiss, 1994 p.1). They represent a particularly powerful 
means of  learning about places we have not visited and about settings in which we have not 
lived, thus helping to inform us about the nature of social life (Weiss, 1994). Interviewing 
enables the researcher to uncover the meanings and interpretations that social actors ascribe 
to social phenomena (Blaikie, 2010), helping us to identify the perceived causal inferences and 
explanations for these (Yin, 2009). Taking these factors into account, this method was selected 
to help us develop a picture of the UK ESCo market and energy system but also the reasons 
why these have evolved in the manner they have. 
Weiss (1994) explains that interviews can provide us with a window on the past, enabling us to 
build a detailed picture about the nature of social phenomena and the factors responsible for 
their emergence. They can also help to elucidate our understanding of what could happen in 
the future. With respect to this research interviewees were not only invited to discuss how the 
interplay between ESCo population had influenced the various different dimensions of the UK 
energy system but also to hypothesize about how this dynamic might change in the future by 
drawing upon their own knowledge and past experiences, as well as insight into on-going and 
emerging market developments. In some cases they made reference to probable, imminent 
developments such as the ratification of regulation, which would most likely have an 
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important bearing on the UK energy system. In other instances, they made reference to 
plausible and/or possible developments, such as rising energy prices or the proliferation of 
sustainable user practices.  
Saunders et al. (2009) highlight the value of semi-structured interviews. In comparison to 
structured interviews they allow the interviewee to lead the discussion to a large degree. This 
can often mean that they lead the discussion into areas that the researcher had not previously 
considered but which provide valuable insight into the phenomena being investigation. They 
also explain that this technique also allows the interviewee to ‘think aloud’ about issues they 
may not have previously considered. The interviewee often has to go through this process to 
provide insightful responses to the interviewee’s own answers. This method also provides the 
interviewer with sufficient control to cover the necessary themes during the interview and also 
to probe answers that require further explanation from the interviewee, helping the 
interviewer to ‘understand the meanings that participants ascribe to various phenomena’ 
(Saunders et al., 2009 p.234). The semi-structured method therefore provides a balance 
between the benefits of structured and unstructured interviews. 
Despite the strengths of the interview method for data collection, we acknowledge it does 
have its limitations. For instance, Weiss (1994) explains the interviewer must be aware that the 
interviewee may indeed omit certain pieces of crucial information relating to the interview 
questions for a range of different reasons (e.g. trust, confidentiality etc). It is also possible that 
the interviewee’s interpretation of events may not present a sufficiently accurate account of 
past events to be able to identify the causal factors of social phenomena, possibly due to an 
imperfect recollection of events. It is for these reasons that a large number of interviews were 
conducted, which all followed a similar interview guide, in order for us to be able corroborate 
interviewees’ accounts (Weiss, 1994).  
To avoid bias responses, the interview guide included questions that were open ended, 
allowing the interviewee to provide a wider range of responses to the same question, i.e. 
where possible the questions were not ‘leading’. In some instances questions were asked in 
relation to specific phenomena that the interviewee had made reference to, in order to 
provide them with the opportunity to embellish their account.  
Interviewee Sampling Strategy 
In line with the Straussian Grounded Theory approach, a theoretical sampling strategy was 
employed, considering that it constitutes a ‘defining property of grounded theory’ (Charmaz, 
2000 p.519). Theoretical sampling is understood as: 
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‘the process of data collection for generating theory whereby the analyst jointly 
collects, codes and analyses [their] data and decides what data to collect next and 
where to find them, in order to develop [their] theory as it emerges. The process of 
data collection is controlled by the emerging theory, whether substantive or formal’ 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967 p.45) 
Therefore, data collection and analysis did not represent a pre-planned linear process of 
testing hypotheses (Blaikie, 2010). Instead, it constituted ‘an evolving process in which what 
has been ‘discovered’ at any point will determine what happens next’ (Blaikie, 2010 p.143). As 
illustrated by Figure 4.3 in Section 4.1.3, sampling continued until theoretical saturation was 
reached.  
Turning to the types of individuals this research sought to interview, a core criterion for 
interviewee selection in Phase 1 was that they had extensive experience of ESCo management 
and/or working alongside ESCos. In relation to the former, this meant interviewing individuals 
who were either currently employed by an ESCo or had recently been so. Expanding upon the 
latter, this meant that the interviewee was working or had recently worked with ESCos in an 
operational (e.g. provision of financial, technical or legal expertise) and/or strategic capacity 
(e.g. design of ESCo related policy). However, interviewee sampling was complicated by the 
issue that the term ESCo is often a contested and often misused term (see Section 3.1). 
Therefore, the decision was made to identify a core set of characteristics that ESCos exhibited 
in order to guide our selection of ESCo, from which we could then select interviewees who had 
extensive experience and knowledge of these kinds of organisations. 
ESCo Selection Criteria 
An initial set of ESCo selection criteria were developed from the existing literature relating to 
energy service contracting, which provided us with valuable insight into what constituted an 
ESCo. Consequently, these criteria guided the sampling strategy for Phase 1a.  
During Phase 1a these criteria were refined as a more detailed and accurate picture of what 
constituted an ESCo emerged from the data collection and analysis. These refined selection 
criteria were subsequently adopted to guide interviewee selection for Phase 1b and case study 
selection in Phase 2. By using these criteria as opposed to only selecting organisations that 
were referred to as ‘ESCos’, we avoided the issue of selecting organisations that had been 
incorrectly termed ESCos, or omitting organisations that had not been labelled as ESCos 
despite exhibiting the necessary characteristics. The ESCo criteria were as follows: 
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 Provides either useful energy streams and/or final energy services to customers, not 
units of delivered energy or primary energy (e.g. gas) (see Sorrell, 2007) 
 Provides either Energy Supply or Performance Contracts (as outlined in 2.6) where the 
ESCo is committed to an on-going, long-term service arrangement that stipulates the 
provision of a certain quality and/or quantity of energy service(s) to its customer 
 Assumes all or some of the technical and financial risk associated with the supply of 
energy services to its customer 
 Recoups the upfront costs associated with delivering these energy services via on-
going revenue streams (e.g. sale of energy to customer, receipt of financial incentives) 
and/or any cost savings achieved on the customer’s energy bill over a long-term period 
Once the relevant organisations were identified it was then a matter of identifying individuals 
who had extensive experience and knowledge of ESCos. Interviewees were identified via an 
extensive review of academic, governmental, industrial and third sector literature relating to 
ESCos in the UK (as defined by the selection criteria above). This review provided us with 
details of individuals both working directly and indirectly with ESCos. In particular, high-quality 
reports, papers, presentations etc on ESCos were useful for providing names of ESCo experts. 
Additionally, websites of individual ESCos or those associated with the energy services industry 
(e.g. National Energy Action, Energy Services and Technology Association, Energy Savings 
Trust) were also helpful for identifying interviewees. Suitable interviewees were then invited 
along to interview via a personalised invitational email. Snowball sampling was also employed , 
whereby interviewees were asked to identify other individuals who might possess valuable 
information relating to the research questions. In some cases prospective interviewees were 
identified by other interviewees, who provided the referral. 
The sampling strategy was designed to ensure that a broad range of experts from different 
professional backgrounds were interviewed in order to provide a variety of different 
perspectives on ESCo-related issues. Although all interviewees were required to have an 
expert understanding of the ESCo business model, efforts were made to select a range of 
interviewees who possessed expertise in different disciplines (e.g. financial, legal, architectural 
etc) (Appendix E – Section 12.4). 
Ethical Considerations 
‘Data collection is associated with a range of ethical issues’ (Saunders et al., 2009 p.193) and 
these should be considered and addressed as part of the research design. One of the most 
important ethical considerations relates to interviewee consent. As Weiss (1994) explains it is 
important to gain the interviewee’s written consent to be interviewed. In line with his 
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recommendations, as part of the data collection all interviewees were provided with an email 
and separate document outlining the content and purpose of the research to provide the 
interviewee with the necessary information to make an informed decision regarding consent. 
Furthermore, they were also provided with a consent form that was either sent prior to the 
interview or presented during the interviewee. Interviewees were required to read, complete 
and sign the consent form, which stipulated the manner in which they were prepared for the 
information they provided to be used because ‘confidentiality and anonymity may be 
important in gaining access to organisations and individuals’ (Saunders et al., 2009 p.194). 
During the interview the interviewee was also requested to highlight any confidential 
information before or after they provided it so that it could be omitted from analysis. The 
details of all interviewees were also anonymised.  
It is important to note that the research project as well as the related ethical documentation 
(e.g. information sheet, consent form) was reviewed and approved by the Ethics Committee at 
the University of Leeds. 
Interview Technique 
All interviews followed an interview guide, which included a list of themes and questions to be 
covered with the interviewee (Saunders et al., 2009). Although the interviews covered similar 
themes and questions the nature of semi-structured interviews is that these sometimes varied 
from interview to interview. Furthermore, the order of questions also ‘varied depending on 
the flow of the conversation’ (Saunders et al., 2009 p.320). It is also important to note that 
additional questions were sometimes included if the interviewee had made a particularly 
revealing remark relating to the research questions, which probing could provide valuable 
insight into (Saunders et al., 2009). 
Ideally interviews were conducted on a face-to-face basis because this allowed us to more 
accurately gauge the reaction of the interviewee and ask questions accordingly. Furthermore, 
it meant that a stronger rapport was built between the two parties, which often helped the 
interviewee to relax and consequently, provide more revealing information. They were also 
predominantly conducted on a one-to-one basis to allow the interviewee to respond without 
interruption or interference from other interviewees. Where face-to-face interviews were not 
possible either due to the interviewee’s schedule or because such a meeting was logistically 
difficult (e.g. rural, long-distance away etc) and/or too resource intensive, phone interviews 
were conducted. All interviews were recorded via Dictaphone to enable the interviews to be 
accurately transcribed.  
Potential Weaknesses of Interview Method 
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Weiss (1994) warns that one of the potential shortcoming of employing interviews for data 
collection is that we as interviewers ‘cannot assume that we will be told the whole truth nor 
the precise truth. If respondents want to keep from us events or behaviours or a sector of their 
lives, there is every reason to believe that they can succeed’ (p.149). He explains that to 
address this inaccuracy or bias within the data, we should look to other records for 
corroboration. Consequently, we conducted a large number of interviews in Phase 1 (31 in 
total), which presented us with the opportunity to compare and contrast responses from 
interviewees, relating to the same issue or event.  
Access to interviewees was also an issue in some cases considering that not all interviewees 
responded to their invitation and those that did were either unable to be interviewed due to 
confidentiality reasons, time constraints etc. Although sufficient data was collected to enable 
generalisations to be drawn and theory to be developed, a handful of individuals who could 
have provided valuable insight were sadly not interviewed. 
4.4.2 Phase 2 Data Collection 
Data collection was again centred around semi-structured interviews, with an additional 12 
interviews being conducted across 4 different organisations. Unlike Phase 1, primary 
documentary evidence formed an integral aspect of data collection in Phase 2, being used to 
provide additional information to construct the narratives of each ESCo (Section 4.4.2.2). This 
allowed for triangulation to take place between interview and documentary evidence, helping 
to improve the reliability of results (Yin, 2009). Furthermore, it allowed for the design of 
predominantly retrospective case studies to be developed ‘through the use of archival records 
and documents, or interviews with people who participated in or observed past events’ (De 
Vaus, 2001 p.227) 
4.4.2.1 Semi-Structured Interviews 
Yin (2009) identifies interviews as ‘one of the most important sources of case study 
information’ (p.106) due to their ability to target relevant information, which normally 
provides sufficient insight to identify perceived causal inferences and explanations. The 
interview sampling strategy was very similar to that employed in Phase 1 (see Section 4.4.1), 
however in Phase 2 only senior personnel from a single ESCo were selected for interview for 
each case study, as opposed to a broad range of experts from a range of ESCos and non-ESCos, 
as employed in Phase 1. The only exception was the Thameswey Energy case study where a 
member of Woking Borough Council was interviewed. This was because the council own 
Thameswey. 
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The ethical considerations and interview technique (Section 4.4.1.1) were the same as in Phase 
1, however although interviewees were asked similar questions to those in Phase 1, these 
were phrased in relation to a specific ESCo (i.e. the ESCo they were affiliated with) as opposed 
to ESCos more generally, in order to encourage responses that related back to that ESCo in 
order to help construct the case study. For instance, instead of asking ‘what are the core 
characteristics of the ESCo business model’, interviewees were asked ‘what are the core 
characteristics of your organisation’s business model?’ 
4.4.2.2 Primary Literature 
Primary literature20 was used to construct the case studies as it provide qualitative, detailed 
information of events stretching back over a number of years, which was helpful in developing 
the narratives of each ESCo’s evolution since formation (Yin, 2009). It was particularly useful in 
providing precise details relating to the ESCo’s operations, such as the quantification of carbon 
and cost savings achieved, turnover, expenditure, number of personnel etc. This kind of 
precise numerical data was often hard to come by during the interviews and so documentation 
proved extremely valuable. Furthermore, rather like the transcripts, documentation can be 
revisited at a later date for analysis (Yin, 2009), when new ideas or connections may have 
occurred to the researcher, thus putting the documentation in a ‘new light’. 
Documentation produced by the case study ESCos was collected alongside case studies of 
these organisations that had already been compiled by reputable organisations (e.g. Energy 
Savings Trust, NESTA, CHPA etc). In some cases, archival data was collected to provide valuable 
context for the case study (Yin, 2009), which could help to explain why the company was 
established and has since evolved, such as statistical data relating to an area’s level of fuel 
poverty, mix of housing stock, disposable income etc.  
A significant amount of primary literature relating to the 4 ESCo case studies had already been 
sourced as part of the extensive review of academic, governmental, industrial and third sector 
literature relating to energy service contracting and ESCos in the UK conducted as part of 
Phase 1 (Section 4.4.1.1). Additional documentation was sourced via internet searches that 
typically included the name of the case study ESCos and/or the names of their personnel. 
Other valuable documentation was provided by interviewees. In all cases, it was important to 
take into account that this documentation was likely to incorporate the bias of the ESCo or the 
organisation’s reporting on the ESCo (Yin, 2009). 
                                                          
20 Primary literature refers to documentation that constitutes the first occurrence of a 
particular body of information or research, such as company reports, employee presentation, 
conference proceedings, archival records (e.g. census data, maps etc) 
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4.5 Data Analysis 
This section identifies the methods of data analysis that were employed and the reasons for 
their selection. 
4.5.1 Coding 
In accordance with Straussian Grounded Theory, coding was applied in both phases to help 
‘make sense’ of the interview data collected and to produce ‘a set of well-developed 
categories…that are systematically related through statements of relationship to form a 
theoretical framework that explains some relevant social…or other phenomenon’ (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998 p.22). The three core coding stages are as follows (Strauss and Corbin, 1990):  
Open coding – The breaking down, examining, comparing, conceptualizing and 
categorizing of qualitative data 
Axial Coding – A set of procedures whereby data are put back together in new ways 
after open coding, by making connections between categories 
Selective Coding – The procedure of selecting the core category, systematically 
relating it to other categories, validating those relationships, and filling in categories 
that need further refinement and development 
Coffey and Atkinson (1996) have criticised the de- and re-construction of data via the coding 
process for leading to a loss of context, which is crucial for understanding how and why 
phenomena emerge. In reaction to this, efforts were made to retain context and narrative 
where possible during the coding process via the use of illustrative examples of ESCo activity. 
Furthermore, the ESCo case studies are also designed to capture this valuable context through 
the development of individual ESCo narratives. 
Initial coding began during the transcription of the interviews (Sandelowski, 1995), where 
particularly insightful phrases or passages were highlighted. Conversely, phrases or passages 
that were not relevant to the research questions, as well as duplication of statements, were 
excluded from the transcripts to avoid wasting time that could be better spent preparing and 
analysing pertinent data. Once transcripts had been produced from the interview and we had 
familiarized ourselves with these, the main bulk of the coding was facilitated using a form of 
computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) known as NVivo. 
It is important to note that the analytical framework outlined in Section 3.3 had an important 
influence on the coding categories that were used because the framework incorporated a 
number of pre-defined coding categories as illustrated by Figure 2.9. For instance, Osterwalder 
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& Pigneur’s business model framework provided a number of coding categories, which 
facilitated the population of the ESCo business model generally, as well as the case studies 
ESCos (Figure 4.4 in Section 4.5.1.1). Consequently, empirical data was coded in accordance 
with each of these building blocks (e.g. revenue streams, key partners, customer relationships 
etc).  
The co-evolutionary framework had less of an influence on the design of the coding categories, 
however categorisation was broadly split between the causal influences the different 
dimensions of the UK energy system had on the ESCo population (e.g. institutions, 
technologies, incumbent business model etc) and conversely, the causal influence the ESCo 
population had already had or was likely to have on the wider UK energy system. This meant 
that coding categories were arranged to broadly reflect the coevolutionary dynamic between 
ESCos and the UK energy system.  
Although Phases 1 and 2 both followed the coding strategy outlined above they differed with 
respect to the level of analysis, considering that Phase 1 was sector-level and Phase 2 was 
ESCo-level. As such, the focus for Phase 1 was to improve our understanding of how and why 
the ESCo sector had co-evolved with the wider UK energy system. For Phase 2 the focus was 
on providing insight into how and why an individual ESCo had co-evolved with the different 
dimensions of the energy system.  
4.5.1.1 NVivo 8 
NVivo 8 represents a form of CAQDAS and is designed to take ‘over [the] manual tasks 
associated with the coding process...[such as] writing marginal codes, making photocopies of 
transcripts or field notes, cutting out all chunks of text relating to a code [etc]’ (Bryman, 2012 
p.591). Therefore, it is thought to speed up the time intensive process of thematic coding. 
Creswell (2007) elaborates upon the benefits this software can provide, explaining that it can 
facilitate qualitative data analysis by helping the researcher to: 
 Store and organize qualitative data 
 Locate text or image segments associated with a code or theme 
 Locate common passages or segments that relate to two or more code levels 
 Make comparisons among code labels 
 Conceptualize different levels of abstraction in qualitative data analysis 
 Provide visual illustrations of codes and themes 
 Write memos and store them as codes 
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As illustrated by Figure 4.4, after analysis had been completed we had a number of codes 
underneath categories that broadly corresponded to our main research questions21. This was 
extremely valuable in addressing helping us to answer our research questions and develop 
theory relating to the role novel, sustainable business models could potentially play in 
sustainability transitions. The coding process employed via NVivo is depicted in more detail in 
Appendix B – Section 12.2. 
 
Figure 4.4 NVivo screenshot of ESCo case study coding structure 
4.5.2 Document Analysis 
In parallel with the case study interviews, primary literature was collected that could help 
provide information relating to the structure and experiences of the ESCo being investigated 
(Section 4.4.2.2). These documents were read carefully and any information that provided 
insight into the characteristics of the ESCo’s business model and how it had interacted with the 
wider UK energy system was highlighted. Yin (2009) explains that case studies can produce 
                                                          
21 Figure 4.4 represents a snapshot of the coding structure employed for a case study 
undertaken in Phase 2. The coding structure for Phase 1 was very similar. The screenshot 
illustrated how the 9 business model building blocks framework helped structure the coding 
categories. Here the 9 building blocks are collapsed into 4 categories, in accordance with 
Osterwalder’s (2004) 4 business model pillars 
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unmanageable amounts of data and therefore recommends developing a case study database. 
Consequently, the primary literature was logged into an EndNote documentary data base for 
each case study in order to categorise the documents with respect to the type of information 
they provided. For example, a category for ‘ESCo objectives’ was normally created where 
documentation that provided information relating to the ESCo’s mission statement was filed. 
Once the data had been analysed and sorted, the documentation was then used to 
supplement the thematically coded interview data to provide the additional information 
necessary to build a detailed narrative of each ESCo. 
4.5.3 Case Study Analysis 
4.5.3.1 Within-Case Analysis 
Once the interview and documentary data had been analysed using the methods described in 
Sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2 the data was then subject to within-case analysis, which involved the 
various forms of qualitative data being assembled into a traditional and detailed narrative of 
the ESCo (Miles, 1979), each of which followed a similar structure (Section 6.2). This presented 
a useful means of coping with the enormous volume of data and an opportunity to become 
intimately familiar with each case as a stand-alone entity (Eisenhardt, 1989). Additionally, 
taking this approach allowed the unique patterns of each case to emerge (Eisenhardt, 1989), 
helping to illuminate the various causal mechanisms linked the evolution of the ESCo and its 
environment. Each narrative for case-study ESCos are presented in Section 6.2. 
4.5.3.2 Cross-Case Analysis 
Once the unique patterns of each case had emerged, cross-case analysis was employed. Here 
the narratives of the various cases studies were compared and contrasted in order to identify 
the commonalities and differences between these (Charmaz, 2000). This examination served 
to highlight how patterns within each of the cases could be generalized across cases 
(Eisenhardt, 1989), an important stage in the development of theory. Eisenhardt (1989) 
explains that cross-case analysis of numerous case studies is an important tactic if investigators 
are to go beyond their initial impressions of each case study. This is because it forces the 
researcher to go beyond analysing each case in isolation and instead considering them as a 
collective. This helps the researcher to identify common and contrasting themes between each 
the cases. She emphasises that this approach ‘enhance[s] the probability that the investigators 
will capture the novel findings which may exist in the data’ (p.541), leading to the generation 
of more robust theory. 
In summary, the analysis as part of Phase 2 incorporated a combination of within-case and 
cross-case study analysis. The former involved the development of detailed narratives of the 
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ESCo case studies, each of which corresponded to the key variants identified in Phase 1. The 
latter incorporated the comparing and contrasting of these 4 different accounts of ESCo 
activity with one another.  
The purpose of employing both within-case and cross-case analysis was to improve our 
understanding of (1) how the characteristics of the business models these ESCo variants 
employed differed from one another; (2) the different strengths and weaknesses of these 
variants; (3) the different co-evolutionary relationships these variants shared with the broader 
UK energy system and (4) how the variants’ co-evolutionary relationships with the wider 
energy system were likely to develop in different ways, despite being subject to the same 
emerging developments in the UK. Consequently, by ensuring that this research took into 
account the narratives of these ESCo variants and consequently factored in the heterogeneity 
of the UK ESCo market, we were able to provide additional and valuable insight into how the 
characteristic differences between these different ESCos have had an important influence on 
the nature of their relationship with the wider UK energy system, such as why some variants 
have enjoyed greater uptake than others. In turn, this helped to provide a more balanced 
account of the role ESCo are likely to play in a transition to a sustainable UK energy system. 
4.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has introduced the methodology this research employs and provides a detailed 
rationale for having selected these methods over other alternatives. We outline in detail how 
we have mobilised our analytical framework, which was outlined in the previous chapter, via a 
phased qualitative research strategy that adopts a Straussian Grounded Theory approach to 
theory building. In the following chapter we consider the empirical context in which this 
methodology will be applied, providing a detailed overview of the ESCo and Energy Utility 
populations’ historical development alongside key historical events in the UK energy system 
during the 20th and 21st centuries. 
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5 Empirical Context: Historical Development of ESCos in the UK 
Energy System 
This chapter explores the history of the Energy Service Company and Energy Utility Company 
markets in the UK and explores how both these populations have evolved alongside key 
developments that have shaped the UK energy system since the Second World War. In 
particular, the chapter focuses on how the UK energy system has changed in the face of 
privatisation and liberalisation since the 1970s, and how this gave rise to an energy sector in 
the UK, which became dominated by 6 large, vertically-integrated, Energy Utilities. Most 
importantly, we highlight how in the context of these developments a small ESCo market has 
emerged and slowly matured in the UK over the late 20th century and early 21st century, 
enjoying periods of sustained growth since its formation. 
The purpose of this chapter is not to identify the causal mechanisms that exist between the 
ESCo and EUCo populations and the wider UK energy system, which have been responsible for 
shaping their evolution. This line of enquiry is explored in the following chapters of this thesis. 
Instead, this chapter develops a narrative of both these populations’ development during the 
20th and 21st centuries, to highlight how the timing of defining moments in these populations’ 
history has in some cases coincided with key developments in the UK energy system. We argue 
that developing a detailed, historical narrative of these populations’ evolution alongside key 
UK energy market developments constitutes an essential step in order to make sense of the 
data collected as part of our empirical investigation outlined in Section 4. A clearer picture of 
the context in which the ESCo and EUCo markets have evolved will inevitably support our 
efforts in identifying the causal mechanisms that have been responsible for the dominance of 
the EUCo model and marginalisation of the ESCo model in the UK. 
We also take the opportunity to explain how the ESCo model has enjoyed greater uptake in 
other countries apart from the UK, namely the US, Germany and France, despite these energy 
systems sharing some key characteristic features with the UK. For example, these countries’ 
energy system have all been subject to privatisation and liberalisation by their national 
governments (Heddenhausen, 2007). The rationale for doing so is to identify the context in 
which the ESCo model proliferated in these countries and to emphasise that the emergence of 
a healthy ESCo in the UK is a distinct possibility.  
The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 5.1 we describe how the UK energy market was 
nationalised after the war and how it was within this environment that the first ESCos were 
established in the UK. In Section 5.2 we explore the reasons why the UK energy market was 
privatised in the 1980s and early 1990s, discussing how this changed the structure of the UK 
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energy system and importantly how this impacted upon the ESCo and EUCo markets. In 
Section 5.3 we adopt a similar approach but this time focusing on the period of liberalisation 
during the 1990s and 2000s. In Section 5.4 we highlight how the UK energy system has been 
characterised in recent years by a focus on improving energy security, affordability and 
sustainability. Here we discuss how the ESCo market has developed in light of important 
market and regulatory developments and take stock of the current status of both the ESCo and 
EUCo markets. Finally in Section 5.5 we briefly discuss how and why the ESCo model has 
enjoyed greater traction in other countries compared to the UK. 
5.1 1940s – 1980s: State Owned 
‘For most of the post-war period, the [UK] energy sector was run by the state through 
integrated monopolies’ (Helm, 2003 p.14) (Appendix C – Section 12.3). This was a consequence 
of nationalisation, which Chesshire (1996) explains had been deemed necessary ‘given the 
need to restore and expand electricity supply capacity as a precondition for economic 
recovery’ (p.37), following the effects of the war. Consequently, in 1948 the electricity sector 
was divided into 3 distinct geographical areas: (1) England & Wales, (2) Scotland and (3) 
Northern Ireland (Pond, 2006), across which a number of publicly owned national institutions 
were responsible for the generation, transmission, distribution and supply of electricity and 
gas (Ekins, 2010). In England and Wales the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) was 
established in 1957, taking over from the Central Electricity Authority (Helm, 2003) and was 
responsible for both the UK’s electricity generation and transmission.  
Moving down the supply chain, electricity distribution and supply was the responsibility of 12 
regional bodies known as Area Boards (Pond, 2006). In contrast in Scotland and Northern 
Ireland the public institutions were vertically integrated and were therefore responsible for 
electricity generation, transmission, distribution and supply, rather like many of today’s Energy 
Utilities in the UK. The gas sector was also nationalised during this post-war period, with the 
Gas Council and Area Boards being formed in 1948 (which later became known as the British 
Gas Corporation in 1972) to take responsibility for the distribution and sale of natural gas 
sourced from the North Sea (Ekins, 2010). In light of these developments, the UK energy 
system between the end of World War Two and the late 1970s was characterized by 
government led, top-down decision making and nationalised institutions responsible for 
energy generation, distribution and supply (Pond, 2006). During this period ‘the idea that [the 
UK energy system] could be left to market forces was simply beyond the pale’ (Helm, 2003 
p.14). 
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It was during this period of nationalisation that the first ESCo emerged in the UK. It was known 
as Associated Heat Services22 and was established in 1966 as a subsidiary of the nationally 
owned National Coal Board (Fawkes, 2007, Iqbal, 2009). It was established by Sir Derek Ezra, 
then Chairman of the National Coal Board, as a down-stream energy management business to 
which organisations could outsource the management of their boiler houses (Fawkes, 2007, 
Dalkia, 2012). The company had been established to provide supply-side energy services amid 
growing concerns around escalating energy prices in the late 1960s (Dalkia, 2012) in order to 
achieve a reduction in organisations’ energy costs, predominantly via energy efficiency and 
labour savings (Iqbal, 2009). Iqbal (2009) explains that following the establishment of 
Associated Heat Services ‘many other similar companies came on the scene and they all 
offered very similar services of providing operation and manning...[of] coal-fired boiler houses’ 
(p.27). 
During the period in which the majority of the UK energy system was nationalised, two ‘oil 
crises’ occurred. The first was the 1974 oil crisis, following the Yom Kippur war, and the second 
took place in 1979, following the Iranian revolution (Thomas, 1996). These events were 
subsequently responsible for a dramatic rise in energy prices during the later 1970s (BP, 2011): 
‘From the mid 1970s to the early 1980s, many thought that oil prices were on a permanent 
upward trajectory’ (Pearson and Watson, 2012 p.8). During these crises and prior to the 
growth of the UK ESCo market, the UK entered a deep economic recession in the mid 1970s, 
which the oil crises are thought to have contributed to (Aguiar-Conraria and Wen, 2006)23. 
These developments consequently had a major impact on industrial and political decision 
making in the UK energy sector (Pearson and Watson, 2012). Bolton (2011) explains that the 
recession was partly responsible for undermining the rationale that had previously 
underpinned the nationalised structure of the industry, as the financial crisis was at odds with 
the strategy relating to promoting expansion of the energy system and to increase energy 
demand after the war. This contributed to a step-change in UK energy policy and consequently 
a period of privatisation, signalling a radical transformation of the UK energy system during the 
1980s.  
Before the cogs of privatisation were really set in motion, the ESCo market enjoyed a period of 
growth. In the context of rising energy prices, following the energy crises of the 1970s, the UK 
welcomed the first ESCo to offer energy performance contracts, known as the Utility 
                                                          
22 Associated Heat Services is no known as Dalkia, one of the largest ESCos in the UK 
23 The link between oil price shocks and poor macro-economic performance has been debated 
(e.g. Barsky and Kilian, 2004), although a large body of empirical literature supports the 
relationship (see Aguiar-Conraria and Wen, 2006 for references) 
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Management Company (1980) (Fawkes, 2007). There was also additional growth in ESCos 
focused on providing heat via energy supply contracts, with the establishment of the non-state 
owned Shell’s Emstar (1982) and BP Energy (1983) (Sorrell, 2005). These companies offered to 
take responsibility for not only the design, building and financing of customer’s boiler houses, 
(normally large systems situated on large industrial sites) but also the operation and 
maintenance of these facilities, in accordance with pre-specified service level agreements and 
performance guarantees (Fawkes, 2007, Sorrell, 2005). Fawkes (2007) explains that ESCos 
offering these services emerged mainly in reaction to the support the UK government was 
providing for the use of coal fired boiler houses by industrial consumers at the time, in the 
form of coal conversion grants.  
5.2 1980 – 1990s: Privatisation 
The formation of Margaret Thatcher’s government in 1979 led to significant changes in the 
structure of the UK energy system, as an intense period of privatization commenced. Indeed, 
privatisation proved to become the ‘centrepiece’ of this government’s policy programme 
(Thomas, 1996). Thomas (1996) explains that the core rationale behind the government’s 
privatisation strategy was to create a ‘share-owning democracy’, where shares were created 
via the privatisation of the main public institutions, be they energy related or otherwise. This 
strategy would also generate money for the treasury via the sale of these shares. It was the 
revenue from privatisation that ‘allowed public services to be maintained at a level that would 
have been impossible without politically damaging tax increases’ (Thomas, 1996 p.41). Another 
integral driver behind privatisation was the government’s aim to reduce the power wielded by 
the large unions (Thomas, 1996).  
As outlined in the Appendix C (Section 12.3), privatisation of the UK energy industry began first 
with the oil industry (1982-1987) followed by the gas (1986), non-nuclear electricity (1990-
1991), coal (1995), transmission (1995) and nuclear power (1996) markets (Bolton, 2011, Ekins, 
2010). Privatisation of the non-nuclear UK electricity market began with the sale of the 
Regional Electricity Companies (RECs), which were sold intact (Pearson and Watson, 2012). 
Subsequently in 1991, the National Grid Company, the CEGB and the two Scottish companies 
(i.e. Scottish Power and Scottish Hydro-Electric) were privatised (Pearson and Watson, 2012). 
The CEGB was divided into three parts: Nuclear Electric, National Power and Powergen 
(Thomas, 1996, Pond, 2006). Nuclear Electric remained publicly owned until 1996 when British 
Energy was formed, whilst National Power and Powergen, who held the non-nuclear 
generation, were privately owned from their formation in 1990 (Thomas, 1996, Pond, 2006, 
Helm, 2003). The division of the nationally owned CEGB into a mixture of private and public 
sector organisations signalled the birth of the privately owned Energy Utility companies that 
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dominate the UK energy system today. For instance, Powergen was eventually bought by E.On 
in 2001, and National Power became part of the German energy company RWE. 
Another defining feature of the privatisation of the UK energy market was the formation of the 
‘Power Pool’, which constituted a wholesale market for electricity which generators were 
obligated to participate in (Thomas, 1996). Generators sold their output according to changing 
prices in response to the demand of the regional electricity companies and other major users 
(Pond, 2006). This pool was integral to opening up the electricity market to competition and 
thus fulfilling the basic philosophy upon which electricity privatisation was established 
(Thomas, 1996). The pool represented the predecessor for later electricity trading 
arrangements (i.e. the New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) and the British Electricity 
Trading and Transmission Arrangements (BETTA)), which have subsequently been criticised for 
favouring large-scale generators that utilise mature technologies, such as those that utilise 
fossil fuels (e.g. coal, gas etc), because they reward flexibility and predictability (Mitchell, 2008, 
Woodman and Baker, 2008). Consequently, the introduction of the Power Pool laid the 
foundations for an electricity market that was not supportive of companies seeking to trade 
electricity who operated at a small scale and utilised less mature, more intermittent 
generation technologies (e.g. PV, wind, CHP etc), such as many ESCos providing Energy Supply 
contracts. We elaborate upon this point in Section 5.3. 
The gas market was also subject to privatisation during this period. The 1986 Gas Act ratified 
the privatisation of British Gas, although the organisation initially remained intact after this 
piece of legislation was passed  (Thomas, 1996). Consequently, there was little immediate 
impact on the structure of the UK gas market post-privatisation as British Gas continued to 
hold a monopoly over the market (Stern, 1997). However, the focus of liberalisation was to 
promote competition in this newly privatised energy market, eventually giving rise to the Big 6 
Energy Utility companies that dominate both electricity and gas markets today 
5.3 1990 - 2000s: Liberalisation 
Once the process of privatisation in the energy markets had gained momentum, the UK 
government’s attention then turned to promote competition in this newly privatised energy 
market, a process known as liberalisation (Ekins, 2010, Pearson and Watson, 2012). To achieve 
this objective a number of major changes were made to the UK energy system, which primarily 
included (1) the introduction of market regulators; (2) the break-up of the incumbent energy 
companies to encourage new entrants into the market; and (3) the reform of the electricity 
market arrangements. We briefly outline these changes before describing how the ESCo 
market evolved in parallel with these developments. 
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In the late 1980s market regulators were introduced for both the gas (Ofgas in 1986) and 
electricity (Offer in 1989) markets, which were eventually merged in 2000 to form the Office of 
Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) (Ekins, 2010, Pearson and Watson, 2012). The market 
regulators existed to promote and manage competition in the energy industry via regulation, 
which has historically lent itself to natural monopolies (Ekins, 2010). Focusing on the 
liberalisation of the gas market, Ekins (2010) notes that ‘as retail competition in the utilities 
sector developed, multi-utility suppliers emerged, such that the main gas suppliers are now 
the same as the main electricity suppliers’ (p.43). For instance, British Gas, under the 
ownership of Centrica, is now a retailer of both gas and electricity.  
The UK government also moved to break-up the recently privatised and extraordinarily 
powerful incumbent energy companies (i.e. British Gas, Powergen and National Power) 
(Appendix C – Section 12.3) as a means of weakening their hold on the energy sector and 
encouraging new entrants to enter the market in a bid to encourage greater competition. For 
instance, in 1997 the UK government moved to break-up British Gas, which led to the 
establishment of two separate organisations: Centrica, which took responsibility for gas 
trading and retail and Transco, which owned and operated the gas pipeline network (Pearson 
and Watson, 2012). Powergen and National Power, the two incumbent electricity companies, 
who at the time possessed sufficient power to set prices in the wholesale markets, were 
encouraged to divest large swathes of their generation capacity, much of which was 
subsequently bought up by the Regional Electricity Companies (Pearson and Watson, 2012). In 
return the two generators were allowed to acquire some of the RECs in 1998, who represented 
the energy retailers of the market at the time (Pearson and Watson, 2012, Pond, 2006). This 
policy enabled the Energy Utilities to engage in a much greater degree of vertical integration 
across the whole energy industry (Helm, 2003, Pond, 2006), ultimately laying the foundations 
for the emergence of the vertically integrated UK Energy Utilities we see today in the UK (e.g. 
RWE nPower, Centrica etc). 
Helm (2003) explains that the reason the Energy Utilities wanted to become large-scale, 
vertically integrated companies was because both generation and supply had become a risky 
business. For instance, if ‘generation was in excess of supply and there were no-long term 
contracts to provide stability, prices could collapse’ and ‘if generation was tight, suppliers 
without contracts would be exposed to rapidly rising prices’ (Helm, 2003 p.243). Vertical 
integration helped to mitigate this risk because: ‘if the company is big enough, it can take price 
risk against equity, as oil companies do’ (p.243). This trait has been inherited by today’s UK 
Energy Utilities, helping them to dominate the market. 
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Finally, the other key change during this period of liberalisation was the reform of the 
electricity trading arrangements (i.e. the Power Pool) in order to further promote a 
competitive generation market (Helm, 2003) and to ensure that the electricity system was 
balanced, largely due to the limited opportunities for electricity storage (Ekins, 2010). 
Consequently, NETA were introduced in 2001, which was superseded by BETTA in 2005. These 
arrangements are still in operation today and dictate that generators inform the system 
operator (the National Grid) of their contracted output whilst the suppliers inform the 
operator how much they intend to buy (Mitchell, 2008). It is the National Grid’s responsibility 
to ensure minute-by-minute balancing of this system (Ekins, 2010). Mitchell (2008) provides a 
brief synopsis of this complex system: 
‘All contracts [are] submitted to central settlement 1 hour (initially 3.5 hours) ahead of 
the half hour dispatch period. After this gate closure, generators, suppliers and 
customers can submit offers and bids to deviate from their expected levels at specified 
prices into the Balancing Mechanism. The system operator can then accept or reject 
these to ensure the system is balanced, the quality of supply is maintained and short-
term transmission constraints are dealt with. Prices in the Balancing Mechanism 
dictate the prices that must be paid by any generators or suppliers for any differences 
in their contracted position after real time Imbalance Settlement. If a generator has a 
shortfall in its contracted generation it must pay for that shortfall at the System Buy 
Price and if it exceeds it at the System Sell Price’ (p.144) 
 
Figure 5.1 Overview of BETTA market structure (National Grid, 2006) 
BETTA was designed to support large, centralised, predictable fossil-fuelled and nuclear 
generation, with the view to deliver sufficient electricity capacity at low cost (HMG, 2011). 
Consequently, its design has created difficulties for intermittent electricity sources (HMG, 
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2011). Mitchell (2008) emphasises how these electricity arrangements have served to maintain 
the status quo and buttress the dominance of the Energy Utilities because the arrangements 
are technology and fuel blind, which means the system favours large-scale and/or 
conventional technologies (e.g. combined cycle gas turbines) because these are normally the 
most cost-effective. Furthermore, they contain no mechanism to allow intervention in the 
market that could support the use of sustainable energy technologies, often utilised by 
companies such as ESCos. BETTA rewards predictability of supply, not intermittency, with 
financial penalties issued to those responsible for imbalances between electricity demand and 
supply, which increases costs for these intermittent generators (e.g. some ESCos), 
consequently discouraging them to enter the pool and inhibiting their development (Mitchell, 
2008, Woodman and Baker, 2008). By not joining the pool, these small-scale, intermittent 
generators are likely to sell their electricity to a third party, known as an electricity 
consolidator ‘who is likely to offer a price that factors in the impact of imbalance changes on 
its own market participation’ (Woodman and Baker, 2008 p.4528). In essence, these 
arrangements support the operation of the large-scale, vertically-integrated Energy Utilities 
who utilise centralised, conventional technologies, at the expense of small-scale, low-carbon 
energy generators, such as ESCos. 
It is worth noting that less than 5% of electricity generated is traded through the balancing 
mechanism (Toke and Fragaki, 2008). Instead, the bulk of electricity is traded through either 
between the Utilities and large generators via long-term contracts or through bilateral 
contracts that are internal to the large vertically integrated Energy Utilities, who own 
generation as well as supply units (Toke and Fragaki, 2008). Some of the Energy Utilities also 
own distribution (DNOs) and transmission network operators (TNOs) (e.g. SSE, Scottish Power), 
enabling them to take responsibility for the entire electricity supply chain. Therefore, in many 
cases the Energy Utilities do not normally rely on other organisations to satisfy their 
customers’ energy needs.  
Whilst, the periods of privatisation and liberalisation culminated in a major reconfiguration of 
the UK energy industry, this transformation ultimately accomplished relatively little with 
respect to moderating the power of the large Energy Utilities: 
‘The consequence of this new [market framework] is that the very market power and 
vertical integration that privatization tried to curtail has re-emerged – and largely 
without regulators or politicians realizing what they have allowed to happen’ (Helm, 
2003 p.243) 
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In some respects liberalisation was seen to undermine growth in the ESCo market. For 
example, the significant and prolonged reduction in electricity prices was in part attributed to 
the introduction of the new electricity arrangements (i.e. NETA & then BETTA), which had the 
effect of limiting interest in energy efficiency measures and consequently the ESCo model 
(Sorrell, 2005, Bertoldi et al., 2007, Bertoldi et al., 2006b). Despite the negative influence this 
had on the UK ESCo market in some respects, liberalisation of energy markets throughout 
Europe is considered to have played an important role in supporting ESCo market growth. For 
example, it:  
‘transformed the semi-public energy sectors of some member states into sectors with 
competing market oriented companies, thus creating more room for value-added 
services and facilitating contractually arrangements’ (Marino et al., 2011 p.6193) 
On balance the ESCo market enjoyed a period of sustained growth during the 1990s (Sorrell, 
2005). For instance new entrants such as Enron Energy Services (1999) and RWE Solutions 
(2002) entered the UK ESCo market,(Fawkes, 2007). Fawkes (2007) explains that this growth 
was predominantly in Combined Heat & Power (CHP) oriented energy supply contracts 
(Fawkes, 2007). In an effort to quantify this growth during this period, Sorrell (2005) explains 
that according to Energy Service and Technology Association (ESTA), the total value of the 
annual energy bills being handled by ESCos rose from £127 million/year in 1993 to £500 
million/year in 2001. Growth in the ESCo market at the time was mainly due to the rise of 
industrial downsizing and outsourcing. He also notes that in 1992 there were changes to 
Treasury rules (known as the ‘Ryrie rules’), which had acted as a barrier against the use of 
private finance within the public sector, meaning that energy service contracting had largely 
been limited to the private sector (Sorrell, 2005). The removal of these rules and the 
introduction of the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) in 1992, meant that private finance could 
now be leveraged to deliver energy service contracts to the public sector, helping to grow the 
ESCo market (Sorrell, 2005, Grout, 1997).  
Pearson and Watson (2012) explain that with the election of the Labour government in 1997, 
the focus remained on liberalisation but it was also during this time that the government’s 
political objectives slowly became centred around improving the security, affordability and 
sustainability of energy supply, which began to have a profound effect on the environment in 
which ESCos operated. 
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5.4 2000s – 2010s: Security, Affordability and Sustainability of Energy 
Supply 
At the turn of the century the UK’s energy regulatory framework began to change in response 
to a number pressing energy challenges, namely energy security, affordability and reducing 
carbon emissions (Section 1.3). Many of the challenges facing the UK energy system have 
provided a welcome boost to UK ESCo market growth. For instance, Sorrell (2005) explains that 
large increases in gas and electricity prices in relation to issues relating energy scarcity and 
supply disruptions during the 2000s have provided a boost to the ESCo market, which was 
growing at approximately 15%/year during the mid 2000s. Furthermore, the UK government’s 
reaction to these challenges has played an important role in supporting this growth, such as 
the introduction of stringent environmental regulations in response to climate change and 
other adverse environmental effects associated with energy consumption (Sorrell, 2005). The 
work in this thesis will analyse how these challenges and other related developments are 
beginning to change the institutional context for the application of the ESCo model in the UK. 
In light of the emergence of this triumvirate of energy challenges the UK ‘government has 
sought to take the powers it perceived necessary to address these new concerns’ (Ekins, 2010 
p.45), signalling a new era for UK energy policy. An important aspect of this strategy was the 
introduction of a number of policies to incentivize low-carbon energy generation capacity, 
including amongst others the Renewables Obligation Certificates (ROCs) (2002); the Feed-in-
Tariff (FiT) (2010) and the Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI) (2011)(Ekins, 2010).  
The ROC scheme provides certificates to electricity generators in relation to the amount of 
eligible renewable electricity they generate, which can subsequently be sold on to suppliers or 
traders, allowing them to receive a premium in addition to the wholesale electricity price 
(DECC, 2012t). Unlike this scheme the FiT provides a long-term revenue stream for the small to 
medium-scale, decentralised generation of low-carbon electricity. A generation tariff is 
available for each unit of electricity generated, which is dependent on the form of generation, 
whilst an export tariff is available for the sale of excess electricity to the grid  (DECC, 2012l). 
The RHI is similar to the FiT but instead provides generators with a long-term revenue stream 
for the small to medium scale generation of low-carbon heat, as opposed to electricity. The 
RHI payments have been available for non-domestic generators since November 2011 but the 
domestic RHI will not be introduced until 2013 (DECC, 2012s).  
Policies have also been introduced to address these energy challenges by increasing levels of 
energy efficiency, which have included Warm Front (2000); the Climate Change Levy (2001); 
the Energy Efficiency Commitment (EEC) (2002-2008); the Carbon Energy Reduction Target 
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(CERT) (2008-2012); the Community Energy Savings Programme (CESP) (2009) (Ekins, 2010). 
EEC, CERT & CESP all represent forms of obligations on energy companies to reduce the GHG 
emissions associated with their energy supply. For example, as part of CERT, all energy 
companies with a customer base of over 250,000 customers are required to deliver measures 
that will provide overall lifetime carbon dioxide savings of 293 MtCO2 (DECC, 2012c). Ofgem is 
able to impose a financial penalty of up to 10% of the utility’s annual turnover if it fails to 
achieve this target (DECC, 2010c). The utilities are expected to meet this target by promoting 
the uptake of energy efficiency or low carbon energy solutions to their customers. Finally, in 
2010 the CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme (CRC) (2010) was introduced, which required all 
organisations consuming more than 6GWh of electricity per annum are required to buy 
allowances each year to cover their emissions, which started at £12/tonne of CO2 in 2011 
(Carbon Trust, 2012). Furthermore, participants’ performance is ranked in a publicly accessible 
league table (Carbon Trust, 2012).  
The recent step-change in UK energy policy from privatisation and liberalisation towards 
promoting a secure, affordable and low-carbon energy supply has provided fertile ground for 
growth in the ESCo market. Recent surveys estimate the size of the ESCo market to be worth 
approximately €400 million per annum (Marino et al., 2010), whilst Fawkes’ (2007) own 
estimates value the market between £500 and £700 million per annum24. However, despite 
the introduction of a raft of legislation that supports energy efficiency and low-carbon energy 
supply measures, Marino et al. (2010) point out that whilst the ESCo market continues to 
grow, growth has in fact slowed in recent years. This stands in stark contrast when compared 
with the Energy Utility Market, where the combined pre-tax profit for the six major Energy 
Utilities in 2010 stood at approximately £8.55 billion, constituting a 35% increase on 2007 
profits (Consumer Focus, 2012). This comparison serves to highlight how the EUCo market 
continues to grow and how the Energy Utilities continue to dominate the UK energy market. It 
also serves to illustrate how small the UK ESCo market is in comparison, emphasising how the 
ESCo model has enjoyed only niche applications to date.   
Looking to the future it is quite possible that the ESCo market could begin to enjoy a period of 
accelerated growth, in light of the existing and emerging raft of legislation that has been 
designed to promote energy efficiency and low-carbon energy supply. For example, the 
Electricity Market Reform (EMR) is expected to be introduced in 2013, which contains within it 
a carbon-floorprice. Other legislation includes new Low Carbon Building Regulations; the 
Energy Company Obligation (ECO) and the Green Deal, all designed to promote domestic 
                                                          
24 It is unclear from Fawkes’ (2007) and Marino et al.’s (2011) methodology how they 
calculated the value of the UK ESCo market 
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energy efficiency. These policies and their impacts upon the UK ESCo market are explored in 
detail in Section 6.1.4.3 and the ESCo case-studies in Section 6.2. There is certainly significant 
scope for growth in the UK ESCo market, considering for example the potential size of the EPC 
market for the non-residential sector alone is estimated at approximately €1 billion (Marino et 
al., 2010). We now examine how the ESCo model has fared in energy systems outside the UK. 
5.5 International Comparison of UK Energy Services Market 
In outlining how the UK ESCo market has developed alongside the broader UK energy system 
since the war, we have highlighted how market developments have provided the ESCo model 
with sufficient scope to emerge and enjoy some modest uptake. However, these 
developments were also responsible for the proliferation and ultimately, the dominance of the 
Energy Utility market over the ESCo market. Whilst the ESCo model has enjoyed limited uptake 
in the UK, it has been much more successful in other countries: 
‘The energy services market is mature in the United States and Canada, well 
established in some European countries (e.g. Austria, Germany, France, Hungary), 
emerging in others (e.g. Spain, Sweden, Italy) and almost entirely absent in countries 
outside the OECD’ (Sorrell, 2005 p.36) 
In this sub-section we briefly examine the ESCo markets in the US, Germany and France, whose 
energy systems share some similar characteristics with the UK, for instance all having 
undergone privatisation and liberalisation (Heddenhausen, 2007). Here we identify the factors 
responsible for the development of much larger and healthier ESCo markets that in the UK. 
5.5.1 United States 
The US ESCo market is the largest in the world (Sorrell, 2005) and like in the UK the majority of 
energy consumers are served by large, privately owned Energy Utilities, with approximately 
75% of the population being supplied by them (York and Kuschler, 2011). Furthermore, as in 
the UK, the US energy market has been liberalised, with private sector companies also subject 
to significant amounts of regulation, from a combination of local, state and federal agencies 
(York and Kuschler, 2011). In contrast to the UK ESCo market, the US market has grown at an 
annual growth rate of between 10-25% during the 1990s. In 2000 ESCos in the US generated 
$2 billion of revenue and between 1990 and 2000 delivered $15 billion in net energy cost 
savings (Goldman et al., 2005). 
Goldman et al. (2005) attribute the dramatic growth of the US ESCo market to a number of key 
drivers. These include for example the introduction of the Demand Side Management and 
Integrated Resource Planning programmes in the 1980s, which provided standardised 
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contracts to deliver verified Energy Performance Contracts. Another important driver was the 
introduction of state legislation designed to encourage public sector institutions to sign long-
term energy service contracts, by allowing procurement decisions to be made on the basis of 
whole life costs, rather than minimising capital costs. The US ESCo market also benefitted from 
the emergence of new sources of finance to fund energy service contracts. Finally, the 1992 
Energy Policy Act mandated federal agencies to make arrangements for cost-effective energy 
efficiency investments, thus encouraging many of these to turn to ESCos as a means of fulfilling 
this objective. The case of the US ESCo market shows us that: 
‘US ESCos have demonstrated that performance contracting, in combination with 
other supporting policies, can be used to address and overcome many market barriers 
that inhibit energy-efficiency investments among large, institutional, public sector 
customers’ (Goldman et al., 2005 p.404) 
5.5.2 Germany 
According to Marino et al.’s (2010) European ESCo review, Germany is Europe’s largest and 
most mature ESCo market, valued at between €1.7 and 2.4 billion/annum, with approximately 
250 – 500 ESCos operating there. Bertoldi et al. (2007) explain that standard procedures, EPC 
model contracts, procurement procedures and contracting guidelines have all helped to 
provide confidence in the German market, something that is currently lacking in the UK. 
However, Marino et al. (2010) attribute the German ESCo market’s success primarily to:  
‘a good mix of governmental support (including both technical and financial support), 
non-governmental programs and favourable conditions such as the energy taxes 
(ecological tax reform25), which were increased considerably during the energy sector 
liberalisation along with an increase in energy prices. The implementation of a large 
number of municipal projects along with public-private partnerships also had a strong 
demonstration effect by introducing the ESCo and EPC concepts on the market’ (p.26) 
5.5.3 France 
Finally we turn to the case of France, where the provision of outsourced energy services dates 
back to the 19th century, with approximately 100 ESCos operating in France today (Marino et 
al., 2010). Marino et al. (2010) attribute the current growth in the market primarily to ‘Le 
Grenelle de l’environnement’, which constitutes an action plan developed by businesses, local 
communities, unions, associations and most importantly the French government, with the aim 
                                                          
25 ‘The ecological tax reform has two objectives. The first is environmental protection, 
particularly the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. The second objective is to reduce 
statutory pension contributions in order to reduce labour cost and increase employment 
(Beuermann and Santarius, 2006) 
142 
 
 
of developing and implementing policies, information campaigns and financial instruments 
that are capable of promoting sustainable development. For instance, the Grenelle included 
the provision for a carbon tax that incorporated sectors that sat outside the carbon market 
(Pairault, 2009) and a requirement to reduce the energy consumption within existing 
residential building stock by 28% by 2020, compared to 2008 levels (Marino et al., 2010). It was 
this favourable policy framework, alongside a number of pilot projects that demonstrated the 
value of retrofitting universities and schools, as well as the availability of funding and finance 
to deliver energy service contracts that has been responsible for growth in the French market 
According to Marino et al. (2010) the UK ESCo market represents one of the most developed 
ESCo markets in Europe (Marino et al., 2010). However, the UK ESCo market stands a long way 
behind France and Germany in terms of market size and maturity, and even further behind 
that in the US. This international comparison serves to illustrate how in countries that share a 
number of similar key characteristics with the UK (e.g. liberalised, centralised, regulated etc) 
the ESCo model has enjoyed much wider-scale uptake.  
5.6 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter we illustrated how the UK energy system has transformed over the years and 
how major developments in both the ESCo and EUCo market have to some extent coincided 
with important periods of change in the wider energy system. It also helped to illustrate how 
the UK energy system is currently subject to a dramatic period of change, in reaction to the 
triumvirate of challenges outlined in Section 1.3, outlining a handful of key policies that are 
likely to have an important bearing on the future development of the UK ESCo market. Finally, 
we turned our attention to ESCo markets beyond the UK to identify how developments there 
have encouraged the wide-scale uptake of the ESCo model. In the following chapter we draw 
upon these insights to examine the factors that have been responsible for the limited uptake 
of the ESCo model in the UK to date and how this situation might change in the future, in light 
of emerging developments.
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6 Sector level and case study analysis of ESCos in the UK 
This chapter presents the findings of the research’s qualitative empirical investigation into the 
implementation of the ESCo business model in the UK energy system, as outlined in the 
Methodology chapter (Section 4). The primary purpose of this chapter is to address both 
research questions 1 & 2, which relate to the ‘core characteristics of the ESCo model’ and the 
‘strengths and weaknesses of the ESCo model’, as well as to present the empirical evidence 
that is drawn upon in the Chapters 0 & 0 to address research questions 3, 4 & 5 (see Section 
1.5 for Research Questions). These questions relate to the past, present and future co-
evolutionary relationship between the ESCo population and the UK energy system. 
Section 6.1 presents the findings of Phase 1, which constituted a sector-level study of ESCo 
activity in the UK. The section begins by outlining the core characteristics of the ESCo business 
model (Section 6.1.1) and subsequently compare these with the incumbent Energy Utility 
(EUCo) model (Section 6.1.2). Following this we discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the 
ESCo model from the perspective of potential and existing ESCo model adopters (Section 
6.1.3). We then identify the factors that have either enabled or inhibited adoption or 
operation of the ESCo model in the UK, i.e. its drivers and barriers (Section 6.1.4) and then 
identify emerging drivers and barriers (Section 6.1.4.3). We complete this sub-section by 
addressing the heterogeneity of the ESCo population and explore the key variants that exist 
within the UK ESCo population (Section 6.1.5).  
Section 6.2 presents the findings of Phase 2, which incorporated 4 ESCo-level case studies of 
UK ESCo activity, which correspond with the key variants identified in Phase 1. A cross-case 
examination of these case studies follows in Section 6.2.5, designed to draw out both common 
and divergent themes that have emerged from the case studies. 
It is important to note that throughout this chapter a referencing system is used to make 
reference to statements made by the interviewees as a means of increasing the transparency 
of the research’s methodology. In Section 6.1 these are predominantly provided in conjunction 
with quotes, whilst in Section 6.2 interviewee references are also used to signpost where 
interview data has been used to develop the narrative of the case studies. For example, a 
reference such as ‘Energy Utility Senior Manager – B 27’ might be used. The first part relates to 
the professional capacity of the interviewee and the second part constitutes the interviewee’s 
reference code, which the reader can use to access additional information on the interviewee 
via the interviewee lists for Phase 1 in Appendix E (Section 12.4) and Phase 2 in Appendix F 
(Section 12.5). 
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6.1 Phase 1: Sector Level 
6.1.1 Core Characteristics of the ESCo Business Model 
In this sub-section we examine the empirical evidence gathered from the 31 interviews 
undertaken as part of Phase 1, in accordance with the data collection and analysis methods 
outlined in the Methodology chapter (Section 4). A breakdown of the interviews conducted for 
Phase 1 is available in Appendix E (Section 12.4). 
Phase Date 
Nos. of 
Interviews 
Conducted 
Focus 
1 
1a 22/7/2010 – 17/1/2011 11 
Pilot sector-level study of UK ESCo 
market 
1b 8/7/2011 – 10/10/2011 20 
Sector-level study of UK ESCo market 
Table 6.1 – Phase 1, sector-level investigation of UK ESCo activity 
The data generated by these interviews was analysed using the analytical framework outlined 
in Section 3, specifically the element relating to Osterwalder & Pigneur’s (2010) business 
model framework. This process took place to identify the core characteristics of the ESCo 
business model in order to address Research Question 1. The aim here is to further improve 
our understanding of what constitutes an ESCo and thus build upon the insight provided by the 
literature (Section 2.6). A summary of the core characteristics of the ESCo model identified by 
this research is subsequently provided in Table 10.1 (Section 10.1). 
6.1.1.1 Value Proposition 
The bundle of products and services ESCos offer that create value for their customers 
The most important aspect of an ESCo’s value proposition is that they satisfy a number of their 
customer’s energy needs (e.g. warmth, illumination, hygiene, motive power etc). Crucially, ESCos 
seek to do this at a lower financial cost compared to the Energy Utilities’ offerings, constituting a 
core tenet of their value proposition. Predominantly this is achieved by reducing the amount of 
primary energy input required to satisfy the customer’s energy needs by installing more energy 
efficient primary and/or secondary conversion equipment, alongside the implementation of 
modern building controls and/or facilitating changes to the customer’s consumption behaviour. 
An ESCo may also reduce its customer’s energy bills by utilising an alternative, less expensive 
form of primary energy input (e.g. solar, biomass etc) than traditional fossil fuels (e.g. gas, coal, 
oil etc)(see Section 6.1.1.9 for further detail): 
 ‘The customer’s energy bills are £1 million a year and our engineers go in there and 
save you 20%, [which is equivalent to] £200,000 a year…So now the energy bill of the 
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customer has gone down from £1 million to £800,000, so they have that £200,000 
difference’ (Senior ESCo Manager - B 15) 
A central part of an ESCo’s value proposition is that it assumes the vast majority of the financial 
risk associated with delivering the energy demand management and/or sustainable energy 
supply measures, which are required to not only satisfy their energy needs but to do so at a 
lower final cost to the customer compared to their current energy costs with an Energy Utility. 
Consequently, the customer often makes no upfront capital investment as the ESCo covers the 
costs of the measures themselves or via a third party (e.g. bank): 
‘No we stump up all the capital for the build. We've got three or four sources of funding 
to do that’ (Senior ESCo Manager - A 3) 
Additionally ESCos assume much of the technical responsibility associated with implementing 
and managing the measures required to satisfy their customers’ energy needs. For instance, 
ESCos take responsibility for operating and maintaining the energy measures it employs (i.e. 
technical responsibility), helping to free-up time and effort on their customer’s behalf, which had 
traditionally been spent on such tasks. For commercial organisations, by outsourcing this 
responsibility, they can avoid the need to hire personnel to manage their energy equipment. 
ESCos normally look to achieve energy related cost and time savings for their customers by 
taking a holistic approach to the design and implementation of its energy service contracts: 
‘What an ESCo does is look at it in a holistic way, right across the organisation [because] 
80% of the [efficiency] opportunities are going to be in 20% of the buildings’ (Senior ESCo 
Manager - B 15) 
Additionally, ESCos normally implement bespoke energy supply and/or demand management 
measures as part of its contracting. Consequently, ESCos’ energy solutions are typically ‘tailor 
made’ to the needs of their customers, representing an important source of customer value 
compared to the standardized contracts Energy Utilities traditionally offer: 
‘So what you do is you look to the customer and understand what exactly they really 
want and then you build programme around that’ (Senior ESCo Manager - B 28) 
By reducing the energy consumption of their customer and/or increasing the proportion of 
low-carbon energy they consume, ESCos can provide a range of broader societal benefits. For 
instance, by reducing residential consumers’ energy bills ESCos can help alleviate fuel poverty, 
which can not only radically improve these residents’ lives but also improve broader societal 
welfare by helping to address this key indicator of deprivation. ESCos can also help to mitigate 
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against the effects of climate change by delivering demand management and/or sustainable 
energy supply measures, which normally result in a reduction in GHG emissions associated 
with their customers’ energy consumption. Local Authority and community owned and led 
ESCos can also help to improve the local economy by localizing the capital flows associated 
with energy supply and recycle any profit generated back into the local area to support the 
local economy and associated welfare gains (Sections 6.1.5.1 and 6.1.5.4): 
‘If you can keep your pounds local you will actually get a far greater benefit to local 
economy…there is a multiplier effect to keeping your money local...The things with 
ESCos is that in theory you can re-localise money flows’ (Think Tank Partner - B 13) 
These examples serve to highlight how ESCos can provide wider societal benefits, which their 
customers are also likely to indirectly benefit from because they are members of society: 
‘The benefits were really around something that was off [the] balance sheet [i.e.] jobs, 
CO2 reductions, renewable energy improvements and health benefits, also money for 
the local economy’ (Senior ESCo Manager - A 1) 
ESCos can also help commercial customers to fulfil various regulatory obligations, such as the 
Carbon Reduction Commitment (CRC) (see Section 5.4 & 6.1.4.1) by reducing their GHG 
emissions via the implementation of demand energy management and/or sustainable energy 
supply measures. Additionally, the social and environmental benefits associated with ESCos’ 
energy service contracting, as outlined earlier in this sub-section, can help ESCos’ commercial 
customer meet a number of their own Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) commitments. 
Broadly, ESCos’ customers can normally enjoy all of these direct and indirect benefits over a 
long-term period because ESCos typically engage in energy service contracts that last for a 
number of years (normally between 5 – 25 years). However, ESCos’ long-term contracts can 
constrain the operational flexibility of their customers by locking them into this contractual 
arrangement over a long-term period, regardless of how their needs might change in the future 
(Marino et al., 2011). Furthermore, the contracts may also stipulate that the customer changes 
their behaviour to maximize energy savings, thus further constraining their freedom. Finally, 
some customers may also perceive the service arrangements to constitute a form of long-term 
debt to the ESCo because they are committing themselves to provide the ESCo with ‘x’ 
percentage of the revenue from the energy service project (e.g. energy savings) for ‘y’ years. 
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6.1.1.2 Customer Segments 
The different groups of people or organizations ESCos aim to reach and serve 
In the context of this research, which is limited to residential and commercial customers (i.e. 
not industrial, agricultural etc), the majority of energy service contracts to date have been 
signed with public sector organisations for a number of reasons. Firstly, public sector 
organisations typically occupy large sites (e.g. hospitals, universities etc) meaning that they 
normally have a large energy demand, which translates into either significant energy sales as 
part of an ESC or significant energy savings as part of an EPC. ESCos can also capture better 
economies of scale by contracting with organisations operating on large, single sites compared 
to smaller sites, thus helping to reduce their transaction costs and make the energy service 
project more financially viable. This is because they are able to implement energy measures at 
a single site for a single customer, rather than multiple sites for multiple customers, enabling 
them to centralise their operations and reduce costs such as transportation. 
Public sector organisations are also attractive to ESCos because they are financially backed by 
government: ‘the public sector never goes bust’ (CHP Expert - B21). This provides the ESCo with 
confidence that they will exist for the period of the long-term contract and thus be able to 
honour their payments. Public sector organisations are also attractive to ESCos because they 
have access to more affordable finance compared to the private sector, via schemes such as 
the Public Loan Works Board, which can be utilised to help fund the upfront costs of the 
energy service projects.  
Finally, public sector organisations were generally considered to occupy inefficient buildings, 
thus presenting a wealth of opportunities to reduce their energy consumption and carbon 
footprint. However, due to recent public sector cutbacks, many of these organisations did not 
have the available capital and/or the human resources to make the necessary investments to 
improve their building stock, despite these public sector cutbacks placing additional pressure 
on these organisations to reduce their overheads, such as energy bills: 
‘[The ESCo market has] predominantly [targeted] the public sector because public 
sector have got buildings that leak like a sieve and they haven't got any money’ (Senior 
Bank Manager - B 17) 
Energy service contracts with private sector organisations are at present less common in the 
UK than with the public sector, partly because the private sector often lease their own 
premises as opposed to own them. Therefore, they typically require the consent of their 
landlord to sign an energy service contract because these often entail significant changes to 
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the building stock. However, commercial customers were deemed attractive in other respects 
because they can be charged the higher, commercial rate for energy. 
To date there has been relatively little energy service contracting with domestic consumers, 
largely because it has proven difficult to capture sufficiently high economies of scale in doing 
so because owner occupiers traditionally contract individually for energy as opposed to 
communally:  
‘The cost of administration and billing per head is more when you only have 172 
customers rather than 20,000 or 200,000...because you aren't going to be able to 
achieve some of the [economies] of scale’ (Senior ESCo Manager - A 6)  
One way around this has been to contract with organisations that are able to bundle 
numerous consumers together, such as Housing Associations and Social Housing Providers. 
Here the ESCo can either sell energy services to these organisations, which in turn then sell 
them onto their tenants or alternatively the ESCo can contract with the tenants individually, 
under conditions set out as part of a concession agreement between the ESCo and the 
organisation representing these tenants. 
6.1.1.3 Customer Relationships 
The relationships ESCos establish with their customers 
ESCos share long-term contracts with their customers, typically between 5 and 25 years, 
meaning they also share a long-term relationship. An important aspect of their relationship is 
that it incorporates a significant amount of dialogue and collaboration between the ESCo and 
its customers, particularly prior to the contract to not only ensure that the solutions 
programme is feasible and will satisfy the customer’s energy needs but also generate a profit 
for the ESCo. Furthermore, the two parties must remain in close contact to ensure that the 
various, detailed stipulations of the contract are being met by both parties. For instance, the 
ESCo may have to monitor that it has achieved a pre-agreed room temperature for its client or 
delivered a certain percentage of energy savings and be able to provide the necessary 
evidence to verify these claims. In return the customer may have to prove it has honoured 
their pre-agreed behavioural changes: 
‘A really crucial element of energy performance contracting is a trusting relationship 
between the ESCo and the client, a more transparent and open relationship, more so 
than with other forms of contracting’ (ESCo Employee - B 31) 
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This is particularly true as part of a shared savings EPC contract, i.e. where the ESCo and its 
customer share the energy savings achieved, because the customer assumes some of the 
performance risk because they are partly responsible for delivering the savings  (Section 2.6.3).  
The ESCo-customer relationship associated with community owned and led ESCos, such as 
MOZES and Ashton Hayes Community Energy Company, is rather different to other customer 
relationships with external, commercial ESCos because it is the community who are 
responsible for making the necessary arrangements to deliver energy services to the other 
community members. Therefore, with this arrangement, the customers are typically 
responsible for fulfilling their own and other customers’ energy needs. 
6.1.1.4 Customer Channels 
How ESCos communicate with and reach their customers 
Consumers’ awareness of ESCo contracting was improved mainly through ESCo-led marketing, 
via the internet, leafleting, marketing events etc. In some cases public and third sector 
organisations have helped to raise awareness of the ESCo model, such as the London 
Development Agency via the RE:FIT scheme (Section 6.2.3.7), which was responsible for 
recruiting customers to tender for EPCs: ‘it made what we were trying to promote before 
[RE:FIT] ‘mainstream’ instead of a lovely, niche business idea or concept’ (Senior ESCo Manager 
- B 30). 
In terms of payment, customers typically pay monthly or quarterly payments to the ESCo in 
return for useful energy streams via ESCs or final energy services and some form of guaranteed 
energy saving via EPCs. Where ESCs have been signed for the provision of heat and/or 
electricity to residential customers, the charge for these services might be levied by their 
Housing Association or Social Housing Provider as part of their rent. 
6.1.1.5 Key Activities 
The most important things ESCos do to make their business model work 
ESCos key activities revolve around the financing, design, installation, operation and 
maintenance of the energy measures the implement, as part of their energy service contracts. 
ESCos do not engage in a standard set of activities because these vary with the scope (i.e. 
number of useful energy streams or final energy services the ESCo is responsible for) and 
depth of their energy service contract (the number of activities required to provide these 
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streams and/or services) (Sorrel 2007). However, we provide an example of the type of 
activities an ESCo would engage in for typical form of both ESC and EPC. 
Energy Supply Contracting – e.g. Supply of the useful energy stream ‘hot water’ via installation 
of a CHP district heat scheme  
The ESCo would first identify a customer base with a sufficiently large heat and electricity 
consumption profile via its sales and marketing team. Subsequently, it would design its CHP 
system and district energy network to take into account the consumption profile of its 
customers and the geography of the site. It would then consider how it might fund the 
installation of this infrastructure, through a combination of its own capital and external 
sources of funding (e.g. finance, investment etc). Once the funds were in place and the various 
forms of consent had been secured (e.g. planning), the ESCo would commence installation of 
this energy system, normally with the help of sub-contractors. Post-installation, it would be 
responsible for contracting with customers and connecting these to the network. During the 
period of the contracts the ESCo would also be responsible for the operation and maintenance 
of the system, and the metering and billing its customers’ heat and electricity consumption. 
Energy Performance Contracting – e.g. Provision of the final energy service ‘lighting’ and 
associated guaranteed energy savings via a lighting retrofit of its customer’s property 
The first stage would be for the ESCo to identify a potentially suitable customer via sales and 
marketing, which it would then undertake a preliminary audit of their premises to ascertain 
whether their lighting system is sufficiently inefficient so that the upfront capital cost of an 
energy efficiency upgrade could be recouped via the energy savings it generates, within a 
reasonable time period (e.g. 10 years). If the audit stage satisfies the ESCo’s criteria for a 
financially viable project then they would work in conjunction with the customer to develop a 
suite of demand management solutions (e.g. energy efficiency light bulbs, lighting sensors etc) 
that are capable of delivering the potential savings identified in the audit, whilst continuing to 
satisfy the energy needs of the customer (i.e. illumination). During this stage the ESCo explores 
the various ways it could fund the project (e.g. self-financing, external investment, customer 
investment etc), which is usually undertaken in conjunction with sub-contractors. The ESCo is 
then responsible for operation and maintenance of this new lighting system, as well as the 
measurement and verification of the energy savings it generates. 
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6.1.1.6 Key Resources 
The most important assets required to make the business model work 
ESCos require sufficient capital to cover the upfront costs of their energy service projects. 
Normally the ESCo is unable to cover this cost alone due to the high costs associated the 
implementing energy service projects (e.g. equipment, installation, design etc) and will 
typically require the customer and/or a third party to contribute, such as a financial institution. 
Typically, long-term, low-cost finance was most desirable for ESCos: 
‘If you can't get access to capital, patient capital, [at] a low rate of return over a long 
period of time...you're not going anywhere’ (Think Tank Partner - B 13) 
As previously explained, considerable amounts of capital are normally required for the 
purchasing of technology, which constitutes another key resource. The technology ESCos 
utilise depends on the scope of the contract but typically includes one or more of the 
following: 
 Primary conversion equipment (e.g. CHP, PV, biomass boiler etc) 
 Distribution technologies (e.g. private wire, district heat network etc) 
 Building controls (e.g. thermostat, lighting sensors etc) 
 Secondary conversion equipment (e.g. lights, radiators etc) 
As part of an Energy Supply Contract, ESCos will require the fuel (or primary energy) to input 
into these systems (e.g. gas, biomass, solar radiation etc), as well as the space/land to install 
and operate them. ESCos also require highly skilled personnel with a wide range of expertise to 
deliver energy service contracts, whether these are in-house or sub-contracted. The most 
important skills include: 
 Legal - to navigate the complex regulatory framework in order to constitute the ESCo 
initially. These are also required to draft energy service contracts to ensure they 
comply with legislation (e.g. consumer rights) and offer the ESCo the necessary 
protection if the customer fails to pay 
 Technical - to undertake audits to identify feasible and cost-effective energy solutions, 
bundle these into a workable solutions package and finally, implement these. Also, 
these are required to provide on-going services (e.g. operations and maintenance, 
measurement and verification etc) as part of the contract 
 Financial – to advise on the design of energy service contracts to ensure they will 
provide the ESCo with a profit, over a long-term period. Also, these are required to 
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identify and secure the various forms of financial support available from government 
(e.g. capital grant schemes, FiTs etc) 
 Marketing – to identify consumers who fit the ESCo’s Customer Segments and 
subsequently recruit these as customers 
6.1.1.7 Key Partners 
The network of suppliers and partners that make the ESCo model work 
ESCos typically require a strong network of partners to develop, fund, implement and manage 
their energy service contracts: 
‘Partners are important in this sector. We’ve got partners in a number of sectors, 
whether they are supporting us by communicating the opportunity to an end-user, 
providing a deeper understanding on the technology side or providing a 
complementary service alongside what we are offering’ (Senior ESCo Manager - B 30) 
Key partnerships ranged throughout the private, public and third sectors and the most 
commonly cited ESCo partnerships are presented and explained in Table 6.2 and in Figure 6.1. 
It is worth noting an ESCo’s key partnerships did however vary depending on the type of ESCo 
in question (see Sections 6.1.5 & 6.2).  
Partner Value of Partnership to ESCo 
Nos. of 
Interviewees 
who 
Identified 
Partner 
Financial 
Institutions 
(e.g. Banks, 
Pension 
Funds, 
Venture 
Capitalists) 
The majority of ESCos are heavily reliant on securing external investment or 
finance to cover the upfront costs of their project and therefore normally 
develop a partnership with a financial institution to provide this funding. These 
institutions also play an important role in designing the energy service contracts, 
to ensure they are financially and legally robust 
‘Companies such as ourselves don't actually finance [the projects] 
ourselves; we all have a banking partner’ (Senior ESCo Manager - B 15) 
13 
Sub-
contractors 
ESCos commonly sub-contract the installation of their energy service contracts 
projects, normally because these require highly specialised skills, which ESCos 
often do not possess in-house. They are also often used for the operation and 
management of these measures, as well as metering, billing and measurement & 
verification of savings 
 ‘There is so much subcontracting down and down and down [the supply 
chain]. There is the biomass, gas and electrical suppliers, the 
maintenance on the turbines, boilers and PV, the billing and metering 
company, the Electrical engineers, the high-voltage specialists etc. There 
is a plethora of subcontracting’ (Senior ESCo Manager - A 6) 
12 
153 
 
 
Financial, 
Legal and 
Technical 
Consultancies 
As outlined in Section 6.1.1.6, financial, legal and technical resources are 
essential to the delivery of energy service contracting. If the ESCo does not 
possess these skills in-house, it is likely to turn to technical consultancies, law 
firms, accountancies etc to provide these resources 
‘You need technical people, you need financial and you need legal’ 
(Senior Energy Consultant - A 11) 
11 
Local 
Authorities 
Local authorities wield significant political power at the local level and ESCos 
often require their support to unlock opportunities to develop energy service 
projects (e.g. district heating scheme), such as gaining planning permission. The 
LA can also play an important strategic role by introducing the ESCo to local 
stakeholders that could help facilitate the project or to potential customers  
‘If you are talking about local projects then you should almost certainly 
be talking to your local authority...If you have got them on board it is a 
much easier ride on planning [because] you are delivering on the LA’s 
objectives as well as your own [helping to] reduce the uncertainty 
associated with the project’s success’ (Energy Policy Advisor - B 26) 
10 
Property 
Developers 
ESCos often engage with property developers developing new residential and/or 
commercial sites to come to an agreement for the ESCo to develop an energy 
centre on-site and subsequently to supply energy to the site’s occupants 
‘[The ESCo is] buying into an opportunity. The developer is almost saying 
that here is a space for you to put your hardware in, here is a customer 
base and here is the opportunity for a 25 year contract or whatever it is 
[because] most developers will want to disappear once the building has 
been completed’ (Senior ESCo Manager - A 6) 
8 
Energy 
Utilities 
Energy Utilities play a number of smaller, less important roles but were 
frequently cited as an important partner. For instance, via the energy company 
obligations (e.g. CERT, CESP etc) they have financially supported some ESCos’ 
operations (e.g. Aberdeen Heat & Power, MOZES). They also often provide the 
fuel (e.g. gas) to ESCos, to generate energy services from. They also own a 
number of the District Network Operators (DNOs) that ESCos often have to work 
closely with when connecting decentralised electricity generation to the grid  
‘There are all sorts of obligations imposed on the [energy] Utilities that 
we have tapped in, not just the CHP, we tap into it all the time. We have 
had a lot of money out of them over the years’ (LA ESCo Manager  - B 
22) 
6 
Table 6.2 Typical key ESCo partners 
ESCos also have relationships with a range of other energy and non-energy actors that enable 
them to effectively deliver their energy service contracts. These are illustrated in Figure 6.1, 
along with the key partners as outlined in Table 6.2. 
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Figure 6.1 Integral and Peripheral ESCo Partnerships 
6.1.1.8 Cost Structure 
Major costs ESCos incur to operate their business model 
An ESCo’s most significant costs are reflected by the key activities it undertakes to fulfil its 
value proposition (see Section 6.1.1.5) and the key resources it must access in order to 
undertake these activities (see Section 6.1.1.6). For instance, a key activity of the ESCo model 
is the operation and maintenance of the technology it installs to enable it to provide energy 
services to its customers. This typically requires key resources such as the employment of 
engineers with a broad range of skills to ensure that this equipment is both safe and 
functional. Alternatively, the ESCo may out-source this responsibility to a sub-contractor or 
perform this activity in-house. Either tactic results in a cost on the ESCo. Therefore, an ESCo’s 
cost structure is reflected by the costs associated with the key activities and resources that are 
essential to deliver energy service contracts to its customers. 
Some of the key costs that are not highlighted in these previous sections include the payment 
ESCos often make to property developers or landlords to become preferred energy supplier to 
the consumers that reside on their development. This normally takes the form of an upfront 
capital contribution to the developer or landlord, as part of a concession agreement, which 
allows the ESCo to supply energy services to these customers over a long-term period (e.g. 25 
years): 
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‘The ESCo says ‘I will make capital payment to you Mr landlord or Mr developer 
[because] I want to buy a concession to provide the heat…to your tenants and I am 
going to do that for profit’’ (Senior ESCo Provider - B 18) 
Other important costs include finance repayments to the financial institutions that have 
loaned ESCos the necessary funds to cover the upfront capital costs of their project or 
dividends to investors in their project or business. Finally, when providing EPCs, if the ESCo 
fails to meet its cost saving guarantee, it will have to pay compensation to its customers, equal 
to the value of the energy savings it failed to provide:  
‘[The ESCo] says ‘I'm going to save you a 25% kWh reduction [and if they don’t] they 
make good the shortfall however they choose to do it’ (Senior Bank Manager - B 17). 
6.1.1.9 Revenue Streams 
The money ESCos generate from their customers 
An ESCo’s core revenue streams depend upon whether it is providing ESCs or EPCs to its 
customer. With EPCs, the main revenue stream for an ESCo is a regular payment from the 
customer to the ESCo to maintain a certain quantity and quality of one or more final energy 
services, such as lighting, ventilation, heating etc. The customer covers this cost with the 
savings the ESCo achieves on its energy bill (Figure 6.2). The customer’s payment is structured 
by the ESCo so that it not only covers the upfront (e.g. cost of equipment) and on-going costs 
(e.g. labour) it incurred whilst delivering the measures capable of generating these savings but 
also provides the ESCo with a profit (Figure 6.2). The amount the customer pays the ESCo will 
depend on whether the two parties have signed a guaranteed savings or shared savings 
agreement (Section 2.6.3). Normally, the contracts are structured so that the ESCo takes the 
majority but not all of the cost savings it achieves on its customer’s Energy Utility bill to ensure 
the customer immediately enjoys a small percentage cost saving (e.g. 5%) for the duration of 
the contract (Figure 6.2). 
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Figure 6.2 An ESCo’s revenue and cost model for a basic Energy Performance Contract (adapted from 
Sorrell, 2005) 
The core revenue stream as part of an Energy Supply Contract is the sale of useful energy 
streams, such as hot water and/or electricity, to its customers. In this sense the ESCo’s revenue 
stream is rather similar to an Energy Utility’s, particularly with respect to electricity supply. 
However, one key difference is that ESCos normally implement decentralised energy 
generation systems rather than centralised generation, meaning that they are often eligible to 
receive the financial incentives available for decentralised generation of low-carbon electricity 
(i.e. Feed-in-Tariff) and/or heat (i.e. Renewable Heat Incentive) (Section 5.4). Capital grants 
(e.g. Low Carbon Communities competition) also represent an important source of revenue for 
ESCos, however these represent ‘one-off’ payments rather than on-going, reliable revenue 
streams. 
ESCos providing ESCs are also able to identify savings on the customer’s energy bill, in a similar 
way to EPCs, by installing more efficient primary conversion equipment that requires less 
primary energy input to provide the same quality and quantity of useful energy streams. For 
instance, the ESCo may choose to install a CHP system that can yield a 28% primary energy 
saving compared to the traditional centralised forms of energy supply because it reduces 
electricity transmission and distribution losses by generating electricity ‘close to the point of 
use’ (B 26) and captures heat traditionally lost via cooling towers for consumption (Carbon 
Trust, 2010)(Figure 6.3).  
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Figure 6.3 Energy efficiency of CHP compared to conventional sources of heat and power generation 
(shown in units of power) (Carbon Trust, 2010) 
Alternatively the ESCo may choose to reduce its customer’s current energy bills by replacing its 
customer’s current primary conversion system with one that utilises a different primary energy 
input compared to the customer’s existing choice of fuel. For example, the ESCo may replace 
its customer’s gas-fired boiler with a biomass boiler or a solar thermal system. This decision is 
often made when the ESCo calculates that it can still provide the same quantity and quality of 
energy service more cheaply by utilising an alternative source of fuel, which has lower 
associated capital and operating costs over the lifetime of the contract, when compared with 
the costs associated the customer’s existing fuel. However, this process is generally less 
common than developing more efficient conversion processes for traditional fuels because 
alternative fuels (e.g. biomass, solar, wind) often entail higher lifetime costs than traditional 
fuels, which have benefitted from increasing returns, such as learning effects (see Section 
2.3.3.1). 
Similar to EPCs (see Figure 6.2) the ESCo can treat these savings on the customer’s current 
energy bill as a revenue stream because the capital has now been ‘freed up’. The ESCo can 
capture a proportion of this cost saving via the charge it places on its customers for the sale of 
its useful energy streams. As illustrated in Figure 6.4, the ESCo seeks to combine the monetary 
value of the financial incentives and energy efficiency gains on the primary conversion 
equipment to subsidise the customer’s energy bill so that they are able to pay less than they 
currently do to satisfy their energy needs with an Energy Utility: 
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‘We put [our price] against…what you would be paying with a typical energy solution. 
We will show you a 5 to 10% operational cost saving [over] 10 or 15 years’ (Senior 
EUCo Manager - B 19) 
In summary, as part of an ESC, ESCos are normally able to reduce the customer’s current 
energy bill by harnessing a combination of financial incentives and cost savings, associated 
with improving the efficiency of the customer’s primary conversion stage or switching to a less 
costly primary fuel input. Alongside its ‘mark-up’ on the sale of kWh of useful energy (e.g. heat 
and electricity), ESCos also draw upon these two revenue streams as part of its own income. 
 
Figure 6.4 An ESCo’s revenue and cost model for a basic Energy Supply Contract 
6.1.2 Comparison of ESCo and EUCo Models 
Our empirical investigation identified that there are a number of important characteristic 
differences between the incumbent Energy Utility (EUCo) business model and the ESCo model. 
Broadly, the ESCo business model revolves around the provision of useful energy stream or 
final energy services as part of bespoke, value-added, long-term contracts, which require a 
close and open relationship with the customer. In contrast, the EUCo model focuses on low-
cost provision of gas and electricity via centralised generation and distribution, supplied to 
customers via standardized short-term contracts with limited customer engagement26: 
                                                          
26 Energy Utilities have traditionally generated their electricity from high-carbon, finite fossil 
fuels (e.g. coal and gas), however they could generate electricity via non-finite, renewable 
sources of energy (e.g. wind or solar), thus making their energy supply more sustainable 
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‘Their business model has been said to be, purchase as low as you can and cost as low 
as you can, and have a call centre. That is what an energy supplier is. They send out 
bills, that's pretty much what they do’ (Energy Efficiency Expert - A 7) 
We argue that in order to understand why ESCos have fared differently to the Energy Utilities 
within the same selection environment (i.e. the UK energy system) we must build a detailed 
picture of the characteristic differences between these two business models. To accomplish 
this we apply our analytical framework (i.e. Osterwalder & Pigneur’s (2010) framework) to our 
empirical evidence in order to identify the core characteristics of these two business models. 
The core characteristics of the EUCo model were populated primarily by drawing on insights 
from the interviews during Phase 1 of the empirical investigations, which included 
interviewees from 3 of the 6 major Energy Utilities, as well as personal experience of Energy 
Utilities. The core characteristics of these two models are introduced in Table 6.3 and are 
presented side-by-side to help highlight their characteristic differences. Such a detailed 
analysis and comparison of the ESCo and EUCo business models has not been undertaken 
before, according to our literature review. 
Business 
Model 
Building 
Blocks 
Energy Service Company (ESCo) Model  Energy Utility Company (EUCo) Model  
Customer 
Value 
Proposition 
 
- Fulfil energy needs at a similar or lower 
cost to EUCo model 
- ESCo assumes most financial and 
technical risk of fulfilling customer’s 
energy needs 
- Bespoke and holistic energy solutions 
that closely fit the customer’s needs 
- Energy needs met with fewer adverse 
environmental effects compared to 
EUCo model, meaning customer can 
enjoy more sustainable lifestyle, fulfil 
regulatory and CSR obligations etc 
- Societal benefits (e.g. alleviation of fuel 
poverty, climate change mitigation, 
localization of capital flows) 
- Fulfil energy needs at low cost  
- Reliable energy supply 
- Short-term contracts mean flexibility for 
customer 
- Little interference with customer as 
they do not go ‘beyond the meter’ e.g. 
few behavioural stipulations 
  
Target 
Customer 
- Mainly commercial (focus on public 
sector), with some residential and 
industrial  
- Residential, commercial, industrial and 
agricultural  
Customer 
Channels 
 
Similar to Energy Utilities with the 
addition of: 
 
- Energy supplied via localized and often 
private distribution networks 
- Support via on-going customer 
interaction & project management  
- On-line, TV, telephone, postal & door-
to-door marketing, purchasing, 
metering, billing & customer feedback 
- Energy supplied via a national 
transmission & distribution network 
- Support via customer service call centre, 
metering & billing etc 
Customer 
Relationship 
 
- Bespoke & holistic  
- Long-term service contracts 
- Close, cooperative, candid and trusting 
- Impersonal & standardised  
- Short-term supply contracts 
- Customer responsible for managing 
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relationship to ensure customer’s and 
ESCo’s needs are met 
- Customer may invest in ESCo  
- Customer may manage ESCo (e.g. 
Community ESCo) 
most conversion processes (e.g. gas to 
heat via boiler) 
Key Activities 
 
- Typically finance, design, build, operate 
and maintain small to medium scale 
demand management & low carbon 
supply energy projects 
 
ESCs  
- Generation, distribution, supply, 
metering and billing  
 
EPCs 
- Preliminary and investment grade 
auditing, measurement and verification 
of energy savings  
 
- Typically Utilities engage in generation, 
distribution and supply (some 
transmission) 
- Generation - Finance, design, build, 
operate and maintain large-scale, 
centralised energy generation & 
distribution infrastructure 
- Distribution – Through utility owned 
District Network Operators (DNOs) they 
link transmission and generation with 
supply 
- Supply – Electricity trading and 
metering & billing of energy supply 
- Rarely go ‘beyond the meter’. Some 
installation & maintenance of small-
scale conversion and control 
technologies (e.g. central heating)  
Key 
Resources 
 
- Financial resources and technical, 
financial and legal expertise to develop 
small to medium scale demand 
management and low-carbon supply 
energy projects. Also customer facing 
services i.e. operation and maintenance, 
billing etc 
 
ESCs 
- Technologies: Decentralised, primary 
conversion technologies (i.e. 
generation) & distribution technologies, 
as well as fuel 
 
EPCs 
- Technologies: Secondary conversion 
equipment and building controls 
- Financial and technical resources to 
develop large-scale, centralised 
generation and distribution 
infrastructure 
- Customer facing services i.e. nationwide 
metering, billing and customer service 
network 
- Fossil fuels (e.g. gas, coal) 
- Centralised generation & distribution 
technologies  
Key 
Partnerships 
 
- Financial Institutions & Investors 
- Technical, Legal & Financial 
Consultancies 
- Property Developers 
- Sub-Contractors  
- Local Authorities 
- Financial Institutions & Investors 
- Electrical Power Generation Companies  
- Transmission & Distribution Network 
Operators  
- Gas & Electricity Network Regulators 
Revenue 
Streams 
 
- Capital grants  
- Customer investment 
- Bank finance 
 
ESCs 
- Payment for useful energy streams (e.g. 
hot water). Customer covers this in part 
via energy savings ESCo achieves 
through efficiency gains or utilisation of 
cheaper primary energy input 
- Low-carbon financial incentives for 
micro-generation (e.g. FiT, RHI)  
 
- Sale of metered units of delivered 
energy (e.g. gas, imported electricity) 
- Low-carbon financial incentives (e.g. 
Renewables Obligation Certificates) 
- Trading of surplus electricity on the 
market 
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EPCs 
- Payment for predefined quality & 
quantity of final energy services (e.g. 
light). Customer covers this via energy 
savings the ESCo achieves through 
efficiency gains 
Cost Structure 
 
Similar to Energy Utilities with the 
addition of: 
 
ESCs 
- Acquiring the rights from gatekeeper 
organisations for energy service 
provision (e.g. property developer) 
 
EPCs 
- Measurement & Verification of savings. 
Compensation for poor performance 
- Generation Technology and/or 
wholesale purchase of energy 
- Staff 
- Fuel 
- Premises & land acquisition 
- Marketing and communication 
- Infrastructure for Metering & Billing 
- Operations & Maintenance 
- Finance or investment repayments   
- Technical, financial and legal 
consultancy 
Table 6.3 Detailed account and comparison of EUCo & ESCo business models 
The table above highlights how the ESCo and EUCo models characteristically differ from one 
another. The major difference between the two is that Energy Utilities do not provide final 
energy services (e.g. lighting), whilst ESCos do. On the other hand, Energy Utilities supply 
primary energy to their customers (e.g. gas), whilst ESCos do not. One similarity between the 
two is that they both provide electricity as a useful energy stream, however they differ in 
terms of how they provide this to their customers. Essentially, ESCos typically engage in 
decentralised generation, often in the form of district energy or micro-generation, whilst 
Energy Utilities typically engage in centralised generation. The starkest difference exists 
between Energy Utilities and ESCos offering EPCs. The former’s revenue is coupled with their 
customer’s energy consumption, whilst the latter’s is decoupled from their consumption 
because they draw their revenue from the savings they achieve on their customer’s energy bill.  
Another key difference is that ESCos typically have a closer relationship with their customers 
than the Utilities as they offer bespoke and holistic energy solutions, as part of long-term 
contracts. In contrast, the Utilities have a more distant, standardized relationship with their 
customers. Importantly, ESCos normally seek to fulfil their customers’ energy needs at a lower 
cost than Energy Utilities, predominantly by reducing their customers’ primary energy 
consumption via energy efficiency improvements and changes to their consumptions 
behaviour. Through their implementation of energy demand management and sustainable 
energy supply measures, ESCos also focus on reducing the carbon emissions associated with 
their customers’ energy consumption, forming an important part of their value proposition. In 
contrast, the Energy Utilities are not intrinsically incentivised to improve their customers’ 
energy consumption or reduce the carbon intensity of their energy supply. 
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The features of the ESCo model should, in principle, form an attractive package for a range of 
customers, particularly when compared to the EUCo model. However, as we discuss in Section 
6.1.4.2, a number of key barriers have limited its uptake. Furthermore, whilst the ESCo model 
exhibits a number of key strengths that are mainly reflected by its value proposition, it also 
displays a number of weaknesses that have also helped to limit its uptake.  
6.1.3 Strengths and Weaknesses of the ESCo model 
In Section 6.1.1.1 we examined the Value Proposition of the ESCo model, which encapsulates 
the strengths of the business model from the perspective of the ESCo’s customers 
(summarised in Table 6.3). In doing so we also highlighted some potential weaknesses from 
the customer’s perspective. In this sub-section we now examine the strengths and weaknesses 
of the ESCo model as identified by our interviewees, which constituted a heterogeneous group 
of ESCo and energy experts. They considered how the ESCo model might be deemed attractive 
or unattractive from the perspective of adopters or potential adopters of the business model.  
ESCos normally provide bespoke energy demand management and/or sustainable supply 
solutions, which is considered a key strength of the ESCo model considering how much value 
they create for the ESCos’ customers (Section 6.1.1.1). However, it also represents an important 
weakness because the development of such ‘tailor made’ energy solution packages means that 
each project is normally quite distinct from others, making the replication of energy service 
contracts from one project to the next difficult for ESCos. Consequently, new contracts are often 
drafted or existing ones heavily amended with each new project, placing a significant amount of 
pressure on the ESCo’s financial and technical resources: 
‘The big problem with the Distributed Energy (DE) ESCo model is that is very bespoke and 
as a result it is very costly, lawyers make a fortune. It doesn't tend to be highly replicable 
and that is a problem’ (Senior ESCo Manager - B 18) 
Furthermore, bespoke contracting requires the ESCo to spend significant amounts of time with 
their customer during the design stage to ensure that the solutions satisfy their customers’ 
needs and will not adversely affect their day-to-day operations. For instance, as part of an EPC 
the ESCo audits their customer’s current and projected levels of consumption, which requires 
the ESCo to collate information from the customer to draft a workable EPC agreement.  
Despite these drawbacks, the bespoke nature of energy service contracts, coupled with the 
small-scale energy projects ESCos normally engage with (e.g. small to medium scale CHP scheme; 
retrofit of an office block) means the ESCo model is relatively accessible to a broad variety of 
potential ESCo model adopters, ranging across the private, public and third sectors. 
Furthermore, the flexibility of the ESCo model also means it can be implemented to serve a 
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broad range of Customer Segments (e.g. residential, private sector, public sector). Consequently, 
the ESCo model can be adopted by a broad range of organisations to satisfy a variety of 
Customer Segments. 
Although, the relatively small scale of most energy service projects has made the ESCo model 
accessible to a broad range of organisations, it has also meant that ESCos generally struggle to 
effectively harness the economies of scale. This in conjunction with the resource intensive 
nature of bespoke contracting has meant that ESCos’ transaction costs are usually high (Sorrell, 
2007), which serves to constrain the ESCo’s profit margin. Consequently, many ESCos have 
become very dependent on government capital grants (e.g. CERT funding) and regulatory 
financial incentives (e.g. Feed in Tariff) in order to make their business commercially viable, 
which exposes ESCos to risk as these schemes can be subject to major restructuring with little 
prior notice, as demonstrated by the recent FiT cuts. 
ESCos rely on a broad range of Key Resources (e.g. capital, expertise, experience) (Section 
6.1.1.6) and Key Partners (Section 6.1.1.7) to deliver energy service contracts, which serves to 
exclude those organisations from adopting the model who are unable to gain access to these. 
However, some organisations have overcome this weakness by forming joint-venture ESCos that 
enable multiple organisations to pool their resources and consequently provide a more 
compelling value proposition than if they were to operate independently: 
‘It might be that a local authority contracts with the big six operator who has their own 
energy services development arm…or it could be that they are contracting with the big six 
guy because they don't have the cash to be able to do it’ (Energy Policy Advisor - B 26) 
The long-term nature of energy service contracts means ESCos are able to enjoy reliable, long-
term revenue streams. The downside however is that this restricts their operational flexibility 
and so they are not easily able to adjust their business model as they have to honour long-term 
energy service contracts (Marino et al., 2011). 
‘It is very hard if you have a 20 year contract to run the boiler services for instance...to 
modify or change it to become a completely new type of contract…[That] becomes a 
barrier to implementing other [business] models’ (Senior Investment Manager - A 5) 
Finally, an important potential weakness of the ESCo model is that the GHG reductions ESCos 
achieve via energy service contracting could potential be significantly moderated by the 
‘rebound effect’ (Section 2.6.4). Although the impact of the rebound effect on the final GHG 
savings ESCo achieve for their customers has not been quantified either by this project or 
previous research projects, it is unlikely that the rebound effect will negate these GHG savings 
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entirely. However, we acknowledge that this is possible and this is identified as a potential 
avenue for future research in Section 10.3. 
6.1.4 Key Drivers and Barriers to ESCo Model Adoption and Operation in the UK 
Having outlined the key strengths and weaknesses of the ESCo model from the perspective of 
both potential ESCo customers (Section 6.1.1.1) and ESCo model adopters (Section 6.1.3) we 
now examine the factors that have either enabled or inhibited the adoption and operation of 
the ESCo model in the UK, i.e. its drivers and barriers. These factors were identified using the 
data collection and analysis methods outlined in the Methodology chapter (Section 4). 
Considering the large number of drivers and barriers identified during the empirical 
investigation we present them in the tables below (Table 6.4 & Table 6.6). Only factors that 
had been corroborated by two or more interviewees are presented due to the sheer volume of 
factors identified.  
The tables provide (1) a brief description of each factor and its influence on the ESCo 
population; (2) a selected quote to provide evidence that is representative of the driver or 
barrier; (3) the number of interviewees who identified the driver or barrier and (4) a ranking 
for each driver and barrier, which is also illustrated by colour coding. The drivers and barriers 
are categorized by themes (e.g. institutional and regulatory; technological and infrastructural) 
to enable the reader to identify which groups of factors have had the greatest influence on the 
uptake of the ESCo model in the UK. These themes broadly correspond with the different 
system dimensions outlined in the research’s Analytical Framework (Section 3). We elaborate 
upon and discuss a number of these factors in Section 7 to help provide insight into the co-
evolutionary relationship between ESCo population and UK energy system. 
6.1.4.1 Key Drivers 
Description of Driver and its 
Influence 
Selected Qualitative Evidence 
Frequency of 
Responses from 
Interviewees 
Nos. who 
Identified 
Driver 
Overall 
Rank 
Institutional and Regulatory 
Low-Carbon Energy 
Generation Financial 
Incentives (i.e. Feed-in-Tariff 
& Renewable Heat Incentive) 
provide revenue stream for 
ESCos 
‘[They are] brilliant for ESCos…It is guaranteed income, RPI 
linked for 25 years. Where do you get that sort of 
guaranteed money? It is safe as houses [and] government 
backed’ (A 6) 
15 1 
Carbon Reduction 
Commitment Energy 
Efficiency Scheme (CRC) puts 
‘[With the CRC] you are now getting the likes of Diaggio and 
BP going ‘Oh God, I've got to write a cheque for £2 million, 
where's that come from?’...Think of their energy spend, it is 
11 2 
165 
 
 
energy efficiency on 
corporate agendas 
massive’ (B 17) 
Capital Grant Schemes have 
made upfront capital available 
for delivering energy service 
projects 
‘We were fortunate because we got DECC Low Carbon 
Communities challenge money. We were awarded £400,000 
from that which enabled demonstration [of our] community 
projects…to try some of these ideas out’ (B 12)  
7 =6 
Energy company obligations 
(i.e. CERT & CESP) have made 
upfront capital available and 
encouraged Energy Utilities to 
diversify their business 
activities  
‘There are all sorts of obligations imposed on the [Energy 
Utilities] that we have tapped in, and not just for the CHP. 
We tap into it all the time and we have had a lot of money 
out of them over the years’ (B 22) 
7 =6 
Localism & Local Government 
Acts have provided greater 
opportunities for LAs and 
communities to establish 
ESCos  
‘[The Localism Bill] is clearly closely related to planning 
because most of the things to do with generation involve 
planning permission. If that is brought back to the 
community level, such as a parish council for example, it 
would really take the temperature of the community. If the 
community wants to go ahead with it, why should some 
higher level stop them doing it? That is an important stage 
in the process to allow local self-determination’ (B 12) 
6 =10 
Planning Regulations have 
raised energy efficiency 
standards for buildings 
‘[If] planning people say I want CHP on that site otherwise I 
will not give you planning permission, then you have to 
provide a gas fired CHP. If they believe in that and insist on 
that because they believe it gives a low carbon 
solution…you cannot get your site off the ground [without 
it]’ (B 20) 
5 =12 
Decline of Capital Grant 
Schemes has meant 
consumers less likely to afford 
upfront capital cost of energy 
solutions and so turn to ESCo 
to do so 
‘[The] FITs are a bit of a bonkers idea…because the barrier 
[to energy projects] is the upfront capital cost, so why are 
we giving them a long-term revenue stream?...The 
institutional and policy arrangements might lead you to an 
ESCo [because] if you gave a grant, what is the role for 
ESCo? [But] if you've got a FiT, you might get a role for an 
ESCo. The RHI will be the same issue’ (A 7) 
3 =17 
Building Regulations have 
raised energy efficiency 
standards for buildings 
‘Developers have this requirement on them to meet 
a…carbon reduction or…renewable [target]. They don't 
know how to deal with this…They would say ‘look, I don't 
want to deal with this hassle. I want you guys take it away 
from me’…So what they do is employ us to design, build, 
fund and operate an ESCo company [and] take that 
responsibility for meeting their planning conditions’ (A 8) 
3 =17 
Deregulation has removed 
some regulatory barriers to 
ESCos (e.g. sale of electricity 
by Local Authorities) 
‘There were until this year restrictions on the ability [of] 
Local Authorities to supply electricity. Those have been 
removed which opens up a greater ability certainly for Local 
Authorities to become involved in energy related schemes’ 
(B 14) 
3 =17 
Economic 
Recession has increased 
consumer desire to reduce 
energy bills but constrained 
their ability to make the 
necessary investments to do 
so  
‘I don’t see many people having enough free capital to be 
able to deliver these projects in the short to medium term, 
maybe say over the next 5 years. Therefore, I think ESCos 
are going to have an opportunity to take advantage of that’ 
(B 30) 
9 =3 
Rising levels of fuel poverty 
has stimulated action to 
‘Quite a few of the larger community district scale projects 
that we see going forward, particularly led by the local 
9 =3 
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alleviate it authorities, there seems to be a particularly strong element 
of fuel poverty in there’ (B 22) 
Low-Carbon energy market 
regarded as good investment 
opportunity 
‘Investing in green energy projects actually provides a 
certain level of certainty because we have projections way 
up to 2050, beyond which we are not going to be able to 
walk away from our objectives, [so] investing in these types 
of projects can actually be a really good thing’ (B 26) 
8 5 
Rising energy prices have 
raised interest in solutions to 
reduce energy costs 
‘Well the obvious driver [for the ESCo model] is energy 
prices, because it is tangible and people know pound notes’ 
(B 20) 
7 =6 
Increasing availability of 
finance for ESCo projects 
‘One of the initial barriers was the financial community 
catching up and recognising it as a viable business model 
but that is one that has been overcome. I think there are 
people looking to invest in ESCos’ (B 31) 
7 =6 
Market 
Existence of Local Energy 
‘Champions’ willing to 
establish and lead ESCos 
‘Within each local authority, you have got to find the 
champion. This whole thing about champions is so 
important and champions aren't appointed, they don't 
apply for a job as a champion. Instead they 
emerge…Generally speaking somebody will just get bitten 
by this and they will think ‘My god, this is the right thing to 
do’, and they will just become mad about it’ (B 21) 
6 =10 
Prioritisation of sustainability 
in corporate decision making 
(e.g. CSR) 
‘Most organisations have CSR policies as well and they 
regard sustainability as something which can help them do 
business better, which I think Marks and Spencer have 
proved with their Plan A’ (B 28) 
5 =12 
Introduction of the RE:FIT 
framework has streamlined 
energy service contract 
procurement 
‘The birth of RE:FIT...made what we were trying to promote 
before RE:FIT mainstream instead of a lovely, niche business 
idea or concept’ (B 30) 
4 =15 
UK Energy Insecurity has 
stimulated action to improve 
security 
‘Then there is this security of supply and whole resilience 
thing…Some Local Authorities are seriously concerned about 
that and that is one of the [drivers]’ (B 21) 
4 =15 
Growing experience of 
delivering energy service 
contracts 
‘I think we are learning rapidly from doing [this]…We are 
dealing with inadequacies in the way things are [and] 
everyone is trying to find their way through this structure, 
this crazy and difficult financial world, alongside the carbon 
imperatives…You get innovation in a sector where out of 
necessity from a certain set of drivers, you get this 
ballooning and refining [of business models]’ (A 6) 
3 =17 
Growing base of skills in UK 
associated with energy 
service contract provision 
‘The calibre of staff we are getting to apply for jobs now, we 
didn’t get 10 years ago. People...understand that this is the 
new industry, the new industrial revolution’ (A 1) 
2 =22 
Infrastructural & Technological 
Technological innovations 
that have improved the cost-
effectiveness of energy 
service contracts  
‘The thing about LED lighting is that instead of saving 10% 
or 30%, you can save 80% and then the idea of a 
performance guarantee finance project becomes very easy, 
because the returns are so huge you can say to the client I 
guarantee I will save you 40% of your lighting costs’ (A 5) 
5 =12 
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Existing energy distribution 
networks (e.g. District Heat 
Networks, Private Wires, 
National Grid) 
‘In the case of the plant we buy the existing plant room but 
we tie it to the existing system. So we are dropping in a new 
prefabricated plant on-site and then running its connection 
up to the header in the main plant room’ (B 18) 
2 =22 
Energy service projects 
perceived as a solution to the 
need for regular building 
upgrades  
‘There was more risk in doing nothing, than doing 
something because had the council not replaced the heating 
system when it did, those buildings would not have survived 
another...There would have been a major failure on that 
site’ (A 4) 
2 =22 
User Practices 
Growing consumer awareness 
and experience of ESCo model 
has helped increase energy 
service contract demand 
‘Finding customers that are ready to do [EPCs] as well is 
probably the second [major barrier]…but customers are now 
waking up to this…It is now starting to open up so we can 
do that. A couple of years ago it wasn't necessarily there’ (B 
28) 
3 =17 
Customer dissatisfaction with 
Energy Utilities has 
encouraged them to identify 
alternative means of 
satisfying their energy needs 
‘Three of the big six energy companies here in the UK have 
been saying that we really need to be referred to the 
competition committee because trust has broken down, our 
sort of brand is not respected any more by customers’ (B 29) 
2 =22 
Growing consumer awareness 
of sustainability & climate 
change issues 
‘There is certainly far more awareness, knowledge and 
interest in district heating...The Renewable Energy 
Association's ‘Heat is Half the Problem’ campaign last year 
was a fantastic boon because people realised that heat is 
pretty much half the country's carbon emissions’ (B 19) 
2 =22 
Table 6.4 Key drivers to ESCo adoption and operation in the UK 
Colour 
Code 
Nos. of Interviewees 
 10 + 
 6 – 10 
 4 - 6 
 2 - 3 
Table 6.5 Legend for ESCo Drivers Table 
6.1.4.2 Key Barriers 
Brief Description of Barrier 
and its Influence 
Selected Qualitative Evidence 
Frequency of 
Responses from 
Interviewees 
Nos. who 
Identified 
Barrier 
Overall 
Rank 
Market 
Poor understanding and 
misconceptions of the ESCo 
model has limited demand for 
energy service contracts 
‘Getting the market to understand what is on offer…is a key 
constraint…I don't think that the market genuinely 
understood what we were trying to do when we first 
explained to them’ (B 20) 
11 1 
Lack of standardized energy 
service contracts makes sales 
process lengthier and more 
resource intensive  
‘The time that gets spent negotiating these contracts is 
ridiculous [because] the terms of the individual supply 
agreements, the leases, all require substantial amount of 
rework generally and you go through this process with each 
7 =3 
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project of explaining the conflicts and 
limitations…Regulation would hopefully speed up the 
process [by] standardising the arrangements’ (B 24) 
Unregulated heat market has 
limited consumer protection 
(e.g. monopoly suppliers) 
‘There is no regulation [for energy supply contracting, so 
customers] can't go to Ofgem to complain, can't swap 
suppliers, haven't got statutory rights of compensation if 
[their] supply is interrupted. [They] may have all of this stuff 
enshrined in the contract but you as the customer have no 
control over what that contract says’ (B 24) 
5 =7 
Limited skills in the UK to 
provide energy service 
contracts 
‘Finding people who understand [energy service contracts] 
and can structure them correctly is not easy. They are rare 
and not easy to find’ (B 28) 
5 =7 
Strength of the Energy Utilities 
in the energy sector 
‘[The Big 6] all have one or 2 million customers, their 
overhead costs of supply, billing etc are as low as you can 
get them. So there is a cost penalty to virtually anybody 
coming in their in comparison’ (A 7) 
3 =13 
Lack of experience in UK of 
establishing ESCos and 
delivering energy service 
contracts 
‘On the future of community groups [and] housing 
association ESCos, the real difficulty is that because not 
many people have ever done this before, they don't quite 
know where to start’ (B 14) 
3 =13 
Lack of individuals willing to 
lead energy projects and ESCos 
(i.e. ‘Energy Champions’) 
‘I’ve been involved in discussions with potential clients about 
schemes they have where you can just tell there isn't 
anybody behind it to his saying right I am going to make this 
happen and drive it forward’ (B 14) 
3 =13 
Cannot easily compare ESCo 
contracts with Utility offerings 
to understand if they represent 
good value for money or not 
‘So when [our customers] are comparing [our offer] we have 
been very careful to say you look you are getting a service, 
so if you are going to compare it you can't just go to USwitch 
and pick the top one...That is not looking at your servicing’ 
(A 6) 
2 =19 
Economic 
Lack of appropriate finance to 
support energy service 
contracts 
‘No matter how good the project was, you need the right 
kind of money and the right kind of money just isn't 
available’ (B 13) 
10 2 
Recession has reduced the 
number of property 
developments, reducing ESCo 
opportunities to provide ESCs 
to new-build 
‘We actually did some work for Yorkshire Forward in relation 
to [delivering an ESCo] for Holbeck Urban Village…It got very 
close too [and] would have worked. If the recession had not 
struck that contract would have been signed and something 
would have been delivered’ (B 14) 
2 =19 
Institutional and Regulatory 
Procurement rules makes 
procuring energy service 
contracts lengthy and resource 
intensive for both ESCo and 
customer 
‘If you want to do [an EPC] with more than a certain amount 
of money you will have to go through OJEU to procure an 
ESCo in this costs money and time…It takes two years and it 
will cost £250,000 to procure from scratch… It is easier to 
say I'm doing nothing’ (B 25) 
7 =3 
Decline of Capital Grant 
schemes makes upfront capital 
difficult to secure for less 
wealthy ESCos 
 ‘There is plenty of thinking [around new energy business 
models] but what there isn't is the support to make it 
happen and key to that support is access to capital to try 
things’ (B 13) 
6 =5 
169 
 
 
Lack of Local Authority support 
to engage with ESCo projects 
‘I suppose what is more problematic is that councils are very 
conservative [and] very risk adverse. Not necessarily that 
keen on innovation. So it has been perhaps problematic at 
times [because] as far as I can see…they were born with the 
word no attached to their lips’ (B 22) 
6 =5 
Unstable and unpredictable 
regulatory framework makes 
ESCo development difficult  
‘The jury is out at the moment. You know about the FiT and 
how it wasn’t conducted in the best manner…Policy has 
been communicated and implemented in such a mishandled 
and volatile way. It means confidence is very low in any 
external monetary incentive…Policy is a moving goalpost’ (B 
30) 
5 =7 
Complexity and incoherent 
regulatory framework makes 
ESCo development difficult 
‘Everyone is trying to find their way through this structure, 
this crazy and difficult financial world, alongside the carbon 
imperatives…[It’s] very complex’ (A 6) 
5 =7 
3
rd
 party supplier access to 
private wire significantly 
reduces an ESCo’s certainty of 
the size of its future customer 
base for ESCs 
‘We have a fairly captive audience and that kind of 
works...at the end of the day they can't really shop around 
and we can't afford to lose them. There is a form of 
dependency there. Whereas EDF could lose 2000 customers 
today because they can get 2001 different ones tomorrow. 
We can't do that…[the EU’s] competition and choice agenda 
is at conflict with where a lot of energy and ESCo stuff is 
going’ (A 6) 
3 =13 
Landlord Tenant Act questions 
the legitimacy of landlords 
transferring their responsibility 
to provide their tenants with 
energy to a third party (e.g. 
ESCo) and whether this energy 
can be passed on above cost 
price  
‘What you've got is a couple of hundred years of landlord 
and tenant law [that] is fundamentally at odds with 
government policy pushing an ESCo model to decarbonise 
new build [because it stipulates that] the landlord can't 
profit off the provision of communal services, such as heat. 
They got to pass it on at cost’ (B 18) 
3 =13 
Energy Supplier Obligations 
(i.e. CERT & CESP) provide little 
incentive for Energy Utilities to 
radically alter their business 
model  
‘Their business model has been said to be, purchase as low 
as you can and cost as low as you can, and have a call 
centre. [The energy company obligations] haven’t changed 
their business model fundamentally’ (A 7) 
2 =19 
Internal Treasury Rules 
prohibit Local Authorities to 
invest cost savings (e.g. on 
energy bill) into other activities 
‘A treasury rule [exists] where [government] can't make 
savings and use them for something else, and of course 
that's what you're doing with the performance contract, 
you're making savings to then pay for that debt [i.e. cost of 
the upfront energy measures]’ (B 15) 
2 =19 
State Aid Rules caps how much 
government funding an ESCo is 
eligible receive 
‘You can only have state aid up to the de minimus threshold, 
which is 200,000 euros…If you go above it you are breaking 
[the law]’ (B 12) 
2 =19 
Lack of city-level GHG 
emissions reduction targets 
limits Local Authority incentive 
to engage in low-carbon 
energy projects 
‘There is no requirement for a city the size of Leeds to 
produce an energy plan, none at all. You don't have to do 
any of this, it is not a statutory requirement’ (A 9) 
2 =19 
Decentralised generation 
facilities can often struggle to 
get planning permission 
‘We have had to educate the local planners in the [area] on 
renewable energy, sustainability and all the rest of it…[They] 
just didn't really know anything about it, so the planning 
was quite a barrier…our trial turbine took over a year to go 
through planning permission’ (B 13) 
2 =19 
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Lack of planning requirements 
to incorporate decentralised 
generation in new 
developments (e.g. Danish 
Heat Law) 
‘In Denmark…the power stations have to be in CHP mode 
and so heat is recovered by law. Whereas in this country we 
don't do this and so power stations locate way out in the 
middle of East Anglia or Lincolnshire or Yorkshire and places 
like that…away from where the heat can be usefully used. 
They can get away with that [here] whereas in 
Denmark…they have to locate the power station close to the 
point of use’ (B 21) 
2 =19 
Infrastructural & Technological 
High cost of low-carbon energy 
technologies (e.g. external wall 
insulation) and energy 
infrastructure (e.g. private 
wire) can make energy service 
projects financial unviable  
‘The cost consequences of going to a passive house type 
product are still prohibitively expensive’ (B 24) 
5 =7 
Risk associated with immature 
low-carbon energy 
technologies limits investment 
‘The renewable technologies have a higher risk profile.. It is 
easier to do gas fired CHP [because it is better] understood, 
therefore banks are more likely to lend you the money’ (B 
21) 
2 =19 
High standards of building 
efficiency for new build may 
mean that there are often 
insufficient inefficiencies for 
EPCs to be cost-effective 
(quote 1) and insufficiently 
large energy demand from 
customers for ESCs to be cost-
effective (quote 2) 
‘This building is two years old, it’s very efficient  and we can 
save a bit in this building, maybe 5% say, but you are never 
going to go beyond 5% unless you either knock the building 
down and start again’ (A 5)  
‘Ironically by improving the building fabric…the CHP model 
becomes unfeasible. It's just not going to work’ (A 8) 
2 =19 
User Practices 
Customer preference of certain 
technologies even though they 
may not provide the most cost-
effective solutions, such as 
generation (e.g. PV) over 
efficiency (e.g. insulation)  
‘Where [efficiency technologies] differ is that renewable 
technology is ‘sexy’, it is visible, it is exciting and high-tech, it 
is marketable. Whereas your bog standard lighting, 
insulation, CHP, plant efficiency and fabric efficiency is less 
exciting for the non-energy expert. The reality of this is that 
the non-energy experts are making the decisions’ (B 30) 
4 12 
Lack of consumer awareness of 
the ESCo model has limited 
demand 
‘Purely a lack of awareness Matthew. So performance 
contracting over here is new, people haven't heard of it 
before and people don't know what it is’ (B 15) 
3 =13 
Table 6.6 Key barriers to ESCo adoption and operation in the UK 
Colour 
Code 
Nos. of Interviewees 
 10 + 
 6 – 10 
 4 - 6 
 2 - 3 
Table 6.7 Legend for ESCo Barriers Table 
6.1.4.3 Emerging Drivers and Barriers 
We now explore some of the emerging developments in the UK energy system that 
interviewees believed are likely to have an important influence on the evolution of the ESCo 
population in the future. The term ‘emerging developments’ refers here to developments in 
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the UK energy system that interviewees could foresee happening but importantly, had not yet 
happened. Consequently, many of the emerging developments cited by interviewees were 
related to regulation because the development and consultation process for legislation 
precedes its implementation by many months if not years, meaning they many interviewees 
had a good understanding of how the regulatory landscape was likely change and how this 
might affect the ESCo population. 
Focusing first on the broader developments associated with the UK energy system, the 
continuing and potentially worsening effects of climate change are likely to help support a 
sympathetic selection environment for the ESCo model, by exerting pressure on government 
to develop and maintain a regulatory framework that is supportive of carbon reductions. 
Energy insecurity is expected to worsen as the UK’s finite fossil fuel reserves are steadily 
depleted and existing generation facilities are retired (DECC and OFGEM, 2011). This in 
conjunction with increased global demand for energy are likely to have an impact on energy 
prices, which are expected to continue to rise (DECC, 2011a). High energy prices coupled with 
projected poor economic growth for the UK in 2012 and 2013 (IMF, 2012) means consumer 
demand for a reduction in energy bills is likely to remain high, consequently making energy 
service contracting more attractive: ‘So as energy prices increase, [ESCos] will become more 
and more common’ (Senior ESCo Manager - B 20). In particular, public sector organisations are 
likely to take measures to reduce their energy costs in reaction to recent public sector 
cutbacks, a product of the economic downturn: 
‘I don’t see many people having enough free capital to be able to deliver these projects 
in the short to medium term, maybe say over the next 5 years...I think ESCos are going 
to have an opportunity to take advantage of that’ (Senior ESCo Manager - B 30) 
The emerging development interviewees most frequently cited was the imminent introduction 
of the Green Deal (GD), which constitutes a financial mechanism that eliminates the need for 
householders to pay upfront for sustainable energy supply and/or energy demand 
management measures as these are covered by the savings they will generate on the 
customer’s energy bill in the future (DECC, 2012o). Savings here refer to a reduction in the 
units of gas and/or electricity the customer requires from the Energy Utilities to satisfy their 
energy needs. This can be achieved via the installation of micro-generation technology (e.g. PV 
panels, air source heat pumps) that enables the customer to satisfy some degree of their 
energy needs independently via renewable sources of energy (e.g. solar, hydro, wind etc) 
and/or the installation of demand side management measures (e.g. building controls, 
insulation, secondary conversion equipment) that enable the customer to enjoy the same 
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quality and quantity of final energy service, with a lower primary energy input (Green Deal 
Initiative, 2012b).  
The Green Deal will be provided by a combination of accredited ‘Assessors’ who assess the 
efficiency of the resident’s home, ‘Installers’ who install the identified efficiency measures and 
‘Providers’ who will set out the financial terms of the GD agreement and be responsible for 
fulfilling these. Providers are also responsible for organising the financing of the project and 
coordinating the Assessors and Installers. In some cases the GD Provider might fulfil all three 
roles (i.e. Assessor, Installer and Provider) and incorporate some or all of the elements of an 
ESCo. The Green Deal Provider will operate much like an ESCo, as it will be responsible for 
identifying, designing, installing, financing and servicing of a suite of energy solutions in the 
resident’s home, the cost of which it recuperates via the cost savings they generate on the 
resident’s energy bill. Figure 6.5 illustrates the various stages of the Green Deal process. 
 
Figure 6.5 An illustration of the Green Deal process (BRE, 2012) 
As outlined in Section 6.1.1.2, energy service contracts have to date predominantly been 
signed with commercial customers. Importantly, the GD is designed with the residential 
market in mind and many interviewees believed it should help to open this market up to ESCos 
by putting the necessary systems in place to allow for the cost of the measures to be repaid via 
the customer’s energy bill. It will also attach these costs to the property, not the householder, 
so even if the house is sold, the new householder will continue to pay off the costs of the 
measures to the Green Deal Provider. It was explained that once this system was put in place, 
various different kinds of organisation were likely to become Green Deal Provider in order to 
take advantage of the opportunity the GD presents, leading to greater variety in the ESCo 
market: 
‘Around the Green Deal…I can imagine that you see new organisations springing up to 
satisfy those types of requirements and you will also see one or two other 
organisations changing their business models to take advantage of those 
opportunities’ (Senior ESCo Manager - A 10) 
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It was also considered by a number of interviewees that many financial institutions, in light of 
the Green Deal, are likely to be more forthcoming with finance to fund residential EPCs than at 
present. For instance, the Green Deal Finance Company has recently been set up to provide an 
affordable source of finance to Green Deal Providers, to enable them to deliver a wide range 
of energy efficient measures (GDFC, 2012). Furthermore it was considered that the Green Deal 
would help to raise the profile of energy service contracting and help to ‘mainstream the ESCo 
model’ (LA ESCo Director - B 22). 
Despite the potential boost the GD may provide to the ESCo market concerns were raised that 
it may not have the desired impact the government is hoping for, in part because attaching the 
debt from the cost of the energy measures to the property could make it difficult for the 
householder to sell their home, making it undesirable: 
‘You are taking it on as a debt and you are forcing anybody who comes in and buys the 
property to take on that debt, that long-term obligation as well…I don't think it will be 
attractive to a mainstream property owner’ (Senior ESCo Manager - A 6) 
Furthermore, the GD is an optional scheme and some interviewees were concerned that if 
either households or providers did not consider the GD to be sufficiently attractive they would 
not engage with it. It was expected that the extent to which customers will take up the GD is 
likely to depend on the implicit interest rate being charged by the Green Deal Provider and 
thus the scale of the customer’s cost savings:  
‘So you are creating a structure where capital is being invested and the interest can be 
repaid. That doesn't mean that...people are going to rush out and do it’ (Think Tank 
Director - B 29) 
Under the GD, a proportion of the savings on the customer’s energy bill are repaid to the 
Green Deal Provider via the customer’s Energy Utility bill. Consequently, in most cases, units of 
electricity and gas will continue to be provided to the customer by an Energy Utility. In this 
sense, the GD reserves a role for the Utilities and the EUCo business model as savings are 
repaid via the contracts the Utilities share with their customers. Therefore, unless the Utilities 
engage in the GD as a Green Deal Provider, they are unlikely to overhaul their business model 
in accordance with this policy. 
The GD is set to work alongside the latest energy utility obligation, the Energy Company 
Obligation (ECO), which will provide the necessary funds to implement efficiency measures 
that do not meet the Green Deal’s ‘Golden Rule’, i.e. where ‘the expected financial savings 
resulting from installing measures must be equal to or greater than the cost of repayment over 
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the term of the Green Deal Plan’ (DECC, 2011i p.8). Despite the financial support the ECO is 
likely to provide ESCos supplying affordable low-carbon energy, in a similar fashion to its 
predecessors (CERT & CESP) (see Section 6.1.4.1), some interviewees explained that it would 
continue the tradition of energy company obligations that can be met ‘without any sort of 
detailed intervention on a house by house basis’ by the utilities and without fundamentally 
changing their business model (Energy Efficiency Expert - A 7) (see Section 6.1.4.2). In essence, 
the introduction of ECO is unlikely to place any real pressure on Energy Utilities to alter their 
business model and adopt aspects of the ESCo model. 
The imminent establishment of the Green Investment Bank (GIB) was identified as a 
potentially important driver as it could help ESCos to access appropriate finance to cover the 
upfront capital costs of their projects, given that the funding priorities of this body are set to 
include support for the Green Deal, non-domestic energy efficiency and energy from waste 
generation (BIS, 2011b). The GIB’s role is to help organisations engaging in ‘green’ activities, 
such as ESCos, circumvent many of the existing barriers they face in accessing finance. These 
include ‘the risk profile of green investment, the risk appetite among investors, the capacity of 
borrowers to absorb additional finance and the availability of project finance skills’ (BIS, 2011a 
p.5). Some interviewees explained that the GIB may be structured to help to unlock finance for 
community ESCos in particular (see EAC, 2011), by ensuring that they are no longer ‘at the 
mercy of the usual high street bank financing [and] constrained by those limitations’ (Law Firm 
Partner - B 14). To summarize: 
‘Potentially the Green Investment Bank [could] choose to lend to community groups or 
ESCos [which] might kick-start some community led stuff’ (Think Tank Director - B 29) 
Another important emerging development is the Electricity Market Reform (EMR), which is 
designed to stimulate investment in nuclear and renewable energy, as well as carbon capture 
storage (CCS) (IEA, 2012a). The policy incorporates 4 main components: (1) ‘Contracts for 
Difference’ that will provide low-carbon electricity generators with a guaranteed price for their 
electricity over a long-term period; (2) an Emissions Performance Standard for power plants; 
(3) a capacity mechanism to ensure sufficient system flexibility is available to maintain reliable 
supplies and (4) a carbon floorprice, which will ‘provide a transparent and predictable 
minimum carbon price for the medium and long term’ (IEA, 2012a p.10), designed to 
supplement the one already in place with the EU Emissions Trade Scheme (EUETS)(Figure 6.6). 
It was thought that the latter component in particular could help to address ‘one of the 
weaknesses at the moment [in the UK, which] is the cost of carbon’ (Law Firm Partner - B 24). 
Narrowing the present gap between the cost of fossil fuel derived electricity and low-carbon 
175 
 
 
electricity in the market, by making carbon-intensive electricity more expensive via a carbon 
floorprice, would benefit organisations (e.g. ESCos) engaging in low-carbon electricity 
generation because they would avoid being significantly penalised by this tax. 
 
Figure 6.6 Illustration of how carbon price floor is likely to work under the EMR (in real 2009 prices and 
calendar years) (DECC, 2012e) 
Concerns were however raised that some forms of generation that were commonly used by 
ESCos, such as CHP, may be subject to this ‘carbon tax’: 
‘Within the EMR…CHP is going to be charged carbon floor-price for the EUETS for all 
the energy purchases, not just electricity…but if it was a heat only plant it wouldn't 
because the carbon floor price doesn't apply to domestic gas. It is putting a wedge 
between CHP and gas only’ (Think Tank Director - B 29) 
Another important emerging regulatory development identified was the emerging building 
regulations, where new residential developments by 2016 and new commercial developments 
by 2019 must be ‘zero carbon’. Although the exact definition of this is still being developed, it 
is likely to allow developers to meet this standard via a number of ‘allowable solutions’, 
including both energy efficiency (e.g. highly energy efficiency building fabric) and low-carbon 
generation measures (e.g. district heat network). Inclusion of the latter would create a 
significant opportunity for ESCos to provide ESCs to consumers on new-build complexes: 
‘[By 2016] all new build developments need to be zero carbon. We believe that the 
definition of zero carbon will be a 70% on site carbon reduction [compared to 2006 
Building Regulations], with the remainder being required to pay for some sort of 
allowable solution to meet the rest. If that is the definition it is good news for us, 
because we can get to the 70% carbon reduction through gas fired CHP, which is 
proven, reliable and efficient technology’ (Senior EUCo Manager - A 8)  
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Finally, the proposed European Energy Efficiency Directive was also identified as a potential 
driver because it would obligate EU member states to set their own energy savings targets (EC, 
2011). Furthermore, the proposed Directive makes provision for member states to support 
energy service market growth by making a list of UK ESCos available, thus raising the profile of 
the market, as well as energy service contract templates available, thus helping to reduce the 
amount of time and money ESCos currently spend on developing service contracts from new. 
In summary, it is expected that the majority of the foreseeable, emerging developments in the 
UK energy system will broadly be supportive of ESCo operation and will most likely improve its 
prospects of proliferating over the coming years. 
6.1.5 Key ESCo Variants Operating in the UK 
In response to Research Question 1 (Section 1.5), an important finding of the empirical 
investigation was that the UK ESCo population operated not just one single business model but 
instead exhibited a strong degree of heterogeneity, with a number of different variants of the 
ESCo model in operation, which were similar but still characteristically distinct. The four most 
common variants identified in the UK ESCo population, were the:  
 Local Authority ‘Arm’s Length’ ESCo 
 Energy Service Provider  
 Energy Utility Energy Service Provider27 
 Community Owned and Led ESCo 
The purpose of this section is to examine these 4 ESCo variants in greater detail and identify 
their different core characteristics, as well as the reasons why each specific variant has 
emerged. In doing so we seek to build upon the valuable work already undertaken by King and 
Shaw (2010) in relation to some of these variants. In the ESCo variants diagrams that follow 
the spheres represent the organisations (i.e. the ESCo and its partners) and the diamonds 
represent the customers. Please refer back to Section 6.1.1.7 and the various case studies in 
Section 6.2 for examples of ESCo’s partners.  
6.1.5.1 Local Authority ‘Arm’s Length’ ESCo 
A Local Authority ‘Arm’s Length’ ESCo is an ESCo that is established by a Local Authority (LA), 
which may be wholly owned by the council or partly owned if it is a joint-venture arrangement 
with a private sector partner. The latter may be preferred as a means of apportioning risk and 
pooling organisational resources (see Section 6.1.3) (Figure 6.7). The ESCo is principally 
established by the LA to help it deliver on its political objectives (e.g. reduce fuel poverty, 
                                                          
27 This constitutes a sub-variant of the Energy Service Provider ESCo 
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mitigate climate change, improve local economy etc), constituting a private sector vehicle for the 
‘implementation of the local authority policy’ (Law Firm Partner - B 14): 
‘Rather than a simple contractual relationship [with an Energy Services Provider], it gives 
us more leverage in terms of achieving other objectives and outcomes…We can deliver on 
objectives X, Y and Z …such as around local employment, training and skills’ (LA 
Sustainability Director - A 9) 
LA ‘Arm’s Length’ ESCos can help to support the local economy because they employ a ‘not-
for-profit’ financial model whereby ‘all of the revenue is recycled back into the system to either 
upgrade a project or help it deliver others’ (Energy Policy Advisor - B 26). For instance with 
Aberdeen Heat and Power Company, the Arm’s Length ESCo to Aberdeen City Council:  
‘Any [financial] surpluses stay within Aberdeen. With EDF, any profits made in London 
will then go to Paris, but here they stay in Aberdeen’ (LA ESCo Director - B 21) 
 
Figure 6.7 Local Authority ‘Arms’ Length’ ESCo 
The LA ‘Arm’s Length’ ESCo model insulates the LA from much of the associated financial risk 
associated with delivering energy service contracts because it represents an ‘off balance sheet’ 
solution (Senior ESCo Manager - A 1), where apart from the possibility of some initial start-up 
investment, the LA is unlikely to continue investing in the ESCo because it should be financially 
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self-sustaining. Furthermore, it also insulated from much of the financial and legal risk associated 
with operating the ESCo because the ESCo is a separate legal entity to the council: 
‘[The ESCo is] a separate legal entity, so if its business failed, then it would be that 
which failed, not the [Local Authority’s]’ (LA Sustainability Director - A 9) 
Despite this insulation from risk, the LA will still be exposed to some degree of risk, be it 
financial in relation to the repayment of loans it has made to the ESCos28 and/or technical in 
that it relies upon its ESCo to satisfy its energy needs, which it is partly/wholly responsible for 
operating:  
‘You take a lot of risk…If it all goes wrong, there is no private sector provider to turn 
round and say ‘you have messed this up, we will get rid of you and replace you with 
somebody new’ (Law Firm Partner - B 14) 
Consequently, many LAs can opt against establishing an ‘arm’s length’ ESCo because ‘councils 
are very conservative…very risk adverse [and] not necessarily that keen on innovation’ (LA ESCo 
Director - B 22). The concept of establishing their own ESCo can therefore often sit outside of 
their ‘comfort zone’ (CHP Expert - B 21). LAs may also be unable or unwilling to provide the 
necessary financial and technical resources to establish and operate an ESCo. For instance, a 
great deal of time and effort is required to establish an ‘arm’s length’ ESCo, which the council 
maybe unwilling to provide. It may also be unwilling to engage in energy service contracting 
because it sits outside their remit and they are not incentivised to engage in such activities by 
regulation, such as city-level GHG emissions reduction targets (see Section 6.1.4.2): 
‘[They may think] we know nothing about operation and maintenance of district 
heating schemes and we don't want to go there. It is just an unwillingness to engage in 
that activity’ (Law Firm Partner - B 14) 
Alternatively Local Authorities may choose to contract with an Energy Service Provider instead, 
where they deliver the energy service project on behalf of the LA. 
6.1.5.2 Energy Service Provider 
An Energy Service Provider is a private sector ESCo that delivers energy service contracts to 
either residential and commercial customers, assuming some or all of the financial risk and 
technical responsibility associated with the project in return for a profit (Figure 6.8).  
                                                          
28 Councils are able to raise finance cheaper than commercial organisations via schemes such 
as the Public Loan Works Board, which it can pass on to its ESCo at a competitive commercial 
rate. See Thameswey Energy case study (Section 6.2.1) 
179 
 
 
Importantly an Energy Services Provider does not exist to fulfil its own energy needs but the 
energy needs of others. It therefore represents: 
‘A private sector party to come along and design and build, and...if possible, to finance, 
and then operate and maintain the scheme’ (Law Firm Partner - B 14) 
 
Figure 6.8 Energy Services Provider ESCo 
Energy Service Providers typically offer either Energy Supply or Performance contracts, 
however some providers offer both, such as Font Energy, Self Energy and E.ON Energy 
Services. Organisations like Local Authorities or Property Developers typically engage with 
Energy Service Providers if they lack the financial and technical resources to deliver an energy 
service project capable of satisfying their energy needs and/or the impetus to deliver such 
projects due to the associated risks outlined in the previous sub-section: 
‘Where decisions have been made by local authorities or developers that they don't 
want to establish their own ESCo…then it’s about going to the marketplace...With the 
emergence of ESCo providers, [it was] more comfortable for developers to think about 
engaging with them rather than setting up their own’ (Senior Energy Consultant - A 11) 
It was highlighted that some organisations may choose not to contract with Energy Service 
Providers because transferring this responsibility would mean they are ‘no longer necessarily 
the master of your own destiny any more’ (Law Firm Partner - B 14): 
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‘They are professionally established and they will understand the risks better but the 
disadvantage with that is that they take all the profit unless you can have some sharing 
arrangement’ (Senior Energy Consultant - A 11) 
Transferring this responsibility to the Energy Service Provider, means they take a significant 
share of the revenue the project generates. In contrast, if the customer had delivered this 
project independently they would enjoy the entirety of this revenue stream themselves (Bale 
et al., 2012) 29. 
In some cases the Energy Service Provider may establish a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) or 
subsidiary, which is normally solely responsible for the delivery and management of an energy 
system (e.g. CHP system and network) as part of the energy service contract, within a specific 
geographic location. These are typically set up to manage the needs of a specific property 
development or a town/city. Expanding upon the latter Birmingham City Council elected not to 
establish their own ‘Arm’s Length’ ESCo (Section 6.1.5.1) and instead contracted with Cofely 
GDF Suez to deliver a district heat system on their behalf. Cofely, then known as Utilicom, 
established Birmingham District Energy Company (BDEC) Ltd, which is an SPV responsible for 
the ‘design, build, finance, own and operate sustainable district energy schemes across 
Birmingham’ (DEKB, 2012). The benefits to Birmingham City Council  are that it ‘will be subject 
to less risk and will continue to benefit from many of the project outputs (e.g., reduction in 
fuel poverty and CO2 emissions)’ (Bale et al., 2012 p.249). In this case Birmingham City Council 
constitutes both a ‘partner’ and a ‘customer’ in Figure 6.8. 
SPVs may also be established to enable joint ownership and management of an energy service 
project or group of projects, which can help in some instances to provide ‘a balance between 
public and private interests’ (CHP Expert - B 21) and also to pool these organisations’ 
differentiated but complementary resources (Section 6.1.3). For instance, ownership of 
Thameswey Energy in Woking (Section 6.2.1) was initially split between Woking Borough 
Council and Xergi, a CHP specialist. Additionally, rather like the Local Authority ‘Arm’s Length’ 
ESCos, Energy Service Providers may also establish SPVs to insulate themselves from some of 
the financial and risk associated with providing energy service contracts (Section 6.1.5.1).  
6.1.5.3 Energy Utility Energy Service Provider 
As outlined in Section 6.1.2, Energy Utilities have traditionally employed a characteristically 
distinct business model to ESCos. However, in recent years the Energy Utilities have begun to 
establish their own energy services divisions to provide energy service contracts (Figure 6.8). 
                                                          
29 The thesis author is accredited as co-author of this paper 
181 
 
 
For example, E.On established a division called Sustainable Energy Solutions that provides 
Energy Performance Contracts. The research found that five of the six major Energy Utilities 
had recently provided energy service contracts (Appendix G – Section 12.6). It is important to 
note that the Energy Utility ESCo variant represents a sub-set of the Energy Service Provider 
variant, acting in a very similar manner. However, we make a separation between the two 
because Energy Utility Energy Service Providers represent subsidiaries of the incumbent 
Energy Utilities. 
Senior Energy Utility staff explained that the key factor driving their move towards the ESCo 
model was that they and other senior personnel were acutely aware that the market was 
changing and that it was imperative that their organisation began to adjust their business 
model so that it could remain successful in this radically new environment: 
‘[We recognise] that the energy market is changing, that you can't continue down the 
big coal-fired power stations any more [or] centralised gas plants any more. We need 
to look at the way energy is changing in the UK. There is what we call an energy 
trilemma’ (Senior EUCo Manager - A 8) 
‘The bottom line of it is that this is a new world, and this is where the world is going to’ 
(Senior EUCo Manager - B 28) 
In part the Utilities move towards the ESCo model was also seen to be a response to changing 
patterns in their customers’ demand, with customers recently consuming less energy primarily 
due to high energy prices. This had led to the Energy Utilities seeking to deliver a service that 
resonated with customers’ changing needs: ‘[our customer came to us and said] we need more 
than just a commodity, we have got to save energy’ (Senior EUCo Manager - B 28): 
‘After five years of the customer saying ‘we want this, we want this, we want this’, [the 
Energy Utilities] are starting to change their super tanker path’ (Senior Investment 
Manager - A 5) 
Importantly, one Energy Utility manager indicated that their move towards energy services 
was in part driven by the understanding that energy service contracting could prove more 
profitable than their current offerings: 
‘We have to move away from [selling] commodities [because] the value and margins in 
commodities are so slim…If we save the customer more money, they will give us more 
in return as well. So the customer gets value, they use less energy, we get more value 
and more margin.’ (Senior EUCo Manager - B 28) 
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It is worth noting however that there is little regulatory incentive for the Energy Utilities to 
move into this space at present and it is predominantly driven by a desire to remain profitable 
in the future by retaining and growing their market share in the context of a radically changing 
energy system. Consequently there is little stopping the Energy Utilities overhauling their 
business strategy so that they reversed their move towards the ESCo model: 
‘Everybody says energy suppliers should become ESCos, but well if you understand the 
regulatory environment, they are not motivated to do that whatsoever’ (Senior 
Investment Manager - A 5) 
6.1.5.4 Community Owned and Run ESCo 
A Community Owned and Run ESCo is an ESCo that is established by a community in order to 
help it not only fulfil its energy needs via the delivery of energy service projects but also to 
realise a set of community objectives (e.g. self-sustainable, alleviate fuel poverty, growth in 
local economy etc). Normally the ESCo is wholly owned by the community and it is the 
community members who are responsible for the running of the ESCo (Figure 6.9).  
 
Figure 6.9 Community Owned and Run ESCo 
Community ESCos can enable communities to assume a much greater degree of control over 
the manner in which their energy needs are satisfied and thus ensure that these are fulfilled in 
a manner that are aligned with community’s interests: 
‘At the moment, energy is just something that is done to people but actually giving 
them control over the local generation, distribution and supply of electricity empowers 
that community’ (CHP Expert - B 21) 
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In a very similar fashion to the Local Authority ESCo, Community ESCos are normally non-for-
profit and so any profit generated by the organisation is recycled into other energy service 
projects, providing a boost to the local economy: 
‘Profits from the energy system are retained, shared, distributed and used locally [so] 
you can probably see a measurable increase in the local economy as a result of that. 
Because if your profits are going to New York and Paris [they’re not] being spent 
locally’ (Think Tank Partner - B 13) 
Community ESCos typically rely heavily on key partners to help them deliver their energy 
service contracts because they normally have very limited resources at their disposal 
considering they are only able to draw upon resources amendable to the community, which 
are unlikely to be sufficient to successfully operate an ESCo (Section 6.1.1.5) (Figure 6.9). 
Consequently, Community ESCos are somewhat limited in terms of the scope of energy service 
projects they can engage in due to these resource constraints (Section 6.2.2.7): 
‘Disadvantages…I guess reliance on volunteer time. I mean in our community that's not 
too bad a disadvantage…because there are quite a lot of people in the village…there 
are a lot of professionals in the village and several of them are recently retired [so] 
therefore there are quite a lot of people who are prepared to put in the time, but that 
wouldn't necessarily be the case elsewhere’ (Community ESCo Director - B 12) 
Despite being limited by the availability of resources the ‘enthusiasm of people and the 
strength of the community’ was seen to be an extremely valuable resource because it meant 
that ‘when you need to get numbers for people to do something, then you can get that done’ 
(Community ESCo Director - B 23). Community ESCos can also often avoid against local 
opposition because the community is unlikely to oppose the energy project they have been 
responsible for developing that is responsible for developing. 
In summary the ESCo population exhibits a significant degree of heterogeneity, incorporating a 
wide variety of different ESCos types. This has implications for the future evolution of the ESCo 
population and how it causally influences the evolution of the various dimensions of the wider 
UK energy system, which is explored in greater detail in the following chapters. In the 
following section we explore the narratives of 4 ESCos, each of which correspond to one the 
key variants types outlined in this section. 
 
 
184 
 
 
6.2 Phase 2: 4 Archetypal ESCo Case Studies 
In this sub-section we examine the findings from Phase 2 of our empirical investigation. The 
purpose of this phase was to examine the 4 key ESCo variants identified in Phase 1 (Section 
6.1.5) in much greater detail by undertaking 4 ESCo case studies, each of which corresponded 
to one of these key ESCo variants. Care was also taken to select a mixture of ESCos providing 
both Energy Supply (ESCs) and Performance Contracts (EPCs). Furthermore, it is important to 
note that each ESCo selected for case study had to fulfil the ‘ESCo selection criteria’ outlined in 
Section 4.4.1.1.  
Each of the ESCo case studies were constructed using a combination of data from interviews 
with the ESCos’ personnel and documentation, predominantly produced by the ESCo but in 
some cases documentation was used that had been written by a third party about the ESCo 
under investigation (Section 4.4.2). The documentation used to develop the case studies as 
presented in the Bibliography, whilst a brief overview of the 12 interviews conducted for the 
case studies in this Phase is provided in Table 6.8. Details of which are provided in Appendix F 
(Section 12.5), which also contains the interviewee cross-reference codes. 
Company Type of ESCo Variant Dates Nos. of Interviews  
Thameswey Local Authority Arm’s Length ESCo 10/1/2012 2 
MOZES Community Owned and Run ESCo 9/8/2011 - 9/2/2012 3 (4)* 
Honeywell Independent Energy Service 
Provider 
23/7/2011 - 2/5/2012 
3 (4)* 
Energy Utility 
X 
Energy Utility Energy Service 
Provider  
22/9/2011 - 1/2/1012 
4 (5)* 
Table 6.8 Overview of interviews conducted for the 4 ESCo case studies  
*This denotes that one interview conducted in Phase 1 was used as evidence for the case 
study (see Section 4.3.2.3) 
The qualitative data generated via Phase 2 was examined using our analytical framework (i.e. 
Osterwalder & Pigneur’s framework for business model characterisation) to outline the core 
characteristics of each of the ESCo’s business model (Section 3.1). These characteristics, 
relating to the 9 business model building blocks, were subsumed under headings that broadly 
corresponded with the 4 business model pillars outlined in Osterwalder’s (2004) earlier 
framework for ease of presentation, i.e. product/value proposition, customer interface, 
infrastructure management and financial aspects. For example, customer channels, 
relationships and segments were grouped under the heading customer interface. Additionally, 
the case studies were broadly constructed using the co-evolutionary aspect of our analytical 
framework. In this sense the case studies illustrate how the evolution of these 4 ESCos has 
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been influenced by the environment in which they have operated but also, how their 
operation has influenced the evolution of the wider UK energy system. 
Drawing upon this empirical evidence the case studies seek to tell the story of these different 
ESCo variants, highlighting in particular how and why they were established in the UK, their 
core characteristics, the drivers and barriers they have experienced, as well as their future 
prospects. Importantly, the narratives also highlight how these companies have influenced 
their wider environment. In Section 6.2.5 we undertake a brief cross-case analysis of these 
ESCo case-studies to identify themes that are either common or specific to each of the 
different ESCos’ narratives.  
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6.2.1 Thameswey Energy Ltd 
6.2.1.1 Overview 
Thameswey Energy Ltd 
Commencement of UK ESCo 
Operations 
1999 
Location Woking, Surrey 
ESCo Variant Type Local Authority ‘Arm’s Length’ ESCo 
Ownership Wholly Owned by Woking Borough Council  
Turnover 2010 - £2,691,521 (Thameswey Energy, 2011) 
Number of Staff 23 employees 
Type of Contracting Energy Supply Contracting for heat, electricity and cooling 
Generation Capacity 2.6MW of electricity, 3.2MW of heat and 1.7MW of cooling (Thorp, 2007) 
Table 6.9 Key Facts and Figures for Thameswey Energy 
6.2.1.2 Brief History 
In 1999, Woking Borough Council (WBC) established Thameswey Group (TG), a subsidiary of 
the council designed to help the council deliver on its four main priorities of: decent and 
affordable housing, environmental conservation, health and well-being and finally, economic 
development (Thameswey, 2012e). A year later in 2000, Thameswey Group established 
Thameswey Energy Limited (TEL), a public-private joint venture ESCo in order to provide 
energy supply contracts to residential and commercial customers. Ownership was initially split 
between Woking Borough Council’s Thameswey Group and Xergi, a Danish CHP design and 
build company (Thameswey Energy, 2012e). Xergi owned 81% of TEL, in line with the rules at 
the time against councils not being able to own more than 19% of private companies, with 
WBC owning the remainder (T 2) (Smith, 2007a). 
In 2001 TEL began to install its first energy centre and private wire distribution network to 
supply both heat, electricity and cooling to customers in Woking town centre via energy supply 
contracts (Thorp, 2011). This was followed by another large-scale district energy system at 
Woking Park, as well as a large number of PV installations throughout the area. In 2007, TEL 
established its own subsidiary in Milton Keynes, outside of Woking, called Thameswey Central 
Milton Keynes Ltd whose aim was ‘to construct and operate a Combined Heat and Power 
station to deliver district heating and a private wire network to newly developed areas of 
Milton Keynes’ (Thameswey, 2012c). Since the introduction of prudential borrowing, WBC has 
slowly increased its share of TEL and by the end of 2011, TEL became wholly owned by the 
council (T 1) (Figure 6.10). For the purpose of this case study we focus primarily on Thameswey 
Energy’s activities in Woking, making only a few references to its work in Milton Keynes. 
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Figure 6.10 Organizational structure of Woking Borough Council’s Thameswey Group (Thameswey, 
2012b) 
6.2.1.3 Objectives and Value Proposition 
TEL was established primarily to help Woking Borough Council ‘make long term energy and 
environmental project investments in support of the Council’s climate change strategy’ 
(Thameswey, 2012a) and other political objectives. Broadly, its primary objective is ‘to provide 
public benefit through private sector mechanisms’ (T 2). TEL has served to deliver sustainable 
energy projects and services on WBC’s behalf that have the potential to improve the well-
being of Woking’s residents predominantly by reducing their energy bills and carbon footprint, 
as well as stimulating the local economy. For instance, by reducing its customers’ energy bills, 
TEL has helped to alleviate fuel poverty in the Woking area, which represents a key objective 
for the council (Greenpeace, 2006, Thorp, 2011). 
The establishment of TEL, as an ‘arm’s length’ ESCo to Woking Borough Council, has allowed 
the council to develop energy projects it might not have previously been able to because 
‘companies have business plans that are 25-30 years long they are able to take losses in years 
going forward, which the council couldn’t carry on its books’ (T 2). Therefore, the council is able 
to develop energy projects with a longer term perspective because TEL’s ‘business plans 
transcend the democratic cycle’ (T 2), which typically only lasts for 12 months when the local 
elections take place: 
‘Because of the [political] churn...you wouldn’t have a lot of councillors supporting 
something that would benefit their successors. So [establishing TEL] allows [for] 
developments that are to the ultimate benefit of the community that wouldn’t 
otherwise take place’ (T 2) 
TEL also insulates WBC from much of the financial and technical risk associated with energy 
service projects because it constitutes a separate legal entity (Kelly and Pollitt, 2009, Bale et 
al., 2012), thus enabling it to develop projects it might not have traditionally considered. 
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Conversely, the distance between TEL and WBC means that the ESCo is able to manage its 
budgets autonomously making it less vulnerable to the financial implications of political 
developments within the council and the public sector more widely (Thorp, 2011). 
Additionally, this distance has also meant that TEL has been able to operate outside Woking, 
such as in Milton Keynes. 
A major benefit of establishing TEL was that the council could access private sector finance, 
experience and expertise via this private sector ESCo, enabling it to ‘implement large scale 
[energy] projects’ (Thorp, 2011 p.96), which would have been difficult to deliver had the 
council operated alone (T 1 & 2) (Thorp, 2011). For instance, TEL was jointly owned by Xergi, 
which was responsible for developing and installing its CHP systems and private distribution 
networks (Thameswey Energy, 2012e). Additionally via TEL, the council has also been able to 
capture the expertise and experiences of private sector employees because TEL is a private-
sector entity, which pays private-sector rates. 
An important part of TEL’s customer value proposition is that it is responsible for the design, 
implementation, financing and maintenance of the generation, distribution and supply of 
energy from its facilities (Thameswey Energy, 2007b, WBC, 2003), meaning that the majority of 
the risk and hassle customers associate with fulfilling their energy needs is transferred to TEL. 
For example, TEL are responsible for installation and maintenance of the heat interface unit, 
pump and exchanges in the customer’s property, as well as the various valves, controls and 
thermostats (Thameswey Energy, 2007b). This equipment replaces their boiler and associated 
controls, meaning they do not have to worry about the cost and effort associated with 
installing, operating and maintaining their own boiler. 
An integral part of TEL’s value proposition is that it recycles the profits it generates from its 
energy supply contracting to fund existing and future sustainable energy projects in the 
borough (T 2):  
‘[The] profits that Thamesway generate are not put into the general running of the 
council [but] are ring fenced and used for sustainability work within the borough… 
There are probably been £600,000-700,000 that has come back in so far to help 
support projects’ (T 2) 
This money is channelled into Woking’s cross-party Climate Change Working Group as opposed 
to WBC’s general operations fund. This helps to ensure that the funds are used exclusively for 
projects that are relevant to the council’s climate change strategy (T 2). TEL also generates 
additional funds for the council’s non-sustainability related operations through interest 
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payment of interest on loans from the council. The council borrows money from the Public 
Loan Works Board (PWLB) at a cheaper rate than commercial loans and subsequently lends 
this money to TEL at a close to commercial rate to avoid State Aid rules but at a rate which is 
more affordable to TEL than if it had borrowed from a bank (T 2). These repayments to the 
council total approximately £1 million per annum, which is treated as general revenue and 
used to fund the council’s activities going forward (T 2), helping to improve the quality of its 
public services to Woking’s residents.  
Some customers are likely to value the fact their energy needs are being fulfilled in a more 
environmentally sustainable way, considering their heat, cooling and electricity has been 
generated via a combination of renewable (e.g. PV) and highly efficient (e.g. CHP) generation 
technologies (Thameswey Energy, 2012c). Consequently, during 2010 TEL saved its Woking 
customers over 1400 tonnes of CO2 by supplying them with low carbon energy generated from 
its energy stations (Thameswey, 2012d). However, the reduction TEL guarantees on its 
customers’ energy bills was considered more valuable by their customers: 
‘Our customers are not interested in societal benefits; they haven’t been to the dowdy 
school of corporate sustainability. They are just interested in making a profit [or saving 
money]’ (T 2) 
TEL charges their customers ‘5% below the market rate for electricity, which they would get 
from the top 5 dual fuel suppliers’ (T 2). A similar arrangement is in place for commercial 
customers where TEL guarantees to beat the price they could get on the market (T 2). The 
council is also able to satisfy its energy needs at a lower price than it would cost from the 
leading Energy Utilities (T 2), making more funds available to invest into its public services. 
6.2.1.4 Key Activities, Resources and Partnerships 
TEL’s key activities include the design, financing, building, operation, management and 
maintenance of sustainable, supply side energy service projects for the generation, 
distribution and supply of heat, electricity and cooling (Thameswey Energy, 2012c, WBC, 
2007b). Through these activities TEL has to date delivered two main CHP schemes in Woking: 
one in the City Centre and the other at Woking Park, a large out-of-town leisure complex. 
Together they have a combined generation capacity of 2.6MW of electricity, 3.2MW of heat 
and 1.7MW of cooling (Thorp, 2007). In addition to these schemes a number of PV installations 
have been completed, one of the largest is the Albion Square PV canopy outside Woking 
railway station, which contains 272 solar panels, with a peak capacity of 81kW (WBC, 2007a) 
(Figure 6.12). Combined, TEL’s generation capacity meant that in 2010 it generated more than 
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10 Gigawatt hours (GWh) of low carbon electricity and 9 GWh of heat, enough to provide 
electricity and heat to over 2,000 households (Thameswey, 2012d). 
 
Figure 6.11 Woking town centre CHP plant (WBC, 2007c) 
Figure 6.12 Albion Square PV canopy, next to Woking railway station (Smith, 2007b) 
Thameswey Energy also uses some of its revenue to support non-energy service contract 
energy efficiency measures. For instance, Action Surrey has been established and is managed 
by the Energy Centre for Sustainable Communities Ltd, which is a subsidiary of the Thameswey 
Group (Action Surrey, 2012). Its role is to offer advice to residents, schools and businesses on 
how to reduce energy and water consumption (Action Surrey, 2012). Furthermore, the 
Thameswey Group has been the vehicle for delivering the Council’s home energy improvement 
schemes (e.g. free loft insulation) under the Government’s Home Energy Conservation Act 
1995 and more recently Warm Front and Energy Utility company obligations (e.g. CERT) 
(Thorp, 2011). 
TEL has relied upon a number of key resources to deliver its energy projects, most notably a 
combination of technical expertise, administrative capacity and political will (T 1). Technical 
expertise related to the skills and experience, i.e. the ‘know how’, to deliver the energy service 
projects. Administrative capacity referred to the more tangible capacities of the organization 
required to deliver the project, such as sufficient staff and capital to organize and deliver the 
project. Finally, the most important resource identified was the political will to develop and 
deliver sustainable energy service projects, it was important that this vision was shared 
throughout senior management and also had cross-party support (T 1) (Thorp, 2011): 
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‘There needs to be the will in place…You can buy the technical and administrative 
capacity but you cannot buy the will to do it…[i.e.] the dream, the aspiration to do 
something. If there is a will, there is a way’ (T 1) 
The availability of decentralised generation technologies, most notably the CHP and PV 
systems, has also been integral to enabling TEL to extend its value proposition (Thorp, 2011). 
For instance, CHP technology has enabled TEL to offer lower energy prices to its customers 
than the bigger Energy Utilities because CHP captures the usable heat produced from 
electricity generation to provide to customers, which would otherwise normally be treated as 
a by-product in centralised generation (CHPA, 2012a), making it approximately 28% more 
energy efficient (Carbon Trust, 2010). Furthermore, if CHP is applied on a local-scale, lower 
transmission and distribution losses for electricity can be enjoyed compared to centralised 
generation, as the CHP plant is in close proximity to the consumers. This phenomenon is 
commonly referred to as the economies of proximity (Carbon Trust, 2010) (Figure 6.3 in 
Section 6.1.1.9).  
TEL has also relies on the support of its partners to fulfil its value proposition. Although 
technically both its owner and largest customer, Woking Borough Council also represents TEL’s 
most important partner, considering that WBC is a legally separate entity to TEL and the two 
operate fundamentally differently to one another. The council has supported TEL’s operations 
from the very beginning, providing the start-up funds for the ESCo, which were drawn from 
energy savings achieved on the council’s properties (Thorp, 2011). This partnership has 
continued throughout TEL’s history, with the council having an important presence on the 
board of Thameswey Group, with Ray Morgan, the council’s Chief Executive acting as an 
Executive Director of Thameswey Group. It is also likely that the close partnership it shares 
with the council has presented key development opportunities for TEL in the local area, 
considering that the council is a key gatekeeper due to its political power.  
As previously mentioned in the case study, the Danish CHP firm Xergi has also been a key 
partner to TEL. Even though Xergi are no longer shareholders of TEL, the two continue to share 
a contractual relationship, where Xergi are responsible for the ‘building and operation of the 
energy centres’ (Thameswey Energy, 2012e). TEL have also been reliant on sub-contractors to 
deliver its PV projects such as RES Group, PV Systems and Gleeson Construction during the 
construction of Albion Square PV canopy (Figure 6.12) (RES, 2012). Other important partners 
have included the Energy Savings Trust who provided a £25,000 grant to the council to explore 
the possibility of establishing a public-private joint-venture ESCo. Post-feasibility study Clyde & 
Co., a law firm, were commissioned to provide the council with advice on the corporate 
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arrangements for TEL, including the financing and development of its renewable and 
sustainable energy projects (WBC, 2007b, Clyde & Co, 2012).  
6.2.1.5 Customer Interface 
TEL now has over 170 business and domestic customers receiving electricity and/or heat via 
energy supply contracts in Woking (Thameswey, 2012d). Unlike in Milton Keynes where TEL 
has connected 1500 apartments to its private wire heat system30, TEL only has approximately 
40 residential customers in Woking (T 2). TEL’s largest customer in Woking is the council, 
although it does have other public and private sector customers that mainly consist of: 
‘the Civic Offices, HG Wells Conference Centre, the Big Apple, Car Parks, YMCA, 
Enterprise Place, the Lightbox and the Woking Leisure Centre and Pools in the Park.’ 
(Thameswey, 2012d) 
The contractual relationship it shares with its residential customers is very similar to that 
which its customers would share with an Energy Utility in terms of metering and billing 
(Thameswey Energy, 2012d), as well as the customer’s ability to change their energy supplier 
and thus terminate their energy supply agreement with TEL provided they give 30 days’ notice, 
as outlined under Ofgem rules (T 2). However, use of system charges are still applicable 
because their new supplier would need to use TEL’s distribution network (Thameswey Energy, 
2007a). Commercial customers’ energy supply contracts are much longer term, lasting for at 
least 10 years (Thameswey Energy, 2012a), whilst TEL has signed a ‘pass through’31 contract 
with the council, which works on a rolling basis (T 2). TEL supplies electricity to its customers 
predominantly via its own private wire network, with heat and cooling supplied via a private 
network of pipes, which it is responsible for operating and maintaining (Thameswey Energy, 
2012c). Customers are able to sign-up with TEL and pay for their energy services online, over 
the phone or by post (Thameswey Energy, 2012b). 
6.2.1.6 Revenue Streams and Expenditure 
As highlighted in Section 6.2.1.4 the initial start-up funds for establishing TEL came from the 
council and that WBC has continued to finance TEL’s activities by raising money from the PWLB 
(Section 6.2.1.3). WBC is also the largest single shareholder in TEL, alongside other major 
shareholders such as a UK investment bank (Thorp, 2011). It was explained that ‘the working 
capital for a lot of the activities of the group comes from shareholder loans or shareholding 
                                                          
30 This does not necessarily equate to 1500 household customers because of the 3rd party 
access rules introduced by Ofgem following the Citiworks case 
31 TEL charge WBC for the amount of gas the former needs to purchase in order to supply the 
latter with heat, cooling, electricity, in addition to a service charge (for investment and 
maintenance) and a small profit margin (T 2) 
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equity from the council’ (T 2). TEL aims to provide a return of at least 8% to shareholders on 
their investments in the Woking area for the period to 2030 (Thorp, 2011).  
TEL’s decision to install its own energy centres and private energy distribution network has 
meant that its upfront costs have been very high. For instance, the energy centre, private wire 
and heat system in Milton Keynes, which followed a very similar design to Woking, cost TEL 
approximately £25 million to design and install (T 2). On-going costs include the operation and 
maintenance of this infrastructure, labour, rental of premises, metering and billing etc (T 2). 
On the other hand TEL’s largest revenue stream is the sale of heat, cooling and electricity to its 
local residential and commercial consumers, charging their customers according to how much 
electricity, heat and cooling they consume (Thameswey Energy, 2007b), as well as for the 
operation and maintenance of the systems required to generate, distribute and supply these 
useful energy streams to their customers (Thameswey Energy, 2012d). TEL also receives Feed-
in-Tariffs (FiTs) from the electricity generated by its PV systems. For instance, PV panels on 35 
council buildings are expected to raise £44,000 a year in FiT payments over the next 25 years 
(Thameswey, 2012f).  
It was also explained that Thameswey Group had set up their own consultancy called the 
Energy Centre for Sustainable Communities (Figure 6.10), which has enabled the Thameswey 
Group to generate additional revenue by sharing their intellectual property relating to the 
development of their energy service projects. They have advised a range of other councils on 
the developments of ESCos and district energy systems (e.g. Southampton, Aberdeen, Leeds, 
Bristol etc) (T 1 & 2) helping to illustrate how TEL has served as a template for other councils to 
enter the UK ESCo market. Consequently, this exchange of knowledge has helped and 
continues to help the ESCo model to proliferate outside of Woking: 
‘Probably the change or the influence [on the wider energy system] is to demonstrate 
that Local Authorities could do district heating better than they had before. So that has 
probably been an influence, which has caused people to think, ‘could we do that?’’ (T 1) 
6.2.1.7 Drivers and Barriers 
As outlined in Section 6.2.1.4, political will at the local level was a key factor that enabled TEL 
to emerge, alongside the necessary administrative capacity (e.g. staff, finance etc) and 
technical capacity (e.g. expertise, experience etc):  
‘It is a little bit like the alignment of the planets but we had 3 key components 
aligned... Those 3 happened to come together in the mid-90s and were built upon’ (T 1) 
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It was explained that political developments at a national and international level laid the 
groundwork for this local support (T 1 & 2). For instance, in 1992 the Rio Earth Summit took 
place and from this emerged the Local Agenda 21, which sought to link sustainability action 
across international, national and local levels. Subsequently, a climate change agenda began to 
emerge in the UK (Sections 1.3.1 & 5.4), designed to support activities that helped to mitigate 
climate change, such as that proposed by TEL. This agenda ‘kept the council committed to 
Thameswey’s activity’ (T 2), which was very important in the emergence and growth of TEL. 
Furthermore, the council had a track-record of tackling sustainability and energy related issues 
from the early 1990s, creating a precedence for TEL’s activities (Thorp, 2011), helping them to 
circumvent potential barriers. 
TEL has however encountered a number of regulatory barriers, most notably the structure of 
the electricity market and the electricity trading arrangements (BETTA), which were 
considered to be bias towards the Energy Utility companies by the interviewees: ‘The rules are 
written for them’ (T 1). They explained that it was prohibitively expensive for them to enter the 
electricity market to trade their electricity: ‘it would cost us £500,000 minimum to join that 
pool...far too much as a small suppliers’ (T 2); ‘The transaction and membership costs are 
inhibitive’ (T 1). Consequently, TEL is unable to benefit from the advantages of joining this pool 
such as being able to access a significantly larger customer base than could realistically be 
connected to its own private network, as well as avoiding the cost and hassle associated with 
establishing their own private electricity distribution network and operating this network. 
This meant TEL has had to apply for electricity generator, distributor and supplier licence 
exemptions under the Electricity (Exemption from the Requirement for a Generation Licence) 
(No.2) Order 2004 to be legally allowed to supply energy. Selling electricity directly to its 
customers and not via the pool has benefitted TEL in a number of ways such as avoiding the 
costs incurred from transmission and distribution losses, Transmission & Distribution Use of 
System charges32, VAT etc, which account for a large proportion of customers’ electricity bills 
(WBC, 2003). Avoiding these costs, in conjunction with the high levels of energy efficiency from 
CHP means TEL has been able to undercut the Energy Utilities’ price for electricity (WBC, 
2003). However, ‘the exempt licensing regime limits exempt supply capacity to domestic 
customers and limits exports over public wires’ (Thorp, 2011 p.96). The Electricity Order 2004 
stipulates that licence exempt generators can generate up to 100MW; distribute up to 2.5MW 
but only up to 1MW for each private wire; and supply up to a maximum of 5 MW of power, of 
which a maximum of 2.5 MW may be to domestic customers (at present the aggregate limit is 
                                                          
32 Charges for connecting to and using the electricity transmission and distribution networks  
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500KW) (DTI, 2004). Consequently, these restrictions have limited the scale of WBC’s activities 
and the economies of scale they can harness, thus negatively impacting upon their profit 
margin (T 1) (Smith, 2007a). 
Even though TEL does not sell its electricity via the National Grid, it is still is required by law to 
connect their private wire network to the grid for load balancing (T 2). They were also 
incentivised to connect in order benefit from FiT payments for their PV generation 
(Thameswey, 2012f). Although TEL has connected to the grid, ‘the bureaucracy around gaining 
access to that network and the rules around it and the time delay and the cost associated with 
gaining access to that network’ (T 1) was considered a major barrier. Furthermore, it was felt 
that the grid connection arrangements were ‘written to suit the established order’ (T 1), 
namely the Energy Utilities because the only means of gaining cost-effective entry to the grid 
was to work in partnership with them. However, despite the significant cost of connecting to 
the grid, TEL did not have to invest significant amounts of money on a new private distribution 
network because a private wire and several district heating schemes already existed in Woking 
(EST, 2005, CHPA, 2012b) . 
It is worth noting that despite the continuation of these regulatory barriers a number of 
regulatory changes have meant that the TEL’s environment is now more supportive of Local 
Authority activity in the energy market than it once was: ‘All of the legislative framework 
means it is now easier to setup what we setup in 1999 [i.e. Thameswey Group]’ (T 1). For 
instance, Local Authorities used to be prohibited ‘from selling electricity which is produced 
otherwise than in association with heat [e.g. CHP]’ (DECC, 2010b p.4) until a clause in the 1976 
Local Government Act was repealed  in 2010. Importantly, TEL and WBC played an important 
role in getting this rule changed by engaging with national government (DECC, 2010e). For 
instance, Chris Huhne, then Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, explained in 
2010 that; 
‘For too long Whitehall’s dogmatic reliance on ‘big’ energy has stood in the way of the 
vast potential role of local authorities in the UK’s green energy revolution. Forward 
thinking local authorities such as Woking in Surrey (the owners of Thameswey ESCo) 
have been quietly getting on with it, but against the odds, their efforts [have been] 
frustrated by the law. I’ve taken the early step of overturning the ban on local 
authorities selling renewable electricity to the grid’ (DECC, 2010e) 
The ‘localism’ agenda has gained momentum in other ways, such as with the introduction of 
the Local Government Acts 2000 and 2003, and more recently the Localism Bill, which has 
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provided WBC the ‘power of well-being’33, broader borrowing powers and the ability to 
establish non-public sector organisations such as Community Interest Companies (CiCs) (T 1 & 
2). However, despite this support for grass-roots developments, TEL raised concerns about the 
removal of the Local Authority National Indicators and how this might affect the council’s 
willingness to tackle fuel poverty, particularly N186, which was for carbon emissions and N187, 
which was for fuel poverty (T 1 & 2). 
6.2.1.8 Expectations for Future Development 
The global recession has already had a negative impact on TEL’s activities. For instance, in 
Milton Keynes a number of developments that were set for construction and to be supplied by 
TEL were side-lined due to the poor economic climate (T 1). Consequently, TEL has restricted 
investments in future energy projects until the economic climate improves. As this recession is 
set to continue in the UK (IMF, 2012), TEL is likely to continue operating in a challenging 
environment for the foreseeable future.  
Turning to regulation, the emerging regulatory framework is likely to continue being 
supportive of low-carbon energy and grass roots activity (Section 6.1.4.3). For instance, 
Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI) could provide an additional revenue stream for TEL, as it is a 
major supplier of heat. However, it was explained that the growing complexity of the 
framework has made it increasingly difficult to navigate (T 1). Furthermore, due to 
developments such as the FiT cut, the interviewees explained that they lacked confidence in 
how the regulatory framework would develop in the future, making it difficult to plan ahead: 
‘You don’t know how much confidence you can put in what the government is saying 
because they might change their mind in 3 months, as they did with the [FiT] tariffs. 
We do need a certain time period to develop and implement investment and if the 
government keeps chopping & changing, there isn’t a stable platform to go forward 
and start planning’ (T 2) 
More specifically, although TEL acknowledged the Green Deal could provide them with 
opportunities going forward, they had concerns around the extent of support it was likely to 
offer. For instance, they did not feel the Green Deal would be sufficiently attractive enough to 
consumers to encourage them to sign up for it, meaning that the policy would do little to 
improve TEL’s fortunes: ‘there’s nothing inspiring about it or attractive’ (T 1). It was also felt 
that the policy had been written with the major Energy Utilities in mind and not LA led ESCos. 
                                                          
33 These allow local authorities in England and Wales to implement any policy that they 
consider will promote the economic, social and environmental well-being of their area, unless 
explicitly prohibited by national legislation (CLG, 2009) 
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This is because the repayments for the efficiency measures had to be paid via the customer’s 
bill with the Energy Utility bill:  
‘So the option of putting it on the council tax bill [like PACE in the US] was rejected and 
that would have given local government a far greater involvement in the GD’ (T 1) 
Finally, following the Citiworks case in Germany34, the introduction of legislation requiring 
private wire electricity suppliers to allow 3rd party access to their networks (OFGEM, 2011) has 
meant that TEL now has less certainty around the number of customers it will serve either on 
its existing networks or any future networks because customers are now able to switch to 
other suppliers who have accessed that network (T 2). ESCos often need this level of certainty 
to know whether they will be able to recoup their high upfront costs or not and consequently, 
be successful in securing the necessary finance to deliver the scheme. 
6.2.1.9 Summary 
In summary, TEL has demonstrated how Local Authorities are able to satisfy not only their 
energy needs but the needs of their local residents and organisations via energy service 
contracting, in such a way that enables them to fulfil a broad set of political objectives. 
However, TEL has had to battle against a number of key barriers, many of which were 
attributed to a regulation that were considered to favour the incumbent Energy Utilities. 
However, international, national and local political support for sustainable energy projects has 
been a key driver to TEL’s success and despite a challenging economic environment, the 
emerging regulatory framework is likely to ensure TEL continues to operate successfully. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
34 Citiworks, a German utility company, sued Leipzig Airport for breach of competition laws as 
it held a monopoly over energy supply on an on-site private wire scheme (CHPA, 2011) 
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6.2.2 MOZES 
6.2.2.1 Overview 
MOZES 
Commencement of UK ESCo 
Operations 
2009 
Location The Meadows, Nottingham, East Midlands 
ESCo Variant Type Community Run ESCo 
Ownership Company Limited by Guarantee 
Turnover Less than £10,000 to date 
Number of Staff Board of 13 directors, all volunteers and no full-time staff  
Type of Contracting Energy Supply Contracting for electricity 
Generation Capacity Approx. 95kW of PV 
Table 6.10 Key Facts and Figures for MOZES 
6.2.2.2 Brief History 
The story of Meadows Ozone Energy Services Limited (MOZES) began with an unsuccessful bid 
in 2005 for Living Landmarks National Lottery funding with the view to help the Meadows 
become Nottingham’s first, inner city low carbon neighbourhood (M 1) (NEP, 2011) (Figure 
6.13). Although the group were unsuccessful the work they had undertaken prompted the 
local council to work towards implementing some of the ideas the group had developed. 
However, these ideas ultimately these failed to materialise (M1).   
 
Figure 6.13 A map of the Greater Meadows area. The yellow denotes MOZES’s catchment area and the 
red the wider Meadows area (MOZES, 2012g) 
The Lottery bid ‘left an awareness in the community of green issues and [an] aspiration in the 
community to move towards a zero carbon footprint’ (M4). The group responsible 
consequently began to explore how the Meadows could reduce its carbon footprint and 
turned to the idea of establishing an ESCo, largely in light of the Meadow Partnership Trust’s 
(MPT) work with the Credit Union on developing a rolling loans fund (NEP, 2011). 
Consequently, a steering group was established to explore the options for establishing an 
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ESCo-like entity, which included representatives from MPT, Nottingham Energy Partnership 
(NEP), National Energy Action (NEA), Nottingham City Council and local Residents Associations, 
as well as the local MP  (Alan Simpson) and the local Councillor at the time (MPT, 2012).  
In 2007 NEA provided the Meadows community with sufficient funds to conduct a feasibility 
study into the options for establishing an ESCo, which was undertaken by Brodies, a law firm 
(M 1) (Energyshare, 2012). Brodies identified a range of options for the Meadows community 
to establish a community led ESCo. After considering these options, MOZES was constituted in 
2009 as a company limited by guarantee, effectively owned and run by the Meadows 
community. Since its formation MOZES has undertaken a number of energy related projects, 
such as energy efficiency retrofits and the provision of energy efficiency advice for residents of 
the Meadows. However, their largest project so far was the installation of 67 photo-voltaic 
(PV) systems in 2009 throughout the Meadows area, the vast majority of which were installed 
as part of an energy supply contracts, at no upfront cost to the consumer. 
6.2.2.3 Objectives & Value Proposition 
The Meadows is a relatively deprived neighbourhood of England35. For instance, according to 
the most up-to-date statistics for the area, in 2007 4.4% of the area’s residents were claiming 
Job Seekers benefits, compared to an average of 2.3% for the whole of England (Monstadt, 
2007). Furthermore, in 2007/8 the average net household weekly income was approximately 
£400, compared to £490 for the East Midlands area (ONS, 2008): 
‘We have quite a deprived community. Some people own their own houses but some 
people don’t and there are some people in the community who have money but not 
many’ (M 3) 
Consequently, a key objective of MOZES was to help alleviate deprivation in the Meadows 
neighbourhood by promoting community and economic development in the local area 
(Brodies, 2008, Gutteridge, NEP, 2011). It has primarily sought to achieve this by localizing the 
capital flow associated with payment for energy services by establishing a community ESCo 
(i.e. MOZES) to satisfy the community’s energy needs as opposed to a multinational Energy 
Utility. The logic here is that by keeping this capital in the community it can support local 
economic growth via the ‘local multiplier effect’, where each pound spent locally stimulates 
considerably more local economic growth than if it were spent elsewhere (New Economics 
Foundation, 2005). This effect is enhanced because MOZES’s revenue is not appropriated by 
shareholders but instead is recycled into future local energy projects (Section 6.2.2.6). 
                                                          
35 We have chosen the Middle Layer Super Output Area ‘Nottingham 033’ to provide 
deprivation statistics as this area encompasses most of the Meadows neighbourhood 
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MOZES has focused on alleviating fuel poverty in particular, a core indicator of deprivation, 
where 21.2% of households in the Meadows were in fuel poverty, compared to the national 
average in England of 18.4% (DECC, 2011e)36; 
‘A lot of people are on benefits…most of them are living hand to mouth and it is kind of 
‘heat or eat’. It is one of those communities’ (M 3) 
The Meadows’s antiquated building stock, where approximately 1/3 of its 3800 homes were 
built around 1900 and the majority of the rest during the 1970s, has also contributed to this 
high level of fuel poverty (Gutteridge). This is because due to their old age many of the homes 
in the Meadows do not have wall cavities, and are therefore not suitable for cavity wall 
insulation, a particularly cost-effective energy efficiency measure (MOZES, 2012b). 
Consequently, MOZES was set up to provide a means of alleviating fuel poverty by reducing 
the energy bills of Meadows residents primarily via the provision of energy supply contracts: 
‘I don’t think any of them are interested in saving the planet...If I talk to them about 
saving money, they are with me’ (M 4) 
MOZES was also established to reduce the carbon footprint of the Meadows’ community (M 
2), with the aim of making the Meadows the first low-carbon, inner city community (M 1). A 
closely aligned objective was also to help the Meadows community to become more self-
sufficient. Finally, MOZES has also been designed to help develop the Meadows into a space 
for sustainable energy technology experimentation and innovation: ‘We wanted to help push 
things forward and we wanted to be a guinea pig’ (M 1) 
6.2.2.4 Key Activities, Resources & Partnerships 
To help achieve its main objectives, MOZES engaged in an energy service project where it 
installed PV systems on 63 houses, 3 schools and 1 community building, each system 
comprising of 8 PV panels (M 3), which were delivered in 2 phases (Figure 6.14). The first phase 
incorporated 58 PV systems and the second 9 PV systems (M 3).  
                                                          
36 DECC statistics are for Lower Layer Super Output Areas (LSOAs), so we have taken an 
average for the 6 LSOAs that make up the Middle Layer Super Output Area ‘Nottingham 033’ 
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Figure 6.14 Meadows housing after PV installation (MOZES, 2012e) 
After the PV installations residents enjoyed approximately a 20% reduction on their energy 
bills, which amounted to approximately £100 savings per year (Energyshare, 2012) because 
they no longer had to import as much electricity from Energy Utilities because they were now 
generating electricity independently (M 3). The energy projects that MOZES have developed 
have also helped the Meadows become more self-sufficient, with the first phase of PV systems 
generating sufficient electricity to satisfy the needs of approximately 25 homes per year 
(Energyshare, 2012). 
MOZES’s activities have also extended to the provision of energy efficiency advice and 
measures. For instance, MOZES has advised approximately 400 people in relation to saving 
energy, as well as managing their energy bills and debt issues (MOZES, 2012h). It has also 
provided 26 homes with energy efficiency measures, such as solid wall insulation or highly 
efficient gas boilers (MOZES, 2012d) 
To achieve its objectives via these activities, MOZES has relied heavily on the expertise, 
experience and determination of its Board of Directors, many of whom are highly qualified 
(e.g. two Professors of Architecture, former MP, former teacher, social enterprise business 
consultant etc): 
‘The staffing is absolutely important really…You can have the best system in the world but 
if you don’t have the right people, it could be a mess…We are very fortunate…there are 
some really talented people here’ (M 4) 
MOZES is dependent on these individuals volunteering their free time to operate MOZES (M 1). 
The willingness to do so has been attributed to ‘the enthusiasm of people and the strength of 
the [Meadows] community’ (M 1). This ‘community spirit’ in turn was attributed to the 
Meadows being a relatively isolated community due to a combination of factors such as its 
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location close to the River Trent, the implementation of the council’s town planning strategy 
that served to cut the community off from adjacent communities in 1970s and its history of 
various socio-economic problems, all serving to help reinforce the community’s strength and 
solidarity (M 1). 
Despite the depth of its community’s technical resources, MOZES relies heavily on key partners 
to enable it to deliver its energy service contracts. For instance, MOZES has forged a strong 
relationship with the Meadows Partnership Trust (MPT) largely because ‘the synergy between 
the two organisations is very strong and so there are a lot of things which we can genuinely 
work on together’ (M 1). MPT has been responsible for the day-to-day running of MOZES, 
which they earn a fee for (MOZES, 2012a). Furthermore, the charity’s expertise and experience 
has also been instrumental in the delivery and management of MOZES’s energy projects, in 
particular its accountancy expertise (M 1 & 3). Furthermore, MPT has supported MOZES 
financially, helping to finance Phase 2 of the PV installations. In recent months, as funding has 
become harder to secure, MOZES has become extremely reliant on MPT’s financial support: 
‘we exist at the moment financially courtesy of Meadows partnership trust’ (M 1). MPT has also 
helped MOZES to win grant funding, by acting as principal bidder: 
‘MOZES had been incorporated for 1 month. They had a bank account but nothing in it, 
no staff, no record of delivery…We thought there was very little chance of them 
winning [the DECC] money. Whereas MPT is a registered charity, which had run lots of 
projects and was in a much stronger position’ (M 3) 
Another important partnership has been with Nottingham Energy Partnership (NEP), which 
was strongest during MOZES’s formative years, as NEP ‘played a crucial role in initiating 
projects and ideas [as well as] giving advice and support’ (MOZES, 2012a):  
‘Initially at the start up stage they came along with expertise, as we started to get the 
project under way’ (M 2) 
For instance, NEP was on the Steering Group that helped to set up to develop MOZES. They 
continue to play an important role today, with NEP’s CEO sitting on the Board of Directors. NEP 
is also helping MOZES to develop a number of its current projects (Section 6.2.2.8).  
British Gas are another key partner of MOZES, having partnered them on the successful DECC 
funding bid, which funded the first phase of the PV energy service contract (Section 6.2.2.6) (M 
1). They were also responsible for managing the installation of the PV systems (M 3): 
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‘We realised we needed a partner from a large energy company to help us to deliver 
some of our aims...British Gas seemed to be the most aligned with what we wanted to 
achieve [and] the way we wanted to achieve it’ (M 3) 
In return British Gas was able to discharge some of its energy company obligation 
commitments (e.g. CERT & CESP), as well as improve its brand and reputation as an Energy 
Utility by supporting low-carbon community development (M 1). Furthermore, it gained 
valuable practical experience in developing energy projects in conjunction with community 
organisations, which was seen as a potentially useful means of preparing for the forthcoming 
Green Deal: 
‘They get valuable experience which no other energy company will have and I think 
they see that as being very useful for them in negotiations with government. I think 
that they see this community interface will be useful for them as things move forward’ 
(M 1) 
Finally, MOZES forged an extremely important partnership with Alan Simpson their local MP 
(at the time), who provided MOZES with the necessary political ‘clout’ to make things happen 
(M 1), i.e. a voice within key political circles and a number of important contacts to help aid its 
development. 
6.2.2.5 Customer Interface 
MOZES’s customer base is primarily the residents of the Meadows community. Residents are 
invited to become guarantors and thus members of the ESCo by pledging £1 to become 
members. This pledge also represents their maximum financial exposure if MOZES were to 
become bankrupt (M 2) (Brodies, 2008). Each member has the same degree of control as one 
another and members have control over the direction of the organisation, by voting on the 
election of Board members and the passing of resolutions (M 2) (Brodies, 2008). ‘The future 
direction of MOZES and what projects it works on is decided by the ‘Board of Directors’’ 
(MOZES, 2012c), which is also made up of residents in the Meadows  as well as representatives 
of other key stakeholders of the Meadows community (e.g. members of Nottingham City 
Council & Nottingham City Homes) (MOZES, 2012c) and associates who provide expert advice 
on projects (MOZES, 2012c). 
MOZES relies heavily on its website, handing out leaflets, making visits to people’s homes, 
word-of-mouth and holding community events to communicate with prospective and existing 
customers (M 3 & 4). Furthermore, customers are able to provide feedback to the Board of 
Directors at annual meetings (M 2). 
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Some of MOZES’s members have also signed energy supply contracts with MOZES to receive 
electricity via the PV systems (M 2). The contracts have been signed with the individual rather 
than the property because the costs of registering it with the Land Registry were considered 
too high: 
‘They have signed a contract with us to say if we don’t get into an arrangement with 
the new purchaser [of their home] then they are financially liable’ (M 3) 
To be eligible for a PV system at no upfront costs residents had to be owner-occupiers who 
resided within a suitable property and in a suitable location (e.g. south facing, pitch roof etc), 
to ensure the PV panels would be most productive (M 2). Furthermore, eligibility for the PV 
project was ‘means tested’, i.e. favouring those on ‘lower income…because they need the most 
help’ (M 2). The energy supply contract dictates that MOZES retains ownership and is 
responsible for maintenance of the panels. As part of this contract, the customer is financially 
liable if they move home and the occupiers of their old residence do not continue the same 
arrangement (M 3). 
6.2.2.6 Revenue Streams and Expenditure 
MOZES has been very dependent on capital grant schemes to fund its projects to date, most 
notably the £615,000 won in 2009 as part of the DECC’s Low Carbon Communities competition, 
which was used to fund the installation of first phase of PV installations. During this phase 10 
customers covered half the upfront cost of purchasing and installing the PV systems (M 3). 
Subsequently MOZES also received £100,000 from British Gas Green Streets scheme (NESTA, 
2012), which was used to fund efficiency measures across 22 homes (e.g. insulation, boilers 
etc), which were donated to residents instead of being provided as energy service contracts 
(Energyshare, 2012). 
Recently grant funding has been much harder to come by for MOZES (Section 6.2.2.7) and it is 
existing at the moment on more piecemeal funding such as from Nottingham City Council, 
National Energy Action etc (M 1). In fact, the 9 PV systems installed as part of Phase 2 of the 
energy supply contract were not grant funded but financed via loans from a combination of 
the MPT and a long-term affiliate of MOZES (M3). As yet no finance has been received from 
the major banks, in part because it was felt that ‘a lot of the banks don’t really understand 
social enterprise’ (M 2). However, participants indicated that talks are on-going about securing 
finance for future projects from the Co-operative Bank (M2 & 3). 
In terms of revenue MOZES receives FiT payments for the electricity the PV systems generate, 
i.e. a combination of the generation and export tariffs (MOZES, 2012e) (see Section 5.4 for 
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breakdown of FiT). For Phase 1 alone, it is estimated that £22,000 per year will be generated in 
FiTs for MOZES (Clark and Chadwick, 2011, Energyshare, 2012). MOZES uses this revenue 
stream to cover its running costs and generate a small surplus which is recycled into future 
projects (M3) to ‘develop the business of the ESCo rather than [be] distributed as profits to its 
stakeholders [or] paying dividends to members’ (Brodies p.6). To date, MOZES’s largest 
outgoing has been the delivery of Phase 1 of the PV installations, which cost a total of 
£633,000, with each household installation (i.e. purchase and fitting of the PV system) costing 
on average £9,200 (Energyshare, 2012). The cost of collecting the meter readings, public 
liability insurance and business administration costs for Phase 1 equate to approximately 
£5000 per year, in addition to other maintenance costs, such as the PV system inspections and 
repairs (Energyshare, 2012).  
6.2.2.7 Drivers and Barriers 
Without securing funding from DECC’s Low Carbon Communities fund MOZES would have not 
been able to fund Phase 1 of its PV project (see Section 6.2.2.6). Winning this grant funding 
also provided MOZES with the credibility to form the partnerships and secure the resources 
necessary to be able to implement the community’s ideas (M 4). However, MOZES has 
continued to rely heavily on capital grant funding, which has become increasingly scarce in 
recent years as the government has moved away from capital grant schemes and towards on-
going financial incentives (e.g. FiT); 
‘You have to understand that MPT and [MOZES] are finding it harder to get money… it 
is also a time when there is no money…The funds [MPT & MOZES] usually go for are 
much, much more limited’ (M 1) 
Some capital grant schemes do still exist for communities (e.g. Local Energy Assessment Fund, 
Community Low Carbon Heating scheme etc), however MOZES’s experience to date was that 
these were designed to support new community enterprises, as opposed to established ones 
such as MOZES (M 1). Although these schemes have become rarer, demand for this money 
from communities has increased, meaning funding is extremely competitive and difficult to 
secure (M 4).  
Despite the challenges that the decline of capital grant schemes has brought, the introduction 
of the FiTs has been a real boon for MOZES, providing them with a long-term, reliable revenue 
stream: ‘Without [the FiT] we would all be stuffed really. They are incredibly generous 
payments’ (M 1). However, MOZES will still need to secure the necessary upfront capital to 
fund its energy service projects in the future, to be able to develop the ‘capacity to generate 
its own income’ (M 3). In the absence of grant money, MOZES has had to look to the banks for 
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finance however they have been unsuccessful to date in securing any. It was thought that the 
banks were unwilling to support community enterprises because they had a poor 
understanding of how social enterprises operate (M 2). MOZES’s limited financial and technical 
resources (e.g. staff) have in turn limited the scope of the projects it can realistically develop 
(M 1). However, MOZES has been able to mitigate this lack of resources to a large extent by 
working closely with other organisations (see Section 6.2.2.4), such as MPT and their local MP. 
Despite the support these partnerships offer MOZES, they have not all been without difficulty. 
For instance their relationship with British Gas (see Section 6.2.2.4) has been strained at times 
because it was felt by MOZES that British Gas was working towards fundamentally different 
objectives than itself and was keen to impose its own strategy in the Meadows over MOZES’s 
(M 1 & 2). For instance, British Gas rejected MOZES’s suggestion of a rising block tariff for 
energy supply where ‘the more you use the higher the price becomes’ (M 2): 
‘The energy companies have their own criteria and ways of doing things that they want 
to replicate elsewhere. They come round and say ‘we do this well, we want to do it in 
your place. That may or may not fit with what we see as our priorities’ (M 2) 
MOZES’s relationship with Nottingham City Council has also proven difficult at times. In part 
this was due to the council already operating their own ‘Arm’s Length’ ESCo in Nottingham, 
known as Enviroenergy (M 1). Consequently, their efforts were originally directed towards 
supporting this organisation rather than MOZES: ‘they were a bit sceptical about how far they 
could support [our project] because they were locked into this contract with Enviroenergy’ (M 
2). Additionally, the council also proposed a Private Finance Initiative (PFI) project in the 
Meadows that would have involved the re-development of a number council houses in the 
Meadows, creating an obstacle for the PV project, which hoped to install systems on these 
homes (M 1). However, in recent times the relationship between MOZES and the council has 
improved, with one of the Councillors now sitting on the board. 
In terms of infrastructural constraints, MOZES was limited by how many PV systems it could 
install per street due to electricity network load restrictions imposed by the DNO (Clark and 
Chadwick, 2011, Energyshare, 2012). Other infrastructural constraints included households’ 
electrics not being sufficiently up-to-date or safe enough to install the panels (Clark and 
Chadwick, 2011, Energyshare, 2012). Furthermore, some homes were not suitable for the PV 
system installation due to their location and design (e.g. aspect, roof pitch etc) but also 
because many of the houses were relatively small due to the historically deprived nature of the 
Meadows, which meant that only a small number of panels could be installed, limiting the 
economies of scale that could be captured for each installation:  
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‘You can’t get any more than 6 panels on each house…If you had 20 panels, you would 
pay more for the panels but no more for the installation’ (M 3) 
A key enabling factor has been the strength of the community in the Meadows (see Section 
6.2.2.4). However, communicating with the community has proven difficult in some respects 
due to the high incidence of non-English speaking residents and the high rate of illiteracy in the 
area, making it difficult for MOZES to communicate its aims and thus recruit 
customers/members for on-going and future projects: 
‘I think that is where in a deprived community, you haven’t got [many] people who are 
literate and haven’t got people who speak English or can read English’ (M 4) 
Additionally, many residents were unfamiliar or uncomfortable with some of the key concepts 
integral to energy service contracting. For instance, many residents were ‘not sophisticated in 
terms of finance’ and were consequently sceptical of it (M 1) and by extension energy service 
contracting because financing (i.e. the lending and owing of money) forms the bedrock of 
energy service contracts. Another example was that some residents who had recently arrived 
in the UK had limited experience of enjoying both electricity and heat supply; 
‘We have a lot of people who don’t speak English, coming from Africa etc. I have a 
neighbour who is still getting her head around electricity, let alone saving it’ (M 4) 
6.2.2.8 Expectations for Future Development 
MOZES has a number of planned projects going forward. For instance, MOZES intends to (1) 
continue to raise awareness in the Meadows of cost-effective energy efficiency measures; (2) 
explore the economic viability of a 330kW communally owned wind turbine owned, which NEP 
are assisting them with undertaking the necessary wind surveys to identify suitable areas for 
its location (NEP, 2011); (3) develop an eco-taxi service; and (4) secure funding to retrofit some 
council houses to ‘demonstrate what can be done to reduce the energy use and ‘carbon-
footprint’ of older properties’ (M 3) (MOZES, 2012f). However, MOZES does not appear to 
have any plans to implement additional energy service contract projects at present. Future PV 
projects in particular have been ‘stopped in their tracks’ because the FiT cuts have meant that 
they are longer financially viable for MOZES to implement (M 3). This is because the 
generation tariff for retrofit PV ≤ 4kW has fallen from 43.3p (prior to 2nd March 2012) to 16p 
(from 1st August 2012) (Feed-In Tariffs Ltd, 2012). Furthermore, the swift and unexpected 
nature of these cuts serves to illustrate how MOZES’s ‘environment is changing daily, weekly, 
monthly’ (M 3), which has made it difficult for the ESCo to plan for the future.  
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A high proportion of housing in the Meadows is rental (ONS, 2001). Consequently, it was 
thought that MOZES could play a key role in helping the Meadows community to sign-up to the 
Green Deal, where MOZES would work closely with key landlords in the area to educate them 
about the opportunities in relation to the Green Deal and to help facilitate large-scale 
efficiency retrofits of multiple landlord-owned properties by acting as a trusted intermediary 
between them and the community (M 1): 
‘There is a lot of nervousness around in terms of the Green Deal. British Gas are 
wondering how the hell they are going to deal with…the rented market. [That is] one of 
the areas we think we really can help as a community organisation’ (M 1) 
MOZES are working in conjunction with Nottingham Energy Partnership to explore how they 
might engage with the Green Deal (M 1).  
Finally, MOZES’s future plans are subject to the council’s re-development of the Meadows, 
with a number of council houses earmarked for demolition and a new tram to be built through 
the area (M 4). However, beyond these details the council’s plans for re-development are 
relatively unclear at the moment, making it difficult for MOZES to formulate plans in the 
Meadows area without knowing how the built environment will change in the near future. 
6.2.2.9 Summary 
MOZES has served to illustrate how the ESCo model can be applied by a community to help 
improve the quality of life of residents in a deprived neighbourhood via the provision of 
community inspired energy service projects. It owes its existence and success to a combination 
of factors including community strength, government funding and key partnerships with local 
energy stakeholders, most notably local charities and political figureheads. However, it has 
faced a number of challenges, which have predominantly been financial, such as the FiT cuts 
and a lack of external capital grant funding or ‘high-street’ finance. MOZES continues to seek 
funding opportunities going forward but it faces an uncertain future considering the lack of 
specific regulatory and financial support for community led energy initiatives. 
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6.2.3 Honeywell 
6.2.3.1 Overview 
Honeywell UK 
Commencement of 
UK ESCo Operations 
Mid 1990s (H 3) 
Location International 
ESCo Variant Type Energy Services Provider 
Ownership Honeywell International Inc. 
Type of Contracting Energy Performance Contracting 
Turnover UK EPC Operations - £8-10 million in 2012 (H 4) 
Number of Staff UK EPC Operations – Approx. 30 in EPC operations (H 4) 
Energy Savings Worldwide total of £1.7 billion by 2008  (Honeywell, 2008, Petersen, 2008b) 
Table 6.11 Key Facts and Figures for Honeywell UK 
6.2.3.2 Brief History 
Honeywell’s history begins in 1885, when the inventor Albert Butz patented the furnace 
regulator and alarm, and subsequently formed the Butz Thermo-Electric Regulator Company in 
Minneapolis (Honeywell, 2012e). During the 20th century the company, Honeywell Inc was 
eventually formed following a series of corporate mergers. Today Honeywell operates 
internationally and is a Fortune 100 company, with a turnover of $36 billion in 2011 and 
130,000 employees (Honeywell, 2011). 
Traditionally Honeywell’s business has been focused upon the development and sale of 
building control technologies, however today its business activities are much broader, 
incorporating the sale of both products and services. Its operations are split between 4 
divisions: (1) Aerospace, (2) Automation and Control Solutions, (3) Performance Materials and 
Technologies and (4) Transportation Systems (Honeywell, 2012d). Within the Automation and 
Control Solutions division sits its Building Solutions arm, which ‘installs and maintains 
automated building control solutions that keep workplaces safe, secure, comfortable, cost-
effective and energy-efficient’ (Honeywell, 2012b). Part of this division’s operations is the 
provision of Energy Performance Contracts (EPCs) to commercial customers, which it has been 
delivering in the UK since the mid-1990s and has invested heavily in the past 3 years (H 4). 
6.2.3.3 Objectives and Value Proposition 
As a private sector, publicly traded company, Honeywell’s core objective is to generate profit. 
However, due to its Corporate Social Responsibility commitments it seeks to fulfil a number of 
non-profit oriented objectives, predominantly the reduction of GHG emissions via energy 
efficiency measures (Honeywell, 2012c), which is aligned with the outputs of its EPC 
operations. 
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The core value proposition of Honeywell’s EPCs is that they can guarantee a significant 
reduction in their customers’ energy consumption, typically around 20% (Petersen, 2009, 
Honeywell, 2012a), which translates into significant cost and carbon savings for the customer. 
For instance, Honeywell’s EPC with Gwent Healthcare NHS Trust in South Wales delivered over 
£1.5 million worth of energy savings between April 2007 and March 2008, which represents 
approximately a 30% reduction in their energy bill (Brind, 2008). Furthermore, Honeywell 
reduced Gwent’s CO2 emissions by 7.6% (Brind, 2008). Similarly, Honeywell’s EPC with 
Transport for London provides a saving of £769,128 and 3,648 tonnes of CO2 annually 
(Petersen, 2009). 
Honeywell is able to provide these energy efficiency measures at no upfront cost to the 
customer (Honeywell, 2008), meaning that even if their customer does not possess the 
necessary capital to implement an upgrade of its energy facilities, it can still benefit from the  
improved levels of reliability and comfort Honeywell’s efficiency measures offer (Honeywell, 
2008, Petersen, 2009, Petersen, 2011a, Petersen, 2011b). This upgrade not only improves the 
level of comfort both its staff and clients enjoy when located on-site (Honeywell, 2012a, 
Petersen, 2011a) but also adds value to the customer’s estate (Honeywell, 2008). Once the 
contract is signed with Honeywell, their customers can enjoy ‘piece of mind’ (H 3) that their 
equipment will function correctly because Honeywell guarantees its performance and is 
contractually responsible for its operation and maintenance (Honeywell, 2008, Mewis, 2009, 
Petersen, 2009). Furthermore, Honeywell ultimately financially benefits from the energy 
savings this equipment generates (Honeywell, 2008). 
 
Figure 6.15 Examples of the energy efficiency lighting and boilers installed at Gwent Healthcare NHS 
Trust (Brind, 2008) 
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Honeywell has a wealth of experience of delivering EPC to a range of organisations throughout 
the world, particularly in the US. This experience also forms an important part of its value 
proposition as it provides many public sector organisations with the confidence that Honeywell 
will deliver on its performance guarantees (M 3) (Petersen, 2008a, Petersen, 2008b, Petersen, 
2011a, Honeywell, 2008): 
‘Well we have 25 years’ experience of doing EPCs in the US and we do somewhere 
between $500-750 million of EPCs in the US’ (H 2)  
‘[Honeywell] was a pioneer of the Energy Performance Contracting concept Over the 
past 25 years it has successfully implemented more than 5,000 energy efficiency 
projects around the world for customers in the public and private’ (Honeywell, 2008 
p.6) 
Additionally, Honeywell is a very wealthy company meaning that customers can be confident 
that it will continue to exist for the duration of the EPC, which typically last for a number of 
years: ‘we are very much here to stay… whilst others may come and go in the marketplace’ (H 
3). Again this provides the customer with confidence that Honeywell will continue to deliver on 
its performance guarantees over the coming years. 
Honeywell is able to provide most aspects of the EPC independently, such as the auditing, as 
well as the design and delivery of its Measurement and Verification plan (H 3). They seek to 
provide these services ‘in-house’ because it was believed that sub-contracting too many of its 
EPC responsibilities could mean it could ‘lose sight of exactly how it all ties together’ (H 3), 
which could put it in danger of defaulting on its performance guarantees. However, Honeywell 
does use sub-contractors to install its energy efficiency measures, in turn helping to create jobs 
in the local area, which can be attractive to Local Authorities (H 1) (Honeywell, 2012a, 
Petersen, 2011a). 
Honeywell provides comprehensive, holistic energy solutions that look ‘right across the 
organisation’ (H 1) in order to provide a suite of solutions that ‘tie together nicely’ (H 3) and 
thus, deliver the largest degree of energy savings possible from the client’s property. 
Honeywell also works closely with its customers to ensure the solutions satisfy their 
customer’s needs: ‘it’s a very involved solutions sales process that involves a lot of consultation 
with the client and you need to take the time to really dig into their business and understand it’ 
(H 3). Furthermore, Honeywell takes a technologically agnostic approach, using the ‘best 
products on the market that fit the requirements of the customer’ (H 3).  
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6.2.3.4 Key Activities, Resources and Partnerships 
Honeywell engages in four key consecutive activities as part of its EPC operations (Figure 6.16) 
(Petersen, 2009). The first is a preliminary audit whereby it evaluates the potential energy 
savings in its customer’s buildings (Honeywell, 2012a), to identify whether there are sufficient 
energy inefficiencies to warrant an EPC (H 1). The second involves the detailed design of the 
EPC in partnership with the customer, to develop a suite of measures that suit the needs of 
both parties (Petersen, 2009): ‘[the process of] proposing a solution of some energy 
conservation measures that will deliver the outcome required’ (H 4). The third key activity is the 
implementation of these measures, which Honeywell out-sources to sub-contractors (Section 
6.2.3.3) but it is ultimately responsible for managing the works programme (H 1). The sub-
contractors are often consulted at the design stage to ensure they can implement Honeywell’s 
proposed suite of measures (H 4). Finally, Honeywell is responsible for providing the engineers 
who operate and maintain these measures, as well as the staff to undertake the measurement 
and verification of the savings they provide in order to prove to the customer whether it has 
fulfilled its guarantee or not (H 4) (Honeywell, 2012a, Petersen, 2009).  
 
Figure 6.16 The 4 stage process of Honeywell’s EPC (Petersen, 2009) 
Honeywell typically implements three forms of energy solutions. The first is the installation of 
more energy efficient primary conversion equipment than that which is currently installed in 
the client’s property and/or micro-generation technologies, such as solar technologies, CHP  
and anaerobic digesters (H 2) (Mewis, 2009). Although this is traditionally associated with 
ESCs, some comprehensive EPCs incorporate generation too (Section 2.6.2). The second is the 
installation of more energy efficient secondary conversion equipment (e.g. LED lighting, heat 
recovery), demand management controls (e.g. lighting sensors, thermostats) and building 
fabric (e.g. insulation, draft proofing) compared to that which is currently installed in the 
client’s property (H 2) (Mewis, 2009, Petersen, 2008a, Brind, 2008). The third is to change the 
customer’s energy consumption behaviour so that they consume less energy: ‘typically by 
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getting them to participate in efficient interaction with the building you can get between 6 and 
10% additional savings’ (H 2).  
6.2.3.5 Customer Interface 
Honeywell’s core customer base for EPCs has been the public sector, particularly local 
authorities, government departments and health trusts (H 1 – 4). This can in part be explained 
by the recent public sector funding cuts in the UK, which has put cost savings high on the 
agenda for public sector organisations (Petersen, 2009), thus encouraging some of these to 
turn to EPCs as an effective means of reducing their overheads, whilst maintaining the same 
quality of their public services and avoiding the need to make the significant upfront capital 
investment  required to deliver these cost reductions (Honeywell, 2008). 
Carbon savings are also valuable to public sector organisations considering that most public 
sector organisations are subject to carbon reduction targets, such as the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment Energy Efficiency scheme (CRC) and/or internal governmental targets37 
(Honeywell, 2008) but also tend to occupy very inefficient properties, which often sit below 
the efficiency standards stipulated by these obligations (Petersen, 2009, CAMCO, 2011). The 
high level of energy inefficiency also means that Honeywell can normally identify sufficient 
energy savings to make the EPC financially viable. Public sector organisations also tend to often 
occupy large, single site complexes meaning that energy efficiency measures can be 
implemented with better economies of scale than on a large number of smaller sites: 
‘If you have got some very small buildings on their own, it doesn't matter how 
inefficient they are, there won't be enough financial potential there to pay for the 
improvements. So you are looking for very large single sites [such as] hospitals, NHS 
trusts, campus like facilities, universities, government buildings’ (H 1) 
Honeywell has been drawn to public sector organisations, such as Social Housing Providers, as 
a means of accessing the residential market because these organisations are capable of 
aggregating lots of residential units together, which helps Honeywell to attain better 
economies of scale than serving homes individually (H 1). 
Public sector organisations are also attractive to Honeywell because they’re backed by 
government, meaning they can be quite confident that these organisations will exist for the 
duration of the EPC (H 1). Additionally, the public sector normally own their own buildings, 
which means they are able to take a long-term perspective on their estate management (H 1), 
                                                          
37 The UK government has a 10% target to reduce carbon emissions from central government 
departments (DECC, 2012r) 
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as well as make the executive decision to sign an EPC for that property. In contrast private 
sector organisations normally lease their premises on a relatively short-term basis meaning 
that they are unable to take the same long-term perspective required with EPC and because 
they are tenants, they are unable to make the executive decisions necessary to sign an EPC for 
the building they occupy (H 1). Public sector organisations can also access cheaper finance 
than private sector organisations via schemes such as the Public Works Loan Board, enabling 
Honeywell to utilise this cheaper source of finance to fund the energy service project rather 
than rely on traditional, more expensive sources of finance from financial institutions such as 
banks (H 1). Taking this approach helps Honeywell to reduce the overall cost of its energy 
service projects. Although Honeywell typically engages with the public sector it was explained 
that some private sector organisations are also beginning to consider EPCs (H 3 & 4).  
Honeywell relies on a sales team to identify and recruit its customers: 
‘[To] create or identify prospects for potential jobs, you clearly need some sales 
resource. At a minimum they need to have a conceptual understanding of the model…, 
the kind of elements an EPC will address [and] the sort of outcomes that can be 
delivered through that solution’ (H 4) 
It was explained that Honeywell relies heavily upon support or ‘buy-in’ from senior personnel 
within an organisation, such as the Finance Director, if an energy service contract is ever to 
materialise (H 1 – 3): ‘Typically we would be prospecting at that senior level of people, through 
a variety of channels, via events, cold calling or referrals etc’ (H 3). This commitment was 
required because the organisation would need to make large, quarterly repayments to 
Honeywell as part of the EPC, which would be drawn from its energy savings (Brind, 2008). 
Furthermore, the EPC requires Honeywell to not only monitor but sometimes intervene in the 
organisation’s activities: ‘We need to be all over the site doing a lot of work and analysis, also a 
heavy amount of support from the management to provide us with the right amount of 
information’ (H 3). To date Honeywell’s experience was that senior public sector managers 
were generally very open to the notion of engaging in EPCs (H 2).  
6.2.3.6 Revenue Streams and Expenditure 
As part of its energy service contracting, Honeywell operates a typical EPC ESCo model, 
whereby its major revenue stream is the cost savings on its customer’s energy bills (6.1.1.9). In 
the case of Honeywell’s EPC with Gwent Healthcare (Section 6.2.3.3), the NHS trust paid an 
agreed annual fee to Honeywell in quarterly instalments, which covered Honeywell’s upfront 
and on-going costs, as well as its profit margin (Brind, 2008, Petersen, 2011b). As part of its 
EPC activities Honeywell has to cover the costs of the technologies and materials it requires to 
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implement its efficiency measures, such as a replacement boiler (H 4). However, Honeywell’s 
main cost is labour: 
‘From business development of the solutions, delivery of the install and servicing and 
measurement and verification, there is a hell of a lot of cost around labour. That is the 
predominant cost here with an EPC’ (H 4) 
Where the customer is unable or unwilling to provide the upfront capital investment, 
Honeywell does not normally directly finance the costs of its EPC measures, instead relying on 
a third party to cover the cost of the measures. Subsequently, the customer is responsible for 
repaying the cost of these measures to the third party. The customer covers this cost using the 
savings Honeywell achieved on its energy bill delivered via the EPC (H 1 – 3) (Petersen, 2011a, 
Petersen, 2011b): 
‘The financial deal is between the customer and the bank, not between the customer, 
the ESCo and the bank. If the customer defaults, whether we have achieved the savings 
or not, we are not required to pay back the financing that the customer has’ (H 2) 
Although the customer is responsible for these repayments, Honeywell effectively ‘underwrites 
the revenue stream generated by savings’ (H 2) by providing a performance guarantee to the 
customer, whereby if it doesn’t achieve these savings Honeywell is contractually obliged to 
make up the value of missed energy savings as part of a cash payment. Consequently, the 
customer is safe in the knowledge that it will be able to meet its finance repayments to the 
third party financier because of Honeywell’s energy performance guarantee. However, 
because the loan is between the customer and the financial institution, the bank may not be 
prepared to lend money to Honeywell’s customer if they have a poor credit rating (H 1). It was 
thought that the financial institutions were particularly attracted to financing EPC with public 
sector customers because they were financially supported by government and thus unlikely to 
‘go out of business’ (H 1). Furthermore, financial institutions were attracted to EPCs due to the 
long-term debt they represented, which meant a low-risk revenue stream ‘for the next 10 or 
12 years’ (H 1).  
6.2.3.7 Drivers and Barriers 
One of the key supporting factors of Honeywell’s EPC operations has been the emergence of a 
regulatory framework in the UK that is broadly supportive of low-carbon energy projects (H 1, 
3 & 4). This was in fact a key factor in Honeywell’s decision to enter the UK market (H 2), 
alongside a growing appetite in the UK for EPCs (H 3). This could be attributed in part to the EU 
Directive 2006/32/EC on energy end-use efficiency and energy services (Honeywell, 2008, 
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Petersen, 2008a), which amongst other requirements mandates Member States to adopt and 
achieve an indicative energy saving target of 9% by 2016 and to repeal or amend national 
legislation and regulations that unnecessarily impede or restrict the use of energy 
performance contracting (EU, 2006).  
Another important piece of regulation supporting Honeywell’s EPC operations was the UK’s 
CRC scheme (see Section 6.1.1.1) (H 1, 3 & 4) (Mewis, 2009): ‘I guess the CRC was a big piece of 
legislation…[It] put energy and carbon on the agenda of more senior people in business and 
public sector’ (H 3). However, one interviewee explained that the cost of carbon levied by this 
scheme was ‘not big enough for people to really take notice’ (H 3), explaining that more 
stringent regulation around the cost of carbon was required (Petersen, 2009). The Energy 
Performance of Buildings Directive (EPBD) was also highlighted as another regulatory driver, as 
it ‘introduced higher standards of energy conservation for new and refurbished buildings’ (RICS, 
2007 p.3), increasing demand for EPCs (H 1).  
Despite these regulatory drivers some of the interviewees explained that unexpected changes 
and revisions to regulations such as the CRC and FiT had meant that many organisations were 
unsure whether to act to improve their levels of energy efficiency or not (H 2 & 3): 
‘You have to then adopt a ‘wait and see’ policy because you can’t be sure what you will 
be targeted to achieve when they reform or replace the legislation you are trying to 
achieve at the moment…So what do I prioritise, on the basis that I don’t know what 
legislation is going to incentivise me to do’ (H 2) 
Honeywell has in fact been able to shape government policy to some extent, as it shares a 
number of key relationships with political stakeholders: ‘we sit on a variety of committees and 
bodies and provide advice’ (H 3). For instance, they have advised on such policies as the Green 
Deal, with government responding to a number of their suggestions (H 2). However, they 
emphasised that their influence of policy had been relatively small to date (H 2 & 3). 
In terms of market developments, the rise in popularity of Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) reporting and sustainable branding has also supported Honeywell’s EPC activities and 
has helped to drive energy and sustainability up the agenda of public and private sector 
organisations (H 1 & 3): 
‘There is a sustainability drive in the private sector, green branding, corporate social 
responsibility (CSR). All of those drivers are very positive for energy retrofitting and 
energy efficiency improvements’ (H 1) 
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An extremely important market-based driver for Honeywell has been the introduction of the 
RE:FIT procurement framework by the London Development Agency (LDA), which is a 
procurement framework led by the LDA designed to facilitate the public sector uptake of EPCs 
by ‘providing pre-negotiated, EU-regulation compliant framework contracts through which a 
group of prequalified ESCos can undertake the design and implementation of energy 
conservation measures’ (Managenergy, 2011 p.2). Honeywell was selected as one of these 12 
‘approved suppliers’.  
The bespoke nature of EPCs has traditionally meant that it had been difficult for Honeywell to 
replicate EPC projects from one organisation to another: ‘every single EPC will be bespoke in 
some form or another because the buildings are unique and so the energy consumption and 
provision is unique’ (H 2). However, the interviewees explained that RE:FIT’s introduction of 
standardized EPC contracts had addressed this barrier to some extent by reducing Honeywell’s 
EPC transaction costs because it no longer needed to draft new contracts for each customer (H 
3). For instance the procurement period for EPCs is normally 12 – 18 months in accordance 
with the traditional Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU) regulations but via RE:FIT it 
took only 3 – 6 months (Managenergy, 2011). Additionally, LDA also took responsibility for 
marketing the framework’s EPCs to public sector organisations, saving Honeywell further time 
and expense (H 3). In doing so the LDA acted as a ‘trusted intermediary’ between the public 
sector organisations and Honeywell, helping to increase the level of trust these organisations 
had in Honeywell’s offerings (H 3). Marketing the framework has also helped to raise the 
profile of EPCs in the public sector, as well as the private sector, helping to stimulate further 
demand for Honeywell’s services: 
‘We have had some enquiries outside of RE:FIT from the private sector, who have 
obviously seen what is going on there and have got in touch with the LDA to contact us. 
[There is] a great pipeline of opportunities coming through for us and the other big EPC 
providers.’ (H 3) 
Despite how RE:FIT has helped to raise the profile of the ESCo model, the awareness of the 
model continues to remain low in the UK predominantly due to the ‘lack of referenced [EPC] 
examples and case studies that people can draw [on]’ (H 2). Consequently, a lack of awareness 
of the ESCo model was cited as a key barrier because organisations were still unsure how to go 
about procuring EPCs and also had little confidence in EPCs’ ability to satisfy their needs. 
Furthermore, because of the generally poor understanding in the UK of what EPCs involved, 
many felt it ’sounded too good to be true’ (H 1). However, it was believed that as more ESCos 
offering EPCs had entered the market and more EPCs had been delivered by ESCos, 
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organisations’ awareness and understanding of the ESCo model had begun to improve (H 2 & 
3): 
‘There is a clear sign that other businesses see this as a market opportunity and when 
other organisations see that and act, that can actually get the model into a more 
mature state where customers will feel more comfortable with it’ (H 3) 
It was believed that Honeywell had also played an important role in helping the EPC to grow by 
providing other organisations, such as the Energy Utilities, with a successful business model 
template to replicate: 
‘The Energy Utilities [are] coming in because they want to get in on the act. They 
recognise the growth of the market and the opportunities that lie there. They inevitably 
would have seen the likes of Honeywell or Schneider and said that’s a good model, let’s 
think about offering that. A lot of the new players in the market would certainly look at 
Honeywell as one of the best practice EPC model and something they’d try and 
replicate’ (H 3) 
Finally, the growing availability of finance from financial institutions for EPCs was identified as 
a key driver (see Section 6.2.3.6). However, many of these institutions consider EPCs as 
‘upfront [capital] debt on the balance sheet of the organisation that takes [the EPC] on’ (H 1). 
This has posed a problem for Honeywell because organisations, particularly in a poor economic 
climate, are either unwilling or unable to take on additional debt, meaning they might avoid 
EPCs (H 1). Other financial stipulations had also proven troublesome, such as the Treasury 
rules that prohibit Local Authorities to use cost savings to invest in other activities (which is the 
purpose of EPCs) (H 1) and where the ‘UK Treasury doesn’t facilitate government bodies 
putting private finance into EPCs [because] if these chose to borrow through us, then the 
treasury cuts it back from their operational budget’ (H 2). Therefore, many of the UK’s financial 
rules and regulations were not considered supportive of Honeywell’s EPC operations.  
6.2.3.8 Expectations for Future Development 
In a broad sense, the interviewees were very positive about Honeywell’s future prospects as 
an ESCo. They believed that demand for EPCs would most likely increase as more EPCs were 
completed, thus providing potential customers with greater confidence in EPCs as a means of 
satisfying their needs (H 2). In terms of finance, it was expected that the introduction of the 
Green Deal and Green Investment Bank, as well as the European Energy Efficiency Fund (EEEF) 
(supported by the European Investment Bank and European Commission) would help to make 
finance more easily available to Honeywell (H 1): ‘any way in which an organisation can access 
219 
 
 
funding is going to help things’ (H 1). Another potential driver are the expected changes to the 
RE:FIT framework that would enable private sector finance to be raised to deliver EPCs to 
public sector organisation via this framework, helping to improve Honeywell’s prospects of 
funding these contracts (H 2). 
It was expected that continuing energy insecurity issues and energy price increases would help 
to ensure demand for EPCs either remained high or increased over the coming years  (H 3) 
(Mewis, 2009). However, it was acknowledged that energy prices are likely to remain volatile 
in the coming years, meaning Honeywell could not rely on this development (H 3). Honeywell 
does however have some degree of control over the direction of technological innovation in 
the UK considering it is a major energy technology developer. For instance it is currently 
helping to lead the development of SMART grids in the UK as a form of automated demand 
response system, which could form an important part of its EPCs in the future (H 3). 
Additionally, it was expected that Honeywell’s EPC operations were likely to increase market 
awareness of energy efficient technologies and thus help to increase uptake of these (H 2 & 3). 
Finally, it was explained that Honeywell’s future prospects as an ESCo very much hinged upon 
it being able to identify a means of easily replicating EPCs from one customer to the next, 
considering the bespoke nature of EPCs: ‘The golden egg is what is a model that is easily 
adoptable?’ (H 2). It seemed that this would require a combination of system change, such as 
changes to the procurement framework, the introduction of standardized contracts etc, as 
well as refinements being made to the EPCs Honeywell offers and more broadly its business 
model. 
6.2.3.9 Summary 
By drawing upon its vast experience of delivering EPCs in North America, Honeywell has 
enjoyed success in the UK market, which it had originally decided to enter predominantly due 
to the growing appetite of public sector organisations to reduce their GHG emissions and 
energy costs, as well as the presence of a regulatory framework that is broadly supportive of 
low-carbon energy projects. It has to date faced relatively few major challenges in developing 
its EPC business in the UK, although it has struggled to find a means of replicating these 
contracts at scale due to their highly bespoke nature. Looking forward, it considers that most 
emerging developments are likely to be supportive of its operations, particularly the growing 
availability of ‘green finance’ both in the UK and Europe more broadly. 
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6.2.4 Energy Utility X 
Please note that this case study has been fully anonymised at the request of the case-study 
organisation. Consequently, an alias has been provided for the organisation: Energy Utility X. 
Documentary evidence was used in an identical manner to the other case studies, however the 
documents are not identified here in order to protect the anonymity of the organisation. 
Instead, the documents are referenced as Doc A, Doc B etc. In order to uphold transparency 
the author is able to provide details of the corresponding documentation relating to each 
reference on request. However, consent will first be required from the case-study 
organisation. The interview referencing system used here is the same as the other case-
studies. 
6.2.4.1 Overview 
Energy Utility X 
Commencement of UK ESCo 
Operations  
First EPC provided c.2010 
Location UK 
ESCo Variant Type Energy Utility Energy Service Provider 
Ownership Subsidiary of larger, private sector organisation 
Turnover EUCo X - £4.8 billion in 2011/2012 (Doc J) 
Number of Staff Over 2,500 people employed to reduce energy consumption and 
cost through organisation (Doc F) 
Type of Contracting Mainly Energy Performance Contracting, some Energy Supply 
Contracting 
Energy Savings N/A 
Table 6.12 Key Facts and Figures for Energy Utility X 
6.2.4.2 Brief History 
Energy Utility X (EUCo X) emerged following an intense period of privatisation of the UK energy 
system during the 1970s and 1980s (Section 5.2). Since its formation it has grown to hold 33% 
of the energy retail market (i.e. gas and electricity), which represents the largest share of all 
the six major Energy Utilities in the UK (Doc K). It has traditionally operated an Energy Utility 
(EUCo) model (see Section 6.1.2), where its revenue increases in line with the number of units 
of gas and electricity it sells to its customers. Today the company continues to operate the 
EUCo model generates extremely healthy profits in doing so, for instance in 2011/2012 it 
generated £345 million in profit (Doc J). However, in recent years EUCo X has looked to 
diversify its core business activities, by operating the ESCo model and providing energy service 
contracts (see Section 6.1.2): ‘we want energy services to be just as big a part of [EUCo X] as 
energy supply’ (EUCo X Chief Executive – Doc M). Consequently, Energy Utility X has begun to 
operate two contrasting business models side-by-side, i.e. the ESCo and EUCo models. To date 
most of its activity in the ESCo market has involved the delivery of energy performance 
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contracts (EPCs) to large public sector organisations, however it has also begun to develop its 
capacity to provide energy supply contracts (ESCs) as well.  
6.2.4.3 Objectives and Value Proposition 
As a private sector organisation and a publicly held company (plc), EUCo X’s primary objective 
is to generate profit. However, EUCo X also seeks to fulfil a range of non-directly profit-
oriented objectives, such as investment in community development (Doc I). These objectives 
have emerged in response to a range of government obligations (e.g. Carbon Emission 
Reduction Target, Community Energy Savings Programme etc) as well as its own Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) policies, designed to establish and maintain positive relationships 
with their customers, partners and suppliers, which support EUCo X’s continued commercial 
success (Doc I): 
‘[EUCo X] has a value base and a culture that means we are not going to walk away 
from many of the socio-economic challenges that exist in our market’ (X 2) 
EUCo X has traditionally fulfilled these objectives by operating the EUCo model, i.e. the sale of 
units of electricity and gas. However, as outlined in Section 6.2.4.2, EUCo X has in recent years 
begun to move towards operating the ESCo model. We highlight the key factors that have 
triggered this transition in Section 6.2.4.7. Prior to doing so we explore the value proposition 
EUCo X extends to its customers via the provision of energy service contracts. As part of its EPC 
offering, EUCo X guarantees its customers a minimum level of energy savings over a defined 
contract period (Doc D, E, G, Q), which translates into significant cost savings per annum. For 
instance, EUCo X signed an EPC contract with a major national government department in 
2010 across 350 of its buildings (Doc C) and in the first 8 months of the contract the 
government department reduced its energy bills by £212,000, which has set them on course to 
save approximately £1.3 million over three years (Doc B). EUCo X has also signed an EPC with a 
Local Health Board in Wales, which consists of 4 Hospital Trusts. The contract is set to deliver 
£862,000 per annum (Doc E). These guarantees around energy performance also provide the 
customer with some long-term assurances with regards to the energy costs they will incur in 
the future to satisfy their energy needs, reducing the risk of unplanned and unbudgeted 
maintenance costs (Doc E & G).  
EUCO X’s customers typically enjoy both lower energy costs and a greater certainty around 
their future energy costs without the need to make any upfront investment (Doc B, D, E, F, Q). 
This cost is normally covered by a combination of EUCo X and third party financing from one its 
investment partners, which is recouped over a number of years, whilst the customer still 
enjoys a reduction on their energy bill: 
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‘So instead of paying £10 million upfront, they might pay £1 million for the next 10 
years. What we try and do is structure the length of the financing deal to make it such 
that it is cash positive for the customer. [So] the savings might be £1.2 million per year 
[and] the customer benefits from the extra £200k per year over the lifetime of that 
contract. After that 10 years you don’t need to pay that capital anymore, so you will be 
benefitting from the full £1.2 million of energy savings going forward’ (X 5) 
EUCo X also assumes the technical responsibility of delivering the energy efficiency measures, 
i.e. the installation, operation, maintenance, monitoring and verification etc (Doc D, E, F). This 
transfer of responsibility means EUCo X’s customers are able to spend less time managing their 
energy equipment and procuring energy (Doc E & F). Furthermore, EUCo X’s EPC customers 
can also address the maintenance backlog they have by replacing ‘aging assets that are 
approaching the end of their life’ (Doc G p.14), which constitutes a form of retrofit or 
‘infrastructure upgrade’ (X 4). This upgrade of the customer’s secondary conversion equipment 
and building controls, alongside EUCo X’s management can mean that the customer enjoys 
greater comfort because the energy system is both now more comprehensive and responsive 
(Doc E). In some cases this can improve not only the EUCo X’s customer’s comfort, but also the 
clients of their customers, e.g. hospital patients (Doc E). 
Another aspect of EUCo X’s EPC value proposition is that they can reduce their customer’s GHG 
emissions via energy efficiency measures. For instance, in its first 8 months of EUCo X’s 
contract with the major national government department, it achieved a reduction of 1,200 
tonnes of carbon (Doc B). Emissions reduction can be desirable because they can ‘generate 
significant brand and CSR value’ (Doc G p.14) for the customer. Furthermore, it can help them 
to meet obligations, such as the Carbon Reduction Commitment Energy Efficiency scheme 
(CRC) or government department efficiency targets (Doc E) (we explore this further in Section 
6.2.4.7).  
EUCo X offers their customers bespoke solutions as part of its EPC  (X 2, 3 & 5), where EUCo X 
consults with its customer to develop a suite of efficiency solutions that best suit their needs, 
without bias towards any particular type of energy technology (X 2): 
‘[We] try and understand what they are trying to achieve. This isn’t the sort of thing 
you just turn up and say here is a standard offer for an EPC, do you want to buy one? It 
is a very consultative sales process. We sit down with the customer, work out what 
their objectives are and…put together [a number of] probable packages for the 
customer’ (X 5) 
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EUCo X’s size and heritage were seen to inspire confidence that they would continue to exist 
for the term of the EPC contract (normally between 10 and 15 years) and thus fulfil their 
commitment: ‘We are going to be around for a long period of time, because of who we are’ (X 
4). Finally, it was believed customers were attracted to EUCo X’s EPC offer because they 
represent a ‘one-stop shop’, i.e. a business that possesses the necessary capabilities to provide 
all aspects of the EPC independently: ‘[The customers] don’t want someone to do a bit of this 
and another to do a bit of that. They want someone to come in and do all of it’ (X 3). 
6.2.4.4 Key Activities, Resources and Partnerships 
The delivery of EUCo X’s energy performance contracts follows three distinct stages: auditing, 
implementation and monitoring (Doc E). The first stage is designed to identify opportunities 
for energy savings and subsequently, identify a suite of energy solutions to achieve these 
savings and package these into a financially viable EPC (Doc E & Q). The second stage relates to 
the implementation of this suite of efficiency measures (X 5) (Doc E), which normally includes 
the installation of new building controls (e.g. boiler optimisation, building-management 
systems, air-conditioning controls) and/or the implementation of behavioural changes 
amongst the customer’s workforce (e.g. installation of portable meters to show how much 
energy the employees are consuming) (Doc Q). The third stage includes the operation and 
maintenance of these measures, as well as the monitoring and verification of the energy 
savings these provide during the length of the contract (X 2) (Doc E). 
Considering that Energy Utility X has traditionally operated the EUCo model, which demands a 
different set of resources to the ESCo model, Energy Utility X has in recent years had to acquire 
the necessary staff from other leading ESCos in the UK (e.g. Honeywell) to both develop and 
implement EPCs: ‘We have built a very capable team to tackle this market. It is not like we are 
a bunch of supply oriented people who can’t make EPC work’ (X 5). Additionally it has sought to 
bolster these in-house resources to deliver EPCs by acquiring a number of other companies, 
along with their staff, infrastructure, contacts etc. For instance, in 2009 they acquired a leading 
building management solutions company, which specialised in implementing and managing 
energy efficiency solutions. By acquiring both personnel and companies with energy service 
contracting expertise, EUCo X has brought these resources ‘in-house’ and has gained greater 
control over being able to fulfil its energy performance guarantees (X 5). 
EUCo X’s activity in the ESCo market has predominantly been around EPCs, however it has 
engaged to a lesser extent with Energy Supply Contracting (ESC) (Section 2.6.1). For instance, 
EUCo X recently offered to install PV system free-of-charge on customers’ roofs in return for 
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the FiT, whilst the customer enjoyed free electricity38 (X 3). However, this was discontinued 
following the FiT cut announced in late 2011. To bolster its capacity to provide ESCs, EUCo X 
has acquired a number of other companies. For instance in 2009 it acquired a leading UK 
biomass boiler installation company, which specialises in the provision of biomass oriented 
Energy Supply Contracts (X 3) (Doc N). Consequently, EUCo X has broadened its key activities 
to include the financing, design, installation, operation, maintenance, metering and billing of 
biomass energy centres (Doc L). EUCo X has also recently acquired a heat pump specialist and 
the UK’s leading provider of solar energy technologies to further bolster its energy supply 
contracting capabilities (X 3) (Doc N). EUCo X has subsequently had to engage in major 
organisational restructuring in order to integrate these newly acquired companies into its 
organisation: 
‘We have made a decision that we are very serious which means we have…changed the 
shape of the organisation so it is less focused on the home’ (X 2) 
Although EUCo X’s policy is ‘to do that as much as possible with [its] own employees’ (X 5), it 
still outsources some of its energy service contracting activities. For instance, they have a 
‘supply chain of approved mechanical contractors for some of the heavier engineering stuff 
that [EUCo X doesn’t] do every day’ (X 5). EUCo X has also developed other key partnerships 
such as with a leading facilities management (FM) company, as part of its EPC with the major 
national government department (Section 6.2.4.3). The FM company had been responsible for 
the management of the government department’s facilities for the 9 years prior to 
commencement of the EPC. During this time the FM provider has developed a strong and 
trusting relationship with the government department (Doc A). This relationship constituted a 
good base from which EUCo X could develop an EPC and so a partnership with the FM provider 
seemed the most appropriate way forward (X 2). 
It was highlighted that EUCo X has also developed key partnerships with North American ESCos 
in the past in order to facilitate the delivery of its Energy Performance Contracts (EPCs) in the 
UK. They wanted to draw upon these companies’ 20 years of experience to assist in the design 
of their EPCs (X 2). Furthermore, partnering with these companies lent credibility to EUCo X as 
an EPC provider in the UK, even though it was a new entrant to the ESCo market (X 2). EUCo X 
also has a number of key partnerships with financial institutions, predominantly banks, 
pension funds and investment companies that are interested in investing in projects with 
guarantees around performance (X 2) (Doc R). These partners act as 3rd party financiers that 
                                                          
38 In a very similar fashion to MOZES’s PV offer 
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purchase the assets installed as part of the EPC to ensure that there’s no liability on either the 
EUCo X’s or the customer’s balance sheet (X 3) (Doc E) (see Section 6.2.4.6): 
‘We have an abundance of banks, finance companies and [pension] fund managers 
wanting to invest in the types of programmes I have spoken about…They want big 
projects, £10-15 million projects and a solid guarantee around performance. So it is 
very attractive from their point of view, so investment definitely isn’t a problem for us’ 
(X 2) 
6.2.4.5 Customer Interface 
Although EUCo X has traditionally supplied its energy mainly to households, EUCo X’s customer 
base for EPCs predominantly consists of public sector organisations, such as government 
departments and health care providers (Section 6.2.4.3). This was generally for the same 
reasons outlined in the Honeywell case study (Section 6.2.3.5), i.e. large energy bills, large 
single sites providing good economies of scale, public sector cuts, CRC efficiency scheme, 
government GHG reduction targets (X 2 & 4) (Doc A, C, E, R). The EPCs that EUCo X signs with 
public sector organisations typically last for anywhere between 3 and 15 years (X 5) (Doc E & 
G).  
A key aspect of this long-term relationship is trust, where the customer has to be able to trust 
that EUCo X will deliver on its guarantees and operate at a high standard considering that 
EUCo X ‘spend so much time in the customer’s building and have such a major impact on their 
operations by renewing their assets and improving their infrastructure’ (X 5). In many instances 
EUCo X has ‘become an extra arm to their [customer’s] internal teams and a very trusted 
advisor in terms of what is possible’ (X 5). 
6.2.4.6 Revenue Streams and Expenditure 
With respect to covering the upfront costs of the EPC ‘there are [typically] two options: one is 
the customer funds it and the other is that we fund it’ (X 3). In reality, sometimes it becomes a 
mixture of these (X 5) (Doc E, H, R). As outlined in Section 6.2.4.3, when the customer does not 
have the necessary capital to invest in the project, EUCo X becomes responsible for covering 
the upfront costs of the EPC measures, normally in conjunction with a third party (X 3) (Doc E): 
‘We would finance it only for the construction period [but after that] we would look to 
sell those assets on to a third-party, so there’s no liability on the balance sheet. By 
bringing in the third party we are able to keep the liability off the balance sheet of the 
customer and EUCo X’ (X 3) 
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However, if the customer does have the necessary capital to cover some or all of the cost, then 
they may invest in the energy service project (X 5) (Doc R): 
‘If the customer has capital then it becomes more like a standard construction project 
to a large degree, whereby you charge the customer a capital amount for a series of 
measures. You go and implement those measures and then a smaller amount is 
charged every year after that to maintain the systems, provide the monitoring service, 
uphold that guarantee for the life of that contract’ (X 5) 
Where the customer is unable to cover any or all of the upfront costs, EUCo X often in 
conjunction with a third party take responsibility for meeting the costs of purchasing the new 
equipment, designing the energy system design, installing the equipment etc: ‘about 80% of 
the cost is tied up in the capital investment, so actually installing the measures’ (X 5). Following 
this design and installation period, EUCo X has a number of on-going costs it has to meet such 
as the operation and maintenance of the equipment installed, as well as the measurement and 
verification of the savings EUCo X delivers (X 5). 
EUCo X looks to not only cover the upfront and on-going costs of implementing these energy 
solutions but to also generate a profit by appropriating a share of the energy savings on the 
customer’s energy bill. Consequently, EUCo X receives a proportion of these savings via regular 
customer payments (normally monthly) over the lifetime of the contract (Doc E). In some cases 
EUCo X will enter into a shared savings contract with their client, whereby both companies are 
paid a percentage of how much money is saved on the client’s energy bill (Doc B). 
6.2.4.7 Drivers and Barriers 
An important factor driving EUCo X’s movement towards operating the ESCo model was the 
recognition that the existing energy market in the UK is currently undergoing radical change, 
due to pressures such as energy security, climate change, rising energy prices etc, which are 
serving to drive a major transformation of the UK energy market (Doc M). Combined, these 
factors were considered a threat to EUCo X’s future commercial success (Doc M), encouraging 
it to transform its business model as ‘a reaction to this change’ (X 2):  
‘Indeed as I see it, the old utility business model is dead…It is my belief that the energy 
company model we know today will, within this decade, seem just as much a thing of 
the past as the Gas Light and Coke Company. And from where I stand, I can already see 
it happening…We have to do nothing less than develop a new business model for a 
new, low carbon world’ (Chief Executive of EUCo X’s Parent Company – Doc M)  
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Consequently, EUCO X made the decision to diversify into the ESCo market as a means of 
repositioning itself to ensure it would remain profitable in the face of this system change (X 1). 
For instance, it recognised that there was a growing trend amongst its customers to consume 
less energy and so it had begun to make efforts to accommodate this demand (X 1 & 5): 
‘So whilst it seems counterintuitive that we are helping people to use less of what our 
core business is, I think we are under the impression that that is going to happen 
anyway. People are out there reducing their energy consumption, regardless of their 
energy supplier. So we have tried to be at the forefront of helping people to go down 
that road’ (X 5) 
Although, EUCo X viewed these market developments as a threat to their business, they had in 
fact approached these developments largely as an opportunity to grow their business (X 1 & 
2): ‘Existing companies like ours will have to change to survive. I relish the challenge. EUCo X is 
developing the capability not just to survive, but to thrive’ (EUCo X Chief Executive – Doc M). 
Diversification into the ESCo market was also deemed necessary to ensure that EUCo X didn’t 
become over-reliant on the competitive pricing of energy units (X 2), considering the volatility 
of energy prices. Transforming EUCo X’s business model was considered important as a means 
of differentiating itself from the other major Energy Utilities, which together form a relatively 
homogenous market. By offering ‘value-added services’ and a more compelling value 
proposition compared to the sale of energy units, EUCo X sought to set itself apart from its 
competitors, with a view to capture a larger share of the UK energy market (X 1 & 2). 
Another important reason EUCo X has moved into the ESCo market was its desire to develop 
longer-term relationships with its customers, considering that most Energy Utility customers at 
present ‘tend to shop around and chop and change their supplier quite regularly [and] don’t 
have much allegiance to their supplier and it is all based on price’ (X 5). Additionally, it was 
thought that moving into the ESCo market could enable EUCo X to fulfil some of its Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) obligations, such as alleviating fuel poverty (X 1, 2 & 4) and 
consequently  improve consumers’ perception of EUCo X (X 2), helping it to not only retain 
customers but attract new ones.  
EUCo X has however faced a number of challenges in attempting to transform its business 
model, such as shifting EUCo X’s organisational culture or mind-set from selling energy as a 
commodity towards saving energy (X 5). Restructuring the organisation to accommodate the 
new personnel and recent corporate acquisitions in order to effectively deliver energy service 
contracts has also proven difficult (see Section 6.2.4.4): 
228 
 
 
‘I think it is difficult for a company like [EUCo X to move towards the supply of energy 
services], compared to smaller organisations that can set themselves up as an ESCo 
from the start. We obviously have to do a lot of redesign within our own organisation 
to get there’ (X 2) 
 ‘[I think of EUCo X] as a large oil tanker and turning that oil tanker around from its 
current position is going to take some effort and it is going to take a bit of time…to 
become that Energy Services Company that offers energy supply as an add-on…I think 
it is a continuation of the journey I think we already on’ (X 1) 
EUCo X has also faced a battle to change its customers’ perception of it because many of them 
still considered the company to operate exclusively as an traditional Energy Utility, as opposed 
to a company that also provides EPCs (X 2). 
There have also been a range of external influences on EUCo X that have acted as drivers and 
barriers to its entry into the UK ESCo market. For instance the severe recession in the UK and 
the associated public sector cutbacks has encouraged public sector organisations to sign EPCs 
as a means of reducing their overheads (Section 6.2.4.5). Regulation has also proven to be an 
important driver such as the CRC Efficiency Scheme (X 5) (Doc H), which has made energy 
efficiency measures much more financially attractive (Section 6.1.1.1). The continuation of the 
energy supplier obligations (i.e. CERT & CESP) was also cited as a factor that had encouraged 
EUCo X to develop partnerships with community organisations (e.g. MOZES) and engage in 
energy service contracting, as a cost-effective means of fulfilling its supplier obligations (X 3). 
Conversely, public sector procurement rules have meant that the tendering process for EPCs 
takes approximately 18 months (X 4), which was considered too long and thus undesirable to 
both EUCo X and its customers.  
Finally, market developments were also cited as key drivers and barriers. For instance, low 
levels of awareness of EPCs, coupled with a poor understanding of the ‘core constructs of the 
[EPC] contract terms and guarantees’ had limited customer demand (X 4 & 5): 
‘If there was a challenge in life, it is that energy performance contracting isn’t that well 
known throughout the customer base and so they don’t know these exist. The first 
comment will always be ‘this is too good to be true’ and ‘does this really work?’ So 
there is a whole thing around the market not really understanding that EPCs exist and 
that it is a common way of doing business in the energy services business’ (X 5) 
Conversely, the financial sector was considered to possess a strong awareness and 
understanding of EPCs, with many financiers regarding such contracts as a good investment 
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opportunity (Section 6.2.4.4), thus making finance more freely available to EUCo X to fund its 
EPCs (X 2) (Doc E). 
6.2.4.8 Expectations for Future Development 
EUCo X plans to continue developing its energy services division so that it becomes a 
‘dominant part’ of their overall business model (X 5), to the extent where energy services 
become just as big a part of EUCo X as energy supply (Doc M). Ultimately, EUCo X hopes to 
become the leading EPC provider in the UK (X 1, 2 & 5), which could mean it becomes a real 
driver of change in the UK energy system (X 2), helping to ‘lead the transition to a low carbon 
economy’ (X 1). However, it is expected that this move towards the ESCo model is unlikely to 
happen quickly: 
‘It is going to take some time before we get to that place and I think it is a continuation 
of the journey I think we already on’ (X 1) 
Its move towards energy service contracting is likely to help boost growth in the UK ESCo 
market, as it provides other energy actors with confidence in this niche market, considering 
that EUCo X is such a wealthy incumbent organisation in the energy sector. Furthermore, EUCo 
X’s move could also encourage other incumbent Energy Utilities to follow suit and transform 
their business models.  
The introduction of the Green Deal (GD) was identified as a factor that is likely to support EUCo 
X’s move into both the residential and commercial ESCo markets because it: 
‘will help start to make people think about investing in energy savings measures and 
recouping the capital cost of that over the savings…[It will also] help to stimulate the 
market [and] to make it more mainstream, rather than just a niche market’ (X 5).  
Despite its potential to support EUCo X’s energy service business, their pilot version of the 
Green Deal scheme39 identified a number of potential issues with the GD, such as the cost of 
finance to fund the measures and the complexity of the arrangements. It was felt these factors 
would discourage householders to sign-up to the GD independently (Doc P). Therefore, in 
order to get residential customers to engage with the Green Deal, interviewees explained that 
EUCo X would have to engage with a range of new, strategic partnerships with trusted energy 
stakeholders, in particular Local Authorities, Registered Social Landlords and communities, 
                                                          
39 This scheme was to some extent different from the Green Deal. For instance, although the 
customer made no upfront investment for efficiency measures, this was covered by a personal 
loan, as opposed to a loan attached to the property (EUCO X 4) (Doc P) 
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because these represent important gatekeepers to large numbers of households that EUCo X 
could contract with in order to capture the economies of scale (X 1, 2 & 4) (Doc P).  
The Green Deal will be underpinned by the Energy Company Obligation (ECO) by making funds 
available for energy efficiency measures in homes that do not fulfil GD’s Golden Rule, whereby 
expected savings from measures repay the costs (DECC, 2011d), such as the typically expensive 
solid wall insulation. Like its predecessors CERT and CESP, ECO will continue to obligate Energy 
Utilities such as EUCo X to use some of their profits to reduce their carbon footprint and 
alleviate fuel poverty (X 4). EUCo X is likely to continue to seek ways of implementing cost-
effective efficiency measures and may indeed turn to household energy service contracting as 
a solution, as it has to date (X 3). However, as outlined in Section 6.1.4.2 & 6.1.4.3, there is no 
obligation for them to fulfil these energy company obligations via energy service contracting. 
6.2.4.9 Summary 
EUCo X has for a long time been a leading Energy Utility in the UK, selling both units of 
electricity and gas predominantly to residential customers. However, in recent years it has 
begun to develop an energy services division capable of providing EPCs and to a lesser extent 
ESCs, predominantly to commercial customers. The main reason for this shift has been the 
organisation’s realisation that the UK energy system is undergoing a radical transformation 
due to a combination of pressures (e.g. climate change, energy insecurity, energy affordability 
etc), which could seriously undermine the profitability of EUCo X in the future. This shift to the 
ESCo model has not proven easy considering Energy Utility X’s history of operating the EUCo 
model, however it has already delivered a handful of successful EPCs in the UK, serving to 
illustrate how ESCo and EUCo models can co-exist. Looking forward, EUCo X hopes to provide 
energy service contracts to the residential sector as part of the forthcoming Green Deal. 
6.2.5 Cross-Case Analysis 
In this sub-section we briefly discuss the common and divergent themes that have emerged 
from these 4 ESCo case studies. Firstly, the case studies help to highlight the common 
characteristics these ESCo variants share, which mean they can be grouped together as a 
population. Primarily the common characteristic these organisations share is that they assume 
a significant degree of financial and/or technical responsibility from their customers in order to 
provide them with energy services capable of satisfying their energy needs. These energy 
services included useful energy streams (e.g. electricity, hot water, cooling) or final energy 
services (e.g. heating, lighting), the latter normally in conjunction with a guarantee regarding 
quantity, quality and cost of these services. This contrasts against the Energy Utilities’ sale of 
energy units (e.g. gas, electricity) to their customers, where it is the customer, not the supplier, 
who is mainly responsible for converting this energy into useful energy streams or final energy 
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services, which is what the customer ultimately desires (e.g. hot water, lighting). Another 
common characteristic between the ESCos was their desire to capture the economies of scale 
to reduce their transaction costs and thus improve their profitability. 
Despite these characteristic similarities, the ESCo case studies highlight how these ESCo 
variants were also characteristically different in a variety of ways. For example, both 
Thameswey’s and MOZES’s core objectives were to alleviate fuel poverty, promote local 
economic growth and mitigate climate change. In contrast, both Honeywell and Energy Utility 
X’s main focus was to generate a financial profit. Another important characteristic difference 
was the resources each variant had at its disposal. MOZES and to a lesser extent Thameswey 
had relatively few technical and financial resources available to them, whilst Honeywell and 
Energy Utility X are extremely wealthy, multi-national corporations in comparison. 
These characteristic differences meant that to some extent these ESCos were sensitive to 
different enabling and inhibiting pressures, emanating from the wider UK energy system. For 
example, considering MOZES’s limited financial resources, the reduction in government capital 
grants for low-carbon energy projects in recent years had meant it had struggled to secure the 
necessary funds to cover the upfront capital costs for its proposed energy projects. In contrast, 
Thameswey could borrow money from Woking Borough Council, whilst Energy Utility X and 
Honeywell were able to draw on their own financial reserves, as well as secure finance from 
financial institutions. The ESCos also differed in how they had been affected by the economic 
recession. The economic downturn has halted Thameswey’s operational expansion for the 
foreseeable future, whilst it has made MOZES’s task of securing finance from the banks even 
more difficult. In contrast, the public sector cutbacks have represented a boon for Honeywell 
and Energy Utility X’s EPC divisions, considering how they had increased public sector 
organisations’ desire to reduce their energy expenditure. In terms of drivers, both Honeywell 
and Energy Utility X identified the CRC Energy Efficiency scheme as a key driver because it had 
raised the issue of minimizing carbon emissions up the corporate agenda of large 
organisations. However, this had done little to support the activities of MOZES and Thameswey 
who engage with either residential or small to medium sized enterprises (SMEs).  
Although the variation between these ESCos meant that they were often influenced by 
different environmental pressures, the ESCo variants were still influenced by some of the same 
developments in the UK energy system. For example, rising energy prices in the UK were 
identified as a driver in all the case studies, considering that they had raised demand from 
consumers for any service capable of reducing their energy spend. Additionally, the UK 
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government’s support for a transition to a low-carbon, secure and affordable energy system 
had positively influenced all four of the ESCos in some form or another.  
In summary, the case studies have served to highlight the strong degree of heterogeneity in 
the ESCo population. Furthermore, they have illustrated how these different ESCo variants 
have been influenced by some of the same environmental pressures in similar ways (e.g. rising 
energy prices). However, they have also underlined how these variants have in some instances 
been influenced by the same environmental pressures in very different ways (e.g. economic 
downturn). This demonstrates how the ESCo population has not reacted to changes in the UK 
energy system in a uniform manner and how some changes have served to support or inhibit 
certain variants’ operations more than others. We examine this further in the following 
chapters, as well as how the heterogeneity of the ESCo population has characterized the 
influence it has had on the wider UK energy system. 
6.3 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter we presented the findings from our empirical investigation. We began by 
outlining the core characteristics of the ESCo business model (Section 6.1.1), thus addressing 
RQ 1 and subsequently compared these with the incumbent EUCo model (Section 6.1.2) to 
highlight the characteristic differences between the two business models. We also introduced 
the strengths and weaknesses of the ESCo model (Section 6.1.3) to address RQ 2, which 
represent an important consideration when seeking to understand why the model has 
proliferated to the extent it has in the UK so far. Subsequently, we then explored the external 
factors that have influenced the uptake of the ESCo model in the UK (Section 6.1.4), serving to 
underline the multitude of pressures the ESCo population is subject to. In this sub-section we 
also identified the emerging factors interviewees believed would soon have an important 
bearing on the UK ESCo population’s evolution, most of which were centred around imminent 
or probable regulation. We then introduced the key variants of the ESCo population in the UK, 
outlining their core characteristics, as well as the factors that had been responsible for their 
emergence. Finally, we introduced four case studies of ESCos operating in the UK, each of 
which corresponded to one of the ESCo variants identified in Phase 1, i.e. Local Authority 
‘Arm’s Length’; Community Owned & Run; Energy Service Provider and Energy Utility Energy 
Service Provider. These served to highlight the different ESCo models being applied in the UK at 
present and how both similar and dissimilar factors have been responsible for these 
companies’ successes and failures. Furthermore, they illuminated how different types of ESCo 
have been responsible for influencing the UK energy system in different ways. 
233 
 
 
In the following chapters we draw upon these findings to discuss how and why the ESCo 
population has evolved in the UK and the extent to which this can be explained by the co-
evolutionary dynamic between ESCos and the various different dimensions of the UK energy 
system (Section 7). Furthermore, we look to the future and discuss not only how the ESCo 
population is likely to evolve but the influence it might have on the evolution of the wider 
energy system (Section 8).
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7 Co-evolution of the ESCo model with the UK energy system 
The aim of this chapter is to address research questions 3 & 4 (Section 1.5), which relate to the 
past and present co-evolutionary relationship between the ESCo population and the UK energy 
system. Consequently, this chapter seeks to provide valuable insight into how the various key 
dimensions of the UK energy system have causally influenced the evolution of the UK ESCo 
population to date and vice versa. In order to generate this insight we examine the findings of 
our empirical investigation presented in the previous chapter (Section 6) using our integrated 
analytical framework (Section 3).  
The chapter examines whether co-evolutionary mechanisms, and in particular positive 
feedback loops, can help to explain the persistent dominance of the EUCo model and the 
marginalisation of the ESCo model. Furthermore, we explore how co-evolutionary mechanisms 
might help to explain how the selection environment has begun to exhibit a greater fitness 
with the ESCo model in recent years. Taking a co-evolutionary perspective will also provide 
insight into how the ESCo population, as a niche market of organisations practicing a novel, 
sustainable business model, has influenced changes to the UK energy system. Doing so will 
help to elucidate our understanding of how the ESCo model might influence and even 
accelerate a transition to a sustainable energy system, which is discussed in detail in Section 8. 
This chapter begins by examining the various environmental factors that have served to shape 
the evolution of the ESCo population, focusing on the processes of variation, selection and 
retention (Section 7.1). Focusing on these factors is designed to help explain the heterogeneity 
of the ESCo population (variation); the extent to which the ESCo model has been adopted 
(selection) and the reasons why this model has persisted in the UK (retention).  
In Section 7.2 we broaden our analysis to examine the coevolutionary interactions between 
the ESCo business model population and the various dimensions that make up the UK energy 
system: incumbent business model, ecosystems, institutions, technologies, and user practices. 
Moving beyond an evolutionary analysis, we examine not only how these dimensions have 
causally influenced the evolution of the ESCo population but also how the evolution of these 
dimensions has been causally influenced by the activities of the ESCo population. We apply this 
co-evolutionary focus to provide additional insight into the factors responsible for the 
evolution of the ESCo population and the UK energy system. This is possible because a co-
evolutionary analysis, unlike a purely evolutionary analysis, takes into account how the ESCo 
population has in fact shaped the wider UK energy system, which constitutes the very 
environment that causally influences its own evolution. Unlike with the ESCo population, we 
do not undertake a full evolutionary analysis of the other UK energy system dimensions due to 
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both time and resource constraints, i.e. focusing on how the ESCo population has specifically 
influenced variation, selection and retention processes. This is identified as an avenue for 
future research in Section 10.3. Instead we focus on how the ESCo population has influenced 
characteristic changes in these systems and thus focus on their evolution in broader terms. 
7.1 Evolution of the ESCo population 
This section provides an initial analysis of the evolution of the ESCo population, which is 
expanded upon in the subsequent sections to take into account the coevolutionary 
interactions of this population with the wider UK energy system. 
Section 6.1.1 highlighted the characteristics common to the ESCo business model, enabling us 
to set ESCos apart from other organisations such as Energy Utilities, the differences of which 
were underlined in Section 6.1.2. Within the ESCo population, 4 key variants were identified 
that shared the core characteristics common to all ESCos but were also characteristically 
distinct from one another (Section 6.2): 
‘Everybody does everything slightly differently. You have got in the truest sense, the 
traditional [ESCo] model but in reality, it operates in different ways with different 
people’ (EUCo Senior Manager – B28) 
Both our sectoral and ESCo-level empirical investigation highlighted that ESCos can often vary 
with respect to following characteristics in the UK:  
 Sector (private, public, third) 
 Ownership (wholly owned, joint-venture, shareholders) 
 Organisational form (Public limited company, Charity, Community interest company) 
 Contract types (Energy Supply Contracting, Energy Performance Contracting) 
 Core objectives (profit, carbon reduction, fuel poverty alleviation etc) 
 Size (number of employees, size of premises) 
 Wealth (financial resources, technical resources) 
We now ask the question, which factors are responsible for this degree of variation in the UK 
ESCo population? This can be explained in part by how accessible ESCo model is to adoption by 
a broad range of organisations (e.g. Local Authorities, communities, equipment manufacturers 
etc). For instance, ESCos tend to deliver small to medium sized generation and demand 
management projects, making it much more accessible than the EUCo model, which instead 
focuses on the development of costly, large-scale centralised generation projects. The ESCo 
model’s focus on bespoke contracting (Section 6.1.1.1) also means it can be applied to fulfil a 
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wide variety of customers’ energy needs (e.g. commercial, residential, industrial etc), reflecting 
the flexibility of the model. 
The ESCo model’s degree of accessibility and flexibility is reflected by the wide range of 
organisations who have adopted the model, many of whom have not traditionally engaged in 
energy service provision, such as Local Authorities (e.g. Woking Borough Council, Aberdeen 
City Council), communities (e.g. Ashton Hayes, the Meadows), property developers (e.g. 
Galliford Try, Willmot Dixon), equipment manufacturers (e.g. Honeywell, Siemens) and 
facilities management companies (e.g. Mitie, Amey) (Appendix G – Section 12.6). This 
spectrum of organisations seeks to fulfil a range of primary objectives (e.g. profit generation, 
alleviation of fuel poverty, mitigate climate change etc). Consequently, variants of the ESCo 
model have emerged (Sections 6.1.5 & 6.2) as a result of these organisations actively moulding 
the ESCo model to fit their specific organisational needs: 
‘There are very large, sophisticated, multisided, multi-International or national 
companies and then you get smaller, medium-sized commercial buildings… [there are] 
different ESCos to meet different requirements’ (ESCo Senior Manager – B 15) 
Alongside this influx of new entrants into the UK ESCo market has also emerged a number of 
new actor partnerships between a range of public, private and third sector organisations. 
Some of these have taken the form of joint-venture ESCos, such as the Birmingham Energy 
Savers ESCo developed by Birmingham City Council and Birmingham Environmental 
Partnership (a Local Strategic Partnership which serves to deliver a better quality of life in 
Birmingham) (BEP, 2012), whilst others have taken the form of contractual agreements, such 
as between Cofely and Southampton City Council (Section 6.1.5.2) or British Gas and the 
community run MOZES (Section 6.2.2.4). Many of these partnerships have emerged as a 
means of pooling the different organisations’ resources and capabilities, in order to deliver a 
more successful energy service project (Section 6.1.1.7). The emergence of these partnerships 
has helped to increase the variation of the ESCo population as characteristically distinct 
organisations have formed hybrid, joint-venture ESCos. 
The lack of energy service market regulation, such as official standardized contracts or market 
rules, has meant few constraints or incentives currently exist that discourage business model 
experimentation or encourage a standard ESCo model to emerge:  
‘There isn't a standard at the moment…Every scheme seems to be different at the 
moment… it is quite new and quite fluid. Therefore, people are making it up as they go 
along’ (Senior EUCo Manager – A8) 
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Variation has however been constrained to some extent by the length of energy service 
contracts, which typically last for between 5 to 25 years. This is because both the ESCo and its 
customers are contractually locked into a particular type of service agreement for a long period 
of time, making it difficult for either party to engage in new forms of energy service contracting: 
‘It is very hard if you have a 20 year contract…to modify or change it to become a 
completely new type of contract……That in itself becomes a barrier to implementing 
other [business] models’ (Senior Investment Manager – A5) 
Evolutionary explanations can also provide valuable insight into the extent to which the ESCo 
model has proliferated in the UK to date, i.e. the selection process. In part this can be explained 
by the strengths and weaknesses of the business model from the perspective of not only the 
customer, i.e. the value proposition (Section 6.1.3), but also from the perspective of the 
organisations considering adopting and operating the ESCo model. However, the empirical 
investigation illustrated how the environment in which the ESCo model is applied also plays an 
important role in determining how widely it is adopted. This is evident from the plethora of 
extrinsic drivers and barriers that have either enabled or inhibited the adoption and subsequent 
operation of the ESCo model (Section 6.1.4). Therefore, the uptake of the ESCo model cannot 
purely be explained by the extent to which the model is perceived to satisfy the needs of a 
business and its customers but also the fitness of the model with its prevailing selection 
environment, such as with institutions, technologies etc. For instance, the ESCo model might be 
considered to represent a strong fit for both the needs of a particular actor looking to establish 
an energy company and a specific group of energy consumers. However, the ESCo model may 
not ultimately be applied because of numerous extrinsic barriers, which may for instance make 
applying the model too costly and/or difficult. Therefore, the ESCos’ selection environment 
represents an important consideration if we are to understand why the ESCo model has 
struggled to proliferate in the UK, even though it has enjoyed wide-scale uptake elsewhere 
(Section 5.5). 
Retention of the ESCo model refers to its characteristics being ‘preserved, duplicated, or 
otherwise reproduced’ (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006 p.17) from the present group of ESCos to future 
generations of ESCos operating in the UK ESCo market. Retention of the ESCo model is 
challenging at present because there is a distinct lack of awareness of the business model 
amongst both consumers and businesses, which has limited demand to replicate the model 
(Section 6.1.4.2). Furthermore, whilst the EUCo model only changes incrementally from 
customer to customer, the bespoke nature of the ESCo model means that it: ‘It doesn't tend to 
be highly replicable and that is a problem’ (Energy Services Provider Senior Manager - B 18). This 
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issue could be addressed via the introduction of a variety of standardized energy service 
contracts to satisfy the needs of different types of consumers and ESCos. However, the 
immaturity of the ESCo market has meant the ESCo model has not yet become institutionalized, 
in the form of market regulation. For instance, there is lack of nationally recognised standardized 
contracts for either ESCs or EPCs, by either government or trade associations, making retention 
of the ESCo model difficult. Recently however, local energy service contract procurement 
frameworks such as RE:FIT (Section 6.2.3.7) have improved the ESCo model’s prospects of 
retention via the introduction of standardised energy service contracts.  
In this sub-section we have applied evolutionary theory to help explain how and why the ESCo 
population has grown to exhibit the characteristics it does today. However, we argue that 
applying evolutionary theory alone can only go so far to improve our understanding of the role 
ESCos are likely to play in a transition to a sustainable UK energy system. This is because even 
though it takes into account how the ESCos’ socio-technical environment has characterized the 
ESCo population via evolutionary process (i.e. variation, selection and retention) and thus the 
size and characteristics of the ESCo population, it does not account for how the ESCo population 
has simultaneously causally influenced the evolution of the UK energy system. Consequently, it 
does not acknowledge how the ESCo population has shaped its own environment and the impact 
this may have had on its own evolution, via positive feedbacks for example. The same can be said 
for the EUCo model. Therefore, we apply our co-evolutionary analytical framework (Section 3.3) 
to identify how the UK energy system and ESCo and EUCo populations have simultaneously 
causally influenced one another’s evolution and how this has contributed to the marginalisation 
of the ESCo model and the continued dominance of the EUCo model. 
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7.2 Coevolutionary interactions 
In this sub-section we examine how the ESCo population has coevolved with the key dimensions 
of the wider UK energy system, for the reasons outlined in Sections 7 & 7.1.  
 
Figure 7.1 The coevolutionary relationship between the ESCo & EUCo business models and the wider UK 
energy system 
7.2.1 ESCos and Ecosystems 
Firstly, we examine how the ESCo business model has coevolved with ecosystems.  
The ecosystem dimension’s causal influence on the wider UK energy system is largely 
mediated through the other dimensions of the UK energy system, such as institutions. For 
instance, over the last 30 years, the UK has relied heavily on the extraction of oil and gas from 
its North Sea reserves to satisfy its energy needs. However, these reserves have gradually 
dwindled, with the UK becoming a net importer of energy in 2004 (DECC, 2011g), posing a real 
threat to the UK’s energy security (Section 1.3.2). Additionally, extraction and combustion of 
fossil fuels has resulted in a number of adverse environmental effects, namely climate change, 
air pollution, disposal of solid waste, destruction of natural habitat etc. These adverse 
ecosystem effects have placed pressure on UK energy system stakeholders to implement 
energy solutions capable of not only improving the UK’s energy security but also conserving 
the natural environment, consequently adding momentum to the pursuit of developing and 
implementing business models capable of delivering such solutions in a manner that is 
attractive to both suppliers and consumers: 
‘It just isn't sustainable. Gas and oil are going to run out...It is about [re]positioning 
[our business] now’ (Senior EUCo Manager – B 27) 
No major ecosystem change can yet be attributed to ESCo activity, however it is likely that 
existing ESCos have reduced the UK’s reliance on fossil fuels to a very small extent, by reducing 
consumers’ consumption of fossil fuels either using renewable energy as the primary energy 
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input to generate useful energy streams instead of fossil fuels or improving the efficiency with 
which fossil fuels are generated, distributed and consumed. This will have not only have 
resulted in a small reduction of fossil fuel related pollution (e.g. sulphur dioxide, nitrogen 
oxides etc) but also in the UK’s GHG emissions. This reduction can be illustrated by the various 
projects implemented by the ESCo case studies (Section 6.2), as well as Cofely’s ESCo 
operations, where their district heat schemes deliver approximately 77,000 tonnes of CO2 
savings per annum (Cofely, 2012). However, it is important to note that these carbon 
reductions are likely to have been partially offset by the rebound effect (Section 2.6.4). 
7.2.2 ESCos and Institutions 
Secondly, we examine how the ESCo population has coevolved with institutions.  
New regulation that either requires or incentivises organisations to engage in sustainable 
energy supply and demand side management solutions has helped to improve the business 
case of ESCos. These policies include financial incentives (e.g. Feed-in Tariffs, Renewable Heat 
Incentive), capital grant schemes (e.g. Local Energy Assessment Fund), finance schemes (e.g. 
Green Deal, Salix40) and low-carbon obligations (e.g. Low-Carbon Building Regulations, CRC 
Energy Efficiency Scheme, CERT) (see Section 5.4 for details of some of these policies). One of 
the most important regulatory developments for ESCos has been the introduction of financial 
incentives (e.g. FiT, RHI) in place of many of the capital grant schemes (e.g.  Low Carbon 
Buildings Programme). These incentives provide a long-term revenue stream (normally up to 
20 years) rather than upfront capital grants (see Section 5.4). In the past residential and 
commercial consumers could access capital grants to cover the upfront costs of sustainable 
energy measures themselves. However, their decline has effectively created a role for 
organisations such as ESCos to cover the upfront capital costs of delivering these measures in 
place of the grant schemes. In return they are able to capture low-carbon energy financial 
incentives as a revenue stream, such as the FiT & RHI: 
‘The barrier [to energy projects] is the upfront capital cost, so why are we giving them 
a long-term revenue stream?...The institutional and policy arrangements might lead 
you to an ESCo [because] if you gave a grant, what is the role for ESCo? [But] if you've 
got a FiT, you might get a role for an ESCo. The RHI will be the same issue’ (Energy 
Efficiency Expert - A 7) 
                                                          
40 Salix is a not for profit, independent social enterprise that provides funding to public sector 
organisations, via loans and grants, for proven technologies which are cost effective in 
reducing GHG emissions (SALIX, 2012) 
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The emergence of this new regulatory framework has helped to provide ESCos, as well as their 
partners and customers, with greater certainty that there is a significant national commitment 
to a low-carbon transition and that this commitment will last. This has helped to attract 
investment and encourage employers to develop the skills necessary to take advantage of this 
new market opportunity, a lack of which had been cited as a traditional barrier to ESCo market 
development. However, swift and unexpected changes to the regulatory framework have 
served to undermine ESCos’ confidence in the government’s commitment, raising questions 
around the robustness of the framework. For instance, the cases of Honeywell, MOZES and 
Thameswey all help to illustrate how severe and unexpected cuts to the Feed-in-Tariff (FiT) 
have significantly reduced their management’s confidence in how the regulatory framework 
would develop in the future. A series of major amendments to the CRC Energy Efficiency 
scheme has also had a similar effect for Honeywell (Section 6.2.3.7).  
Actors’ lack of confidence in the shape the regulatory framework will take in the future and 
their lack of ability to foresee how their selection environment will develop going forward have 
together served to limit their capacity to plan ahead. This has in turn encouraged indecision 
and inertia from these actors. This had a negative impact on ESCos taking the necessary 
decisions to make additional investments in their energy service operations and is likely to 
have dissuaded some entrepreneurs from taking the decision to adopt the ESCo model: 
‘If the government keeps chopping & changing, there isn’t a stable platform to go 
forward and start planning’ (Thameswey Energy Managing Director – T 2) 
‘You have to then adopt a ‘wait and see’ policy because you can’t be sure what you will 
be targeted to achieve when they reform or replace the legislation you are trying to 
achieve at the moment…So what do I prioritise, on the basis that I don’t know what 
legislation is going to incentivise me to do’ (Honeywell Senior Manager – H 2) 
The complexity of the regulatory framework, and the difficulty associated with identifying and 
navigating the various regulatory drivers and barriers has also made this decision making 
process more challenging.  
Despite the regulatory framework being broadly supportive of ESCo activity, many 
interviewees argued there was still much more that could be done to improve the uptake of 
the ESCo model. For example, they cited the lack of a mandatory GHG reduction target for 
cities and a law similar to Denmark’s 1979 Heat Supply Law41. Conversely, although some 
                                                          
41 Provides Danish local authorities the power to mandate that new and existing buildings 
connect to public heat supply (DEA, 2005) 
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recently introduced regulation has proven supportive of the ESCo model (see earlier in sub-
section), other energy regulation has presented a challenge to ESCos. For instance, Ofgem’s 
recent provision for third party access to private gas and electricity networks, in reaction to a 
change in European law following the Citiworks case in Germany (Section 6.2.1.8), customers 
now have the option to switch energy suppliers and thus avoid being subject to a monopoly 
(OFGEM, 2011). Although this is likely to promote fairer competition, it will also undermine 
ESCos confidence in the number of customers they are likely to supply via their own private 
wire and thus their ability to predict how commercially viable an energy supply project might 
be. This is likely to adversely affect an ESCo’s ability to secure the necessary funds to cover the 
upfront capital costs of the scheme. Non-energy regulation has also served to undermine ESCo 
growth, such as the Landlord & Tenant Act and OJEU procurement law (Section 6.1.4.2).  
Institutions also encompass the ‘rules of the game’ governing the financial sector. The 
emergence of a low-carbon regulatory framework has improved ESCos’ prospects of securing 
finance, as it has provided investors (e.g. banks, hedge funds etc) with greater confidence in 
the projected rate of return they might expect from sustainable energy and thus ESCo projects. 
However, many investors were considered unfamiliar with the ESCo model, meaning that 
many of them had failed to seek out opportunities to support ESCos, whilst others were 
sceptical of those opportunities that had presented themselves42. Moreover, they have 
continued to support the larger, more lucrative centralised Energy Utility led energy projects, 
which they have traditionally financed, channelling valuable financial resources away from 
ESCos and towards Energy Utilities, helping to reinforce their dominance, a process outlined by 
Aldrich and Ruef (2006). The difficulty ESCos currently face in securing finance from private 
sector investors is particularly damaging considering the decline of grant schemes in recent 
years. We elaborate upon this phenomenon in Section 7.2.5. 
Interviewees broadly agreed that the ESCo population has so far had a limited impact on 
regulation and thus the evolution of energy related institutions. This impression is supported 
by the little attention the ESCo model has received in recent white paper publications. For 
instance, it received only a passing mention in the previous government’s 2010 Warmer 
Homes, Green Homes; A Strategy for Household Energy Management (DECC, 2010f), despite 
being referred to extensively in the preceding 2009 Heat & Energy Saving Strategy 
consultation (DECC, 2009). ESCos also barely featured in the current government’s The Future 
of Heating: A strategic framework for low carbon heat in the UK (DECC, 2012n), despite 
                                                          
42 Uncertainty in future developments coupled with an economic recession had meant 
financial institutions had ‘less of an appetite for risk’ (B 29) encouraging many to shy away 
from investing in the ESCo model because they were generally unfamiliar with it 
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representing a business model well suited to the provision of useful energy streams such as 
heat.  
To date no regulation has been introduced with the explicit purpose of supporting ESCo 
activity. However, the ESCo model was referred to a number of times in the impact assessment 
for the government’s planned Green Deal (DECC, 2011f) (Section 6.1.4.3). Additionally, ESCos 
played some role in the government’s removal of an article within the Local Government Act 
1976, which had prohibited Local Authorities (LAs) from selling electricity not generated in 
conjunction with heat (DECC, 2010b) and thus restricted LAs scope to operate in the energy 
sector. For instance, Thameswey’s activities were cited by the Energy Minister at the time as 
having helped to demonstrate the value of LAs being able to sell electricity and how the 
existing regulatory framework was undermining their business (Section 6.2.1.7). 
7.2.3 ESCos and Technology 
Thirdly, we examine how the UK ESCo population has co-evolved with energy technologies. 
The financial viability of energy service contracts is strongly influenced by the costs and 
performance of the energy conversion and demand management technologies ESCos utilise to 
provide energy services. In recent years the cost-effectiveness of a range of sustainable energy 
technologies has improved, such as low-carbon primary conversion technologies, including PV, 
solar thermal and wind generation technologies (Nemet, 2006, Hearps and McConnell, 2011). 
This can mainly be attributed to ‘learning and economies of scale associated with large-scale 
global deployment – not just improvements in technical efficiency’ (Hearps and McConnell, 
2011 p.1). Although ESCos have enjoyed falling costs for some energy technologies, a number  
of other measures are still considered too expensive to be cost-effective for ESCos. For 
instance external wall insulation, which can improve the energy efficiency of properties 
without wall or loft cavities, was often considered non-cost effective because despite 
providing greater reductions on the customer’s energy bills than loft and cavity wall insulation, 
it costs significantly more, outweighing this cost benefit (EST, 2012).   
In some cases new technologies have entered the market, such as residential and commercial 
LED lighting, which has considerably improved the business case of ESCos offering EPCs by 
presenting them with the opportunity to identify significant cost savings in their customers 
energy bills compared to the use of incandescent or compact fluorescent ligthbulbs (CFL) (EST, 
2011, USDE, 2012): 
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 ‘The thing about LED lighting is that instead of saving 10 or 30%, you can save 80%43. 
And then the idea of a performance guarantee finance project becomes very easy, 
because the returns are so huge you can say to the client I guarantee I will save you 
40% of your lighting costs’ (Senior Investment Manager - A 5) 
Infrastructural constraints were also cited as an important barrier, such as the load capacity of 
district electricity distribution networks, which has served to limit the number of PV 
installations that can be linked to the grid on anyone line (Section 6.2.2.7). Numerous key 
infrastructural constraints relating to District Heat (DH) networks were also identified, such as 
the technical difficulty and cost of implementing a DH network in a historical, densely 
populated area. Despite these infrastructural limitations, the age and inefficiency of the UK’s 
housing stock represents a large market for demand side management solutions with 
approximately only half of all households having been fitted with loft and cavity wall insulation 
(DECC, 2011c). The ESCo model has also been supported in some instances by existing 
infrastructure, such as private electricity and heat networks, which ESCos have been able to 
utilise to provide energy services, as illustrated by the case of Thameswey Energy. 
Consequently, technologies and infrastructure (i.e. systems of technologies) can be considered 
to play an important role in shaping the ESCos’ selection environment. 
The adoption of the ESCo model has triggered some small-scale but important changes to the 
UK’s mix of energy technologies, as well as its energy infrastructure. For instance, 123,758 PV 
installations at or below 4kW (approximately 360,291kW of capacity) were registered for the 
Feed-in-Tariff scheme during 2011 (DECC, 2012k)44. A significant number of these were 
domestic roof-top installations, installed free-of-charge to the consumer by ESCos, as part of 
long-term energy supply contracts where the ESCo captured the feed-in-tariff whilst the 
consumer enjoyed the electricity generated by the systems (Section 6.2.2.4). For instance, A 
Shade Greener, a leading ESCo, claims to have installed nearly 10,000 free PV system 
installations since 2010 (ASG, 2012).  
The case of Thameswey Energy also helps to illustrate how ESCos have had a major impact on 
energy infrastructure in some local areas. In Woking for instance, TEL has installed 2.6MW of 
electricity, 3.2MW of heat and 1.7MW of cooling generation capacity (Thorp, 2007), which 
mainly consists of CHP and PV generation technologies. This is sufficient to satisfy the 
electricity and heat needs of over 2,000 households (Thameswey, 2012d). They have also had a 
                                                          
43 LED lights costs significantly more than CFL and incandescent light bulbs but use 
approximately 80% less energy than a 60W incandescent to provide similar lighting levels and 
lasts for a much longer period of time, providing a significant lifetime cost saving (USDE, 2012) 
44 PV systems installed after the 15th July 2009 is eligible for the FiT (Feed-in-Tariffs Ltd, 2012) 
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profound impact on Milton Keynes’ energy infrastructure, installing two CHP units, with an 
electrical output of 6.4 MW, which serves approximately 1,100 businesses and households in 
the town (Thameswey, 2012c).  
Other ESCos have had a much wider impact on the nation’s energy infrastructure. For 
example, Cofely GDF Suez is responsible for the operation, maintenance and management of 
300MW of boilers, 74MW of chilled capacity, 40MW of CHP and 55km of district heating and 
cooling pipework in the UK (Cofely, 2012). Their energy supply contracting extends throughout 
most of England, covering major cities such as London, Manchester, Birmingham, 
Southampton and Leicester (Cofely, 2012). These examples help to emphasise that whilst the 
operations of ESCos cannot be considered to have dramatically altered the UK energy 
infrastructure, they have had a significant impact on the infrastructure of some major towns 
and cities, throughout the UK. 
7.2.4 ESCos and User Practices 
Fourthly, we examine how the UK ESCo population has evolved with energy consumers’ user 
practices. 
Technological innovation, greater GDP per capita and falling energy prices have combined to 
make energy services increasingly attainable for much of the UK population during the 19th and 
20th centuries (Fouquet and Pearson, 2006). However, in recent years, the high level of 
demand for energy services, coupled with significant international oil and gas price rises 
(DECC, 2011g) and falling real wages due to the economic downturn, has meant that the costs 
of energy services have increased for most domestic and commercial consumers. Therefore, 
whilst demand for energy remains high, consumers have found it increasingly difficult to be 
able to afford to satisfy their energy needs. This has helped to generate demand for services 
that can reduce customers’ current energy costs, such as energy service contracting. 
User practices have also begun to alter in reaction to the challenges of reducing carbon 
emissions and other environmental impacts associated with energy use. A number of 
interviewees recognised that recently there had been a significant increase in the demand for 
environmentally sustainable products & services, particularly amongst commercial consumers. 
This can mainly be attributed to the various environmental regulations organisations are now 
subject to (e.g. CRC energy efficiency scheme, low-carbon building regulations etc) (Section 
5.4). This trend can also be attributed to these organisations’ desire to improve the value 
proposition they extend to their more environmentally minded customers. This trend is 
encapsulated by the proliferation of Corporate Social Responsibility commitments, which 
many organisations have sought to fulfil by engaging with energy service contracting.  
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An important user practice related barrier to the uptake of the ESCo model was the lack of 
consumer awareness and understanding of the ESCo model. However, in recent years it was 
explained that awareness and understanding were slowly improving. In part this change can be 
attributed to the work of a small and informal social network of ESCo champions, some of 
whom have worked together to promote awareness and understanding of the ESCo model by 
engaging with energy stakeholders outside the energy service market niche outside this niche. 
It can also be attributed to a positive feedback where as more and more energy service 
contracts have been completed, more and more energy stakeholders have come into contact 
with the ESCo model. Consequently, consumer and stakeholder awareness and understanding 
of the ESCo model has improved. This has not only meant that the profile of the ESCo model 
has been raised but that a range of unfounded, negative preconceptions of the ESCo model 
have been addressed, helping to reduce consumer and energy stakeholder scepticism of the 
model. Consequently, this has increased the likelihood of more energy service contracts being 
signed, bringing us back to the beginning of the loop (Figure 7.2): 
 ‘The only thing that is going to accelerate the business [model] is more EPCs being 
completed…We need the innovators to be innovative and crack on with putting EPCs in 
place…[to show] the [energy] savings are proven, to demonstrate this is how you do 
one and procure one, [in order to make people] more comfortable with it’ (H 2) 
 
Figure 7.2 Positive feedback loop involving customer awareness and understanding of the ESCo model 
In some cases the ESCo model, has reduced consumers’ control over fulfilling their energy 
needs as the ESCo takes the majority of the responsibility for doing so. However, in other cases 
it has served to increase consumers’ control over how they fulfil their energy needs by 
providing them with ownership and control over the ESCo responsible for these needs. This 
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can probably be best illustrated by the emergence of a number of community ESCos, such as 
MOZES, which is owned and managed by local energy users, who take responsibility for 
financing, installing, operating and maintenance of PV systems to generate electricity for the 
community. Customer controlled ESCos, such as MOZES and TEL, enable the user to identify 
ways of fulfilling their energy needs that are in synergy with their broader set of objectives. 
These ESCos may be economically, environmentally, socially and/or politically oriented, such as 
supporting the local economy or alleviating fuel poverty. Furthermore, these types of 
arrangements fundamentally change the consumer-supplier dynamic because the consumers, 
via the ESCo, act as generators and suppliers. The case of Thameswey Energy illustrates a 
similar dynamic, where instead of the community owning the ESCo, it is the council. 
Furthermore, TEL provides the council with much of its heating, electricity and cooling needs. 
User practices have also exhibited change even they have contracted with an external Energy 
Service Provider (Section 6.1.5.2), which they have neither direct ownership nor control of. For 
instance, traditionally the relationship between Energy Utilities and their customers has been 
distant. In contrast, as part of an energy service contract, there is a large degree of 
communication and collaboration between the user and the ESCo. Both supply and 
performance contracts often require the user to engage at the project-design stage, so that 
the ESCo designs a project that is in synergy with their consumption needs and behaviours. 
Furthermore, EPCs often stipulate that the customer alters their consumption behaviour in 
certain ways to ensure sufficient energy savings are delivered to cover the capital costs of the 
project (Section 6.2.3.4).  
7.2.5 Competition between ESCos and Energy Utilities 
Finally, we examine the co-evolutionary relationship between the ESCo population and the 
incumbent EUCo population.  
As Section 5.4 explained, the Big 6 Energy Utilities currently dominate the UK energy sector 
and continue to generate extremely healthy profits, which dwarf those of the ESCo market in 
the UK. Interestingly, the Energy Utilities continue to dominate the UK energy market despite 
delivering poor levels of customer satisfaction, where only 42% of surveyed customers 
believed their Energy Utility’s services represented value for money in 2011 (uSwitch, 2011). 
Although the rise and continued dominance of the EUCo model is likely to be a product of a 
multitude of factors at work over a number of decades, it can in part be explained by positive 
feedback mechanisms, which represent a particular type of co-evolutionary dynamic (Unruh, 
2000) (Section 2.3.3.1).  
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One particular group of positive feedback mechanisms are increasing returns, as outlined by 
Arthur (1989) and North (1990) (Section 2.3.3.1). Drawing on our empirical evidence, the 
Energy Utilities can be understood to have benefitted from scale economies, meaning that as 
they have become larger and increasingly vertically integrated, their transaction costs have 
fallen for each unit of energy they supply, helping them to become more cost-effective45. 
Lower costs have in turn attracted more customers, which has helped to further improve their 
economies of scale: 
‘[They] all have one or 2 million customers. Their overhead costs of supply, billing etc 
are as low as you can get them…It is difficult to see how you are going to be able to 
undercut British Gas or n.Power on a cost basis’ (A 7) 
Adaptive expectations have also helped the EUCo model to gain traction, where increasing 
adoption of the business model has served to reduce levels of uncertainty surrounding its use. 
Over the years key energy stakeholders (e.g. investors, policymakers, customers etc) have 
become increasingly familiar with the model, reducing their uncertainty of it and making them 
more comfortable about engaging with it46.  
Turning to other forms of positive feedbacks that have helped lock-in the EUCo model, the 
wealth and political power the Energy Utilities currently wield has meant they have both 
advertently and inadvertently influenced the evolution of various aspects of the energy 
system, which has broadly helped to cultivate a selection environment that is supportive of 
their operations (Wüstenhagen and Boehnke, 2008). A good example of this relates to the 
persistence of Energy Utilities obligations (e.g. EEC, CERT, CESP) (Section 5.4), which arose out 
of the necessity to reduce the GHG emissions content of Utilities’ energy supply in the context 
of mounting pressure to mitigate climate change. At first glance these obligations seem to 
undermine the EUCo model (Section 5.4), however the Energy Utilities have traditionally 
discharged these obligations ‘without any sort of detailed intervention on a house by house 
basis [meaning that] it hasn't changed their business model fundamentally’ (Energy Efficiency 
Expert – A 7). Therefore, the obligations neither encourage nor obligate the Utilities to 
fundamentally change their business model, enabling them to continue to operate as normal, 
where their revenue is coupled with the sale of energy units normally sourced from fossil fuels. 
Additionally, the obligations have served to legitimize the EUCo model as the UK government 
has designed these flagship, low-carbon energy policies around the Energy Utilities’ business 
                                                          
45 If an increase in operational scale continues unabated, the company may suffer from the 
diseconomies of scale (e.g. duplication of effort, increase internal communication costs etc) 
46 Later in this sub-section we provide an example relating to investment from financial 
institutions to help illustrate this 
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model, reflecting the government’s belief that the EUCo model forms part of the solution to 
decarbonising the UK energy system, as opposed to part of the problem.  
The energy company obligations have therefore enabled the Energy Utilities to operate their 
business as usual and thus retain their current levels of political power and wealth in the UK, 
continuing to afford them considerable influence over regulatory developments. A number of 
leading academics have explained that incumbent companies, such as the Energy Utilities, tend 
to wield their political power to actively shape the regulatory landscape to suit their needs, 
normally via such means as political lobbying (Wüstenhagen and Boehnke, 2008, Unruh, 2000, 
Mitchell, 2012, Gkiousou, 2011, Murmann, 2003, Stenzel and Frenzel, 2008, Hekkert et al., 
2007) and by seconding members of their companies to the Department of Energy & Climate 
Change (Mitchell, 2012).  Although our investigation did not reveal specific empirical evidence 
to indicate that the Energy Utilities have actively shaped CERT, CESP and ECO in such a way 
that benefits their cause, we find that a number of the large Energy Utilities have responded to 
consultations on these obligations in an effort to shape their development. For example, both 
British Gas and Scottish & Southern Energy responded to DECC’s Energy Company Obligation 
and Green Deal consultation, with a specific set of recommendations (Centrica, 2012, SSE, 
2012). Consequently, it is possible that the influence of the Energy Utilities on the design of the 
new Energy Company Obligation (DECC, 2011f) helped to ensure that the policy continues to 
place no obligation on the Utilities to fundamentally alter their business model so that they are 
incentivised to satisfy their customers’ energy needs sustainably (Section 6.2.4.8), bringing us 
back to the beginning of the positive feedback loop (Figure 7.3). 
 
Figure 7.3 Positive feedback loop between Energy Utility population and UK regulatory framework 
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The dominance of the Energy Utility population has also had an important bearing on the 
evolution of the ESCo population. Some of the positive feedback mechanisms that have served 
to ‘lock-in’ the EUCo model by creating a more favourable selection environment for Utilities 
have in turn helped to ‘lock-out’ the ESCo model by cultivating a more hostile selection 
environment for ESCos. Even though ESCos and Energy Utilities operate in the same selection 
environment, the two perform differently because they are characteristically distinct. This 
helps to explain why in the UK energy system, the EUCo model has thrived and remained the 
incumbent, whilst the ESCo model has merely enjoyed niche applications. We now illustrate 
this dynamic with a couple of examples. 
Earlier in this sub-section we identified how the increasing return adaptive expectations 
(North, 1990, Arthur, 1989) could help to explain the dominance of the utilities. This 
phenomenon was observed with respect to the Energy Utilities and the financial institutions. 
The Energy Utility market is mature, having existed in one form or another for most of the 20th 
and 21st centuries  and in the form of the Big 6 since the late 1990s/early 2000s (Section 5). 
During this time the financial institutions (e.g. banks) have become increasingly familiar with 
the EUCo model and importantly with the risk-reward trade-off associated with investing in 
the Utilities’ energy projects. However, they are not as familiar with the ESCo model, 
considering its niche status, meaning they are typically less willing to invest in ESCo projects as 
they are unfamiliar with the risk-reward trade-off (Section 7.2.2). Consequently, many financial 
institutions have favoured investment in Energy Utility projects because they are more 
comfortable with the associated risk-reward trade-off that than with ESCo projects.  
This has consequently stunted the growth of the ESCo market because some ESCos, 
particularly with the decline of capital grant schemes, have been unable to obtain the 
necessary upfront capital to successfully deliver and complete energy service contracts. Doing 
so would help to raise the profile of the ESCo model and in turn help to alert financial 
institutions to the investment opportunity the ESCo model represents. However, the lack of 
finance available to ESCos has limited the number of delivered energy service contracts 
delivered in the UK so far and has in turn limited the financial institutions’ exposure to ESCos, 
thus constraining their awareness and understanding of the ESCo model. The effect has been 
that many of these institutions have remained sceptical about investing in ESCos and have 
continued to favour investment in the Energy Utilities’ projects, bringing us to the beginning of 
the feedback loop. Figure 7.4 illustrates these positive feedbacks, with the feedbacks locking-in 
the EUCo model on the right and the feedback locking-out the ESCo model on the left. 
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Figure 7.4 Co-evolution of ESCo and Energy Utility populations, focusing on financial institutional 
arrangements 
This process can however work in reverse for ESCos. As illustrated in Section 6.1.4.1, 
awareness of the ESCo model has increased within the financial community over the past few 
years as more energy service contracts have been provided, thus helping to increase the 
availability of finance for ESCos: 
‘One of the initial barriers was the financial community catching up and recognising it 
as a viable business model [now] I think there are people looking to invest in ESCos’ (B 
30)  
As ESCos have found funding easier to come by they have encountered fewer barriers to 
delivering energy service contracts, helping to increase the number of contracts being 
delivered. This in turn has helped to raise the profile of the ESCo model in the financial 
community and again improve their prospects of securing finance, helping the ESCo model to 
gain momentum. This could serve to channel funds away from the Energy Utility population in 
the future and potentially adversely affect the development of large-scale, centralised 
generation projects. 
Another example of how lock-in of the EUCo model has adversely influenced the prospects of 
the ESCo model can be illustrated by the case of the British Electricity Trading and 
Transmission Arrangements (BETTA) (Section 5.3). These arrangements were introduced in 
2005 to foster competition in the wholesale electricity market and help to balance electricity 
supply and demand. BETTA is designed to support large-scale, centralised, predictable fossil-
fuelled and nuclear generation (which forms the bedrock of the EUCo business model) to 
ensure sufficient energy capacity is delivered at low cost, as opposed to intermittent, small-
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scale, decentralised generation (Mitchell, 2008, Woodman and Baker, 2008), as frequently 
practiced by ESCos providing ESCs.  
The manner in which BETTA does not support ESCos providing ESCs can be illustrated by the 
case of Thameswey Energy (Section 6.2.1.7), where due to high costs associated with joining 
the ‘electricity pool’ (e.g. connectivity) meant that Thameswey made the decision to opt out of 
joining it. Opting out of the electricity pool has in some respects reduced their overheads 
compared to other companies who are members of the pool, helping Thameswey to offer a 
competitive price for electricity to its customers via private wire (Section 6.2.1.7). However, 
the trade-off is that Thameswey has to adhere to the terms of the electricity licence 
exemptions, which have restricted the scale of its generation, distribution and supply 
operations (Section 6.2.1.7). Furthermore, by not being party to this pool, Thameswey has had 
to cover the substantial capital costs of a installing and managing a private wire network in 
order to supply electricity to its customers. By opting out of the pool, the size of Thameswey’s 
customer base is also limited by the size of its private wire network. This example illustrates 
how BETTA limits ESCos’ economies of scale, thus constraining their profit margin and in turn 
limiting growth of the ESCo market. This can in turn mean the ESCo community does not wield 
sufficient power to alter these arrangements in their favour.  
Conversely, BETTA does not place the same restrictions on the scale of licensed electricity 
companies’ operations of Energy Utilities and as a member of the pool they also have access to 
a much larger customer base than private wire electricity suppliers (e.g. Thameswey). This 
means they can enjoy stronger economies of scale and thus, lower transactions costs per kWh 
of energy sold, which helps to strengthen their profit margin. Consequently, we concur with 
Mitchell (2008) that BETTA has served to ‘maintain the status quo’ (p.145) by fortifying the 
dominance of the Energy Utilities. In turn, the Utilities have had the opportunity to wield this 
power to influence market developments and preserve these market rules in a bid to ensure 
their business model remains profitable. We present these positive feedback mechanisms in 
Figure 7.5. Here the feedback locking-in the EUCo model is presented on the right and the 
feedback locking-out the ESCo model is on the left. 
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Figure 7.5 Co-evolution of ESCo and Energy Utility populations, focusing on electricity market 
institutional arrangements 
For a relationship to be co-evolutionary, the two populations must causally influence one 
another’s evolution (Murmann, 2003, Norgaard, 1994, Nitecki, 1983). So far we have 
predominantly illustrated how the Energy Utility population has co-evolved with other 
dimensions of the UK energy system (particularly institutions) and emphasised how this has 
had an impact upon the evolution of the ESCo population. As a result, we now examine how 
the emergence of the ESCo model in the UK has influenced the evolution of the Energy 
Utilities.  
The emergence of the ESCo market has had the effect of triggering variation in the traditionally 
homogenous Energy Utility population, as we have observed many of the Utilities diversifying 
their operations to include energy service contracting (Sections 6.1.5.3 & 6.2.4), despite the 
continued profitability of the EUCo model (Consumer Focus, 2012). Five of the six major 
Energy Utilities were found to have recently delivered demand and/or supply side energy 
service contracts to their customers, with 3 of the Utilities offering both demand and supply 
side energy services. For example, EDF has recently signed an EPC contract with the 
supermarket Morrisons, guaranteeing £1 million worth of energy savings per year across its 
stores (EDF, 2011). EDF also currently hold a 34% stake in Dalkia, one of the world’s leading 
providers of energy supply contracts for heat provision. Energy Utility X has also made great 
strides to develop its energy service contracting capabilities by recruiting energy service 
experts and acquiring both ESCos and specialist energy solutions firms (Section 6.2.4).  
The Energy Utility X case study helps to illustrate the reasons why some Energy Utilities have 
exhibited variation by adopting aspects of the ESCo model. For instance, they regarded energy 
service contracting as an effective means of adding value to their service propositions, which 
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could help them to gain competitive advantage over their competitors and grow their market 
share. Additionally, this move was also a reaction to the Utilities’ acknowledgement that a 
period of accelerated energy system change was underway, which could conceivably pose a 
long-term threat to the viability of their traditional business model by transforming their 
selection environment. They highlighted developments such as the introduction of low-carbon 
regulation, changing customer demand, rising energy prices etc as indicators of this change. 
Adopting the ESCo model, at least in part, is evidence of the Utilities acting to restructure their 
business model and thus reposition their business in a bid to ensure they are able to operate 
successfully in this new selection environment, rather than being a victim of it. This strategy is 
embodied by a speech delivered by the CEO of Energy Utility X’s parent organisation (Section 
6.2.4.8): 
‘Within a few years, we want energy services to be just as big a part of [Energy Utility 
X] as energy supply…Indeed as I see it, the old utility business model is dead…It is my 
belief that the energy company model we know today will, within this decade, seem 
just as much a thing of the past as the Gas Light and Coke Company. And from where I 
stand, I can already see it happening’ (Chief Executive of EUCo X’s Parent Company) 
7.3 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has served to highlight how the ESCo population has co-evolved with the key 
dimensions of the wider UK energy system. Importantly, it has demonstrated how co-
evolutionary processes and in particular positive feedbacks have helped the EUCo model 
become and remain dominant in the UK, at the expense of the ESCo model. However, similar 
mechanisms are also responsible for improving the ESCo model’s degree of fitness with its 
selection environment and thus, helping to explain why the ESCo model has begun to gain 
momentum in the UK in recent years. Consequently, the ESCo population is beginning to have 
a more pronounced effect on the evolution of the UK energy system, even to the extent where 
the incumbent Energy Utilities are beginning to restructure their business model to deliver 
energy service contracts. This indicates that the ESCo model may indeed play an important role 
in the transition to a sustainable UK energy system, which constitutes the focus of the 
following chapter. 
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8 Future evolution of the ESCo model in relation to a low-carbon 
transition of the UK energy system 
In the previous chapter we outlined the past and present co-evolutionary relationship between 
the ESCo population and the wider UK energy system. We now examine how this relationship 
is likely to develop in the future by drawing upon insight from the ESCo population’s past and 
present coevolutionary relationship with the energy system, as well as evidence from our 
empirical investigation and other research relating to emerging developments that will have an 
important influence on UK energy system change (e.g. regulatory changes, energy prices, 
climate change, economic development etc). This will in turn provide us with a stronger 
understanding of the role ESCos are likely to play in a transition to a sustainable UK energy 
system. For comparison, at the end of this chapter (Section 8.2.6), we discuss how this 
research’s vision of how the UK energy system and ESCo market will evolve in the future 
compares with that provided by the Transition Pathways research project (Foxon, 2012). 
Subsequently, we identify a number of policy recommendations that could help the ESCo 
model to gain additional traction in the UK. 
It is important to note that it is difficult to predict with any strong degree of certainty the role 
ESCos will play in a transition of the UK energy system, considering that a lot of uncertainty 
continues to surrounds the nature of this transition, as illustrated by the three potential 
transition pathways presented by (Foxon, 2012) and the six presented by DECC’s 2050 
pathways (DECC, 2010a). Uncertainty exists because of the potential for unforeseen 
perturbations in the energy system to take place, such as the emergence of radical 
technologies innovations, unexpected changes to regulation or major energy crises such as in 
Chernobyl and Fukishima, which can serve to dramatically change the direction of a socio-
technical transition and consequently severely alter the selection environment for ESCos. 
8.1 Expected changes to the ESCo population 
A strong degree of variation is expected to continue to characterise the UK ESCo population 
due to the expectation amongst interviewees that the different ESCo variants introduced in 
Sections 6.1.5 & 6.2 are likely to continue to exist in the future. However, it is expected that 
some variants are likely to struggle more than others, in particular Community ESCos (Sections 
6.1.5 & 6.2.2), who are likely to continue to find it difficult to secure the necessary financial 
resources to deliver energy service projects in light of the decline of capital grant schemes and 
the difficulty they have faced securing finance during a prolonged economic downturn. In 
contrast, it is expected that the Energy Service Providers will enjoy the greatest traction 
amongst all the ESCo variants as their personal wealth and strong connections with financial 
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institutions means that securing funding presents a much less significant barrier when 
compared to the other ESCo variants.  However, whilst it is expected that some ESCo variants 
are likely to proliferate more than others going forward, it is expected that there will continue 
to be a broad range of characteristically distinct organisations operating the ESCo model in the 
UK (e.g. Local Authorities, communities, energy equipment manufacturers), with a view to 
satisfy the needs of a variety of different customers.  
The empirical investigation identified that a number of new entrants may indeed enter the UK 
ESCo market, such as supermarkets and foreign ESCos (e.g. the US’s Amerseco). In relation to 
the former it was thought supermarkets (e.g. Tesco) could capitalise upon their experience of 
harnessing both efficiencies and the economies of scale, as well as their focus on branding as a 
tool to increase the uptake of their products and services to provide a competitive energy 
service contract package. However, it was expected that supermarkets would have to forge 
partnerships with more traditionally energy focused organisations to effectively develop and 
deliver energy service contracts. Focusing briefly on the entrance of foreign ESCos into the UK, 
it was considered that these organisations would be particularly attracted by the potential in 
the UK to deliver either ESCs or EPCs, when considering not only the nascent nature of the UK 
ESCo market at present but also consumers’ high energy demand and the inefficiency of its 
antiquated building stock: 
‘There is a huge market there, far too big for the ESCos that exist today…You may start 
getting the US companies, the Amarescos of this world may come across and into this 
market. I know they are looking at the European market’ (Senior ESCo Manager – H 1) 
It is possible however that instead of increasing variation, the influx of larger, wealthier and 
longer established international ESCos into the UK could serve to constrain variation. This is 
because, in a similar vein to Honeywell, they are likely to draw upon their experience of their 
energy service operations in other countries, to apply a ‘tried and tested’ formula for energy 
service contracting. Consequently, these new international ESCos are unlikely to engage in 
business model experimentation, which constitutes a key driver of organisational variation.  
One emerging development that is likely to increase variation is the proliferation of 
organisational partnerships, as organisations look to pool their complementary resources to 
provide profitable energy service contracts, particularly with the introduction of the Green 
Deal (Section 8.2.2): 
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‘There will probably be quite a lot of actors in the space and my vision would be that 
these actors work and engage with each other effectively and efficiently, and therefore 
bring projects to fruition’(Law Firm Partner - B 14) 
As characteristically distinct organisations join forces to deliver energy service contracts, 
innovative ESCo models are expected to emerge to suit their contrasting organisational 
structures and objectives. Another important driver of variation in the ESCo population is the 
imperfect replication of business models (Murmann, 2003), either due to accident, experiment 
or design (Hodgson and Knudsen, 2004b). Conversely, variation will be moderated as some 
ESCos fall victim to selection pressures, which means they are consequently disbanded, as has 
happened previously (e.g. London ESCo, Caithness Heat & Power): ‘I think some ESCos will do 
very well and some ESCos will disappear without trace’ (Head of Environment for Council - A 2). 
Variant failures, coupled with learning effects (Section 6.3) may lead to one or more ESCo 
variants becoming dominant, analogous with the concept of dominant technological designs 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982): 
‘You get innovation in a sector where out of necessity from a certain set of drivers, you 
get this ballooning and refining [of business models]…[The market] is starting to 
consolidate’ (Senior ESCo Manager - A 6) 
Additionally, variation is likely to be moderated by the introduction of standardized energy 
service contracts, as outlined in Article 14 of the proposed European Energy Efficiency 
Directive (EC, 2011). A growing awareness and understanding of the ESCo model via the 
completion of more energy service contracts, alongside the emergence of more exemplary 
cases of ESCo operations will also help to make replication more accurate, in turn limiting the 
incidence of replicative imperfections of the ESCo model, i.e. copying errors from generation 
to generation of ESCos. Taking into account the various factors encouraging and inhibiting 
variation in the ESCo population we expect the degree of variation in the population to remain 
broadly similar and thus, the type of influence this population exerts on the wider UK energy 
system to remain broadly similar to that at present. However, the co-evolutionary relationship 
between the ESCo population and the different dimensions of the UK energy system is likely to 
change to some degree in the future, which we now explore in greater detail. 
8.2 Future Coevolutionary Interactions   
In this sub-section we examine how the co-evolutionary relationship between the ESCo 
population and the various dimensions of the UK energy system is likely to change in the 
future. We do so by drawing upon insight from the ESCo population’s past and present 
coevolutionary relationship with the UK energy system, as well as evidence from our empirical 
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investigation and other information relating to emerging developments that will have an 
important influence on UK energy system change. 
As Section 7.2 illustrated, the ESCo population has had some causal influence on the UK energy 
system, however this has been relatively minor to date. Broadly the empirical investigation 
indicated that the ESCo population would grow as their selection environment gradually 
improved (Sections 6.1.4.3 & 6.2). As such, it was expected that their influence on the various 
dimensions of the UK energy system would increase, with some interviewees indicating that 
the ESCo population could indeed have a profound effect on a UK low-carbon transition: 
‘If it takes off, then…energy performance contracting, the flexibility it offers and the 
fact that it delivers guarantees of savings will fundamentally change the market’ 
(Senior EUCo Manager - B 28) 
However, some interviewees were less convinced that the ESCo population would have a 
major impact on the UK energy system in the future, due to the persistence of key barriers: 
‘I think at the moment there's no killer reason why [the ESCo model] should take off 
now. I don't think ESCos are going to suddenly become really important now, I think the 
factors that have inhibited them will continue to apply’ (Think Tank Economist - B 29) 
Taking into account the variety of interviewee responses relating to expected future UK energy 
system and ESCo market developments we now discuss how the co-evolutionary relationship 
between the ESCo population and various key dimensions of the UK energy system is likely to 
change in the future. 
8.2.1 ESCos and Ecosystems 
Firstly, we examine how the ESCo business model has coevolved with ecosystems. This is 
largely mediated through the effects ecosystem changes have on institutions and other 
dimensions of the UK energy system, as illustrated below. 
It is expected that the triumvirate of energy challenges facing the UK at present (i.e. climate 
change, energy insecurity, affordability of energy) will persist and potentially worsen, over the 
coming years (Section 1.3). Consequently, ecosystem pressures are likely to continue to have 
an extremely important influence on the evolution of the various dimensions of the UK energy 
system. For instance, the regulatory framework (as part of the institutional dimension) is likely 
to continue to be characterized by legislation and government policies that promote 
sustainable energy solutions (Section 8.2.2). Another example might be the way that 
technologies and infrastructure research and development (as part of the technological 
dimension) are conducted with a view to develop technological innovations that help 
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consumers to satisfy their energy needs in a sustainable manner (e.g. low-carbon generation, 
building controls etc) (Section 8.2.3). Finally, user practices may also alter as the effects of 
these challenges are felt and consumers seek to make their own contribution to addressing 
these issues (Section 8.2.4). Therefore, it is expected that ecosystem developments will help to 
cultivate a selection environment that is broadly supportive of ESCo operations over the 
coming years. 
If the ESCo model does enjoy greater uptake, partly at the hands of ecosystem crises, then the 
ESCo population will in return gradually exert a larger influence on ecosystem change by 
reducing consumers’ reliance on fossil fuels to satisfy their energy needs. However, 
considering that these ecosystem challenges are global in scale, application of the ESCo model 
in the UK going forward is unlikely to have any significant impact upon ecosystem change 
(Section 7.2.1). To achieve such a change will require a suite of compatible and effective 
energy solutions, applied at an international scale. However, the application of the ESCo model 
could constitute an important part of this strategy to protect the environment. 
8.2.2 ESCos and Institutions 
Secondly, we examine how emerging regulatory developments are likely to influence the 
evolution of the ESCo population and vice versa.  
As outlined in Section 6.1.4.3 changes to the regulatory framework can be foreseen months or 
even years prior to these being enacted, considering the typically lengthy process in the UK for 
developing and passing legislation. The imminent introduction of the Green Deal was 
highlighted as an important emerging driver to ESCo operation (Section 6.1.4.3). Despite some 
important flaws, which are likely to limit its impact, the Green Deal is expected to improve the 
ESCos’ selection environment by helping to open up the residential market to energy service 
contracting. Specifically it will help to achieve this by: (1) making finance more freely available 
to implement domestic energy service contracts; (2) enabling the cost of the sustainable 
energy supply and/or demand management measures to be repaid via the householders’ 
energy bill and (3) ensuring that the debt remains with the property not the householder. The 
ESCo case studies teach us that the Green Deal is likely to improve the prospects of selection 
for all the various different ESCo variants. 
The Green Deal is expected to increase the degree of variation the ESCo population exhibits as 
the opening up of the residential market will present a business opportunity that encourages 
new entrants into the ESCo market, who perceive themselves to be strongly suited to 
providing large groups of households with energy service contracts in order to capture the 
economies of scale (e.g. Local Authorities, Registered Social Landlords etc) ‘Partnerships and 
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collaborations will be absolutely critical’ (Senior ESCo Manager - A 10) to enable these 
organisations to access the necessary resources to act as Green Deal Providers (Section 8.2.2). 
One interviewee explained that Local Authority ‘Arm’s Length’ ESCos could play an important 
role as an interface between large Energy Utilities and local-level organisations to facilitate 
Green Deals: 
‘The Green Deal [will help] the sort of companies we represent take off because we 
operate in the interface between the large multinational, such as your British Gas, 
Scottish Power etc and the community groups and civil society, district councils, 
housing associations etc… [For] multi-nationals to get down to that level is really 
difficult and yet community groups and civil society [need help] to effectively reach into 
multi-nationals [and access their resources’ (Local Authority ESCo Manager – A 1) 
The Green Deal is also likely to impact upon retention of the ESCo model, considering that a 
Green Deal Code of Practice will be introduced which ‘defines the minimum standards 
required of those participating in the Green Deal whether as Green Deal Providers, assessors, 
or installers’ (DECC, 2011c p.3). These standards, as well as the increase in awareness and 
understanding of the ESCo model the Green Deal is likely to generate, will help to make 
replication of the ESCo model both easier and more accurate47.  
Section 6.1.4.3 also identified how other emerging regulation is likely to support the uptake of 
the ESCo model, such as the introduction of the Green Investment Bank, the Electricity Market 
Reform and the European Energy Efficiency Directive. The latter, rather like the Green Deal, is 
also likely to improve retention of the ESCo model as it stipulates that member states will need 
to make provision for energy service contract templates that could be easily adopted by new 
entrants to the ESCo market. Another important development will be if national government 
continues to promote its localism agenda (Section 6.1.4.1), which will help to improve the 
selection environment for the Local Authority and Community owned and led ESCos by 
providing new rights and powers for communities and local government to enable them to 
engage in activities outside their traditional remit. 
It is unclear from the empirical investigation how ESCos are likely to influence the formal 
institutional landscape in the future and at what level they might exert change (e.g. local, 
regional, national, international). However, if the institutional landscape continues to be 
supportive of ESCo activity (Section 6.1.4.1) then the ESCo population can be expected to 
grow, thus exerting a greater influence on institutional change in the UK. 
                                                          
47 As we outlined in Section 6.1.4.3 a Green Deal Providers take responsibility for identifying, 
designing, installing, financing and servicing energy solutions, essentially acting as an ESCo 
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8.2.3 ESCos and Technology 
Thirdly, we examine how the ESCo population is likely to co-evolve with energy technologies in 
the future.  
As highlighted in Section 6.1.4.2, one of the key barriers to ESCos in the UK at present is the 
high cost of existing sustainable energy technologies, however even though certainty in this 
development remains low, the costs of these technologies in the UK ‘are expected to fall over 
time as supply chains develop, technical challenges are overcome, and the cost of capital 
reduces with lower risk’ (DECC, 2011h p.6). The latter here is an effect of adaptive 
expectations, where the articulation of visions and expectations associated with technological 
innovations reduces consumers’ scepticism of innovative energy technologies (Arthur, 1989) 
(Section 2.3.3.1). The effect on ESCos would be a reduction in their energy service contracting 
costs, thus improving the cost-effectiveness of their business. 
As Section 7.2.3 illustrates, technological innovations have played an important role in 
improving the cost-effectiveness of energy service contracts, as illustrated by the impact of 
domestic and commercial LED lighting on ESCos delivering EPCs. It is difficult to predict what 
types of technological innovation will emerge in the future but if the trend of increasing 
investment in sustainable energy research and development (R & D) continues both in the UK  
and internationally (IEA, 2012a) (Figure 8.1) then the introduction of new energy technologies 
or major advances in existing ones could help to improve the cost-effectiveness of energy 
conversion and control equipment, thus supporting wider uptake of the ESCo model.  
 
Figure 8.1 Government energy R&D expenditures 1990 to 2010 (IEA, 2012a)
48
 
                                                          
48 The IEA have sourced data from the OECD (2011) and other countries 
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However, technological research and development may lead to a different set of technological 
innovations that could serve to reinforce the dominance of the EUCo model. For example, the 
emergence of carbon capture & storage (CCS) presents a means of storing the carbon 
emissions emitted from large-scale, centralised fossil fuel combustion, thus undermining the 
need to identify alternative lower carbon energy solutions. Another emerging technological 
innovation that could prove to undermine the prospects of the ESCo model gaining additional 
traction is the process of hydraulic fracturing or ‘fracking’, which has made vast reserves of 
shale gas available for extraction that were not accessible before. These reserves could be 
utilised in place of renewable sources of energy (Stevens, 2012).  
Interviewees did not expect that the UK ESCo population would have a major direct influence 
on research and development agenda, which drives technological innovation, considering that 
most ESCos are not engaged in technological research and development. However, some 
energy technology companies, such as Honeywell, also provide energy service contracts and 
play an important role in shaping technological innovation in the UK. For instance, they are 
currently driving forward the development of SMART grids (Section 6.2.3.8). However, even 
those ESCos who focus on adopting rather than developing sustainable energy technologies 
are likely to have an important indirect influence on technological innovation. For instance, as 
the case studies of Honeywell and Thameswey help to demonstrate, the adoption of 
sustainable energy technologies as part of ESCos’ operations has helped to raise awareness 
and understanding of demand energy management or sustainable energy supply technologies, 
particularly with regards to the value they are capable of creating for customers and 
businesses. Going forward this could encourage greater investment in the research and 
development of these technologies, with a view to improve their cost-effectiveness via 
innovation. In turn, this is likely to make these technologies even more attractive to ESCos and 
other companies, bringing us to the beginning of the positive feedback loop (Figure 8.2). 
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Figure 8.2 An emerging positive feedback loop between ESCo population and energy technologies 
8.2.4 ESCos and User Practices 
Fourthly, we discuss how the UK ESCo population and energy consumers’ user practices are 
likely to co-evolve in the future.  
The empirical investigation did not identify any significant emerging developments to the user 
practices dimension i.e. the habits, behaviours and routines of individuals or groups associated 
with the fulfilment of their energy needs, other than a broad continuation of the key user 
practice trends identified in Section 7.2.4. For instance, UK energy prices are expected to 
remain high or even rise (DECC, 2011a), whilst the economic downturn is projected to continue 
for the foreseeable future (IMF, 2012). These developments are likely to ensure that there 
remains high demand amongst consumers for solutions capable of reducing their energy bills, 
such as energy service contracting. Another important development will be if UK energy 
consumers begin to personally experience the adverse effects of impending ecosystem crises, 
such as climate change (Jenkins et al., 2009), which may encourage them to adopt sustainable 
consumption practices to help mitigate these effects. It is important to note however that 
economic, energy price and climate change projections incorporate a significant degree of 
uncertainty and we also have a poor understanding of how these developments might 
influence energy related user practices in the future.  
In relation to how the ESCo model is likely to influence user practices, it is expected that the 
positive feedback relating to a growing customer awareness and understanding of the ESCo 
model, as highlighted in Section 7.2.4 and Figure 7.2, will persist considering that it is a 
virtuous cycle. This will have the effect of improving the prospects of the ESCo model.  
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Energy user practices in the UK today are characterised by the EUCo model’s supplier-
consumer relationship, where the customer is detached from the processes of energy 
generation, distribution and supply: ‘[When] we turn the light on, we have no idea how it gets 
there. There is no connectivity whatsoever’ (Local Authority Chief Executive – T 1). The 
Thameswey and MOZES case studies help to illustrate how the proliferation of Local Authority 
‘Arm’s Length’ and/or Community ESCos in the future, driven in part by the government’s 
localism agenda (Section 8.2.2), could help to ‘reconnect what happens locally’ (Local Authority 
Chief Executive – T 1), via locally managed decentralised energy generation, distribution and 
supply. This could help to encourage consumers to think ‘beyond the meter’, and trigger a shift 
away from the traditional mind-set where consumers consider the fulfilment of their energy 
needs to be the responsibility of multi-national private sector corporations, towards one 
where consumers consider this to be a fundamentally local undertaking, which requires a 
combination of grass-roots activity and local resources to achieve (Section 7.2.4): 
‘A shift in mind-set from customers individually saying they want [X amount of] energy, 
which the energy companies provide, which is the [current] model, to one where 
communities decide how they're going to decarbonise [potentially via] ESCos’ (Think 
Tank Economist - B 29) 
8.2.5 Competition between ESCos and Energy Utilities 
Finally, we examine how the UK ESCo and Energy Utility populations are likely to coevolve in 
the future.  
There is evidence to suggest from our empirical investigation, particularly the Energy Utility X 
case study, that the Energy Utilities are looking to expand their energy service contracting 
operations, largely as a result of their belief that their traditional EUCo model is likely to 
struggle in the emerging selection environment, which is currently being reshaped by a range 
of developments across the various different system dimensions (e.g. ecosystem, institutions 
etc) (Sections 6.1.5.3 & 6.2.4). A move from these incumbent firms into the ESCo market would 
send a strong signal to other energy actors (e.g. financial institutions, energy technology firms, 
fuel suppliers etc), emphasising not only that the Energy Utilities’ believe their own business 
model could face an uncertain future but that the ESCo model may be better positioned to 
take advantage of this new selection environment. In turn this is likely to influence these 
actors’ own visions of the future, particularly about how the ESCo and EUCo models will 
perform, which may consequently alter these actors’ strategies going forward. If these actors 
begin to act in accordance with the incumbent Utilities’ expectations and start to make efforts 
to accommodate the ESCo model, then the Utilities are likely to observe changes to their 
selection environment that are considered to favour the ESCo model. Consequently, the 
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Utilities would observe their own predictions coming true, helping to reinforce their belief that 
it is necessary to diversify their business to incorporate aspects of the ESCo model. This 
process could represent a form of a self-fulfilling prophecy and thus a positive feedback 
mechanism, which could help the ESCo model to proliferate in the future (Figure 8.3).  
 
Figure 8.3 Positive feedback loop involving Energy Utility movement into the ESCo market 
Despite the evidence that the UK Energy Utilities have begun operating the ESCo model, it is 
important to note that they continue to focus the majority of their efforts on operating the 
EUCo model. Consequently, it is difficult to ascertain how sweeping this transition to the ESCo 
model may be going forward, considering that they continue to generate extremely healthy 
profits from operating the EUCo model (Consumer Focus, 2012). This presents a persuasive 
argument to shareholders and board members alike to continue operating the EUCo model: 
‘People are sitting there making money on those contracts…The innovation models say 
you should innovate and change but the reality of life is that people don't most of the 
time because [they] are making money’ (Senior Investment Manager – A5) 
It is possible that the Energy Utilities are merely ‘testing the waters’ of the UK ESCo market, to 
ensure they have a sufficiently large presence in the ESCo market to be able to scale-up their 
operations to take advantage of the ESCo market in case their selection environment radically 
changes and their traditional EUCo model becomes significantly less profitability. However, by 
continuing to operate the EUCo model, the Utilities are able to fall back on their traditional 
business model if the selection environment remains broadly the same: ‘they are all dabbling 
but dabbling is probably the right word’ (Energy Investment Company Manager – A5). If the 
Energy Utilities continue to focus the majority of their efforts on operating the EUCo model, 
i.e. sale of units of gas and electricity as commodities, then this will adversely affect the future 
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of the ESCo market for similar reasons to those identified in Section 7.2.5, where the Energy 
Utilities continue to advertently or inadvertently shape dimensions of the UK energy system to 
favour their operations.  
It is also important to note however that even if the Energy Utilities, such as Energy Utility X, 
maintain their current momentum towards the ESCo model, it is expected that this transition 
would take a long period of time to complete: ‘It is going to take some time before we get to 
that place and… [it’s a] journey I think we are already on’ (Energy Utility Manager – B27/X1) 
8.2.6 Summary ESCo Model’s Role in a Low-carbon UK Energy System Transition 
Drawing on the insight generated from Sections 7 and 8, we now seek to address research 
question 5, which relates to how the ESCo model is likely to influence the nature of a UK low-
carbon transition (Section 1.5). It is important to reiterate here that we make these predictions 
with a low degree of certainty taking into account the complexity of the UK energy system and 
the potential for small perturbations to result in considerable changes, which could serve to 
undermine the prospects of the ESCo model. Furthermore, a multitude of significant barriers 
still exist, which continue to limit ESCo operation to niche deployment in the UK (Sections 
6.1.4.2 & 6.2) and these may persist for a number of years to come. 
Taking into account the past, present and likely future coevolutionary relationship between 
the ESCo population and the various dimensions of the UK energy system we anticipate that 
the ESCo model’s degree of fitness with its selection environment over the coming years will 
gradually improve. This development can largely be attributed to developments beyond the 
control of ESCos, such as climate change, economic downturn, rising energy prices, depleting 
fossil fuel resources etc. However, by applying our coevolutionary analytical framework we 
have been able to identify a number of positive feedbacks mechanisms that have meant that 
application of the ESCo model has in fact helped to create a more favourable selection 
environment for ESCos. Taking these factors into account, steady but moderate growth in the 
ESCo market is expected over the coming years, as too is an increase in their causal influence 
on the evolution of the wider UK energy system. Therefore, ESCos are expected to gradually 
exert a stronger influence on a transition to an alternative UK energy system state. We now 
summarise how the ESCo population is likely to shape the various different dimensions of the 
UK energy system going forward. 
Beginning with its influence on technology and infrastructure we expect a growth in ESCos 
providing ESCs to encourage a shift away from centralised energy generation via fossil fuels 
towards decentralised generation via renewable energy sources. Therefore, we expect to see a 
greater number of district energy generation and supply systems, as well as micro-generation 
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systems to be deployed over the coming years by ESCos. Furthermore, a growth in ESCos 
delivering EPCs mean we are likely to observe an improvement in the energy efficiency of our 
residential and commercial building stock. The greater deployment of these sustainable energy 
technologies by ESCos could also influence the direction of energy technology research and 
development. This could have the effect of improving the cost-effectiveness of low-carbon 
energy technologies and in turn, the cost-effectiveness of energy service contracting (Section 
8.2.3). 
We expect a greater uptake of the ESCo model to influence user practices in two key ways. The 
first is the behavioural constraints imposed upon consumers as part of energy service 
contracts, particularly with EPCs. Here the consumer has to tailor their user practices to a set 
of pre-determined behaviours regarding the duration and intensity of their energy 
consumption on a day-to-day basis, as outlined in the contract. The second is a less direct 
influence and refers to a shift in the consumer’s mind-set relating to their culturally embedded 
beliefs about how we approach the challenge of satisfying our energy needs. For instance, as 
outlined in Section 8.2.4, this may involve consumers coming to regard the generation, 
distribution and supply of energy as a fundamentally local undertaking. This focus may 
encourage a greater connectivity between national and local energy decision making, which 
would involve actors at various scales (national, regional, local) operating in partnership with 
one another. 
The ESCo model has to date had only a minor influence on the UK’s formal energy institutions, 
barring the obvious similarities between the structure of energy service contracts and the 
Green Deal. However, a greater uptake of the ESCo model in the UK will place greater direct or 
indirect pressure on UK government to make adjustments to the regulatory framework so that 
it is more supportive of ESCo operation, as illustrated by Thameswey Energy’s role in the 
deregulation of the law prohibiting Local Authorities to sell electricity (Section 6.2.1.7). 
It is possible that the ESCo model could threaten the dominance of the EUCo model in the 
future, which represents the incumbent business model in the UK energy system at present. 
This is evident in the way that the Big 6 Energy Utilities have begun to diversify their 
operations to include energy service contracting in recent years. If this trend continues, which 
remains uncertain (Section 8.2.5), then we may observe an abatement in EUCo operations at 
the expense of a proliferation of ESCo operations. It is however quite likely that the EUCo 
model will remain dominant over the coming years as the Energy Utilities continue to operate 
this as their core business model, due to its continued profitability, thus making only a partial 
transition from EUCo to ESCo model (Section 8.2.5). The trend for other organisations, such as 
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Equipment Manufacturers, Property Developers, Local Authorities and Facilities Management 
Companies, to alter their traditional business model to incorporate energy service contracting 
is also expected to continue in the future (Sections 7.1 & 8.1). 
Finally, and in some respects most importantly, we outline the expected influence of ESCos on 
the ecosystem, which can help us to gauge the extent to which the ESCo model will help 
reduce the environmental impact of fulfilling our energy needs and help drive a transition to 
an environmentally sustainable energy system. Although the remit of this research did not 
include a quantitative examination of the environmental impact of energy service contracts 
compared to Energy Utility offerings, both Section 7.2.1, as well as the ESCo case studies 
(Section 6.2) illustrated how ESCos have helped to reduce consumers’ reliance on fossil fuels to 
date, which has helped to reduce the adverse environmental effects associated with fossil fuel 
extraction (e.g. destruction of habitat) and combustion (e.g. carbon emissions, air pollution 
etc). As Section 8.2.1 outlined, a greater role for ESCos is likely to continue to help alleviate key 
ecosystem challenges associated with fossil fuel consumption, such as climate change, 
however in the context of these crises being global, UK ESCo activity will not make a tangible 
difference alone. 
8.3 Comparison of Results with Transition Pathways 
Having summarised the role we expect the ESCo model to play in a transition to a sustainable 
energy system, we now compare this with the role the Transition Pathways project has 
reserved for ESCos (Foxon, 2012), undertaken by a consortium of scholars across different 
universities in the UK. The project outlines three different pathways the UK energy system 
could potentially take towards a low carbon electricity future by 205049. In a similar fashion 
to this project, these scenarios have partly been constructed by drawing upon co-
evolutionary theory. We select the Transition Pathways research for comparison, as these 
pathways provide more in-depth details relating to business model and institutional change 
than the DECC 2050 pathways referred to earlier in the chapter (DECC, 2010a). The pathways 
include: 
 Market Rules – ‘the continued dominance of the market-led logic for the governance 
of UK energy systems’ (p.7) 
 Central Coordination – ‘envisions the dominance of the government-led logic [where] 
the UK government [takes] greater direct government involvement in the governance 
of UK energy systems’ (p.9)  
                                                          
49 The Transition Pathways consider only electricity, not the generation and supply of heat, 
which normally forms a core part of Energy Supply Contracts  
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 Thousand Flowers – ‘envisions the growing dominance of civil society in the 
governance of UK energy systems’ (p.10) 
Examining the Market Rules pathway first, our results support the view presented by this 
scenario that private-sector actors are likely to continue to shape market developments in the 
UK energy system in the future. Furthermore, our results also support the view that the 
incumbent Energy Utilities are likely to remain dominant for a number of years to come. 
However, the Market Rules pathway makes no reference to the role of ESCos. In contrast, our 
results highlight how there is already a healthy ESCo market operating in the UK at present, 
predominantly consisting of private-sector organisations. Consequently, we expect that if the 
‘market-led’ logic remains dominant, then the ESCo model could gain significant traction, 
predominantly in the form of private-sector Energy Service Providers. Additionally, whilst our 
results support the notion that the Utilities are likely to remain dominant, they indicate that it 
is possible they will do so by operating the ESCo model alongside their traditional EUCo model. 
This would mean the provision of Energy Supply and Performance contracts alongside their 
traditional supply of electricity units via centralised generation and distribution.  
The Central Coordination pathway, in a similar way to the Market Rules pathway, does not 
explicitly reserve a role for ESCos. Instead the focus here is on the governance of national 
government, where large energy companies constitute the vehicles responsible for delivering 
government inspired energy projects. In light of our research findings, we would add to this 
scenario the potentially important role Local Authority ‘Arm’s Length’ ESCos could play in an 
energy system dominated by a government-led logic. Here national and local government may 
well establish these ESCos as vehicles to deliver their own policy objectives. This is because 
compared to private-sector energy companies, they would have greater control over LA owned 
ESCos. Furthermore, they could recycle the profits they generate to help fund other policy-
inspired projects.  
The Thousand Flowers scenario envisions the most important role for ESCos out of the three 
different pathways. This pathway constitutes a scenario whereby citizens, i.e. individuals and 
local communities, take the leading role in relation to how the UK’s local and national energy 
systems operate. Here central government plays a key role in facilitating this transition e.g. 
community/local investment, feed-in-tariffs etc. Of relevance to this research is the emphasis 
on the ‘move to the ESCo business model’ (p.8), whereby communities look to adopt the 
model, as well as Energy Utilities, who establish ESCo-type business units whose primary focus 
would be on implementing both domestic and commercial decentralised generation 
technologies as part of Energy Supply Contracts: 
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‘Whilst some large energy companies continue to focus only on the centralised 
generation business model, with continuing large investments in coal CCS and nuclear 
power, others diversify by setting up ESCO-type business units to provide an 
alternative focus for the company’s growth’ (p.10) 
Broadly, these developments align very closely with our own empirically grounded 
expectations. For instance, the pathway envisages that a range of new entrants will enter the 
UK ESCo market, which is in line with our own observations in Sections 7.1 & 8.1. Additionally, 
the range of ESCo variants outlined is also reflected in our own research (Section 6.1.5), 
including Community and Energy Utility ESCo variants. However, little mention is made of the 
role Local Authority ESCos might play. The characteristics of the Energy Utility ESCos envisaged 
by the pathway are very similar to those identified in Section 6.1.5.3, where the Energy 
Utilities establish separate business units or divisions for energy service contracting. 
Furthermore, the pathway emphasises how ESCos will play an important role in driving 
forward the development of decentralised generation, as observed in Section 7.2.3. 
 
Figure 8.4 Electricity generation mix in the Thousand Flowers pathway (Foxon, 2012) 
The Thousand Flowers pathway projects that non-civil society, private sector led ESCos are 
likely to work closely with LAs, housing associations and community groups, particularly in light 
of the introduction of increasingly strong obligations on energy companies, who see such 
partnerships as the most effective means of discharging these obligations. Again this aligns 
closely with this research’s findings, where many new actor partnerships are expected to 
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emerge in the future as a means of pooling resources and capabilities to enable organisations 
to deliver energy service contracts, particularly in reaction to the Green Deal (Section 8.1).  
In a similar vein to this research, the Thousand Flowers pathway indicates that positive 
feedback mechanisms are likely play an important role in the development of this pathway and 
the rise of ESCos. Although the details of these are not provided, it is envisaged that these will 
exist between entrepreneurial activities, advocacy coalitions, early adoption of technologies 
and mobilization of financial and human resources (Hekkert et al., 2007). 
Finally, a number of potential barriers to this pathway are identified, which are also reflected 
in our work. These include the high costs associated with the deployment of decentralised 
energy systems and energy efficiency measures (Section 6.1.4.2) as well as the rebound effect, 
where consumers use some of the savings on their energy bills to increase service demand 
levels (Sections 2.6.4 & 6.1.3). One important future barrier our investigation doesn’t highlight 
is the potential backlash against local energy solutions considering the need to ‘keep the lights 
on’, which might be best served by large-scale, centralised energy solutions. 
8.4 Policy recommendations 
In both Sections 7.2.2 & 8.2.2 we illustrated the strong influence the regulatory framework has 
and is likely to continue to have on the uptake of the ESCo model. Consequently, we now take 
the opportunity to identify a number of changes to the UK’s regulatory framework that could 
help to improve ESCos’ selection environment and thus enable it to play a more substantive 
role in a low-carbon transition. These predominantly relate to addressing barriers identified in 
Section 6.1.4.2 and the various different ESCo case studies (Section 6.2). 
8.4.1 Standardized Energy Service Contract Templates 
Replication of energy service contracts for both EPCs and ESCs was regularly cited as a barrier 
to the proliferation of the ESCo model, particularly considering the bespoke nature of energy 
service contracting. We concur with Marino et al. (2011) and Sorrell (2007) that the uptake of 
the ESCo model could be improved by, such as in the US (Section 5.5.1): 
‘The standardisation of common core contractual provisions including clear 
frameworks, definitions, and measurement and verification standards (such as the 
International Performance Measurement & Verification Protocol)’ (p.6195) 
It is possible such standards may emerge if the energy service market becomes more heavily 
regulated, in a similar manner to the gas and electricity market under the governance Ofgem. 
They may also emerge as part of energy service contract procurement frameworks, such as 
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RE:FIT or be introduced by trade associations such as the Energy Services and Technology 
Association (ESTA) as examples of ‘best practice’. 
8.4.2 City-level GHG emissions Targets 
The research supports the Committee on Climate Change’s recommendation to introduce ‘a 
statutory duty for local authorities to develop and implement low-carbon plans’ (CCC, 2012b 
p.8) that translates into a high-level commitment on Local Authorities (LAs) to reduce their 
town or city’s GHG emissions. This would require LAs to initiate and coordinate energy projects 
at the city-level that are capable of delivering the necessary carbon reductions to meet these 
targets, which could be undertaken via an Energy Service Provider or the council’s own LA 
‘Arm’s Length’ ESCo. The author of this thesis has co-authored a paper that outlines how a LA 
might establish a Strategic Energy Body (SEB), responsible for coordinating and facilitating such 
sustainable energy projects to deliver such reductions (Bale et al., 2012). In this paper it is 
conceived that the council’s own LA ‘Arm’s Length’ ESCo would play an important role in 
implementing these projects and recycle profits generated by the schemes into the council’s 
future energy projects. 
This obligation could sit alongside a policy similar to the Danish Heat Law, which would provide 
LAs with the power to mandate owners of new and existing buildings connect to SEB inspired 
low-carbon energy schemes (DEA, 2005). This would offer the LA ‘Arm’s Length’ ESCos the 
necessary powers to ensure that sufficient numbers of consumers were connected to their 
network to make the schemes financially viable.  
8.4.3 Better Accommodate Decentralised Generation in BETTA 
As Section 5.3 and the Thameswey case study (Section 6.2.1.7) served to highlight, the current 
electricity trading arrangements in the UK (i.e. BETTA) are not supportive of small-scale, 
decentralised energy generation, distribution and supply, particularly that which relies on 
intermittent sources of renewable energy. It is this form of electricity generation that ESCos 
providing ESCs typically engage in. Although we recognise the need to match supply with 
demand to avoid blackouts etc, we argue that in order to improve the fitness between BETTA 
and the ESCo model we would recommend the system is structured so that companies 
sourcing their electricity from intermittent (renewable) sources of energy are not penalised to 
the same extent, as they are now. This may be achieved via interventions in the pricing 
structures that artificially increase the value of renewable electricity (Mitchell, 2008). 
It is also possible that changes to BETTA could improve ESCos’ economies of scale. For 
example, relaxation of the constraints imposed by licence exemptions on the scale of 
generation, distribution and supply unlicensed organisations are able to engage in, could help 
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unlicensed ESCos to operate at a larger scale and thus harness greater economies of scale. This 
would serve to reduce their transaction costs per kWh of electricity sold and consequently 
improve their profit margin. Alternatively, we would recommend that the system be re-
structured so that smaller-scale electricity companies are not subjected to the same 
membership costs as larger scale companies, such is the high cost of connectivity to the grid.  
8.4.4 Green Deal Recommendations 
As outlined in Section 6.1.4.3, we find that contracts signed under the GD constitute a form of 
energy service contracting, i.e. the GD Provider covers the upfront costs of the low-carbon 
energy supply and/or energy efficiency measures and recoups these back over a number of 
years. Therefore, any measures that can be taken to increase the uptake of the GD we believe 
will translate into growth in the ESCo market. Therefore, we briefly outline a number of 
recommendations for the Green Deal (GD) that could help to encourage the uptake of the 
ESCo model. 
Drawing on the Thameswey case study (Section 6.2.1.8) we suggest that because the GD is not 
mandatory it must be structured so that the householder enjoys an immediate saving on their 
energy bill that is considered large enough by the householder to off-set the time and effort 
they expend on contacting and engaging with a GD Provider, as well as the inconvenience and 
disruption caused by the installation of the energy measures. It is also important that 
householders are convinced that engaging with the GD constitutes an investment in their 
property, as opposed to the attachment of long-term debt to their home. 
We argue that in order for the GD to be a success, the Energy Utilities will need to engage with 
the policy. This is because they already have a relationship with millions of residential energy 
consumers in the UK. Therefore, access to these homes is likely to be easier for them than for 
new entrants who do not currently possess such relationships. Furthermore, they also have 
the technical and financial resources to implement ‘Green Deals’ across the UK, unlike other, 
smaller new entrants. However, to ensure the Utilities engage with the policy it is important 
that the government makes the effort to underline the benefits this would provide them with. 
For instance, helping them to meet their energy company obligations, improve their 
reputation (or ‘brand’) and develop longer term relationships with their customers. 
Consequently, greater engagement by the Energy Utilities with the GD could add momentum 
to their movement towards the ESCo model and provide a major boost to the UK energy 
market as illustrated by Figure 8.3 in Section 8.2.5. 
Finally, we recommend that ‘green finance’ schemes such as the Green Investment Bank and 
the Green Deal Finance Company (Section 6.1.4.3) are structured so that they make finance 
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available to community organisations, not only private sector organisations. This would help to 
support growth of Community ESCos in the UK. 
8.4.5 Alter Energy Company Obligations 
We agree that the current energy company obligations (e.g. CERT) have successfully increased 
the deployment of cost-effective energy efficiency measures (e.g. loft and cavity wall 
insulation) (Eyre et al., 2009). However, we also agree that ‘the approach is less likely to be 
successful for measures that are innovative [but] not cost-effective, or to deliver change in 
customer attitudes or behaviour’ (Eyre et al., 2009 p.438). This is because this approach does 
not remove the Energy Utilities’ volume sales driver, neither does it address consumers’ 
growing demand for energy services nor provide incentives for consumers to change their user 
practices (Eyre, 2008). To achieve these aims, we recommend obligations that either mandate 
or encourage Energy Utilities to fundamentally restructure their business model so that they 
are intrinsically incentivised to satisfy their customers energy needs in a sustainable manner, 
as opposed to a set of obligations that only encourage the Utilities to ‘do the bare minimum’ in 
terms of GHG reductions and which can also be discharged whilst operating their traditional 
EUCo model, where their revenue is coupled with the sale of energy units, predominantly 
sourced from fossil fuels. 
8.4.6 Adjust OJEU Procurement Process  
We concur with Sorrell (2005) and Marino et al. (2011) that there is a need to alter the 
procurement process for energy service contracts, as it was frequently cited as a barrier by 
interviewees: 
‘Firstly, adaptation of the public procurement laws in order to facilitate the evaluation 
of energy performance contracting providers by allowing the inclusion of energy 
efficiency in technical tender specifications and by taking into consideration the life-
cycle cost in the project cost evaluation’ (Marino et al., 2011 p.6195)  
Furthermore, procedures should be put in place to help support organisations seeking to 
procure energy service contracts, namely: 
‘Clear, practical and ready-to-use guidelines on how to apply energy efficiency criteria 
in public procurement procedures [would] help the practical implementation of energy 
efficient public procurement’ (p.6195) 
8.4.7 Landlord & Tenant Act 
Currently the Landlord & Tenant Act stipulates that if a landlord is to pass on energy to its 
customers, it must procure this at best value and pass this on at cost-price to their tenants 
(Section 6.1.4.2). However, this obligation is at odds with landlords out-sourcing this obligation 
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to ESCos, who want to sell their energy services at a price that incorporates a reasonable profit 
margin.  
‘The argument for an ESCo getting involved is that it has the experience, they can do 
things cheaper because of the economies of scale across multiple sites, they have 
expertise etc. So there is an argument that the ESCo is able to do better and ultimately 
costs everybody less’ (Senior ESCo Manager - B 18) 
We recommend that this law is amended so that ESCos are able to provide energy services to 
tenants as a ‘for-profit’ activity, on behalf of the landlord. However, it is essential that legal 
provision is made to ensure that an impartial third-party examines whether the arrangement is 
beneficial to all parties involved (i.e. tenant, landlord & ESCo), especially the tenant. 
8.4.8 Low Carbon Skills Training Schemes 
A lack of skills necessary to deliver both EPCs and ESCs was highlighted as a barrier to ESCo 
proliferation in the UK, such as the measurement & verification of energy savings and the 
operation & maintenance of low-carbon energy equipment. Therefore, we support the 
introduction of schemes similar to Scotland’s Low Carbon Skills Fund (SDS, 2012) and the UK 
government’s Green Deal Skills Alliance (Green Deal Initiative, 2012a), which have been 
designed to ensure that the necessary skills exist in the UK to deliver sustainable energy 
measures. We would recommend that in order to support ESCo operations that specific 
schemes are established to offer training in a broad range of specialised skills necessary to 
deliver Energy Supply and Performance contracts.  
8.4.9 General Policy Recommendations 
The lack of confidence amongst energy actors with respect to how the regulatory framework 
will develop over the coming years was frequently cited as a barrier to ESCo activity. This was 
largely attributed to the government making swift and unforeseen changes to the regulatory 
framework, such as the FiT cuts (Sections 6.1.4.2 & 6.2.2.8). Consequently, a clear policy 
roadmap, alongside a strong commitment from the government to adhere to this strategy, 
would reduce actors’ scepticism that an energy service project would be financially viable in 
the future. Also, we support the notion that the government should help energy actors to 
navigate the complex regulatory framework by providing them with greater information about 
new and existing regulation (Sorrell, 2007). This is encapsulated by DECC’s move to introduce 
its Community Energy Online Portal (DECC, 2012d) as a means of helping to raise communities’ 
awareness of energy funding, best practice case studies, planning issues etc, designed to 
support the establishment of community energy organisations such as Community ESCos.  
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Finally, we recommend that the financial incentives available for small-scale, low-carbon 
energy generation (e.g. FiT & RHI) are not subject to any further cuts until the costs of 
implementing these technologies (i.e. design, installation, operation, maintenance etc) fall 
sufficiently as a result of both technological and learning advances to off-set these cuts. Any 
additional cuts prior to a steady and prolonged fall in the costs of these technologies would 
serve to undermine the business case of ESCos delivering electricity or heat as part of ESCs. 
8.5 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter we have applied our co-evolutionary analytical framework to examine our 
empirical evidence, as well as a combination of academic and government literature in order 
to develop a better understanding of the role ESCos are likely to play in a transition to a 
sustainable UK energy system. Broadly, we expect the ESCo model to gradually gain wider-
scale uptake over the coming years and as such, it is expected to exert a greater causal 
influence on the evolution of the UK energy system. In Section 8.2.6 we summarised the co-
evolutionary dynamic between the ESCo population and the various dimensions of the UK 
energy system, and highlighted the ways in which a more pronounced role for the ESCo model 
is likely to characterize a sustainable energy system transition. In Section 8.3 we compared the 
role this research envisages for the ESCo model with that presented by the Transition 
Pathways project, highlighting both a number of similarities and differences. Finally, in Section 
8.4 we presented a number of policy recommendations designed to encourage the uptake of 
the ESCo model in the UK. In the following chapter we reflect upon the implications of our 
findings in the context of the existing literature. 
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9 Discussion: Contribution of the Research to the Wider 
Literature 
In this chapter we broaden our analysis from the previous chapter to reflect upon the insights 
generated by applying our integrated analytical framework to examine the evidence collected 
as part of our empirical investigation. The main purpose of this chapter is to relate our 
research findings back to the broader literature, as outlined in Section 2 and discuss the 
contribution this research makes to on-going debates in this literature.  
9.1 Contribution of Research to Wider Literature  
This sub-section is split into three different sections, each of which outline the contribution we 
consider this thesis has made to on-going debates in the sustainability transitions, co-
evolutionary and innovation literature (Section 9.1.1); the business model, sustainable 
business model and Product-Service System literature (Section 9.1.2); and the ESCo and energy 
service contract literature (Section 9.1.3).  
9.1.1 Socio-Technical System Change Literature 
We begin by discussing the contribution this research had made to the socio-technical 
transition, co-evolutionary and innovation literatures, paying close attention to the work 
surrounding sustainability transitions and innovations.  
Contribution 1: This thesis synthesizes business model and co-evolutionary analytical 
frameworks to develop an integrated framework designed to examine how a 
population of organisations adopting a certain business model co-evolves with the 
various dimensions that make up the socio-technical system in which they operate 
This thesis synthesizes Osterwalder & Pigneur’s (2010) 9 business model building blocks 
analytical framework for business model characterisation and Foxon’s (2011) co-evolutionary 
framework for analysing sustainability transitions. In doing so this thesis presents an 
integrated analytical framework (Section 3.3) designed to examine not only the co-
evolutionary relationship populations of firms applying novel business models share with the 
various dimensions of the wider socio-technical system but also the co-evolutionary 
relationship of populations employing incumbent business models. Consequently, we can use 
this framework to improve our understanding of how the wider socio-technical system 
constrains and enables the uptake of novel, sustainable business models and conversely, how 
these business models can characterise socio-technical system change. The same examination 
can take place for unsustainable, incumbent business models. Furthermore, by separating 
novel, sustainable models and unsustainable, incumbent models we can explore how 
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populations of firms operating these contrasting business models interact with one another 
and the implications this has for sustainability transitions. Therefore, a key contribution of this 
research is that it has helped to bridge the gap between the business model literature and the 
socio-technical transitions and co-evolutionary literatures. 
Importantly, the analytical framework this research has developed and implemented can be 
employed by other researchers examining the role of business models in socio-technical 
system change, both within or outside of the context of sustainability transitions (Section 
10.3). Furthermore, this research also develops, implements and clearly presents a 
methodology designed to mobilise this framework, which can also be employed by other 
researchers. Consequently, this has helped to address the need for a clearer, more rigorous 
methodology for sustainability transitions research. 
Contribution 2: This thesis highlights the coevolutionary relationship novel 
(sustainable) and incumbent (unsustainable) business models share with the wider 
socio-technical system they operate in. It also identifies that business models can be 
subject to positive feedbacks and thus, lock-in phenomena 
By applying our integrated analytical framework to our empirical evidence, this research 
presents a multitude of examples that illustrate the co-evolutionary relationship the ESCo and 
EUCo populations share with the wider UK energy system. Consequently, this supports the 
view that both novel and incumbent business models share a co-evolutionary relationship with 
their social environment (Doganova and Eyquem-Renault, 2009, Mason and Spring, 2011, 
Teece, 2010, Hagberg and Kjellberg, 2010) and as such the evolution of a business model is not 
only influenced by the social environment in which they exist (Osterwalder, 2004, Teece, 2010, 
Mason and Spring, 2011) but that their implementation can in turn shape this social 
environment (Doganova and Eyquem-Renault, 2009, Mason and Spring, 2011).  
A special form of co-evolutionary relationship is that of positive feedback mechanisms, i.e. ‘the 
tendency for that which is ahead to get further ahead’ and lock-out others i.e. ‘that which 
loses advantage [, loses] further advantage’ (Arthur, 1996 p.100). As illustrated in Section 
2.3.3.1, the locking-in and associated persistence of some technologies (e.g. QWERTY, VHS etc) 
(Arthur, 1989) and institutions  (North, 1990, Pierson, 2000) has been attributed to positive 
feedback mechanisms. At a broader scale, lock-in mechanisms (e.g. technological) can support 
other forms of lock-in (e.g. institutional), serving to reinforce one another, stabilizing the 
existing regime and consequently locking-in unsustainable socio-technical system states 
(Geels, 2011), such as fossil fuel based energy systems (Unruh, 2000). This research indicates 
that, in a similar manner to technologies (Arthur, 1989) and institutions (North, 1990, Pierson, 
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2000), business models can also be subject to positive feedbacks and thus fall victim to lock-in 
phenomena50. Although outside the remit of this research, it is possible that business models 
could help to reinforce the lock-in of other socio-technical components, in a similar way to 
how technological and institutional lock-in have served to reinforce one another (Unruh, 2000, 
Foxon, 2002). Consequently, this research emphasises the important role business models can 
play in the locking-in of unsustainable socio-technical system states and that they should be 
factored into future research examining sustainability transitions.    
It is also important to note that whilst positive feedbacks may lock-out sustainable business 
models, they can also serve to help novel, sustainable business models to gain traction. This is 
supported by the positive feedback mechanism between application of the ESCo model and 
improving levels of customer awareness and understanding of the model as outlined in Section 
7.2.4. Additionally, some positive feedback mechanisms that have traditionally contributed to 
the locking-out the ESCo model have begun to show signs of being reversed, such as the 
mechanism involving the co-evolution of the ESCo model and financial institutional 
arrangements (Section 7.2.5). Therefore, we emphasise that positive feedback mechanisms 
can play an important role in both helping and hindering sustainable business models to gain 
traction and thus the extent to which they shape socio-technical system change. 
Contribution 3: This thesis underlines how the implementation of novel sustainable 
business models represents a potentially important driver of sustainability transitions 
As underlined in our Literature Review (Section 2.2.2.5) the manner in which innovative 
sustainable business models in shape sustainability transitions is currently under-researched 
and thus poorly understood. However, in recent years there has been a growing call from 
academics, industry and policymakers (Boons and Lüdeke-Freund, Schaltegger et al., 2011, 
Uren, 2010, COWI, 2008, Wilson et al., 2009) to improve our understanding of how the 
adoption of sustainable business models could help us to drive forward sustainable 
development. As outlined in the previous sub-section (Contribution 2), this research has 
sought to address this gap by taking a co-evolutionary approach to examine the factors 
responsible for enabling and inhibiting the uptake of the ESCo model and in turn, the influence 
the application of the ESCo model has had and is likely to have on a transition to a sustainable 
UK energy system. 
As identified in the previous sub-section (Section 10.1) we observe that the implementation of 
novel, sustainable business models (e.g. ESCo model) can exert an important influence on the 
                                                          
50 Different to the concept of customer lock-in (Amit and Zott, 2012, Zott and Amit, 2010) 
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evolution of the various dimensions that make up socio-technical systems (Sections 7 & 8). 
Consequently, novel sustainable business models could have an important bearing on the 
trajectory of sustainability transitions. In light of this, we concur with academics who have 
argued that sustainability transitions are not only shaped by technological innovations but also 
non-technological or social forms of innovation (Witkamp et al., 2011, Steward, 2008, Steward, 
2012), such as business model innovation.  
Despite our research supporting the view that novel, sustainable business models could help 
to facilitate sustainability transitions,  their proliferation is far from guaranteed, considering 
the multitude of barriers sustainable business models face in achieving wide-scale adoption 
(Charter et al., 2008, COWI, 2008, Steinberger et al., 2009, Wilson et al., 2009). We find that a 
number of these challenges can be attributed to the poor degree of fitness novel sustainable 
business models share with their selection environment. In socio-technical terms this relates to 
the mismatch between the business model innovation and the prevailing socio-technical 
regime, i.e. the ‘established practices and associated rules that stabilize [the] existing [energy] 
system’ (Geels, 2011 p.26). This is evident in the various ways in which the ESCo model 
encountered barriers relating to both formal and informal institutions that had evolved during 
the history of the UK energy system (Section 6.1.4.2).  
Contribution 4: This thesis highlights that incumbent organisations can also play an 
important role in the proliferation of novel sustainable business models even though 
such models could potentially threaten their position of dominance  
A particularly interesting finding of this research was that many of the incumbent Energy 
Utilities had made the decision to adopt the characteristically distinct and potentially 
disruptive ESCo model, despite the continued commercial success of their EUCo business 
model (Consumer Focus, 2012). The research found that the Utilities had made this move in 
light of their perception that current and emerging developments within their selection 
environment posed a critical threat to the success of the EUCo model going forward. This 
move can be considered to represent a strategy designed to avoid a repeat of other high-
profile incumbent organisations that failed to adjust to their rapidly changing market place, 
such as Kodak (Koen et al., 2011) or Borders (Section 2.4.3.2).  
The strategy they have employed mirrors the ‘adopt the innovation by playing both games at 
once’ strategy outlined by Charitou and Markides (2003), where the incumbent continues to 
operate its traditional model (i.e. EUCo model) but establishes separate business units that 
operate the characteristically distinct, novel business model (i.e. ESCo model). This choice was 
surprising not only because of the continued financial success of their model but also the risks 
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associated with employing two models at the same time, where the new model is in direct 
conflict with the traditional model51, which could result in a cannibalization of their existing 
customer base (Markides and Oyon, 2010, Porter, 1980). Although our research finds that it 
was the non-incumbent energy organisations (e.g. Honeywell, Thameswey Energy, Dalkia, 
Siemens etc) that constituted the main driving force behind the development of the UK ESCo 
market, this finding highlights that despite the threat novel sustainable business models may 
pose to the incumbents’ position of dominance, incumbent organisations could also play a key 
role in the proliferation of such models in the future. For instance, the move of such wealthy 
and well-renowned organisations into the ESCo market could raise actors’ confidence that the 
ESCo market is set to grow, helping to stimulate support for ESCo operations (Section 8.2.5). It 
is important to emphasise once again, as we did in Section 8.2.5, that the Energy Utilities could 
quickly change their strategy of developing their energy service contracting capabilities, to 
focusing on improving their traditional business activities. 
The finding that organisations such as the Energy Utilities have moved to alter their business 
model on account of their perception that their environment is undergoing radical change 
supports the view held by Cordes (2006) that socio-technical evolutionary processes (i.e. 
variation, selection and retention), unlike in the natural world, are not entirely ‘blind’ but are 
instead influenced by actors’ perceptions of how their environment is likely to change. For 
instance, without the strongly held belief amongst some of the Energy Utilities that their 
traditional business model could be threatened by emerging developments, it is unlikely they 
would have begun to alter aspects of their business (variation) in order to accommodate the 
ESCo model (selection), which in some cases has followed a very similar template to other 
high-profile ESCos (e.g. Honeywell) (retention). Therefore, this research indicates that actors’ 
perceptions of how the socio-technical system will change plays a key role in socio-technical 
evolutionary processes, helping to address Smith et al.’s (2010) question of ‘how do [actors’] 
decisions and action strategies reflect and anticipate selection environments and evolutionary 
dynamics?’ (p.446). 
The manner in which the Utilities have reacted to the potentially disruptive ESCo model in 
some ways contradicts Christensen’s (1997) notion that disruptive innovations are normally 
considered a threat to incumbents, considering their potential to radically change the existing 
market by introducing a different set of values that jar with the status quo. It was therefore 
surprising to observe that many of the Utilities’ personnel considered the ESCo model to 
represent more of an opportunity than a threat. For instance, a number of Utility managers 
                                                          
51 This refers specifically to EPCs where revenue is decoupled from energy throughput, which 
contrasts against the EUCo model where revenue is coupled with throughput (Section 6.1.2) 
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acknowledged that by adopting aspects of the ESCo model, they could enjoy benefits such as 
longer contractual relationships with their customers, healthier profit margins and greater 
differentiation from their relatively homogenous competitors.  
To some extent our research supports the view that incumbents can struggle to adopt 
disruptive innovations (Macher and Richman, 2004, Walsh et al., 2002). This was illustrated by 
the case study of Energy Utility X (Section 6.2.4.7) that had faced a number of challenges, 
which included altering the mind-set of the organisation’s personnel that had become aligned 
to the traditional EUCo model and developing key resources (e.g. skills, experience) necessary 
to operate the ESCo model. However, the Utilities had generally exhibited a surprising ability 
to accommodate the characteristically distinct ESCo model. Consequently, over the coming 
years the UK Energy Utilities could sit alongside other rare examples of incumbent 
organisations that have successfully identified and exploited potentially disruptive innovations 
prior to being disrupted by others (see Yu and Hang, 2010). This finding indicates that if there 
is ‘buy-in’ from senior incumbent personnel, then the transition from unsustainable traditional 
model to a novel sustainable model may not always be fraught with difficulty. 
9.1.2 Sustainable Business Model Literature 
We now consider the contribution this research has made to the business model literature, 
particularly that relating to sustainable business models and Product-Service Systems. 
Contribution 5: This thesis provided an empirically grounded, detailed account of a 
business model that has the potential to fulfil our energy needs in a sustainable 
fashion 
As part of the in-depth and extensive Literature Review undertaken as part of this research 
(Section 2), we identified only a handful of examples where scholars had undertaken a detailed 
examination of a specific sustainable business model or Product-Service System (PSS) (see 
Mont et al., 2006, Wells, 2006, Williams, 2007), outlining not only their core characteristics but 
how they functioned as a business. Furthermore, the review did not identify any instances 
where Osterwalder’s comprehensive and state-of-the-art 9 building blocks framework had 
been adopted to populate the core characteristics of a sustainable business model. 
Consequently, we argue that an important contribution of this research has been to provide a 
detailed, empirically grounded account of a sustainable business model by populating the ESCo 
model. In turn, this has provided insight into the types of components that make-up a business 
capable of creating, delivering and capturing value by satisfying a human need (such as energy 
services) in a sustainable manner, and importantly how these different components knit 
together as a coherent system.  
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By comparing the ESCo to the EUCo model, we were also able to illuminate the differences 
between a business model that is broadly regarded as having the potential to fulfil our energy 
needs sustainably (i.e. ESCo model) (Fawkes, 2007, Marino et al., 2011, Vine, 2005, Hansen, 
2009) and one that has traditionally fulfilled our energy needs in an unsustainable manner (i.e. 
EUCo model) (Eyre, 2008, Steinberger et al., 2009, York and Kuschler, 2011). This has 
contributed to a stronger understanding of not only what a sustainable business ‘looks like’ but 
also how an organisation adopting such a business model may characteristically differ from 
others operating a less sustainable business model.  
Contribution 6: This thesis highlights that organisations across private, public and third 
sectors can drive the development and implementation of sustainable business models 
Our research supports the view that private sector organisations are likely to play a leading 
role in both developing and implementing innovative sustainable business models (Birkin et al., 
2009, COWI, 2008, Johnson and Suskewicz, 2009, Osgood, 2009), considering the wealth of 
technical and financial resources they are capable of drawing upon, as well as the pressure on 
firms to identify compelling value propositions that can enable them to out-compete their 
competitors within their respective markets. However, our research also supports the view 
that sustainable business model innovation can be driven by organisations outside the private 
sector such as community organisations and charities in the third sector (Steward et al., 2009, 
Seyfang and Smith, 2007, Seyfang, 2012, Wilson et al., 2009). Furthermore, it also highlights 
the role public sector organisations could play in sustainable business model innovation, such 
as Local Authorities. This view is supported by the identification of a number of Community 
(e.g. MOZES, Ashton Hayes, Kielder District Heating etc) and Local Authority owned and led 
ESCos (e.g. Thameswey Energy, Aberdeen Heat & Power etc). Therefore, we argue that 
academics, entrepreneurs and policymakers should be sensitive to the potential for 
organisations across all sectors to drive forward the development and implementation of novel 
sustainable business models. 
Contribution 7: This thesis examines the factors responsible for enabling and inhibiting 
sustainable business model innovation 
By examining the trials and tribulations ESCos have experienced, as a form of organisation that 
operates a novel sustainable business models, our research identified a number of drivers and 
barriers to the uptake of sustainable business models. This has served to build upon existing 
research in this field (see Charter et al., 2008, Steinberger et al., 2009, Wilson et al., 2009, 
COWI, 2008, Schaltegger et al., 2011) by corroborating some of the factors previously 
identified (Section 2.5.3), such as a lack of awareness, risk adversity and the lack of regulatory 
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incentives. It also identified lesser known barriers to sustainable business model innovation 
(Sections 6.1.4.2 & 6.2) such as the lack of appropriate skills, scarcity of finance and the 
unpredictability and complexity of the regulatory framework. 
Contribution 8: This thesis examines sustainable business model innovation in a heavily 
regulated industry  
Not only has this thesis built upon previous research examining the factors enabling and 
inhibiting sustainable business model innovation (Contribution 7), it has also examined these 
factors in the context of a heavily regulated industry. Traditionally, much of the research that 
has examined how innovative business models have gained traction and disrupted the status 
quo of traditional markets have focused on case studies of organisations operating in 
industries with relatively little regulation. For instance, the popular cases of Apple and the 
music industry (Johnson, 2010), as well as Xerox and the photocopying industry (Chesbrough, 
2010) both emerged largely in the absence of a strong regulatory framework (Section 2.4.2). In 
contrast, some other studies have focused on business model innovation in more heavily 
regulated industries, such as Southwest Airlines and the airline industry (Teece, 2010), as well 
as Wal-Mart and the food retail industry (Magretta, 2002). However, we argue these have not 
explicitly examined how formal institutions and specifically regulation has served to either 
enable or constrain business model innovation, and particularly the adoption of sustainable 
business models. 
In light of this, we argue our research makes an important contribution to the wider literature 
by examining the operation of a novel, sustainable business model (i.e. the ESCo model) in a 
highly regulated industry (i.e. the UK energy system). The research finds that regulation has 
both served to support and inhibit the uptake of an innovative, sustainable business model 
such as the ESCo model (Section 6.1.4 & 0). The finding that regulation can support the uptake 
of innovative business models holds with Porter & van der Linde’s (1995) view ‘that properly 
designed environmental standards can trigger innovation that may partially or more than fully 
offset the costs of complying with them’ (p.98). This jars with the more traditional, laissez faire 
notion held by some economists that if environmental and financial ‘win-win’ opportunities do 
exist, then firms do not require regulation to encourage them to harness these opportunities. 
Conversely, our findings also supports other research that emphasises how regulation can also 
pose a significant barrier to the development and uptake of sustainable innovations, such as 
novel sustainable business models (Charter et al., 2008, COWI, 2008, Steinberger et al., 2009) 
(Section 2.5.3). 
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In summary, this research emphasises the potential for novel sustainable business models to 
gain traction in highly regulated industries such as the energy sector and other highly 
regulated sectors (e.g. water, transport, waste industries). Importantly, well-designed 
regulation can play a key role in supporting the development and deployment of such business 
models, helping to accelerate the uptake of these compared to less regulated environments. 
However, in contrast, regulations can act as a significant barrier to the proliferation of novel, 
sustainable business models if there is a poor fitness between the model and the institutional 
landscape.  
9.1.3 ESCo Literature 
We now discuss the contribution this research has made to the ESCo literature. 
Contribution 9: This thesis provides a detailed account of the core characteristics 
exhibited by the 4 most common variants of the ESCo model operating in the UK, 
presenting their characteristics, strengths & weaknesses and drivers & barriers 
Very little research to date has examined the characteristics and experiences of the various 
different forms of ESCo that exist in the UK (see King and Shaw, 2010, Smith, 2007a, Bertoldi et 
al., 2006a). Although these studies have provided some valuable insight into the types of 
variants of the ESCo model that exists in the UK, this research has provided a much more 
detailed, empirically grounded analysis of these variants. For instance, the sector level (Phase 
1) (Section 6.1.5) and particularly the case study (Phase 2) (Section 6.2) phases of the empirical 
investigation served to highlight how although these variants were similar in some respects, 
they also exhibited a number of characteristic differences, as well as different strengths and 
weaknesses. Furthermore, the research identified how these variants were also subject to a 
mixture of similar and differentiated drivers and barriers. The case studies helped to situate 
these in the context of an ESCo’s narrative, helping to relate these to ‘real world’ examples. 
Contribution 10: This thesis provides a detailed account of the 9 building blocks that 
make-up the ESCo business model 
We argue that building a detailed picture of the ESCo business model, using the 9 building 
blocks framework (Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2010)(Section 6.1.1), represents an important 
contribution to the ESCo literature. This is because, as outlined in Section 3.1, although some 
valuable and detailed research already exists that outlines the core characteristics of energy 
service contracting (see Fawkes, 2007, Marino et al., 2011, Smith, 2007a, Sorrell, 2005, Sorrell, 
2007), no detailed accounts previously existed of how the various components and linkages 
that make-up an ESCo’s business model were identified, despite numerous references having 
been made to the ESCo business model (Hansen, 2009, Sorrell, 2005, Steinberger et al., 2009, 
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Goldman et al., 2005). Consequently, we argue that this research helps to improve our 
understanding of the ways in which ESCos create, deliver and capture value via the provision 
of energy services to their customers, thus helping to alleviate some of the confusion 
surrounding what constitutes an ESCo (Bertoldi et al., 2006a, Hansen, 2011, King and Shaw, 
2010, Sorrell, 2005). 
Contribution 11: This thesis incorporated an in-depth, up-to-date examination of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the ESCo business model from the perspective of the 
customer and potential adopters of the model, as well as the factors enabling and 
inhibiting ESCo operation in the UK  
Little research to date has examined the strengths and weaknesses of the ESCo model from 
the perspective of both energy consumers and potential ESCo model adopters. In Sections 
6.1.1.1 & 6.1.3 we sought to address this. Significantly more research has focused on the 
factors responsible for enabling and inhibiting their operations (i.e. drivers and barriers), 
however we argue that a large number of these studies incorporated a limited empirical 
investigation of UK ESCo activity (see Bertoldi et al., 2007, Marino et al., 2010, Marino et al., 
2011, Bertoldi et al., 2006b). Other work, despite providing valuable insight into UK ESCo 
activity, has incorporated no obvious empirical methodology (see Fawkes, 2007, Smith, 2007a, 
Boait, 2009). This thesis has helped to corroborate some drivers and barriers to ESCo operation 
in the UK previously identified by other scholars with additional, in-depth, up-to-date 
qualitative evidence. Additionally, a number of previously unidentified drivers and barriers to 
ESCo operation were identified by this research, such as the decline of capital grants and the 
introduction of financial incentives for low-carbon micro-generation. 
Contribution 12: This thesis provides valuable insight into the role that ESCos are likely 
to play in a transition to a sustainable UK energy system 
The only other work we identified as part of the Literature Review, which has also considered 
the role of ESCos in the transition to a sustainable UK energy system, was undertaken by 
Sorrell (2005) and Foxon (2012). We discussed in Section 8.3 how our findings compared with 
the role the three different transition pathways reserve for ESCos. Therefore, we briefly 
consider how our research findings compared with Sorrel’s. Broadly, our findings are closely 
aligned with Sorrell’s, for instance his research also identified that the ESCo market 
represented a niche market, where application of the ESCo model rather than the EUCo ‘tends 
to be the exception rather than the rule’ (p.iv). Furthermore, he also indicated that the ESCo 
population had exhibited a significant degree of heterogeneity. Looking forward Sorrell 
explained that ESCos were likely to play some role in the transition to a sustainable UK energy 
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system, however he was sceptical of how important this role would be explaining that a 
‘wholesale shift from commodity to service supply appears very unlikely’ (p.100) largely 
because ‘the transaction cost of contracting will continue to provide a substantial obstacle and 
many energy services will remain inaccessible to the contracting approach’ (p.99-100). 
Although our research also indicates that the ESCo model is unlikely to entirely displace the 
EUCo model, it does however envisage a more prominent role for ESCos in this transition than 
Sorrell, when taking into account both the uptake of the ESCo model by the Energy Utilities in 
recent years (Sections 6.1.5.3 & 6.2.4) and the positive outlook for the UK ESCo market in the 
context of emerging developments (Sections 6.1.4.3 & 8). 
We argue that although Sorrell’s research is both insightful and of an extremely high quality, 
this research builds upon his work in five key ways to provide a stronger understanding of the 
role ESCos could play in a transition to a sustainable UK energy system. Firstly, we have applied 
an analytical framework that situates the ESCo business model within the context of its wider 
socio-technical system, in an attempt to understand how its broader environment will causally 
influence the evolution of the ESCo population and how this might influence the role it plays in 
a transition to a sustainable energy system. Secondly, we identify specific ways in which 
operation of the ESCo model in the UK has led to changes in the various dimensions of the 
energy system. Thirdly, our empirical investigation was considerably more in-depth 
incorporating the undertaking and analysis of 43 interviews and a wealth of primary literature, 
compared to Sorrell’s 13 interviews. Fourthly, our empirical investigation provided a greater 
focus on the heterogeneity of the ESCo population by incorporating 4 in-depth case studies of 
the 4 key variants of the ESCo model in the UK. Finally, although still valid and insightful, 
Sorrell’s work was conducted in 2005. Since then a number of important energy related 
developments have taken place, most notably the introduction of key pieces of low-carbon 
regulation (Sections 1.3 & 5.4). In contrast, our project provides an up-to-date examination of 
the ESCo operation in the UK.  
9.2 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has situated the key findings from the previous chapters in the context of the 
wider literature. In doing so we have underlined the key contributions this research has made 
to on-going debates in the socio-technical transitions, business model and ESCo literatures. In 
the following chapter we briefly summarise the key findings of this research and how these 
address our research questions, before reflecting upon the key strengths and weaknesses of 
our research strategy, particularly the application of our integrated analytical framework. 
Finally, we conclude with a number of suggestions for future research, which we argue would 
build upon the insights and experience gained from this research.  
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10 Conclusion 
In the previous chapter we outlined the key theoretical and empirical contributions this thesis 
has made to the broader literature. In this final chapter we begin by drawing upon the insights 
gained from the previous chapters in order to address our research questions (Section 1.5). 
Following this we reflect upon the strengths and weaknesses of both the integrated analytical 
framework and research strategy this thesis has employed. These insights are in turn drawn 
upon to inform a number of suggestions for future research, which are presented at the end of 
this chapter. 
10.1 Addressing the Research Questions 
Based on the empirical findings of the sector level and case study analyses of the UK ESCo 
population presented in Chapter 6, and the present and future coevolutionary analyses of the 
relationship between the ESCo population and the UK energy system presented in Chapters 0 
and 0, we now summarise how the thesis has addressed the research questions set out in 
Chapter 0. 
1. What are the core characteristics of the ESCo business model? 
The core characteristics of the ESCo business model are discussed in detail in Section 6.1.1 and 
a summary of these is provided in Table 6.3, as part of a comparison with the EUCo model. In 
Table 10.1 we present the core characteristics of the ESCo model characteristics as outlined in 
Table 6.3 in a more visually accessible manner in order to help the reader identify these more 
easily. The colour coding corresponds to Osterwalder’s four business model pillars, (i.e. 
product/value proposition, customer interface, infrastructure management and financial 
aspects), which represent categories that each of the 9 building blocks falls into (Section 6.2).   
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Key Partners 
Private Sector 
 Financial Institutions & Investors 
 Technical, Legal & Financial 
Consultancies 
 Sub-Contractors 
 Property Developers 
 Energy Utilities 
 
Public Sector  
 Local Authorities 
 
(Also a number of less important 
partnerships as outlined in Section 
6.1.1.7) 
Key Activities 
 Finance, design, build, operate 
and maintain small to medium 
scale demand management & 
low carbon supply energy 
projects 
 ESCs: Generation, distribution, 
supply, metering and billing 
 EPCs: Preliminary and 
investment grade auditing, 
measurement and verification of 
energy savings 
Value Proposition 
 
Fulfil Energy Needs at a Lower 
Cost and/or with Added Value 
 
 Fulfil energy needs at a similar or 
lower cost to Energy Utilities 
 ESCo assumes most financial and 
technical risk of fulfilling energy 
needs 
 Bespoke and holistic energy 
solutions can ensure energy 
needs are entirely satisfied 
 Energy needs met with fewer 
adverse environmental effects 
than via EUCo model. Customer 
can enjoy more sustainable 
lifestyle, fulfil regulatory and CSR 
obligations etc 
 Societal benefits e.g. alleviation 
of fuel poverty, climate change 
mitigation, localization of capital 
flows  
Customer Relationships 
 On-going & long term 
 Close, cooperative, candid and 
trusting relationship to enable 
open and detailed dialogue, in 
order to develop bespoke & 
holistic energy solutions that 
satisfy both its own and its 
customer’s needs 
 Customer may also act as 
investor and/or manager of the 
ESCo (e.g. Community ESCo) 
Customer Segments 
Core 
 Public sector (local authority, 
government etc) 
 Commercial (office, retail etc)  
 
Peripheral 
 Residential sector 
 Industrial sector 
 Agricultural sector 
 
Key Resources 
 Project capital 
 Experienced personnel with 
technical, financial and legal 
expertise to deliver energy 
service contracts 
 ESCs: Primary energy conversion 
and decentralised distribution 
equipment. Fuel to generate 
energy from 
 EPCs: Secondary conversion 
equipment and building controls 
Channels 
 On-line, TV, telephone, postal & 
door-to-door marketing, 
purchasing, metering, billing & 
customer feedback 
 Energy supplied via localized and 
often private distribution 
networks (e.g. private wire) 
 Support via on-going customer 
interaction & project 
management 
Cost Structure 
 Equipment/technology 
 Technical, financial and legal consultancy 
 Staff 
 Marketing and communication  
 Operations & Maintenance 
 Finance or investment repayments 
 Technical, financial and legal consultancy 
 EPCs: Preliminary Auditing; Measurement 
& Verification; Compensation for poor 
performance 
 ESCs: Fuel and energy; Acquiring rights to 
supply from gatekeeper organisation (e.g. 
developer); Metering & Billing 
 
Revenue Streams 
 Capital grants  
 Customer investment 
 Bank finance 
ESCs 
 Payment for useful energy streams (e.g. 
heat). Customer covers this in part via the 
energy savings the ESCo achieves through 
efficiency gains or utilisation of cheaper 
primary energy input 
 
 Low-carbon financial incentives for micro-
generation (e.g. FiT, RHI)  
 
EPCs 
 Payment for predefined quality & quantity 
of final energy services (e.g. light). 
Customer covers this via the energy savings 
the ESCo achieves through efficiency gains 
Table 10.1 The core characteristics of the ESCo business model according to Osterwalder & Pigneur’s (2010) 9 business model building blocks framework
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2. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the ESCo model? 
This research acknowledges that the extent to which the ESCo model has proliferated in the 
UK cannot be explained by extrinsic factors alone but also by the strengths and weaknesses 
associated with the ESCo model from the perspective of both the organisation considering 
adoption of the model, as well as its customers. Consequently, the research sought to identify 
the strengths and weaknesses of the ESCo model from the perspective of the ESCo’s customers 
(Section 6.1.1.1) and the organisations operating the ESCo model (Section 6.1.3).  
The strengths of the ESCo model from the perspective of the customer are encapsulated in the 
Value Proposition section of Table 10.1. The key weaknesses of the ESCo model from the 
customer’s perspective include (1) a reduction in operational flexibility over a long-term 
period, (2) the requirement of the customer to engage heavily in contract design and (3) a 
financial commitment with the ESCo that resembles financial debt.  
From the perspective of the ESCo (or potential ESCo), a key strength of the model was 
considered to be the provision of bespoke energy service contracts as bespoke contracting is 
normally capable of creating more value for energy consumers than compared to the 
standardized contracts associated with the supply of energy units. Firms find compelling value 
propositions such as this desirable not only because they can normally attract more customers 
but that customers are often willing to pay more for bespoke services as they constitute a 
‘value-added’ service compared to standardized offerings. Bespoke energy service contracting 
also opens up a large potential customer base as such offerings are capable of satisfying a 
more heterogeneous customer base than standardized offers. However, this strong value 
proposition and flexibility comes at a price because replicating bespoke energy service 
contracts from customer-to-customer typically proves problematic, meaning many ESCos 
typically have to design new agreements for each of their customers, reducing their economies 
of scale and thus subjected them to high transaction costs for each energy service contract 
they provide.  
An important strength of the ESCo model is that it cannot only be applied to satisfy the energy 
needs of a broad range of customers but that it is accessible to a broad variety of adopters, 
ranging across the private, public and third sectors. However, these organisations will be 
required to access a range of key resources (e.g. capital, skills etc) and partners to effectively 
provide energy service contracts, which are often difficult to secure. Finally, even though long-
term energy service contracts provide long-term revenue streams for ESCos, they also 
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constrain their ability to alter their business model because they are committed to contracts 
that typically last up to 25 years. This limits their ability to react and adapt to changes in their 
selection environment, which could prove detrimental to the organisation’s future prospects. 
3. How have the various key dimensions of the UK energy system causally influenced the 
evolution of the ESCo population? 
4. How has the ESCo population causally influenced the evolution of the various key 
dimensions of the UK energy system? 
The core focus of this thesis was to improve our understanding of how the evolution of the 
ESCo population has been causally influenced by the five key dimensions of the UK energy 
system, which include the ecosystem, institutions, user practices, technology and the 
incumbent business model dimensions (question 3). Furthermore, we sought to identify how 
the ESCo population has influenced the evolution of these different dimensions and has thus 
characterised change in the UK energy system (question 4). In short a core aim of this thesis 
was to elucidate our understanding of the co-evolutionary relationship between the ESCo 
population and the UK energy system. 
In response to question 3, we found evidence that supported the view that each of the key 
dimensions of the UK energy system has had an important causal influence on the variation, 
selection and retention of the ESCo population. Although we cannot easily quantify each 
dimension’s influence and thus compare their relative strengths, the research indicated that 
the institutional dimension had the greatest direct influence on the evolution of the ESCo 
population, whilst the other dimensions had a similarly strong influence compared to one 
another. We found evidence to support that these dimensions were in part responsible for the 
heterogeneity of the ESCo population, encouraging the emergence of the four archetypal ESCo 
variants outlined in Section 6.1.5, which were examined as case studies in Section 6.2. The 
causal influence of these dimensions had also constrained the scope for retention of the ESCo 
model, although regulatory (e.g. standardised contracts) and user practice (e.g. growing 
awareness and understanding of the ESCo model) developments had helped to improve the 
model’s prospects of retention in recent years. Finally, the limited uptake or selection of the 
ESCo model could also be attributed to developments within each these dimensions, the 
pressures from which formed a broadly hostile environment for the ESCo model, which in 
contrast was supportive of the EUCo model’s operation. However, the research found that in 
recent years the evolution of each of these dimensions has contributed to a more favourable 
selection environment for ESCos, thus helping the ESCo model to gain additional traction. 
Conversely, recent developments were judged to have cultivated a more hostile environment 
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for Energy Utilities, however they continue to remain extremely profitable and dominant in 
the UK energy system. 
In relation to question 4 the research indicates that the ESCo population has causally 
influenced the evolution of each of different dimensions of the UK energy system to varying 
degrees. As was expected, the small size of the ESCo population and the number of energy 
service contracts that have been delivered in the UK to date has meant that ESCos’ have not 
had a major causal influence on the evolution of the UK energy system, however their 
influence was large enough to be identifiable. The ESCo population’s influence was strongest 
on the user practice dimension, where the signing of energy service contracts, particularly 
EPCs, had required consumers to engage in different consumption behaviours. Furthermore, 
the uptake of the ESCo model by communities and Local Authorities had the effect of 
transforming these consumers’ traditional role as they had assumed significant control over 
the organisation responsible for fulfilling their energy needs, i.e. the ESCo. One of the most 
interesting findings was in relation to the incumbent business model dimension where the 
majority of the Energy Utilities had created separate organisational divisions that were 
established to deliver energy service contracts. Furthermore, the Utilities had also made 
efforts to scale up their ESCo operations. 
The most compelling evidence to support the existence of a co-evolutionary relationship 
between business models and the wider socio-technical was the identification of positive 
feedback mechanisms, considering that they constitute evidence to support the view that the 
ESCo population’s has causally influenced the evolution of the UK energy system (question 3) 
and that the energy system has causally influenced the population’s evolution (question 4). 
These positive feedbacks were observed to have locked-in the EUCo model and locked-out the 
ESCo model. However, it was also found that positive feedbacks were helping the ESCo model 
to gain additional traction, such as the feedback involving improved awareness and 
understanding of the ESCo model and the greater incidence of energy service contracts.  
5. How is the co-evolutionary relationship between the ESCo population and the UK 
energy system likely to change in the future? 
Having identified the manner in which the ESCo population has co-evolved with the key 
dimensions of the UK energy system during the past and at present, we turned our attention 
to the future in order to provide insight into how this dynamic is likely to change over the 
coming years, during which the UK will seek to move towards a sustainable energy system. In 
order to do so we drew upon a combination of the insights from our interview, documentary 
evidence relating to emerging regulatory developments and other research that has provided 
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projections relating to key energy sector related developments (e.g. energy prices, climate 
change etc).  
Over the coming years we expect that emerging developments are likely to mean that the 
ESCo population will continue to exhibit a similar degree of variation to that at present. This is 
because some emerging developments are expected to increase variation, such as the influx of 
new entrants and strategic partnerships in the UK ESCo market, although these are expected 
to be balanced out by factors that will decrease variation, such as the introduction of 
standardised contracts, learning effects and the disbanding of some ESCos (Section 8.1). 
Additionally, the sector-level and case study findings indicate that no single ESCo variant is 
expected to ‘win out’ over the others and so we envisage that these will continue to operate 
alongside one another. 
The prospects for retention of the ESCo model, i.e. it being ‘preserved, duplicated, or 
otherwise reproduced’ (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006 p.17), are set to improve with the introduction 
of standardised contracts, alongside other emerging developments such as actors’ improving 
understanding of the ESCo model and their growing awareness of exemplary cases of energy 
service contracting, which could provide a template for other firms to emulate (Section 8.1). 
The ESCo model’s selection environment is expected to improve particularly at the hands of an 
expected continuation of ecosystem related crises, such as climate change and energy 
insecurity. Institutional developments are also expected to help cultivate a more favourable 
selection environment for ESCos, most notably the imminent introduction of new regulation 
such as the Green Deal, Green Investment Bank and European Energy Efficiency Directive, 
alongside the expected continuation of supportive policies such as the CRC Energy Efficiency 
Scheme, the Feed-in-Tariff and the Renewable Heat Incentive. However, many of the barriers 
identified in Sections 6.1.4.2 & 6.2 that have traditionally presented significant challenges to 
ESCo operation in the UK are expected to persist for some time to come, such as the instability 
and complexity of the regulatory framework and the lack of skills in the UK to deliver energy 
service contracts. Furthermore, some emerging developments may serve to inhibit ESCo 
proliferation, such as the imminent Energy Company Obligation, which will continue the 
tradition of enabling the Energy Utilities to discharge their commitment to reducing their 
associated GHG emissions without fundamentally altering their business model, thus 
discouraging the establishment of Energy Utility ESCos. It is also expected that many of the 
positive feedbacks identified in Section 7 that have served to both lock-in the EUCo model and 
lock-out the ESCo model are likely to remain, considering the persistence of virtuous cycles.  
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Despite these potential challenges, emerging UK energy system developments are expected to 
be broadly supportive of ESCo operation, encouraging the ESCo model to proliferate in the 
future. Considering that the ESCo population is expected to exhibit a similar degree of 
variation over the coming years to that at present, we expect the type of influence ESCos have 
on the wider energy system to be broadly similar to that at present. However, considering that 
their selection environment is expected to continue to improve, we expect the strength of 
their causal influence on the evolution of these dimensions to increase as the ESCo population 
grows. Consequently, it is envisaged that we will begin to observe more changes and 
potentially more profound changes to the different aspects of the UK energy system over the 
coming years, which can be partly or wholly attributable to ESCo activity (Section 8.2). For 
example, a greater focus on sustainable, decentralised energy generation and demand side 
management technology as part of the UK’s energy technology research and development 
programme (Section 8.2.3) and/or a shift in public consciousness, where energy consumers 
realise they have the potential to assume control over how they fulfil their energy needs. 
Having addressed these research questions we now turn to our overarching research question: 
What role could the development and adoption of the Energy Service Company (ESCo) 
business model play in the transition to a sustainable UK energy system?  
In recent years the ESCos’ selection environment has radically improved, helping many existing 
ESCos to scale-up their activities and serving to encourage new entrants across different 
sectors to enter the UK ESCo market, most notably the UK energy system’s incumbent Energy 
Utility companies. Looking forward, this pattern is expected to continue, considering that the 
majority of the emerging developments this research identified are set to support the activities 
of the various different ESCo variants. Many of these emerging developments can be 
considered beyond the control of the ESCo population, such as climate change or rising energy 
prices. However, as the fitness between the ESCo model and its selection environment 
improves and the model gains traction, the causal influence of the ESCo population on the 
wider UK energy system is expected to increase, which could in turn help to cultivate a more 
favourable selection environment for the ESCo model. Positive feedbacks, similar to those that 
have helped the Energy Utilities to rise to dominance, are expected to play a particularly 
important role in cultivating a favourable selection environment for ESCos, as illustrated in 
(Sections 7 & 8). In summary, our research broadly supports the view extended by Sorrell 
(2005) and Foxon (2012) that the ESCo model is likely to play a prominent role in the transition 
to a sustainable UK energy system, which raises questions around the lack of attention 
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policymakers have paid to the ESCo model to date as a means of facilitating this transition 
(Section 7.2.2). 
Despite this positive outlook for ESCos, we expect a number of key barriers to ESCo operation 
to persist in the future, meaning that although the ESCo model may rise in prominence, it is 
unlikely to replace the EUCo model in near future as the dominant energy business model in 
the UK. This view is supported by the expectation that many of the enabling factors and 
positive feedbacks that have helped the EUCo model to dominate the UK energy system will 
persist (e.g. electricity trading arrangements, energy supply company obligations etc). 
Therefore, we envisage that the Energy Utilities will continue to operate their traditional EUCo 
model for many years to come and are unlikely to make the wholesale transition to the ESCo 
model, even though their energy services divisions are expected to grow. Consequently, the 
EUCo model will continue to play an influential role in shaping the UK energy system’s future.  
It is important to note that the different ESCo variants identified in this thesis, such as the 
Energy Utility Energy Service Provider discussed in the previous paragraph, are likely to enjoy 
varying levels of uptake under the 3 different Transition Pathways envisaged for a low-carbon 
UK electricity system (Foxon, 2012) (Section 8.3). As illustrated by Section 6.2, these different 
ESCo variants differ to some extent with regards to the way in which they influence change in 
the wider energy system. Consequently, a proliferation of one variant over another will have a 
bearing on the manner in which the ESCo population causally influences the evolution of the 
UK energy system and thus the role ESCo play in the sustainability transition. Under the 
Market Rules pathway, where a market-led logic continues to characterise the governance of 
the UK energy system (as it does today), Energy Service Providers and Energy Utility Energy 
Service Providers are most likely to proliferate due to their private-sector structure and 
corporate rationale. Whilst, these organisations are also likely to play a key role in the 
Thousand Flowers pathway, where a civil-society led logic is dominant, Community ESCos are 
likely to proliferate considering that they represent a manifestation of the civil-society logic. 
Finally, in the Central Coordination pathway, where there is significantly greater direct 
government involvement in the governance of the UK energy system, Local Authority ‘Arm’s 
Length’ ESCos are likely to enjoy the greatest degree of growth of the ESCo variants 
considering that they can be controlled by local government.  
In conclusion, we foresee that the development and adoption of the ESCo business model will 
play a key role in the various different envisaged transition pathways to a sustainable UK 
energy system. However, we broadly agree with Sorrel’s (2005) prediction that ‘a wholesale 
shift from commodity to service supply is unlikely’ (p.iv) and that the ESCo model will have to 
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work alongside other business models (e.g. EUCo) and sustainable energy solutions, in the 
transition to a sustainable UK energy system. Importantly, as we emphasised in Section 8.4, 
the role ESCos play in a UK low-carbon transition will very much depend upon how the 
regulatory framework develops over the coming years. Consequently, we outlined a number of 
policy recommendations designed to help the ESCo model achieve wider-scale uptake and thus 
play a more prominent role in a low-carbon transition. These included amongst others changes 
to public sector procurement frameworks, the Landlord Tenant Act, the energy company 
obligations and BETTA, as well as the introduction of standardized energy service contract 
templates, city-level GHG emissions targets and energy service contracting skills programmes. 
10.2 Strengths and Limitations of Analytical Framework and Research 
Strategy 
In this sub-section we briefly consider the strengths and weaknesses of our analytical 
framework (Section 3) before examining those relating to our research strategy (Section 4). 
10.2.1 Analytical Framework 
We argue that applying the 9 business model building blocks framework initially developed by 
Osterwalder (2004) and refined by Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010), provided an effective 
means of uncovering how an ESCo is able to generate income by satisfying their customers 
energy needs and importantly, how this contrasted with the EUCo model employed by the 
incumbent Energy Utilities. Our experience of the framework was that it provided a 
comprehensive account of the system of different components that constitutes a certain type 
of business. However, one recommendation we would make to improve the framework would 
be to incorporate a greater focus on how these various business model components fit 
together to form a coherent and effective system. We find that Osterwalder’s earlier work 
incorporated flows from one business model dimension to another (Osterwalder, 2004) but 
more recent iterations have diluted this focus. At present these building blocks are somewhat 
disconnected and we argue that a greater emphasis on the relationships between these could 
serve to provide greater insight into how the restructuring of one of these blocks (e.g. key 
activities) may trigger changes in other business model blocks (e.g. value proposition). 
Importantly, the framework enabled us to build a sufficiently clear picture of the ESCo model 
to appreciate whether it presents a financially viable means of satisfying our energy needs in a 
sustainable manner by detailing the relationship between the processes of value creation, 
delivery and capture, and the flows of natural and financial resources. In contrast, it helped us 
to appreciate how the EUCo model fails to incentivise Energy Utilities to satisfy their 
customers’ energy needs in a sustainable manner. However, we acknowledge that in order to 
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truly appreciate whether a business model is capable of satisfying one or more human needs 
sustainably, it is important to quantify the value, financial and resource flows associated with 
the model’s operation. Although the business model framework does not exclude 
quantification of these flows, it does not encourage it. Therefore, we argue that the business 
model aspect of our analytical framework would benefit from a greater focus on populating 
the business model using quantitative data (see Section 10.3) to provide deeper insight into 
the economics of firms’ business model (see Sorrell, 2007). 
We concur with Foxon (2011) that one of the key strengths of applying a co-evolutionary 
framework a la Norgaard (1994) is that by incorporating a significant degree of analytical 
separation between the core dimensions of a socio-technical system, one is able to focus 
attention on the causal influences between the various key dimensions that make-up a socio-
technical system (Section 2.3.3.3). Consequently, the framework afforded us the opportunity 
to examine in detail how a population of organisations practicing a novel business model has 
causally influenced the evolution of the core dimensions of a socio-technical system and 
conversely, how these dimensions causally influenced the population practicing this novel 
business model. In comparison, we find that the MLP does not provide this same degree of 
analytical separation between the core dimensions of a socio-technical system, instead 
emphasising the intertwined nature of these dimensions. Importantly, it was felt that the 
analytical separation of these dimensions was particularly helpful in structuring the empirical 
investigation, by ensuring that empirical data was collected that corresponded to the ESCo 
population’s relationship with each key dimension. 
A key strength of our analytical framework was that it afforded us the opportunity to identify 
positive feedback mechanisms that were responsible for locking-in and locking-out business 
models. In contrast, although the ST literature frequently refers to lock-in phenomena, we 
argue that the MLP is not designed for the identification of the positive feedback mechanisms 
responsible for lock-in. Furthermore, we found the framework was particularly useful in 
providing detailed insight into how changes in one dimension may trigger change in another. 
For instance, how emerging institutional developments, such as the Green Deal, or ecosystem 
developments, such as climate change, might influence the evolution of the ESCo and Energy 
Utility populations. Consequently, we support Foxon’s view that the framework could generate 
valuable ‘insight into how decisions made by policy-makers or other actors could affect these 
influences, so as to promote evolution towards more sustainable, low-carbon systems’ 
(p.2262). The framework was also sensitive to how change in one dimension may trigger a 
series of consecutive changes across others dimensions (i.e. a chain effort), which we argue 
contributes to socio-technical transitions. 
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It could be argued that analytically separating the socio-technical system into 5 key 
differentiated dimensions over-simplifies the complexity of socio-technical systems,  
considering the multitude of components that make-up a system such as the UK energy 
system. Furthermore, as emphasised by the socio-technical transitions, Science and 
Technology Studies (STS) and Social Shaping of Technology (SST) literatures, it is both difficult 
and inappropriate to divorce ‘the social’ from ‘the technical’ considering that ‘that science and 
technology are thoroughly social activities’ (Sismondo, 2010 p.11) and vice versa. However, 
having applied the framework to analyse the evidence from our empirical investigation we 
found that the central components of the UK energy system were well accommodated by the 
various dimensions of our analytical framework. In addition, we argue the framework remains 
committed to the view that social and technical components are intertwined by being sensitive 
to how the evolution of both social (e.g. institutions, user practices) and technical (e.g. 
technology) components is shaped by the influence of other social and technical dimensions. 
One of the major criticisms levelled at the MLP is the lack of consideration it gives over to the 
role of political power and agency in shaping socio-technical transitions and consequently, how 
actors’ decisions and the power imbalances between actors shape evolutionary processes such 
as selection and variation (Genus and Coles, 2008, Shove and Walker, 2007, Smith et al., 2005). 
We argue that by distinguishing between populations of incumbent and non-incumbent actors, 
our analytical framework draws attention to the imbalance of power between two populations 
that possess varying degrees of political power. This dynamic is important because populations 
with greater political power and financial might are likely to exert a stronger causal influence 
on the wider socio-technical system, via such means as political lobbying (Murmann, 2003, 
Murmann, 2012, Stenzel and Frenzel, 2008). Consequently, we concur with Foxon (2011) that 
our framework is sensitive to the role of power and importantly the inequalities of power 
amongst market, government or civil society actors, in shaping socio-technical transitions.  
Our analytical framework could be criticised for being too focused on the enabling or inhibiting 
influence that external factors have had on firms’ operating sustainable business models and 
not sufficiently focused on internal factors, such as the firm’s organisational culture and 
structure, as well as their financial resources. However, a number of internal drivers and 
barriers could be drawn from the key resources and partnerships which are required to 
successfully operate the ESCo model (Sections 6.1.1.6 & 6.1.1.7). For instance, the technical 
expertise to provide energy service contracts constitutes a key resource for organisations 
looking to adopt the ESCo model and the absence of such expertise constitutes an important 
internal barrier to doing so. Additionally, our empirical investigation highlighted other internal 
drivers and barriers, particularly as part of the case studies. For example, organisational 
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culture and structure were identified as an internal barrier to Energy Utility X’s adoption of the 
ESCo model (Section 6.2.4.7). 
Finally, it is important to acknowledge that the application of an analytical framework based 
on existing theory can mean the researcher is less sensitive to alternative conceptualizations of 
the phenomena under investigation (Maxwell, 2005). However, we argue that as the extensive 
Literature Review in Section 2 illustrates, this research is sensitive to a broad range of 
approaches capable of explaining socio-technical system change. Consequently, if our co-
evolutionary analytical framework was found to be entirely unrepresentative of our empirical 
evidence then alternative bodies of theory would have been utilised and the analytical 
framework restructured; a process which is encapsulated by our research strategy (Figure 4.3). 
In short, the framework was chosen to fit the observed empirical phenomena. On reflection, 
evidence supported the view that a co-evolutionary relationship existed between the ESCo 
model and the wider UK energy system, thus validating our choice of framework. 
10.2.2 Research Strategy 
Moving away from the analytical framework we now consider some of the strengths and 
weaknesses associated with our research strategy as outlined in our Methodology (Section 4). 
On reflection employing a Straussian Grounded Theory approach to theoretical development 
enabled us to strike a balance between an inductive and deductive research strategy, ensuring 
that the research was informed by existing theory but was also able to advanced existing 
theory by allowing for new theory theoretical insights to emerge from our empirical 
investigation. We also found that the sector-level and case study approaches complemented 
one another well. For example, the sector-level approach provided valuable insight into how 
the ESCo population was evolving in the UK and the factors responsible for this, whilst the case 
study approach helped to corroborate a number of these findings by situating them within the 
context of a particular ESCo’s narrative. Furthermore, the case study approach gave us the 
opportunity to provide additional insight into the key variants of the ESCo population 
identified in the sector-level investigation. Broadly, the interviewee selection, data collection 
and data analysis methods were effective in providing the necessary quantity and quality of 
evidence to address our research questions. 
The research strategy did however have some limitations. Firstly, the breadth and depth of the 
empirical investigation into UK ESCo operation was limited by the modest resources available 
for this research. Consequently, it is possible that important causal mechanisms responsible 
for characterising the evolution of the ESCo population and UK energy system were not 
identified. Secondly, the co-evolutionary causal mechanisms were identified via analysis of 
qualitative data from energy stakeholder interviews and documentary evidence. In both cases, 
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the data collected constituted a representation of an individual or group’s interpretation of 
past, present and future developments in the UK energy system. Although this provided 
valuable insight into the different interpretations actors shared for the same phenomena, it is 
important to note that their accounts may not have been wholly representative of the causal 
mechanisms at play due to factors such as inaccurate recollections of past events and/or the 
difficulty of making sense of the complexity inherent in the UK energy. Thirdly, quantitative 
methods for data collection and analysis could have proved useful in identifying other 
characteristics of the UK ESCo market, such as the value or size of the market. Therefore, 
whilst we believe this research has improved our understanding of how novel business models 
can characterise sustainability transitions, we acknowledge that the research has its 
limitations. This leads us to our final sub-section, which focuses on potential avenues for 
future research. 
10.3 Potential Avenues for Future Research 
Focusing on additional research relating to ESCo operation first, we would recommend that 
future research incorporates a quantitative analysis of the monetary and resource flows 
associated with the operation of the ESCo model in different contexts. This would help us to 
build a more accurate picture of how commercially viable the ESCo model can be and also the 
environmental impact associated with operating the model (e.g. GHG emissions), thus helping 
us to draw more accurate conclusions relating to its sustainability credentials. This could 
incorporate an analysis of how the extent to which the rebound effect typically offsets the GHG 
emissions reductions achieved by the ESCo model, which occurs when their customers choose 
to invest their cost savings in product and/or services with a high carbon-footprint (Section 
2.6.4). Other potential avenues for research include a cross-case comparison of the UK ESCo 
market with markets in other countries (Section 5.5) to improve our understanding of how and 
why the ESCo model has enjoyed varying degrees of success in different socio-technical 
contexts. Finally, we would suggest a more customer-centric analysis of ESCo operation to 
provide insight into why energy consumers have or have not engaged with the ESCo model and 
importantly, what changes might be required to increase customer engagement with ESCos. 
Moving away from the ESCo model, research may also focus on the co-evolutionary 
relationship between populations practicing business models that seek to fulfil multiple human 
needs in a sustainable manner. For example, Multiple Utility Service Companies (MUSCos) 
constitute a single point of supply for multiple utilities (e.g. energy, water, communications, 
waste management etc) and like ESCos, they focus on providing these not as commodities but 
as services (SuRe Infrastructure, 2012). Additional research into the EUCo model may also 
prove insightful. As emphasised in Section 6.1.2 (Footnote 26), even though the EUCo 
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incorporates a volume sales driver, this does not necessarily translate into the unsustainable 
fulfilment of consumers’ energy needs. This is because Utilities could in theory source their 
electricity from low-carbon, secure and affordable sources of energy. Consequently, we 
recommend additional research into the changes to the structure of the EUCo model and the 
Utilities’ wider socio-technical environment that might encourage the Energy Utilities to move 
towards renewable sources of energy instead of carbon intensive fossil fuels. 
The analytical framework developed and applied in this thesis could also be applied to provide 
insight into the co-evolutionary relationship between other forms of sustainable business 
models, operating in other types of socio-technical system (e.g. water, waste, transport etc). 
We suggest that research would be most revealing if the system in question featured an 
unsustainable business model that represented the dominant means of creating, delivering 
and capturing value, in a similar fashion to the EUCo model and the UK energy system. For 
example, the research could focus on the transport sector and examine the reasons why use-
oriented (e.g. car leasing, pooling and sharing schemes) and result-oriented (e.g. ‘pay-per-km’) 
business models for private transportation occupy a relatively small market share in 
comparison to the product-oriented ‘Fordism’ business model employed by the majority of the 
major vehicle manufacturers (e.g. General Motors, VW, Nissan etc), which predominantly 
focuses on the sale of vehicles as products, in conjunction with a handful of basic services (e.g. 
warranty, maintenance packages etc) (Wells, 2006, Williams, 2007).  
Finally, turning to additional research in relation to our analytical framework, we would 
suggest that the other dimensions of the coevolutionary framework (e.g. institutions, 
technologies etc) are ‘opened up’ in a similar way to how the business model dimension was 
opened up as part of this research, by using Osterwalder & Pigneur’s (Osterwalder and 
Pigneur, 2010) framework for business model characterisation. Doing so would provide a more 
detailed picture of which components make up these system dimensions, allowing for a more 
accurate analysis of how bi-directional causal mechanisms between dimensions have causally 
influenced their evolution, specifically the processes of variation, selection and retention. For 
example, with a clearer understanding of the different types of technology that make up the 
technology dimension in an energy system, we could more accurately identify the emergence 
of new technological innovations (variation), chart how these innovations have fared in the 
prevailing selection environment (selection) and the extent to which the characteristics of 
these technological innovations have been retained in the design of future technological 
innovations (retention).
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12 Appendices 
12.1 Appendix A: A Section of Osterwalder & Pigneur’s Business Model Canvas 
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12.2 Appendix B: An Extract from a Coded Interview 
Extract of Interview (H 2) used in Honeywell Case Study 
M – In terms of the solutions that you offer, is it largely what I would 
term demand-side, the lighting and the various technologies that 
convert energy into what the customer really wants. 
J – We do three things mainly. The first is generation, like CHP or tri-
gen. We can integrate and provide renewables but we don’t 
specifically sell them as part of our offering.  
We do look at the demand side by putting in efficient kit but then 
we also go one step further and provide active demand 
management. So I may have efficient demand management in the 
building but if it is not active, then I may still be wasting energy 
because I am not managing the usage of those assets based on the 
individual requirements of the building from day to day. As the 
occupancy levels rise and fall I can actually have minute-by-minute 
or hour-by-hour active demand management that gives me a 
number of savings over above having kit that uses energy efficiently. 
We also engage with behavioural management, working with the 
users of the building and typically by getting them to participate in 
efficient interaction with the building you can get between 6 and 
10% additional savings 
M –Looking to the future, how do you see the market developing 
considering the various emerging developments? 
J – It is still a mate market and there are still some challenges we 
face. I can really start to see the market is maturing and we will start 
to see a greater number of EPCs progressing.  
An EPC will still take between 12-24 months from absolute start to 
signing the contract. It just takes that long, even in the US where the 
market is much more mature.  
We have got a recognition that EPC for the public sector is currently 
the best way to go. People have different understandings of what an 
EPC and an ESCo is.  
Overall we are starting to see a conversion to a common 
understanding which is required to mature a market.  
Coding Categories 
 
 
 
Business model characteristics  -  Key 
Activities 
 Installation and management of 
primary conversion equipment 
 
 
 Installation and management of 
secondary conversion 
equipment and building 
controls 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Behavioural management 
 
 
Future Drivers & Barriers  -  Drivers 
 Maturation of ESCo Market 
Strengths & Weaknesses of  Business 
Model  -  Weaknesses 
 Long Sale & Procurement 
Process 
Business model characteristics  -  
Customer Segments 
 Public sector organisations 
Current Drivers & Barriers  -  Barriers 
 Lack of common understanding 
of ESCo model 
Current Drivers & Barriers  -  Drivers 
 Growing common 
understanding of ESCo model 
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12.3 Appendix C: Historical Structure of the UK electricity sector 
 Nationalised Privatised Liberalised 
Generation - Central Electricity 
- Generating Board 
- (CEGB) 
- South of Scotland 
- Electricity Board 
(SSEB) 
- North of Scotland 
Hydro- 
- Electric Board 
(NSHEB) 
- Northern Ireland 
- Electricity Board 
- National Power 
- PowerGen 
- Nuclear Electric 
(publicly owned 
until 1996 when 
privatised as British 
Energy) 
- Scottish Hydro-
Electric 
- Scottish Power 
- Northern Ireland 
Electricity 
- (privatised in 1992) 
30 major power producers 
in the UK. The largest of 
these include: 
- E.On 
- Scottish Power 
- EDF Energy 
- Scottish & Southern 
- Centrica 
- Drax 
- GDF Suez 
- RWE Npower 
Transmission - CEGB 
- SSEB 
- NSHEB 
- NIEB 
- National Grid 
Company 
- Scottish Hydro-
Electric 
- Scottish Power 
- Northern Ireland 
Electricity 
- National Grid  
- ScottishPower 
- Scottish & Southern 
- Northern Ireland 
Electricity 
Distribution - 12 Area Boards in 
England and Wales 
- SSEB 
- NSHEB 
- NIEB 
- 12 Regional 
Electricity 
Companies in 
England and Wales 
- Scottish Hydro-
Electric 
- Scottish Power 
- Northern Ireland 
Electricity 
Nine companies now run 
the 14 distribution 
networks in England, 
Scotland and Wales: 
- Scottish Power, 
- Scottish & Southern 
- Northern Power Grid 
- UK Power Networks 
- Western Power 
Distribution 
- Electricity North West 
- Northern Ireland 
Electricity 
- GTC 
- Inexus 
Supply - 12 Area Boards in 
- England and Wales 
- SSEB 
- NSHEB 
- NIEB 
- 12 Regional 
Electricity 
- Companies in 
England and 
- Wales 
- Scottish Hydro-
Electric 
- Scottish Power 
- Northern Ireland 
Electricity 
Over 70 licensed suppliers 
but market dominated by 
six companies: 
- EDF Energy  
- Npower 
- ScottishPower 
- Scottish & Southern 
- E.On 
- Centrica 
Table 12.1 Market structure of the UK electricity sector during periods of nationalisation, privatisation 
and liberalisation (adapted from Pond, 2006)
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12.4 Appendix E: Phase 1 – Sector-Level Interviewees 
Phase 1a 
Job Title Firm Type ESC or 
EPC  
Sector Date Interview 
Reference 
CEO Local Authority ‘Arm’s Length’ 
ESCo 
- Third 
 
22/7/2010 A1 
Head of Environment Unit Local Authority - Public 22/7/2010 A2 
Director Biomass Supplier & ESCo ESC Private 9/8/2011 A3 
Principal Designer & Energy 
Engineer 
Local Authority ESC Public 11/8/2010 A4 
Head of New Energy and 
Power Research 
Investment Company ESC & 
EPC 
Private 17/9/2010 A5 
Sustainability Project Manager Property Developer & ESCo ESC Third 17/9/2010 A6 
Senior Research Fellow University  EPC Public 21/9/2010 A7 
Head of Community Energy Energy Utility ESC Private 18/10/2010 A8 
Head of Sustainable 
Development 
Local Authority - Public 19/10/2010 A9 
Head Of Energy Efficiency & 
Environmental Care 
ESCo EPC Private 8/12/2010 A10 
Associate Director Low-carbon Energy Consultancy ESC & 
EPC 
Private 17/1/2011 A11 
Phase 1b 
Committee member; 
Professor 
Community ESCo 
University 
- Third 
Public  
8/7/2011  B12 
Partner Low-carbon Agricultural Think 
Tank 
- Third 12/7/2011 B13 
Partner Law Firm ESC Private  13/7/2011  B14 
Energy Solutions Marketing & 
Strategy Director   
Energy Services Provider ESCo EPC Private  13/7/2011  B15 
Finance Director Energy Services Provider ESCo EPC Private  14/7/2011  B16 
Director of Sustainable Energy 
Finance 
Big 5 Bank EPC Private  20/7/2011  B17 
Director Energy Services Provider ESCo EPC & 
ESC 
Private  20/7/2011 B18 
Emergent Technology 
Specialist  
Energy Utility Company Owned 
ESCo 
ESC Private  21/7/2011  B19 
Sustainability Director Energy Services Provider ESCo  EPC Private  21/7/2011  B20 
Associate District Heat and Electricity 
Association 
ESC Third  22/7/2011 B21 
Manager Arms Length Local Authority 
Owned ESCo 
ESC Public  4/8/2011 B22 
Chairman; 
Architect; 
Professor 
Community ESCo 
Architecture Firm 
University 
ESC Third  9/8/2011 B23 
Partner Law Firm ESC & 
EPC 
Private 15/8/2011 B24 
Head of Environment & Project 
Leader of Energy Services 
Procurement Framework 
Regional Development Agency EPC Public  15/8/2011 B25 
Policy Advisor Government Department of 
Energy & Climate Change 
- Public  16/8/2011 B26 
Director of Community Energy ESCo Division of Energy Utility - Private  22/9/2011 B27 
Product Development and 
Energy Services Manager 
ESCo Division of Energy Utility EPC  Private  28/9/2011 B28 
Chief economist and Head of 
Fair markets 
Consumer Oriented Think Tank - Third  10/10/2011 B29 
Director  ESCo ESC & 
EPC 
Private  11/1/2011 B30 
Knowledge Transfer 
Partnership Associate  
ESCo & University ESC & 
EPC 
Private  31/1/2012 B31 
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12.5 Appendix F: Phase 2 - Case Study Interviewees 
Case Study Type of 
ESCo 
Variant 
Dates Interview 
Number 
Job Title 
Thameswey Local 
Authority 
Arm’s 
Length ESCo 
10/1/2012 T 1 Chief Executive of Woking Borough 
Council 
10/1/2012 T 2 Thameswey Limited Group 
Managing Director 
Energy Utility X Energy 
Utility ESCo 
Division 
22/9/2011 X 1* (B 27 
in Phase 1) 
Business Development Director of 
Community Energy Division 
16/1/2012 X 2 Director of Business Development 
Public Services in Community Energy 
Division 
19/1/2012 X 3 Head of Energy Solutions 
24/1/2012 X 4 Business Development Manager in 
Community Energy Division 
1/2/1012 X 5 Senior Business Manager 
Commercial Energy Division 
Meadowside 
Energy Services 
Company (MOZES) 
Community 
Owned and 
Run ESCo 
 9/8/2011 M 1* (B23 
in Phase 1) 
Former Chair of MPT & Meadows 
Resident 
2/2/2012 M 2 Director of MPT & Meadows 
Resident 
 7/2/2012 M 3 MPT Trust Accountant 
 9/2/2012 M 4 Chair of Meadows Partnership Trust 
(MPT) & Meadows Resident 
Honeywell Independent 
Energy 
Services 
Provider 
13/7/2011 H 1* (B 15 
in Phase 1) 
Marketing & Strategy Director  
3/4/2012 H 2 General Manager 
4/5/2012 H 3 Business Development Manager  
22/5/2012 H 4 General Manager 
* This denotes interviews conducted in Phase 1 but used as evidence to develop the case studies 
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12.6 Appendix G – A List of ESCos Operating in the UK 
Energy Service Providers Local Authority ‘Arm’s 
Length’ ESCos 
Community ESCos 
ESCos Offering ESCs 
- Alpheon Energy 
- A Shade Greener 
- BioRegionalQuintain 
- Carillion Energy 
- Cofely GDF Suez 
- Cynergin 
- Dalkia (Veolia) 
- Direct Solar Power 
- Due South Energy 
- Dulas 
- EcoCentroGen 
- Econergy 
- Ecovision  
- Energy U Go Green 
- Engensa 
- EnerG Switch 2 
- Evo Energy 
- Freesource 
- Freetricity 
- Green Dimension 
- Green Energy Power 
Solutions 
- Green Nation 
- Greenrock 
- HI Say Solar  
- Highland Wood Energy 
- HOBESCO 
- Home Sun 
- Imperative Energy 
- ISIS Solar 
- My Energy Station 
- MyLincolnshire Renewable  
- Pureglo/Land Energy 
- PV Solar UK 
- Reflex Energy 
- Regeneco (Galiford Try) 
- Schneider Electric 
- Solar Capital 
- Solar Eclipse 
- Solar Solutions 
- Solvis Energy Solutions 
- Scottish & Southern Energy 
Utility Solutions* 
- Street Energy 
- Susenco 
- Stroma 
- Thames Energy Ltd 
- Titanic Mill Energy Services Ltd 
- Touch Solar 
- Vital Energy 
ESCos Offering EPCs 
- Anesco 
- Brookfield Green 
- DC21 
- EDF* 
- Envido 
- GSH  
- Honeywell  
- RENU 
- Schneider Electric 
- Siemens 
 
ESCos Offering Both ESCs & 
EPCs 
- British Gas* 
- E.On UK Energy Services 
Limited* 
- Font Energy 
- Johnson Controls 
- MITIE 
- nPower Business Energy 
Services* 
- Self Energy 
- Aberdeen Heat & Power 
- Enviroenergy 
- Thameswey Energy 
- Birmingham Energy 
Savers 
 
- MOZES 
- Kielder Community 
Enterprises 
- Woodhope Dome 
Community Woodfuel 
- Eskdale ESCo 
- Chale Community 
Project 
 
NOTE: The ESCos listed 
here were identified as part 
of the Phase 1 empirical 
investigation during the 
interviewee selection 
process. Information to 
verify that they met the 
ESCo Selection Criteria in 
Section 4.3.2.3 was sourced 
via the companies’ website 
and/or interviewees. The 
information is accurate as 
of 1/12/2011. Companies 
marked with an * have 
traditionally operated as 
Energy Utilities 
 
